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Abstract 
My research focused on understanding how viceregal authority was accepted in 
Mesoamerica. Rather than approaching the problems from the perspective of institutional 
history, I drew on prosopographical techniques and the court-studies tradition to focus on 
the practice of government and the affinities that bound indigenous and non-indigenous 
political communities. In Chapters two and three I investigate how particular notions of 
nobility informed the ‘ideals of life’ of the Spanish and indigenous elites in New Spain and 
how these evolved up to 1535. The chapters also serve to establish a general context to the 
political situation that Mendoza faced on his arrival.   
Chapters four to seven explore how the viceroys sought to increase their authority in New 
Spain by appropriating means of direct distribution of patronage and how this allowed them 
personally to satisfy many of the demands of the Spanish and indigenous elites. This helped 
them impose their supremacy over New Spain’s magnates and serve the crown by ruling 
more effectively. Viceregal supremacy was justified in a ‘language of legitimacy’ that 
became increasingly peculiar to New Spain as a community of interests developed between 
the local elites and the viceroys who guaranteed the local political arrangements on which 
their status and wealth increasingly depended.  
I conclude by suggesting that New Spain was governed on the basis of internal 
arrangements guaranteed by the viceroys. This led to the development of what I define as a 
‘parasitic civic-nobility’ which benefitted from the perpetuation of the viceregal system 
along with the crown. The internal political logic of most decision making and a defined local 
identity accompanied by increasingly ‘sui generis’ ‘ideals of life’ qualify New Spain to be 
considered not as a ‘colony’ run by an alien bureaucracy that perpetuated Spanish 
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Terms, names, monetary units, abbreviations and acronyms 
 
All translations are my own unless otherwise stated.  
All names and terms in a language other than English are rendered italicised and can be 
found in the Glossary. I have rendered the most familiar Spanish terms in their original 
language because they are relatively uniform and more familiar. The variety of different 
Mesoamerican linguistic and cultural groups within New Spain, on the other hand, 
encouraged me to translate many terms into English. This allowed me to simplify the variety 
of terms and generalise about specific subjects without favouring a particular linguistic or 
cultural tradition and for the sake of clarity. The most obvious and recurrent example is the 
various types of basic political units of Mesoamerica, like the Nahua altepetl or Mixtec ñuu, 
which I have rendered as ‘polities’ composed of ‘districts’ (eg. calpolli in Nahuatl). I refer to 
the head of a ‘polity’ as a ‘prince’ and the head of a ‘district’ as a ‘lord’ to distinguish them 
from other ‘noblemen’ that formed the elites of the polities. 
For ease of comparison I have decided to convert all monetary terms (including cacao) into 
ducats (d), according to the methodology in my ‘Appendix B’.  
 
AGI Archivo General de Indias 
CDI Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y 
colonización de las posesiones españolas en América y Oceanía, sacados en su mayor 
parte del Real Archivo de Indias (Nendeln : Kraus reprint, 1964-1966 Reproduccion 
facsimilar de la edición de Madrid, 1864-1884) 
CJV Cartas del Licenciado Jerónimo de Valderrama Y Otros Documentos Sobre su Visita al 
Gobierno de Nueva España. 1563-1565 José Porrúa e Hijos, Sucesores eds., (Mexico, 
1961) 
ENE  Epistolario de Nueva España F. del Paso y Troncoso (Mexico, 1939-1942) 
SP Las Siete Partidas del Sabio Rey don Alfonso el X, G. López ed., Vol.1, (Barcelona, 
1843).   
VEA Los Virreyes Españoles en América Durante El Gobierno de la Casa de Austria Vol.1, 
L.. Hanke, ed., (Madrid, 1976) 
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Part I: Introduction 
 
Historiographical background 
Spain’s American empire has been characterised as remarkable for being the first 
‘overseas’ empire that was also ‘territorial’ rather than purely ‘commercial’. Furthermore 
unlike other contemporary ‘territorial’ empires it was not contiguous with the metropolis; 
the ecosystems it spanned were unprecedentedly diverse and unfamiliar; and the cultures it 
encompassed were alien and remote. These peculiarities have focused the attention of 
historians on how Spaniards acquired such an empire and then how they were able to keep 
and govern it.  
The extraordinary aspects of Spain’s empire and its formation at the crest of ‘the 
Renaissance’ have shaped the prevalent understanding of how it was governed. The 
administration of Spain’s overseas dominions has been identified as an essential 
manifestation of the early-modern project of state building - Europe’s answer to the 
contemporary ‘bureaucratic’ empires of Asia and a precursor of the European imperialism 
that followed. As a result most historians have focused on the institutions of colonial 
government. ‘By 1600 the machine was installed, huge beyond precedent, blemished here 
and there with ad hoc parts, full of frictions making it creak and groan; but undeniably 
running…the growth of [Spain’s] American empire can properly be seen as a remarkable 
outcome of that concentration of power achieved in Spain by Isabella and Ferdinand in the 
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last quarter of the fifteenth century and reinforced by Charles V and Philip II.’1  This view has 
been increasingly tempered with provisos, but the image of a modern bureaucratic 
‘machine’ operating the Spanish Empire in the Americas, accompanied by a corpus of 
legislation, trailblazing the path to the modern state, persists: 
…the crown, starting from scratch, was better placed than in the Iberian 
Peninsula, with its accretion of historic municipal privileges and corporate rights, 
to create a system of government directly dependent on imperial control. If the 
‘modernity’ of the modern state is defined in terms of its possession of 
institutional structures capable of conveying the commands of a central 
authority to distant localities, the government of colonial Spanish America was a 
more ‘modern’ state than the government of Spain, or indeed of that of almost 
every Early Modern European state.2  
The emphasis on institutional structures has led to a circular explanation in which 
the very modernity of bureaucratic government allowed the crown to govern its remote 
domains. ‘The most obvious tool of domination was the administrative apparatus that Spain 
began installing in America within years of Columbus’ first arrival’ wrote Peter Bakewell ‘…In 
Mexico, officialdom was sufficiently rooted barely a decade after the conquest for the 
encomenderos’ role as representatives of colonial power to become redundant.’ He goes on 
to sketch the rise of bureaucracy through the removal of Cortés from supreme office in New 
Spain to the appointment of an audiencia and the employment of corregidores, ‘the salaried 
administrators of local, rural districts’ and finally the appointment of a viceroy in 1535: ‘Now 
the essentials of a bureaucratic panoply were in place.’ 3  
                                                     
1
 P. Bakewell ‘Conquest after Conquest’, in Spain Europe and the Atlantic World: Essays in honour of J.H. Elliott. 
R.L. Kagan and Geoffrey Parker eds. (Cambridge, 1995) p.314. 
2
 J.H.Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830 (Yale, 2006), p. 127. 
3
 P. Bakewell, ‘Conquest after Conquest’ in Spain Europe and the Atlantic World …., pp.296-315. 
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The work of legal theorists has been employed to support the notion of that a legal 
framework was drawn up by Spanish imperial administrators to govern their colonies in the 
fashion of a ‘modern’ state with a well-defined bureaucracy: Vasco de Puga’s Provisiones, 
cédulas, instrucciones para el gobierno de la Nueva España of 1563 is perhaps the earliest 
example of this emphasis followed in 1571 by Juan de Ovando’s attempt at collating all the 
laws and ordinances of the Americas following his visita of the council of the Indies- a 
project that tellingly was not completed until over a century later. In the meantime works 
like Solórzano y Pereira’s Política Indiana of 1647 attempted to describe the political and 
legal theory of the Spanish administration in New Spain. 
The sheer volume of papers that survive in imperial archives, including royal 
instructions and the meticulous records of judicial proceedings, has been cited as evidence 
for the preponderance of Spain’s bureaucracy. They exemplify the degree of control that 
bureaucrats in Madrid seemed willing and often able to exert.  
...justice was the preserve of royally appointed bureaucrats; ecclesiastical 
patronage was in the king’s hands. The administration aspired to regulate the 
most minute details of the lives of its subjects in Manila and Michoacán, 
down to the weight of the burdens that native labourers were allowed to 
carry and the identity of individuals allowed to wear swords in the street. 
With the exception of a few states of broadly feudal character and some 
ecclesiastical ‘peculiars’ where the rights of the Crown were effectively 
farmed out to religious orders, the overseas empire was run, with all the 
distortions and inefficiencies that derived from the intractability of time and 
space, from Madrid.4 
 
                                                     
4
 F.F.R. Fernández-Armesto ‘The Improbable Empire’ in Spain: A History, R. Carr ed. (Oxford, 2000), p.126. 
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A New Approach 
I have found it useful to adopt Timothy E. Anna’s concept of ‘authority’ and his 
accompanying definitions of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘power’ at the fall of royal government in 
Mexico City as the framework for understanding the origins of royal government in 
Mesoamerica:  
…authority is not power but the foundation of power. Much less is it “the 
established government” or “the authorities” for an established government 
may lose its authority to an opponent or another force without its 
immediately being clear to observers that this transition has occurred… 
Authority as used in this study is thus similar to the more widely recognised 
term legitimacy but somewhat broader… [but] “authority is not ‘legitimate 
power’ as is often claimed, for legitimate power may be without authority a 
situation which arises in the approach to a revolution”… [authority] is the 
right to possess sovereignty, the right to govern. It is thus based upon the 
ability of the established authority to prove to the governed its right to 
continue governing them.5 
The novelty and singularity of Spain’s empire, in particular its remoteness from the 
metropolis with its coercive power, make the establishment of authority the crucial variable 
in the creation and maintenance of the Spanish empire.  ‘The fact that the system is 
accepted rather than imposed helps to distinguish an authoritarian regime from a regime of 
force. In the Spanish political formula, the basic ingredient was acceptance, not violence.’6 
Without acceptance the Spanish empire did not have the resources or the power to impose 
its will: ‘the regime collapsed with a suddenness that appears all the more stunning when 
                                                     
5
 T. E. Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government in Mexico City, (Nebraska, 1978) xiv. 
6
 Ibid. xv.  
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viewed in the context of its newly revived strength. I believe the explanation of this paradox 
is that the Spanish imperial system and idea lost its authority.’7  
If authority was the crucial element in the survival of the Spanish regime after 300 
years, it was even more important at its inception. Paraphrasing Anna and reading back the 
implications of his conclusion, my starting point will be that the Spanish regime became 
established with a suddenness that appears all the more stunning when considering the 
small numbers and comparative weakness of the few thousand Spanish immigrants in 
Mesoamerica during the early to mid-sixteenth century. I believe the explanation for the 
paradox is that viceregal government rapidly gained acceptance of its authority from the 
elites of New Spain.  
With few notable exceptions, by 1568 most of the generation that had experienced 
the conquest of Tenochtitlan as adults were dead or inactive. Successors to the Spanish 
conquistadores had all but given up hope of feudal lordship, titles or even perpetual 
encomienda holdings in their line after the tragic results of the instability following Velasco’s 
death. The once zealous members of the mendicant orders were entering a period of 
disillusion caused by the suspicions and suppressions of their authority by the dictates of the 
Council of Trent and jealous Spanish officials combined with frustrations regarding the 
progress of their evangelic mission. The indigenous elite was in the middle of a thirty year 
period of demographic stability, strong government and relative prosperity but the 
enthusiasm of the first generation of lords for engagement with the mendicant and 
viceregal culture exemplified in the careers, writings and crusading zeal of alumni of elite 
                                                     
7




colleges like Tlatelolco was beginning to wane along with mendicant enthusiasm and 
funding for their academic institutions. The great magnates had gone but the viceroys had 
failed to establish their own official perpetuity of government over New Spain. Debates 
about the continuation of viceregal government seemed settled and official viceregal 
powers were even increased but no subsequent viceroy would rule as long as the first two. 
In terms of legislation the chaotic ‘formative period’ up to 1568 was being replaced with ‘a 
complete revision of the imperial administration of New Spain’8 under viceroys Martín 
Enríquez in New Spain and Francisco de Toledo in Peru, echoing similar previous 
retrenchments in Europe,9 and inaugurating a period of legislative ‘consolidation’.  In short, 
although continuities outweighed the discontinuities, 1568 feels like the end of a period.   
To understand how viceregal authority became established I have concentrated on 
how the viceroys governed in practice rather than on the creation or development of 
institutions. In this regard my approach is indebted to the methodology of historians of 
Tudor government who sought new departures away from the previous emphasis on 
institutional history that had dominated their field.10  As we have seen Spanish 
administration of her American colonies has been held up to be essentially and consciously 
different from what had preceded it, like Elton’s Tudor ‘revolution in government’.  The new 
approach pioneered by Penry Williams ‘[w]ithout ignoring the institutional 
framework…concentrated on describing the ways in which government actually worked, the 
                                                     
8
 A.F. García-Abasolo, Martín Enríquez y la Reforma de 1568 en Nueva Espana (Seville, 1983)  ‘Introduction’. 
p.12 
9
 J. Hernando Sánchez, Castilla y Napoles en el siglo XVI. El Virrey Pedro de Toledo Linaje Estado y Cultura 
(1532-1553), (Castilla y Leon, Valladolid? 1994), pp.197-8. 
10
 P. Williams, The Tudor Regime, (Oxford 1979), p. vii.   
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people who ran it the impact that it made upon society, and the reason for its survival: in 
short… processes not structures.’ This approach was carried forward by others like David 
Starkey who explored the operations of ‘courtly’ government and developed notions like 
that of ‘representation through intimacy’ that I have found particularly useful.11  
My approach has also been prosopographical and has focused on the political 
motivations of both Spanish and indigenous actors (who have been particularly side-lined in 
the ‘structural’ approach) in order to uncover who benefitted from the developing political 
arrangements and how these operated in practice to govern New Spain. In addition I have 
traced the developing benchmarks of legitimacy that motivated, guided and interpreted the 
expectations and actions of the ‘political nation’ of New Spain. The interaction between the 
practice of government, benchmarks of legitimacy and the individual political interests that 
sustained them was dynamic: viceregal authority both guided and was formed by political 
developments; consequently the subject (and the period in general) awaits a chronological 
narrative treatment. That proved unfeasible within the bounds of a doctoral thesis. I present 
here what I hope will be a useful guideline for such a project in the future, and a new 
description of the nature of Spain’s empire over Mesoamerica.  
Viceregal regimes present their own particular problems that historians of royal 
governments don’t have to contend with. Firstly, viceroys were not sovereign and were 
bound by legal restraints, competing authorities within New Spain and the need to justify 
their actions to the king; but they were clearly not bureaucrats either. They were sent to 
rule an artificial political entity called the ‘kingdom of New Spain’ that was theoretically a 
                                                     
11
 Eg. The English Court from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War, David Starkey, ed. (New York 1987), 
passim  esp. pp.82-3.  
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sub-kingdom of Castile, like Granada rather than aeque principaliter like Naples, but 
operating in practice under more (and developing) exceptions than by Castilian norms. I use 
throughout the concept of ‘two audiences’ as judging the actions of the viceroys and other 
power-brokers: the crown in Spain on the one hand and the elites of New Spain on the 
other. The verdicts of one affected the perceptions of the other so that ideally both had to 
be kept content.  
Works like Ronald Syme’s The Roman Revolution provide useful analogous examples: 
Edward Gibbon gave Augustus the epithet ‘that subtle tyrant’ and in a sense Syme’s book is 
an attempt to unravel and explain that subtlety which allowed Octavian to transform the 
limits and the meaning of the ancient Republican offices and titles he held for his political 
ends and ‘auctoritas’. Syme explored how Octavian/Augustus, was able to co-opt and at 
times coerce the individualistic and fiercely competitive Roman elite into peacefully 
accepting his de facto, if not de jure monarchy despite the proud republican traditions and 
sense of aristocratic dignitas  that had already caused a bloody and deeply divisive civil war. 
Syme’s aims inevitably led him to investigate the links between the ‘imperial family’ and the 
power-brokers of Rome. His study focused on the strategic links of dependence or 
patronage, marriage and friendship with which Augustus tied the Roman elite to his 
agendas and linked their fortunes with his own, while concealing it behind a veil of political 
legitimacy expressed in art, architecture and literature. Augustus became the indispensable 
keystone of this unofficial and subtle structure of alliances. ‘In all ages, whatever the form 
and name of government, be it monarchy, republic, or democracy, an oligarchy lurks behind 
the façade; and Roman history, republican or imperial is the history of the governing class’.12 
                                                     
12
 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, (Oxford, 1960), p.7. 
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Seen from this perspective, the distribution of titles and ‘bureaucratic’ offices up for grabs in 
the Roman Empire gain a meaning which transcends the apparent roles and responsibilities 
that they describe.Instead they become part of an often deadly competition for power 
mediated by the person of the linchpin princeps.  
 Nicolai Rubinstein’s The Government of Florence Under the Medici similarly serves 
to explain the hegemony of a single family within a republic whose institutions were 
designed specifically to avoid such a monopoly of power. Rubinstein concentrated on the 
electoral records of the Florentine republic ‘to uncover the mechanisms by which citizens 
with the same status as everyone else wielded such influence’13. He ascertained this by 
finding out who these people were and where they fitted into Florentine society and the 
Medici networks. Like the princeps, the head of the Medici family in Florence came to be 
acknowledged as the mediator of power internally and internationally: from blessing 
Florentine marriages to dealing personally with envoys of other states the first citizen 
became indispensable to the operation of the Florentine state.  
Although the origin and nature of viceregal government in New Spain differs in 
fundamental ways from either ancient Rome or fifteenth-century Florence, there are 
conceptual similarities that make these areas of study at least comparable. The most 
obvious connection is that in all three cases the power that individuals wielded surpassed 
the strictly defined legal limits of their station. In all three cases certain individuals achieved 
a supremacy over their fellow competitors for power by exploiting the ambiguities of the 
                                                     
13
 N. Rubinstein The government of Florence under the Medici 1434-1494, OUP 1997 (2
nd
 edition), introduction.  
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systems they operated in by ‘elbowing’ their way to a position of indispensability ahead of 
competing claimants.14  
Little has been written on American viceregal courts in the sixteenth century, even 
less on their use in governing New Spain, while political or administrative history generally 
has long been out of fashion. An indirect route to understanding the importance of the 
court in the Spanish world generally has been through works on Iberian courts such as 
Instituciones y élites de poder en la monarquía hispana durante el siglo XVI edited by José 
Martínez Millán.15  Although none of the articles in the book relates directly to New Spain 
there is much useful discussion of how to identify and look for the often obscure webs of 
clients and mutual dependence within a sixteenth-century Hispanic court; the vocabulary of 
court power and patronage and a certain culture of service in particular were replicated in 
New Spain.  
For New Spain, interest in this field, though nascent, seems to be growing. As early 
as the 1974 collection of essays New Approaches to Latin American History16 the 
contributions of Stuart B Schwartz on ‘State and society in colonial Spanish America: an 
opportunity for prosopography’ and Margaret E. Crahan on Spanish American counterpoint: 
problems and possibilities in Spanish colonial administrative history laid out the 
bibliographical panorama and pointed to many of the avenues that historians could pursue 
in exploring the non-institutional aspects of the Spanish administration in the Americas. 
                                                     
14
 Eg. N. Elias The civilising process, (Oxford 1994), p.335ff. 
15
 Eg. J. Martínez Millán (ed.) Instituciones y élites de poder en al monarquía hispana durante el siglo XVI,  
(Madrid, 1992). 
16
 New Approaches to Latin American history, R. Graham & P.H. Smith eds., (Texas 1974).  
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Amongst other suggestions a prosopographical approach was advocated to help illuminate 
bonds of kinship and patronage; the importance of Spanish law in the creation of colonial 
society; the influence of bureaucratic corruption and the role of the viceroy’s court. These 
proposals have been followed up sporadically and seem to have aroused some scholarly 
interest, which has been recently outlined in the 2002 write-up of the international 
congress, held in Toledo: El Gobierno de un Mundo- Virreinatos y Audiencias de la América 
hispánica.17 Of most relevance was Pilar Latasa’s contribution ‘La Corte Virreinal Peruana’ 
which provides a useful description of the historiographical development of this field which 
she traces back to the work of Norbert Elias’s The Court Society through works like Ronald G. 
Asch and, Adolf M. Birke (eds.) Princes, Patronage, and the nobility: The Court at the 
beginning of the modern age. However as Latasa points out, the viceregal courts were a 
special case that differed in important respects from better established and sovereign 
courts in Europe, as well as the other European courts under Hapsburg sovereignty: ‘the 
courts of New Spain and Peru were the only courts in the composite monarchy that were a 
new creation’. Little has been done with regards to the direct study of viceregal courts of 
Mexico and Lima, the bibliography she provides is of useful tangential studies on specific 
issues related to patronage. Nevertheless a set of aims and methodology has gained 
acceptance. In summary these are: a reconstruction of the viceroy’s client networks; an 
analysis of the power relations between the viceroys and colonial administrative 
institutions; the design of a system of representation of power and finally the ‘configuration 
of a space of influence and artistic patronage’.18 The need to lay out specific aims for this 
                                                     
17
 P. Latasa ‘la corte virreinal Peruana’ in El gobierno de un mundo- virreinatos y audiencias de la américa 
hispánica. Feliciano Barrios coord., (Castilla-La Mancha, 2004). 
18
 Ibid. p. 345 and pp.347-9. 
18 
 
field, however, illustrates how little has been done and how much is open to investigation. 
Useful biographical studies exist, but no extant work has sought a comprehensive 
description of the establishment and extension of viceregal power through the perspective 
of the court and client-patron relationships.  
Ethelia Ruiz Medrano’s Reshaping New Spain19 comes closest to a study of viceregal 
government using the methodology proposed by Latasa. Her work uses the evidence from 
judicial visitas to try to uncover the networks of patronage and mutual advantage of 
Mendoza’s regime. However, she does not attempt to identify in this a method of 
government but only an explanation of how viceregal corruption deviated from the 
superior, bureaucratic and rule-bound administration of the professional lawyers of the 
Second Audiencia, and in the process reshaped the structure of government in New Spain. 
Nor does it investigate questions of political expectation and legitimacy or their expression 
in the literature, ceremonial and display of the period as recommended by Latasa. This 
approach shows the endurance of the ‘structuralist’ approach to colonial government 
harking back in particular to the work of Horst Pietschman and before him Ots Capdéqui and 
others.20  
The phenomenon of corruption in Spain’s American empire has been studied in the 
context of a modern bureaucratic administration, of the sort described by Weber,21 where it 
                                                     
19
 E. Ruiz Medrano, Reshaping New Spain: Government and private interest in the colonial bureaucracy, 1531-
1550, J. Constantino and P. Marmasse trans., (Colorado, 2006). 
20
 H. Pietschmann El Estado y su evolucion al principio de la colonizacion espanola de America. (Mexico, 1989); 
O. Capdequi, El Estado Español en las Indias (Mexico, 1986). 
21




was considered an inherent evil of early modern government, despite the best intentions of 
the states. For Horst Pietschmann, in the most developed theoretical work on colonial 
corruption, El estado y su evolución al principio de la colonización Española de América, 
‘[t]he state as an ethical and teleological entity was represented by the monarchy, whose 
actions, while being at the service of the common good, demanded a general acceptance of 
the law’ 22  and furthermore that ‘the state’s most important medium for conducting its 
aims was legislation’. The tendency he saw in the sixteenth century was a ‘suppression of all 
the traditional and patrimonial elements that persisted [and this] can qualify the colonial 
empire towards the end of the 16th century as the most developed body of the state in that 
period heading in the direction of the modern rational- bureaucratic ideal’23. To achieve 
this: ‘a bureaucratic government needs a body of functionaries of professional education, 
guided according to high ethical norms and attached to obedience and facts as much as to 
the legislative foundations of government’.  
Corruption arose because the men that composed the administration did not 
possess these attributes  while at the same time ‘the social prestige of state functionaries 
was not harmed by abuses nor by the diffusion of corruption, given that the exploitation of 
an office for personal gain was considered legitimate and so was tolerated by society’. After 
demonstrating various examples of ‘corruption’ or the deviation of individuals from the 
norms set down by the state, his conclusion tried to explain its ubiquity: ‘…corruption in 
America took on the character of a system and it will be necessary to explain it in terms of a 
more or less permanent tension between the Spanish state, the colonial bureaucracy and 
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colonial society.’24 The ‘tension’ arises from the chasm between the ‘perception’ of how 
administrators should behave; according to his belief in the operation of a ‘modern rational-
bureaucratic ideal’, and the reality of ‘legitimate’ conduct. For Ruiz Medrano the oidores of 
the Second Audiencia symbolise the professional bureaucrats who understood the 
teleological intentions of state-formation through legislation, even if no-one else did, while 
the viceroys represented self-interest and corruption: transforming ‘in just a few years, 
institutions that were vital for safeguarding royal jurisdiction, such as the corregimiento – an 
efficient institutional means for limiting the lordly pretensions of some encomenderos and 
introducing royal authority into the Indian communities’ into merely ‘local interests’.25  
Lara Semboloni’s remarkably detailed and well researched doctoral thesis proposes 
a more nuanced approach within a similar ‘structuralist’ intellectual framework.26 
Semboloni agreed that the legislation and bureaucracy of the Spanish administration led to 
the formation of the state but, following Michel Foucault, she argues that this was the result 
of a gradual and continuing process wherein she concedes the first sixty years should still be 
considered a ‘formative period’ followed by one of ‘consolidation’: ‘… the law must be 
understood as the ordering of social aggregations and, in this sense, it responds to a 
moment of articulation, that not only orders society, but adapts itself in a process of 
constant mutation.’27 Furthermore the main agency for this process was not the crown in 
Madrid but the viceroys in Mexico City because they were responsible for the daily 
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mandamientos that constitute the true judicial norms that came to be known as the derecho 
Indiano quoted by the theorists. The issue of these mandamientos represents ‘one of the 
first attempts to exert effective control of the new territory; that is to say if the viceroy 
emits a directive to a specific place and so to a specific authority, it means that there is an 
organisation or the intention of creating one.’28 This internal process within New Spain 
‘constructed’ viceregal authority and the state because ‘…the judicial sphere [is the] 
expression of society as the manifestation of political power’.29   
By contrast, Alejandro Cañeque’s The King’s Living Image30 challenges the usefulness 
of the notion of the ‘state’ and ‘the previous emphasis on the institutional and legal aspects 
of the Spanish dominion in America’ in this period, pointing out that ‘…in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the idea of the ‘state’ as the essential concept that unified and gave 
cohesion to the political community had not yet entered the political imagination of the 
Spanish polity.’ His work provides an alternative methodological approach focusing on the 
‘language of politics’: 
…my aim here is to examine the shared vocabulary, the principles, and the 
assumptions uniting a number of texts, in order to identify the “constitutive 
and regulative conventions” of the reigning ideology. This will allow the 
understanding of the function of language in the theory and practice of 
viceregal power…political ideas and principles are given a central role in 
shaping political behaviour, because “in recovering the terms of the normative 
vocabulary available to any given agent for the descriptions of his political 
behaviour” Skinner has argued, “we are at the same time indicating one of the 
constraints upon this behaviour itself.” In other words we cannot expect a 
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political agent “to have meant or done something which he could never be 
brought to accept as a correct description of what he had meant or done”.  
For Cañeque the ritual ceremonies and visual representations of power produced in 
New Spain reveal ‘beliefs and practices that constitute viceregal power and the Spanish 
imperial system of rule… If we are to understand the nature of viceregal power (and by 
extension, of Spanish colonial rule) most fully and without the constraint imposed by the 
state paradigm, we must learn to ‘see’ a viceroy as contemporaries would have done and 
the way to this end is the study of the viceregal institution as both image and ritual’. 
Cañeque argues that this created a ‘the culture of authority’ and that subscription to this 
culture gave viceroys authority over the inhabitants of New Spain: ‘…I draw attention to the 
images and distinctive political languages used to define and refer to viceregal power, to the 
operation of viceregal symbols, and to the pervasive concern with ritual and gesture. This 
allows me to understand how viceregal power was constituted, sustained, and contested.’  
I have found some of the methodology of these works useful, without agreeing with 
their all of their conclusions. Broadly speaking, I agree that the concept of the ‘state’ in this 
period, and its manifestation in a modern rational bureaucracy, is redundant but I am not 
convinced that the ‘culture of authority’ as described by Cañeque is sufficient to explain 
viceregal authority, especially at its origin, without understanding the daily practice of 
government. Liberated from the need to see the practice of government in terms of a 
‘structural’ approach, and seeing the viceroys ‘as they were seen by contemporaries’, it is 
possible to appreciate the individual political logic, limited by the language of legitimacy, 
that motivated the viceroys’ actions. These interests and the justificatory language of 
legitimacy evolved in a context of political competition created by ambiguous competencies 
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and weak legal structures of the Habsburg monarchy and its ‘two audiences’. It was the 
political success of the viceroys that established the authority of viceregal government.  
The most glaring omission in the historiography is the role of the expectations and 
demands of the local population in defining the terms of this competition and consequently 
the actions of the viceroys and even royal legislation. This is particularly unfortunate with 
regards to the indigenous population of New Spain whose role in shaping the nature of the 
Habsburg empire has been largely ignored even when, as Semboloni discovered, as many 
written viceregal mandamientos that survive in the archives went to indigenous lords as 
they did to Spanish authorities.  
Active indigenous participation in ‘the Conquest’ and in subsequent military 
ventures has long been accepted as decisive. Similarly the influence of Mesoamerican ritual 
and traditions of the sacred in adapting Catholicism in its Mesoamerican manifestation, 
rather than seeing it as an imposition in a ‘second conquest’, has also gained credence. 31 
However there has been little effort to understand the political context in which these 
events occurred or the degree of commitment that many indigenous individuals and by 
extension their polities demonstrated to New Spain. The historiography of the period does 
not explain why so many polities, like Texcoco, that had not lost out from the Mexica empire 
eventually sided with the Spanish confederation or why they continued fighting, remained 
peaceful and collected tribute for Mexico City, beyond the notion that the Spaniards did not 
interfere in their self-government; rewarded certain individuals; that epidemics sapped their 
potential to resist; or that they grudgingly accommodated the parasitic presence of the 
                                                     
31
 Eg., M. Restall Seven myths of the conquest (Oxford, 2003); Indian conquistadors: Indigenous allies in the 
conquest of Mesoamrica, E. Matthew & M. Oudijk eds., (Oklahoma, 2007).  
24 
 
distant Spaniards but resisted in underhand, culturally exclusive ways; or even that Spanish 
military and technological domination kept them suppressed.32 The possibility that has not 
been entertained is that successful elites were active participants and interested parties in 
the survival of viceregal authority and that they were sufficiently enfranchised within the 
viceregal system. 
A political and prosopographical approach shows the extent of indigenous 
participation and the political motivations behind this. James Lockhart’s study of the Nahuas 
after the conquest remains the most important general source for the survival of indigenous 
political organisations, but the diversity of indigenous polities means that it should be read 
with the increasing number of regional histories or biographical studies, including Gerhard’s 
A Guide to the Historical Geography of New Spain.33  Collections of printed documents, 
especially correspondence wills and letters of merit aimed at illuminating the biographies of 
particular individuals are indispensable.34 There have been an increasing number of specific 
studies of the ‘mental world’ and new identities of the post-conquest elites and how they 
developed in this period which are essential for understanding the attitudes, expectations 
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and political interests of the indigenous elites.35 These contributions represent the most 
exciting research on the period and much more remains to be done. Unfortunately the field 
has generally remained artificially compartmentalised into indigenous and Spanish and 
there has been scant effort to integrate both into the common history of government in 
New Spain as a whole. I have tried to avoid this compartmentalisation in my thesis. 
Archival sources 
A full list of the archival material I consulted and I reference in the text is provided as 
part of the bibliography. Here I will discuss the merits of the documents I relied upon the 
most in the formulation of my thesis.   
Unofficial links of patronage, blood, trust and mutual interest in early modern 
administrations are traditionally difficult to identify. Without the benefit of experiencing the 
daily practice of courtly government, historians are left needing to tease out these 
connections by inference, circumstantial evidence and careful analysis from a wide array of 
disparate documentation: from household accounts (which I was unable to locate for either 
viceroy), to memoirs to lists of appointments and many other sources.36 It is fortunate that 
one of the main aims of visitadores Francisco Tello de Sandoval and Jerónimo de Valderrama 
was to reveal such unofficial connections within the viceregal regime and that they could 
experience its workings and first hand. Their intentions were to discredit the viceregal 
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regimes they were investigating but in so doing they prompted an intensification of the 
debate on the nature of viceregal government which was recorded and has survived under 
the guise of a judicial process. The documents produced by the visitas directly and 
tangentially formed the basis of my documentary evidence for prosopographical 
information, attitudes to how New Spain should be governed and for the role of judicial 
processes in this period. Lewis Hanke published several important documents from 
Mendoza’s visita which complement those that I focused on.37  
AGI Justicia 258 proved particularly useful because it contains the testimony of 
various witnesses to 117 questions devised by Tello de Sandoval with the intention of 
uncovering networks of patronage and favouritism that would portray Mendoza’s self-
serving and tyrannous character at odds with serving the crown’s interests. As such the 
evidence needs to be treated carefully and seen in its context. The witnesses are 
predominantly, but not wholly, Spanish members of the ‘political nation’ and different 
witnesses vary from support for the viceroy to denunciations on all sorts of points. Most 
telling are the digressions in which the witnesses seized the opportunity of answering a 
question before a direct representative of the crown to express their personal gripes, 
concerns or opinions of what constitutes good government. The identity of the witnesses, 
their support or rejection of the viceregal regime and their opinions as to the nature and 
purpose of the viceroy’s distribution of patronage provides useful prosopographical 
evidence for key players in New Spain’s Spanish elite. Understanding the concerns and 
allegiances of particular individuals allows the historian to fathom the context of their 
actions and their other writings. Their digressions provide evidence for the expectations 
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these individuals had of the viceregal regime and anecdotal descriptions of how it operated. 
Their testimony first alerted me to the competitive nature of Spanish society, the 
terminology of the political debates Spanish residents engaged in and the rewards that they 
sought. 
Tello de Sandoval asked for a copy of Mendoza’s instructions to the treasury naming 
the recipients of disbursements from the quitas y vacaciones fund and other individuals who 
the viceroy wished to compensate from the treasury. The list was compiled towards the end 
of Tello de Sandoval’s visita in August 1546 and was taken from the ‘libros de la contaduria’ 
or accounting books from the treasury in Mexico City, which have not survived. In this 
relación individuals are named, the services that justify the disbursements are briefly 
described and the amount of money they received was recorded. Like Tello de Sandoval 
(and Valderrama as we will see) these disbursements under viceregal authority represent 
yet more evidence of Mendoza’s appropriation of royal prerogatives, the individuals 
involved in his patronage networks, and the sort of services that justified his favour. The list 
of corregidores and tenientes appointed by Mendoza is also contained in this legajo and is 
published by Ethelia Ruíz-Medrano.38 
Some indigenous noblemen of Mexico City answered questions specifically related to 
the recruitment, pay and provisioning of the Mexica contingent that participated in the 
expedition to Cíbola rather than the full range of questions put to the Spanish witnesses. 
Their answers provide interesting evidence for the terms of voluntary indigenous 
participation in military expeditions, their expectations and complaints. They also provide 
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prosopographical evidence, which is generally scarce, for the noble indigenous elite of 
Mexico City and some of their attitudes.   
The legajo also contains a memorandum in list form of the Indians who received 
licences to carry Spanish weapons and ride horses from Mendoza. The list is much longer 
than that published by Hanke as part of Mendoza’s defence.39 The memorandum names the 
recipients and explains briefly the reasons for the viceregal grants shedding light on the 
identity of local indigenous magnates. It illustrates the viceroy’s personal choice of 
individuals to reward and as such is complementary to other viceregal uses of ‘bastard 
feudalism’ like the creation of knights Tecle. The geographical location of the recipients and 
the motives for granting them the rewards helps to illustrate the strategic logic of viceregal 
patronage.  
The following legajo, AGI Justicia 259, is useful for the list drawn up by Antonio de 
Turcios of the men officially appointed to the ‘guard and accompaniment of the person of 
the viceroy’. The crown had assigned 2,000d for the upkeep of a viceregal bodyguard but as 
several witnesses made clear they were rarely on active duty so that the individuals in 
Turcio’s list were favoured members of the viceregal household who received a more 
regular salary for their upkeep than other householders.  
It also contains Mendoza’s defence deposition which is very useful as evidence for 
the viceroy’s perception of his responsibilities and of the logic he used to justify some of his 
more controversial actions like arming certain indigenous lords or favouring some Spaniards 
above others. Mendoza’s formal defence and recusación can be found in AGI Justicia 277. 
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These documents serve as a corrective to some of the accusations levied against Mendoza 
and offer an insight into the different interpretations of good service to the crown that 
predominated in New Spain. They also expose the language and the ideas that were 
employed to justify political projects and governmental actions. As with much of the 
surviving evidence Mendoza’s defence focused on establishing the particular merit and 
worth of individuals to hold office or discharge responsibilities in the name of royal service. 
On the other hand it depended on discrediting other individuals and establishing their 
particular ‘passions’, prejudices and allegiances to undermine their testimony. Once again 
this provides useful prosopographical evidence about the stance and opinions of various 
influential individuals in Mexico City.  
Valderrama’s visita did not produce witness depositions, perhaps because the 
judicial process was stunted by Velasco’s death, but his investigations sought to illuminate 
similar features of the administration. Many of the most relevant documents pertaining to 
Valderrama’s visita have been printed from AGI Patronato, 182, especially R.13\1-6. 40 Like 
Tello de Sandoval many of the conclusions focus on the recipients of largesse from the 
quitas y vacaciones fund, or loans from the treasury or appointment to office. Valderrama 
sought to uncover the links between the individuals who benefited from this largesse and 
the viceroy, his family or strategic allies. Comparing the individuals that Valderrama 
identified as the favoured members of Velasco’s regime with those that emerge from Tello 
de Sandoval’s visita as Mendoza’s favourites allows us to identify the development of a 
‘viceregal party’ that provided continuity between viceregal administrations. Once these 
links have been established the interests of this politically important elite, and how they 
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influenced the nature and development of the viceregal regime, begin to emerge. They help 
us to better understand the context and intention behind the intensification of factional 
conflict that came to a climax after the death of Velasco and the repression that followed 
the accusations made against the Avila and Cortés brothers. The evidence for the case rests 
largely in AGI. Patronato,203,R.2\1\1 and remains to be explored fully in the context of 
political competition that developed from the practice of viceregal government.  
Printed sources for Velasco’s disbursements are supplemented by archival evidence 
found in AGI, Contaduría, like that in 663B, for the difficult years 1553-1556, dealing with 
the treasury of Mexico City and the accounts of the treasurer. They provide further evidence 
of who the viceroy supported economically but also provide a broader context and 
justification for why Velasco chose to help certain individuals. For example the first 
document describes how the viceroy singled out certain individuals as having too many 
tributaries in their encomienda and helps to illustrate Velasco’s appropriation of the 
tributary dues owed to encomenderos and its manipulation to increase the viceroy’s 
potential for patronage as described in chapter 4.  On the other hand in the fifth document 
and 13th pliego the viceroy’s patronage of friars from the treasury is established as a general 
policy or how the oidores were granted extra funds for their maintenance.  
Letters and reports to the crown in AGI, Gobierno, Audiencia de Mexico,  become 
particularly useful when prosopographical information about sender or subjects is known. 
They signify the ‘paper representation’ (see chapter 8) of New Spain’s political nation before 
the crown and shed light on the political debates of the time. I found the letters in legajo 
323 containing the charges and reports of the royal officials of Mexico particularly useful 
because the royal officials became deeply implicated with the viceregal administration. The 
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royal officials were consequently affected by the visitas and the accusations levied generally 
against the regime and its management of the royal funds in particular. This prompted the 
royal officials to present a defence of the logic of viceregal government and New Spain’s 
internal arrangements. This became acutely pertinent during Valderrama’s visita and the 
political turmoil that ensued after Velasco’s death. Tribute collection and allocation became 
contentious and the royal officials led by Fernando de Portugal and Hortuño de Ibarra 
became prominent bulwarks of the increasingly defined ‘viceregal party’.  
Tello de Sandoval’s letters and reports in legajo 68 were also useful for his general 
opinions on the nature of government in New Spain. By highlighting for criticism the salient 
elements of Mendoza’s regime compared to the expectations of the letrado members of the 
Council of the Indies or the differences that a contemporary perceived between practice 
and custom in Spain and New Spain the particular practices of government that developed 
in New Spain become clearer. Tello de Sandoval’s letters also provide a useful comparison 
with those of Valderrama (which are published) as to the changing perceptions of how New 
Spain should be governed. Together with the letters and depositions of the viceroys, like 
Velasco’s letters in legajo 19, and other members of the political nation they offer overviews 
of political positions in the debates that shaped the administration of New Spain.  
Other legajos of AGI, Gobierno, Audiencia de Mexico, like 96 ‘Cartas y expedientes 
de personas seculares 1545-1559’ illustrate the variety of correspondents that interacted 
with the crown and the many intentions and opinions they expressed in their ‘paper 
representation’. Similarly Patronato contains certain specific recommendations and reports 
to the crown that can be seen in a similar vein for example legajo 180, R.72/24-01-1539  
where don Luis de Castilla and other miners appealed to the crown to retain lower taxes of 
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10% on their silver production in order to incentivise entrepreneurial activity in the 
dangerous mining frontier illustrate this. These documents shed light on the flexible, 
political and participatory, rather than modern-bureaucratic, ethos of the debate between 
























Part II: Ideals of life 
 
Chapter 2: Hidalguía in New Spain up to1535: Expectations and ‘ideals 
of life’ 
Cortés liked to encourage his followers at difficult moments during the campaign 
against Tenochtitlan by claiming that they would all become ‘Counts or Dukes and lords by 
honorific title’ if they prevailed. According to conquistador Francisco de Aguilar ‘With these 
promises, from lambs we became lions’.41 For a short time after the conquest, when the 
moveable spoils had disappointed many conquistadores, Cortés continued to raise similar 
expectations.42 These promises and the effect they had on the conquistadores reveal their 
most cherished ambitions.  
These were particularly relevant ambitions for the individuals that constituted the 
first Spanish expeditions and settlements of New Spain because they were of ill-defined 
status in traditional Spanish society. Like a dissonant chord, the new man was an unstable 
element in sixteenth century political thinking adding tension but also potential to society 
and finally needing resolution within one of the three estates that composed the ideal 
notion of the harmonious commonwealth. Their ambitions were different from those of a 
purely piratical interest in wealth (though these played a part) or the established noble 
dynast’s desire to extend his influence, honours and benefices; they were not the ambitions 
of routiers, mercenary companies or condottieri who were their own masters and fought 
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under contract for specific periods and specific rewards; neither were the conquistadores 
fighting to carve out an autonomous new kingdom for themselves like the fifteenth  century 
‘Catalan Company’ in Greece or the Norman adventurers of the eleventh century. The 
conquistadores, settlers and officials that followed were guided by the ideal of re-affirming 
and strengthening their links with their sovereign expressed in royal mercedes and within 
the context of service to their king and commonwealth: ‘…for the sake of gaining 
recognition as serving Your Majesty and his royal and imperial crown, I have put myself 
through such travails and sufferings’ claimed Cortés.43 Visitador Jerónimo de Valderrama 
reiterated the same formula when he informed the crown towards the end of our period 
that Melchor, son of Miguel López de Legazpi, captain of the first successful expedition to 
the Philippines, had left Mexico City for Spain. ‘He goes in the name of his father to give 
account of the voyage [that his father] was instructed to make and of its success and to ask 
that a merced might be granted to his father’. Thinking also of his own imminent return 
after two turbulent years of service in New Spain he went on to spell out the commonly 
accepted motivation for Spanish presence and actions in the New World: ‘it is this hope [of 
receiving mercedes for their services] that makes all men or most of them, leave their 
homes and tranquillity to place themselves in great dangers and to accomplish deeds of 
importance.’44 
Nobility removed, in theory, future arbitrary obstacles to advancement, office or 
privilege. Despite huge material differences between noblemen in Spain an hidalgo’s 
formally recognised virtue, honour and purpose within the commonwealth theoretically 
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created a sense of equality between him and all his fellow nobles. In an instantly 
recognisable comic caricature, an archetypal penniless young hidalgo could claim to have 
left his native town over a row with his richer neighbour because the latter had failed to 
greet him properly in the street: ‘for an hidalgo owes nothing to anyone save to God and to 
his king’.45 This mental outlook was more usually expressed as a comparison between the 
most basic elements that differentiated nobles from workers; so for instance in the late 
sixteenth century the Duke of Nájera could put it simply to the Cortes of Toledo: ‘The 
difference that exists between hidalgos and pecheros is between personal and monetary 
service [to the king] and in this we know one from another.’46 The implied directness of the 
relationship of trust and vassalage that a nobleman enjoyed with his king differentiated him 
from commoners. One of Miguel de Cervantes’ characters could go so far as to associate the 
qualities of nobles and workers with those of two different species: ‘The spirit of a knight, 
brother, is to put one’s life on the line, when and if it is necessary and to do so willingly; but 
to suffer every hour a thousand deaths carrying sticks and bundles without ever dying is 
more for horses (caballos) than for knights (caballeros).’47 As I.A.A Thompson concluded, ‘In 
Castile the ideological bonding of the noble-estate was stronger than socio-economic 
differences within it, and this made for a unity of consciousness which contributed both to 
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internal mobility and to the broad political cohesiveness that existed across the different 
sectors of the Castilian-dominated elite...’48  
Notions of belonging to this noble caste informed the ‘ideals of life’49 that shaped 
Spanish aspirations and motivated their actions in the New World. These had an impact on 
their behaviour, their sense of justice and their expectations: ‘...where all individual acts 
were in the public domain, personal values corresponded faithfully to social values... we 
insist that the ideal of hidalguía moved men to action’.50 Exploring these ideals and how 
they were affected by the conditions in New Spain after the conquest will help us to frame, 
in subsequent chapters, the political solutions that the viceroys would adopt to establish 
their authority over the Spanish settlers. 
The aspects of nobility emphasised by New World Spaniards were coloured by the 
theoretical justifications for noble status in the Siete Partidas printed to a wider audience in 
1491 on the eve of the conquest of Granada and of Columbus’s first expedition to America. 
Proof of the continuing impact of this law-code is that Hernán Cortés, who was not a 
professional lawyer, knew it well enough to have used it to ‘justify and legalise his own very 
difficult position after breaking with the governor of Cuba… and setting off unauthorised on 
the conquest of Mexico’.51  
                                                     
48
 I.A.A Thompson, ‘Neo-noble Nobility: Concepts of hidalguía in Early Modern Castile’, European History 
Quarterly Vol.15 (1985) p.397. 
49
 J. Huizinga, Men and ideas: history, middle ages the renaissance, ‘Historical ideals of life’ J.S. Holmes and H. 
van Marle trans. (London, 1960), pp.77-96. 
50
 P. Sanchiz Ochoa, Los Hidalgos de Guatemala, (Sevilla, 1976), p.11. 
51




The most resonant elements of the Siete Partidas to the Spanish-American settlers 
were those that show the Thomist influence of Aristotelian political theory because it 
emphasised service to the commonwealth and ‘virtue’ as the essential justifications of 
privileged status. In the Siete Partidas Aristotle’s ‘citizens’ were generally equated with 
Spanish hidalgos. They were free men voluntarily participating in politics and war for the 
good of the commonwealth most notably as ‘warriors’ and ‘counsellors’ of the 
commonwealth. Consequently they ‘must not lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen since 
such a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue… since leisure is necessary both for the 
development of virtue and the performance of political duties’: virtuous citizens produced a 
virtuous state. In further defining the characteristics of the citizens in ‘the ideal constitution’ 
Aristotle concluded that ‘the ruling class should be the owners of property, for… the citizens 
of a state should be in good circumstances; whereas mechanics or any other class which is 
not a producer of virtue have no share in the state’. The same individual should act as both 
a ‘warrior’ and a ‘counsellor’ not only because ‘it is an impossible thing that those who are 
able to use or to resist force remain always in subjection’ but also because these activities 
could ideally be performed by the same person even if at different times of life.’52  
The Siete Partidas coincided with Aristotle to arrive at the norms regarding 
noblemen or hijosdalgo. Titolo XXI of the 2nd Partida for instance described their essential 
function in the commonwealth as defensores, to be differentiated from labradores 
(Aristotle’s mechanics) and oradores (Aristotle’s priests). In a rationalising origin myth, the 
defensores went from being relied on for their strength to being selected for their virtue 
because their position in the commonwealth demanded good and responsible men more 
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than erratic brute force. As with Aristotle’s citizens virtue and its propagation became the 
end for the defensores. The main difference with Aristotle was the emphasis the Partidas 
placed on lineage, but the teleological aim of good birth was the same: to grant 
responsibility and its concomitant rewards to men of virtue ‘Men of good lineage who 
would guard themselves against committing any shameful deed [for the sake of their 
ancestor’s reputation] and hence they are called fijos dalgo which is the same as saying 
‘sons of virtue’ or in other places, gentle-men… or the ‘noble and good’’53.  
Despite the importance of lineage, good birth was in in theory just another 
guarantee of an individual’s ‘virtue’ because an ancestor’s honour could be inherited as 
directly as furniture. Consequently the king retained the right to disenfranchise nobles if 
they conducted themselves unworthily - after a ritual humiliation symbolizing the loss of 
rights and status - and ‘furthermore, he must not receive any office from the king or the 
council nor can he accuse or challenge any knight’.54 Conversely the king could knight men 
who had shown a previously unrecognised but inherent nobility demonstrated in their 
actions and way of life. This would be the first step that could lead to full recognition of an 
individual’s nobility. Not everyone was eligible in Spain, but strictly speaking there was no 
Venetian ‘golden book’ of prescribed families, nothing pre-ordained or divinely sanctioned 
about membership of the nobility. Rather a tradition had developed by the 15th century that 
saw many Spaniards as the heirs to a slumbering nobility that dated back to don Pelayo’s 
surviving Visigothic followers who elected him as king and were all granted hidalguía in 
exchange to kick-start the Reconquista and allow them to carry on the fight. ‘Old Christians’ 
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could count on a nobility temporarily suppressed by the hand of fortune, but no newer than 
that of the king of Castile, if only it could be stirred and then recognised: as Jorge Manrique 
put it in 1476 ‘For the blood of the Goths/ and elevated lineage and nobility/ through how 
many means and ways from its great height can be lost/ in this life! Some for being worth so 
little… and others for not having enough/ are forced with unworthy offices to maintain 
themselves’55.  
The sentiment was echoed by Bernal Díaz del Castillo in judging his companions: ‘We 
were all hijosdalgos, even if some of us were not of such clear lineage, because as we all 
know, not all men are born equal in this world, either in ancestry56 or in virtue.’ Following 
this logic, some went so far as to argue that ‘there is no true hidalguía that is not created by 
the king’ and even the king could only trace his royalty to the election of don Pelayo. 
Consequently ‘the republic also creates hidalgos, because in knowing a man to be brave and 
of great virtue and rich, it doesn’t dare to subject him, since this would be disproportionate, 
and he deserves... to live in liberty and not to be equalled with plebeian people; this esteem 
being handed down to his sons and grandchildren becomes nobility and they begin to 
acquire rights against the king.’57  
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 As has been noted with regards to Spanish notions of inherited nobility of this 
period: ‘cast like ideals [which] suggest that the sanguine aetiology of worth was primarily of 
symbolic importance, expressing not a ‘principle of exclusion’... but a ‘principle of 
association’. What was in practice necessary was not so much to possess noble blood as 
through the sophistries of the genealogists and the historian, to be able to profess it, and 
hence to subscribe to its creed.’58 This was facilitated by the transmission of nobility to all 
the offspring of a nobleman (like classical citizenship) and contrasts, for example, with 
English notions of peerage where the legal status of the younger siblings of a lord was that 
of commoners, which led to a different ‘principle of association’ between the nobility and 
the commons than that which developed in the Spanish world. To shore up these 
credentials the conquistadores sought marriage to established noblewomen. In New Spain 
during the 1520s this could mean either local indigenous women, as in the case of Juan 
Jaramillo and doña Marina or Alonso de Grado and doña Isabel Moctezuma; or (preferably) 
Spanish noblewomen like those that Cortés or Alvarado married.  
Being a ‘free man’ was a fundamental pre-requisite of citizenship or nobility because 
only freedom could foster virtue. Anyone who worked for a salary or was in any way 
dependent on someone else’s will automatically abandoned his freedom because his actions 
and his opinions would be conditioned by those of his master or the financial obligations of 
his employment. This explains why men who engaged in banausic activities, from labourers 
to merchants, were considered inherently un-virtuous and dishonourable and were 
(theoretically) excluded from qualifying as noblemen. It also explains why inherited wealth 
and the leisure that ensued was such a useful supplement to nobility (or classical 
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citizenship): ‘some have likened nobility to the number zero, which by itself is worth nothing 
but together with another number, it makes it increase’.59 Only someone independent of 
anyone else could speak according to his own conscience and act by his own voluntas; 
consequently only a free-man’s actions and opinions were truly valuable. So while the 
Labrador served the commonwealth (and thereby the king) indirectly through the economic 
contribution of his tribute; and the Orador mediated with the divine through his prayers and 
spiritual guidance, the Defensor was worthy to serve the king and commonwealth 
voluntarily with his own person, in war, government or council.60 Not surprisingly much of 
the relevant Titolo in the Siete Partidas dwells on how hijosdalgos should behave if they are 
to be considered virtuous. Amongst much else they should use their leisure in ‘becoming 
educated, as this is what makes a man most upright and accomplished in his doings’61 or 
‘That they [hijosdalgo] should not doubt to die for their lord, not only in protecting him from 
harm or evil, but increasing and improving his land and his honour, as far as they can do and 
know and in doing so they will act for the common good of their land.’62  
In exchange the king had his own responsibilities towards this virtuous elite: ‘Kings 
should honour them [hidalgos] as those with whom they share their work, keeping them 
and honouring them and increasing their power and honour’63. To serve the king was 
perfect freedom because he was the legitimate sovereign authority, head of the 
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commonwealth and the ultimate dispenser of justice and guarantor of status. Nobles 
therefore served the king voluntarily and did so because they were virtuous and upheld 
their oaths of vassalage to him, not because they had been coerced by force or economic 
dependence. As a result, a nobleman ideally did not receive a fixed salary for his service but 
a merced from the king. To further emphasise that a nobleman’s service was personal he 
was exempt from direct taxation or tribute. His freedom from coercion was also 
safeguarded by immunity from confiscation of his house, his horse or his sword for debt, 
and also from torture during judicial proceedings. Only the king could punish a nobleman for 
breaking the law and in extreme cases where the penalty was death, a nobleman could 
expect the honour of decapitation rather than the gallows. As a final symbol of his elevated 
status, the nobleman was not only trusted to appear armed in public but was legally bound 
to carry his sword with him at all times. This became the famous espada ropera64 which 
marked its wearer out as well as embodying the virtues that an hidalgo espoused: ‘wisdom’ 
was represented in the handle, ‘fortitude’ in the pommel, ‘measure/proportion’ in the guard 
and ‘justice’ in the straight and double-edged blade.65  
The centrality of virtue and merit in the theoretical justifications for hidalguía 
formed an important part of the intellectual debate, which continued throughout the 
sixteenth century in both Spain and America regarding its nature. Writers and theoreticians 
at the time dwelt much on the interrelation between virtue, merit and birth with regards to 
nobility because Castile’s dynamism since the late fifteenth century had brought the 
question to the fore of social, legal and theoretical debate. Erasmus’ condensed work 
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‘Enchiridion or manual of the Christian knight’ for example purported to show the path to 
virtue and was extremely popular in Spain and Spanish America. In 1526 it first appeared in 
Castilian and it sold out so quickly that a second edition was printed the same year. Oidor 
Delgadillo in Mexico asked a colleague in Spain for a copy and we know that it featured in 
the Episcopal library of Juan de Zumárraga.66  
Erasmus’s equation of virtue with honour resonated and was taken up in the 
dialogue of many in the Americas who wished to be seen as hombres de bien67 but were 
living in a new context without the established certainties and hierarchies of Spain: virtue 
unlike tradition was not bound by place or memory and required no solar conocido. More 
anecdotal writers like the anonymous ‘Dominican friar living in Seville’68 followed this 
tradition and devoted their entire written corpus to issues that defined nobility and debated 
ennoblement. In satirical-philosophical works like Cristobal de Villalón’s dialogues in el 
Crotalón, the same questions are raised repeatedly.69 These works were filled with popular 
anecdotes like that of a veteran from the Italian wars who claimed his own right arm as his 
‘father’ and argued against yet another arrogant noble by asserting that ‘we [his arm and 
him] are more worthy than you or your lineage.’ By the time of Cervantes Quixote could 
advise his listener, by then sounding resonantly anachronistic, to ‘make virtue the medium 
of all thy actions, and thou wilt have no cause to envy those whose birth gives them titles of 
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great men, and princes; for nobility is inherited, but virtue acquired: and virtue is worth 
more in itself, than nobleness of birth.’70 In 1624 the crown had become so involved in 
defining sensitive matters regarding an individual’s noble standing that Olivares tried to 
formalise the matter of ennoblement using legislation to create a legally binding distinction 
and hierarchy within the hidalgo class itself, which pleased no-one.71 In the early sixteenth 
century, however, the potential of the ‘new man’ was still untested and seemingly unbound 
for the Spaniards who first arrived in New Spain.  
The laws that had governed the Spanish colonisation of America further encouraged 
these attitudes of royal recognition of slumbering nobility in the colonists. The foundational 
royal decree of April 10th 1495 encouraged a sense of direct relationship and recognised 
service between monarch and Spanish settler in America which was a fundamental element 
of hidalguía. After the decree, settlement and exploration were considered services in 
themselves to the crown and were rewarded with certain privileges including exemption 
from direct tribute to the crown of the sort that only pecheros paid in Spain.72 Tapping into 
the voluntary ethos of hidalguía provided an extremely efficient means of exploring America 
for the Spanish crown. The royal treasury spent no money but could still demand its judicial 
and monetary rights as the tokens of loyalty from its explorers and settlers; the same 
remained true in Europe where ‘hidalgos were still the backbone of the tercios’ that formed 
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the core of Habsburg armies from Pavia to Rocroi.73 The freedom of action that this sense of 
direct relationship with the crown allowed its settlers to feel goes a long way towards 
explaining the number of expeditions and the speed with which the kingdom of Castile and 
her subjects extended their dominions in America.  
Myth and recent historical precedents made conquistador ambitions of 
ennoblement seem attainable and desirable. Castilian triumphs in the conquest of Granada 
and military victories in Italy under glamorous commanders like Gonzalo Fernández de 
Córdoba reinvigorated the old allure of military adventure as a means to ennoblement. Its 
appeal was enhanced by the practical benefits that could accrue from it. It has been 
estimated that between 1465 and 1516 around one thousand patents of hidalguía were 
issued by grateful monarchs to reward their successful soldiers74. Rewards were not 
confined to penniless hidalgos; the titled nobility of early sixteenth century Spain sometimes 
known as the Nobleza Nueva owed their titles to the Trástamaran usurpation of 1369 and 
most titles had only been granted in the mid and late 15th century.75  
Conquest and the subsequent political, military or administrative requirements 
associated with the government of conquered lands provided ample opportunities for 
advancement within a context of ennobling royal service. In both Granada and Italy salaried 
administrative titles or offices also became available for distribution. Antonio de Mendoza’s 
father was given the governorship of Granada which then passed to the viceroy’s older 
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brother Luis, establishing a hereditary principle within an administrative office, while other 
administrative positions like the viceroyalty of Navarre and of Naples were also dispensed to 
deserving lords. Many lesser offices also became available to able but often impoverished 
hidalgos like Francisco de los Cobos in Granada, a platform that would elevate him to 
becoming the most powerful man in Spain.  
Conquered land had become available in the kingdom of Granada and acting like 
magnanimous monarchs, the Catholic kings accompanied their grants of titles with often 
enormous repartimientos of land and tributary rights. Far from weakening the Catholic Kings 
these grants reinvigorated the notion of the crown as the most important dispenser of 
grace, rewards, patronage and an agent of ennoblement. Direct royal justice would lead to 
recognition of conquistador merit: hence one of Cortés’s favourite sayings ‘let the king be 
my fighting cock’.76  Royal appropriation of the mastership of the three knightly orders in 
1476, 1487 and 1494 reinforced this perception.77 Old notions of service rewarded by just 
and liberal monarchs seemed palpably real to the generation that embarked for America.  
Literature at the turn of the century reflected the optimism with bestsellers of 
chivalric romance like Garci Rodríguez de Montalvo’s c.1503 edition of Amadís de Gaula ‘the 
most successful printed book of the early sixteenth century in Spain’ and later additions to 
his saga.  This hero’s most prominent attribute was fidelity to his beloved and to his king 
and after fantastic voyages trials and reversals of fortune he was rewarded. The generation 
that produced the conquistadores were aware of the feats of Spanish arms and read and 
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were enthralled by chivalric stories. Bernal Díaz del Castillo was born in Medina del Campo 
where Rodríguez de Montalvo was a regidor of the town contemporaneously with Bernal’s 
father.78 In this hopeful spirit Pedro de Alvarado was said to have worn his uncle’s cross of 
Santiago on a tattered old velvet jerkin throughout his early penniless wanderings and 
adventures in America.79 Cortés also inherited the tradition of martial glory from his father 
who had served in the war against Granada and, equating the notion of service anywhere 
with royal rewards, Cortés at one point considered seeking his fortune with the tercios in 
Italy before deciding to try his luck in America during his time in Valencia.80 The link endured 
in Cuba where Cortés’s friend Amador de Lares who had been maestresala to Fernández de 
Cordoba and according to Las Casas often related the deeds of the Gran Capitán. Another 
link between Spanish feats in Italy, chivalric romance and American colonization can be 
found in Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo who had also served the Gran Capitán as secretary in 
Italy before assuming his administrative offices in Hispaniola where many of the 
conquistadores began their American careers. Oviedo himself wrote a work of chivalric 
romance called ‘the book of the most vigorous knight of fortune called don Claribalte’ 
printed in 1519 as Cortés was setting off from Cuba.81  
These men paid homage to their upbringing in the references they made to the 
classics, to history and romance in their writings, making numerous references to their 
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mytho-historical notions of hidalguía, the new hispanidad and Castile’s role in it.82 In turn 
their behaviour emulated and reinvigorated the popularity of such works. Historical and 
mythical example played a role akin to that of evidence and legal precedence in Spanish-
American self-justificatory discourse. Examples from recent history were brought to mind to 
bear witness to their merit: ‘King James of Aragon defeated the Moors and took much of 
their land which he divided amongst the knights and soldiers that participated in the 
conquest and since those days they have their coats of arms and are brave, the same 
happened when Granada was captured, and in the time of the Great Captain at Naples, 
where lands and lordships were distributed to those that helped in wars and battles.’83 It 
was a subtle history lesson to instruct Philip II on how a magnanimous king rewarded his 
deserving noblemen. Even ‘el Gran Motecuhzoma’, who had become a sympathetic and 
regal figure to the Spaniards after the conquest, was used as a similar device and to 
emphasise how natural and obvious their noble status was: ‘Bernal Díaz seems to me of very 
noble condition’ the emperor had apparently noticed, in part as a result of Bernal’s 
demeanour and in part (somewhat improbably) because Motecuhzoma recognised the 
merit in his efforts after being told that Bernal had already been on ‘two trips to discover 
this New Spain’. Seeing his ‘motolinia (need or poverty in Nahuatl) in clothes and gold’ he 
felt obliged to remedy the situation giving him a ‘merced’, of clothes, gold and a princess: 
‘treat her very well, she is the daughter of a principal man’ the wise emperor had advised. 
The great Tlatoani knew admirably well how to treat men who exuded nobility as obviously 
as Bernal, so it should have been even easier for the Spanish crown:84 ‘I have brought this to 
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mind so that our many good and notable services that we performed for the king, our lord, 
and for all of Christianity, and let these be placed on a balance and each thing measured in 
its quantity and it will be found that we are worthy and deserving of being elevated and 
remunerated like the knights previously mentioned by me…’85 
To humanist intellectuals in Spain such as Francisco Cervantes de Salazar, Francisco 
López de Gómara or Ginés de Sepulveda, who found the classics ‘good to think with’ the 
conquistadores and their warlike deeds seemed to embody virtue.86 Cervantes de Salazar 
was so impressed by Cortés that he went on to dedicate one of his books to him and 
subsequently emigrated to New Spain. He is a useful source to the attitudes of New Spain 
because his newcomer’s enthusiasm mixed with his scholar’s erudition, meant he 
interpreted and intellectualised his experiences in a language of stock allusions that 
translate well through time. In one of these, he described a dream that the future marquess 
had when he was still a penniless scribe, half starving on Hispaniola. Cortés was 
characterised as having dreamt of glory and to have decided there and then to pursue it. 
After the dream he explained to his friends that he would ‘dine to the sound of trumpets or 
die in the gallows’. Cortés then drew a wheel of fortune and with his dagger fixed it at the 
highest point: a man controlling his own fortune. A professor of rhetoric at the University of 
Mexico, Cervantes de Salazar was using this dream to portray the essence of the future 
conqueror as the familiar ‘man of destiny’ who displayed the inherent characteristics of 
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greatness even in his poverty-stricken youth where no-one would have expected to find it.87 
It also betrays the fact that even an admirer of Cortés saw him as a self-made man that 
could as easily have been considered a plebeian criminal: true noblemen were exempt from 
the dishonour of the gallows; their death sentence would have been commuted to 
decapitation.88 
Spanish-Americans portrayed their own actions in New Spain to the crown by 
infusing them with allusions to the values first espoused in the Siete Partidas and 
popularised in myth and positive literary portrayals of virtuous ‘new men’. Andrés de 
Villanueva, whose heroics during the unlikely defence of Guadalajara in 1541 earned him a 
coat of arms, for which he chose a motto that appealed directly to the values of chivalric 
voluntary service and gratitude to the crown: ‘Such as I have always done, with my fortune 
and my person, I will serve thy crown’.89 More than thirty years later Díaz del Castillo writing 
in the provincial but suggestively named Santiago de los Caballeros made the most 
comprehensive appeal to the same ethos: ‘apart from our ancient nobility, with the heroic 
acts and great deeds that we performed in war … serving our king and lord, discovering 
these lands and even conquering this New Spain and the great city of Mexico and many 
other provinces, all at our own cost, being far from Castile or any other source of help save 
that of Our Lord Jesus Christ…with these we revealed ourselves to be much more than what 
came before.’90  
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For the conquistadores and their later humanist allies, the suffering involved in the 
travails of the conquest should have acted like an expiation of their doubtful origins; Saint 
Hippolytus’ day, when Tenochtitlan fell, should have been, the day to ‘gentle their 
condition’. Success in martial endeavours in the service of the crown, the essential ambit of 
the defensores, should have been the most obvious means of revealing the hidden nobility 
of the conquistadores and of assuring the concomitant rewards of hereditary feudal lordship 
from their king and the enhanced possibilities of future services to the crown that their 
status warranted. Instead the ‘the conquest’ would become New Spain’s original sin 
undermining all attempts at establishing merit, its due rewards, or a stable governing 
hierarchy.  
Political modifiers 
Political circumstance affected the ‘ideals of life’ of the conquistadores and settlers 
of New Spain. The sense of hidalgo liberty and the path to ennoblement that the Spaniards 
subscribed to emphasised the precedence of royal judgement over tradition or law in 
establishing merit. The king’s judgement of the colonists’ merit was affected by political 
interests in Spain and the crown’s interpretation of developments in New Spain. The latter 
was coloured by preconceptions about the Spaniards in Mesoamerica and their ability to 
represent their case across the distances (physical and conceptual) that separated Spain and 
Mesoamerica.  
The context in which the conquistadores presented their merit was formed by the 
coincidence between the revolution that Cortés led against Tenochtitlan in 1521 and the 
total defeat of the Castilian rebellion of the comuneros against Charles V. Both uprisings 
resulted in political re-alignments where the victors attempted to concentrate power and 
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reward their allies: Cortés became the arbiter of new political settlements in many 
Mesoamerican polities and he negotiated tributary rights from these polities for himself and 
his closest adherents under the suggestive name of encomienda (against specific royal 
instructions)91 as a repartimiento (apportion) that represented the first step towards the 
titles and honours they had all hoped for. He distributed offices, military commands and 
moveable wealth amongst those Spaniards he favoured most as well. Simultaneously in 
Spain Charles V began concentrating power on the royal court and set about rewarding his 
most loyal vassals for their loyalty and services during the comunero uprising with offices 
benefices and positions at court.92 Amongst the rewards available to Charles V for 
distribution were the offices that required to run the king’s new domains in Mesoamerica 
and the benefices that came with them. Royal interest in Mesoamerica could prove to be an 
opportunity for the Spaniards that had conquered it, so long as their interests did not clash 
with the crown’s.  
The king’s judgement had been exalted as the deciding factor in establishing merit 
but Charles V’s accession to the throne and the aftermath of the comunero uprising altered 
the crown’s priorities when compared to the ‘ideals’ that the conquistadores had hoped to 
fulfil. Afraid of rebellion and conscious of the universalist dimension of Charles V’s authority, 
the Castilian court intended to centralise power over New Spain and to establish a reliable 
means of ‘conveying the commands of a central authority to distant localities…directly 
dependent on imperial control’93 but there was nothing ‘modern’ about either the intention 
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behind this or the means in which the crown tried to achieve its aims. Rather, the 
preponderance of the court ‘was possible because in the court resided the king, the fount 
from which all grace emanated’.94 Confidence in the virtues of ‘intimate representation’, the 
familiarity of personal friendship and confidence where the particular characteristics of the 
individual mattered more than appeals to selective historical precedents or theory – let 
alone the impersonal workings of ‘modern’ bureaucratic rules and ‘institutional structures’- 
in deciding merit.  
Representation 
From the start the legitimacy of Cortés’ expedition and his authority had been 
contested because he had gone against the authority of Bishop Juan Rodríguez de Fonseca 
and his hegemonic trans-Atlantic network of patronage, without establishing an alternative 
mandate from the crown. This network was important because Fonseca had come to 
dominate the organisation of the Castilian expansion in the Indies. Fonseca had originally 
used the decree of 1493 and its ethos to ‘break Columbus’s monopoly’ over the process of 
colonisation in the Americas but he had then substituted it with his own informal 
authority.95 He soon bolstered his authority further by creating and dominating legitimising 
organs such as the Casa de Contratación and leading those members of the Council of 
Castile who dealt with American affairs – the group that would eventually coalesce into the 
Council of the Indies around 1520. This in turn allowed Fonseca to dispense the most valued 
kind of patronage in the Americas: he promoted with offices and benefices his allies (often 
from his circle in Seville) like Diego de Velázquez in Cuba or Francisco de Garay in Jamaica. 
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These rewards were a confirmation of trust in an individual and his personal administrative 
services symbolised de facto his noble status. Dissenters (often Extremaduran) like Nicolás 
de Ovando or Vasco Nuñez de Balboa were deposed and even executed as rebels.96 King 
Ferdinand, whose main preoccupations lay in the Mediterranean, allowed Fonseca a free 
hand over the American theatre. Recognition of his unofficial preponderance came from 
Pope Leo X who granted him the sobriquet ‘Patriarch of the Indies’; his enemies, on the 
other hand, claimed he ruled affairs in the New World ‘like an absolute ruler’.97  
Fonseca’s ability to dispense legitimate and legitimising patronage through offices in 
turn strengthened his political standing at court and perpetuated his control over affairs in 
the Americas. It is important to note, however, that Fonseca’s authority derived from his 
position of influence as the broker that guaranteed office-holding and political support in 
Spain for his allies and not because he was the head of some clearly established or legally 
sanctioned bureaucratic hierarchy. His rise and influence were therefore open to emulation 
by new favourites.  
 Without the protection that these trans-Atlantic networks afforded, the authority of 
offices or rewards in America could be undermined by rival appointees or nominal 
subordinates with the ability to appeal more directly to the crown: as another saying went 
only ‘chin to chin honour is respected’.98 Balboa’s undoing is particularly illustrative in this 
regard: the Fonsequistas were able to encourage Balboa’s own partners, like Pedrarias 
Davila, and subordinates, like Francisco Pizarro, to overthrow him in the name of the king 
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despite all the legitimising attributes he had acquired in America. The conspirators were 
then protected from any consequences and even granted authority over Balboa’s 
discoveries through Fonseca’s legitimising organs and his access to the crown in Spain.99 The 
politics of the court in Spain could always trump attempts at political legitimisation in 
America and both remained intimately linked throughout this period. The development of 
Fonseca’s irregular hegemony and the centrality of trans-Atlantic networks of patronage 
and ‘intimate representation’ were symptoms of the paradoxical effects of the ethos of 
hidalgo liberty which emphasised an hidalgo’s notional direct link to the king but often 
bound him to patrons in order to achieve it.   
Hidalgo liberty also affected the ability of Cortés to establish his authority over the 
Spanish settlers. The conquistadores that had elected him and his plan in the cabildo of 
Veracruz in 1519 had been supplemented by relatively large numbers of later arrivals, many 
of whom had originally sailed with Narváez and other captains opposed to Cortés. The men 
that participated in the capture of Tenochtitlan were of mixed loyalties but held together by 
the promise of rewards. When these did not materialise on the scale they had imagined or 
seemed weighted towards the favourites of Cortés, their loyalty began to waver. Cortés 
seemed at first unable to demonstrate that he had the support of the crown or reliable 
means of access to it compared to the Fonsequistas. Furthermore it was galling to many that 
their social equal was appropriating the trappings of power, surrounding himself with a 
noble indigenous entourage and seemed to be governing them whimsically without royal 
sanction.100 
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Cortés almost ended up like Balboa. The Fonsequistas launched a concerted effort 
involving force, political manoeuvring and the law to destroy Cortés which continued from 
Narváez’s expedition in 1520 until Fonseca’s death in 1524.  They almost succeeded on 
several occasions, in the last and most transcendental instance convincing Cristobal de Olíd 
to rebel in Honduras in 1524. The unprecedented scale of Cortés’s achievement may have 
encouraged greater loyalty from his followers than that given to other commanders in 
America, but it could just as easily feed on their ambition instead.  
Cortés survived because, fortunately for him, he had become politically useful to 
rising new courtiers that wanted to displace Fonseca and dominate the American sphere in 
order to take advantage of the opportunities that New Spain offered and thereby 
strengthen their political standing at court. Ambitious courtiers of the king’s inner circle like 
the Duke of Béjar and in particular Francisco de los Cobos soon displaced Fonseca and 
eventually Gattinara as well.101 These political calculations allowed the agents of Cortés at 
court a chance to circumvent Fonseca’s hostile network and strike a deal directly with new 
favourites.  
Rather than enforcing the rival claims of Fonsequistas, the crown granted Cortés the 
governorship of New Spain in October 1522, praising ‘his deeds in service of God and [the 
king]’ although he and his captains were put on the probation implicit in the trials of 
residencia ordered by the crown.102 For the moment Cortés was also allowed to arrange 
matters in New Spain in his own way even if it contravened direct royal instructions.103 On 
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the other hand Fonseca was accused of corrupt favouritism, particularly in his collusion with 
Diego Velázquez; which prompted him to withdraw from court altogether.104 
Interests of the court 
The interests of the court soon prevailed over those of Cortés. Power was 
increasingly centralised at the Spanish court, or more specifically around the domineering 
orbit of the rising star Francisco de los Cobos. By 1523 he was secretary of every Council of 
state except three, and increasingly displaced or absorbed other networks of patronage as 
he outmanoeuvred the elderly Italian Gattinara for influence within Castile.105 Offices and 
rewards went primarily to family members and allies of Cobos from the Castilian court 
throughout the lands that owed obedience to Charles as the king of Spain. Outside Castile 
local agents like Cardinal Colonna, who had been governing Naples, or conquistador 
captains like Hernán Cortés were side-lined as the highest representatives of royal authority 
in favour of the favourite’s adherents, tying the politics of the Spanish court to the 
development of its imperial administration. 
The political interests of the new courtiers can be seen most clearly in the choice of 
royal officials that were appointed to New Spain. None were Fonseca’s men, let alone 
‘professional’ bureaucrats; instead all were veterans of the comunero uprising, trusted 
courtiers or adherents of the rising favourite Cobos. The factor Gonzalo de Salazar had been 
a page at court since he was a child and had subsequently aligned himself with the network 
of patronage that Cobos had established in eastern Andalucía of which Peralmíndez Chirino, 
the veedor, also formed part. The treasurer Alonso de Estrada was considered an 
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illegitimate son of King Ferdinand. He grew up at the royal court and was entrusted with 
several important military commissions and a naval command in Naples and Sicily for which 
he had been rewarded in Spain with offices and benefices. His reputed birth could have 
been considered a potential nuisance to Charles V but Estrada had displayed loyalty and 
merited some reward. Contador Rodrigo de Albornoz had also made his career at court. 
Before his appointment to New Spain he had been one of Charles V’s personal secretaries 
and had become intimate enough with the monarch to discuss the merits of Mesoamerican 
hunting-hawks in correspondence.106 He was held in such confidence by the Council of the 
Indies and Peter Martyr in particular that he was given a secret code with which to transmit 
delicate information secretly back to the Council without fear of interception.  The higher 
salaries that the Officials received compared to Cortés, for example, also suggest the 
confidence that the king and Cobos placed in these allies and their intentions for them in 
New Spain, much to the conquistador’s chagrin.107  
The later elevation of Nuño de Guzmán to governor of Pánuco and then to president 
of the first audiencia followed the same logic of ‘intimate representation’. He ‘received 
consideration for an appointment in New Spain because of the prestige and service of his 
family, but a far more important factor was Nuño’s own position in the court of Charles 
V.’108 Like the royal officials he belonged to the untitled but upwardly mobile nobility who 
had much to gain from daring services to the crown. He had also been close to Cobos and 
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had served as his secretary before the king’s return to Spain in mid-1522109. All his brothers 
displayed a similar impulse to crown service: of his four brothers, the eldest became a 
prominent Franciscan and was appointed by the order as comisario general of New Spain in 
1531, only for his post to be blocked by the Council of the Indies to avoid further conflict 
between the Guzmanes and fray Juan de Zumárraga the bishop of Mexico. Two were 
amongst the escort which brought the captive Francis I, King of France, to Spain and all 
three were granted membership to the order of Santiago by a grateful king. Like Nuño 
himself, they had all fought for the royal cause during the comunero rebellion. Nuño 
became one of the king’s continos or personal bodyguards along with his brother Gómez 
Suárez and was used for delicate diplomatic missions by the king.  
Cortés tried to take advantage of the opportunity to integrate into the new 
ascendant network by allying himself with these ‘intimate representatives’ of the court, not 
least by granting them some of the richest encomiendas in New Spain:110 López de Gómara 
noted of Cortés’ disposition towards them ‘…as the saying goes The magistrate was their 
father-in law, for they were the henchmen of Secretary Cobos, whom Cortés did not wish to 
offend, lest he suffer in other and more important matters.’111 The problem for Cortés was 
that others followed his reasoning, in particular those whom he had not been able to 
reward sufficiently or who despised him for factional reasons. The royal officials were a 
direct conduit to the court that could by-pass Cortés. As a result their authority in New 
Spain soon became much greater than the official remit of their offices or of comparable 
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treasury officials in Europe and rivalled that of Cortés. The officials came to New Spain with 
their own dependents and their own ambitions for rewards in exchange for serving the 
crown and their allies at court.  It is probably not coincidental that after the death of 
Fonseca and Diego Velázquez in 1524, the royal officials and their patrons began to 
disregard and undermine the authority of Cortés as governor: he had become less useful in 
the political struggles at court in Spain while opposition to his administration in New Spain 
could be harnessed for the officials’ own political advantage. 
Perceptions of the conquistadores 
The disorder that the conflicting authorities and interests brought affected the 
ability of Cortés to govern effectively and undermined both his claims to deserve such 
responsibility and by extension the legitimacy of all conquistador claims to be worthy of 
acting as representatives of royal government. Within months of the conquest Díaz del 
Castillo remembered that Spanish settlers opposed to Cortés began accusing him with 
graffiti verses on the whitewashed walls of his palace in Coyoacan of tyrannical injustice in 
his exercise of power: unjustly favouring his indigenous entourage more than the true 
conquistadores and of setting his own will above that of the king. ‘White walls are the paper 
of fools’ Cortés retorted, only to find the following morning the warning: ‘or rather of the 
wise and of truths and His Majesty will know all very soon’.112 The disastrous expedition to 
Hibueras and political opportunism of the royal officials in Mexico City halted the 
momentum generated by Cortés’ previously continual success. Simmering complaints had 
found a conduit that led them to the crown in the shape of the courtier-officials during 
Cortés’s absence and presumed death in Hibueras. By the time he returned, the officials had 
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created their own power-bases, ‘…there have been in these parts and amongst the vassals 
that have come to lord over the land [and] others to govern, they have counted on the 
Indians for help; one Christian against another…’ complained Albornoz.113 Cortés’ allies in 
Mexico City were displaced and the victors helped themselves to his property.  
Efforts to undermine Cortés in Mexico City combined with the long-standing 
complaints of rivals like Narváez at court and discredited Cortés. Cobos meanwhile 
protected his adherents from their factionalism and mal-administration during these 
years.114 By September 1526 Cortés was informed categorically by Juan de Ribera, his 
representative at court, that he was out of favour.115 An order was made for his arrest and 
his trial was to be conducted by lic. Ponce de León who arrived with a large retinue that 
included several gentlemen ready to take over the government of New Spain. Ponce de 
León and many of his retinue fell ill and died soon after their arrival and the crown 
appointed Alonso de Estrada as interim governor: Cortés on the other hand was exiled from 
Mexico City and left voluntarily. López de Gómara believed that only the timely arrival of 
treasure Cortés sent to the king and the lobbying of the Duke of Béjar (whose niece had by 
then been betrothed to Cortés) at court forestalled the crown long enough to allow him to 
return to Spain to face his accusers.116 
At court in 1528, Cortés had made light of meeting the man who not long before had 
been charged with arresting and decapitating him: ‘long voyages lead to long lies’ he is 
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reputed to have quipped117, but the physical distance of New Spain from the court 
combined with a distance of status, culture and trust undermined his chances, and those of 
other outsiders, of being granted the government of New Spain. Unlike nobleman of bona 
fide name and reputation or the accepted members of trans-Atlantic networks of 
patronage, Cortés was not considered intrinsically trustworthy and was not given the 
benefit of the doubt like Gonzalo de Salazar or Alonso de Estrada who seemed to be 
immune from punishment despite their repeated mismanagement of New Spain. The 
audience in Spain fell back on its underlying suspicions of the virtue of new men like Cortés. 
The literature that accompanied the sense of potential social mobility of the later fifteenth 
and early sixteenth centuries also produced an alternative tradition that associated the rise 
of ‘new men’ with the triumph of hypocrisy: display over substance. It bred a comic 
tradition harking back to Plautus’ Miles Gloriosus, which in Spain was reinterpreted as 
picaresque stories. At the end of Lazarillo de Tormes the eponymous hero believed that due 
to his ‘labours and fatigues [he] could climb the first step towards the good life’. He saved 
enough to ‘dress very honourably, though in the old style’ with a second-hand doublet, 
tunic and cape; finally he bought ‘a sword, one of the old ones of the first kind from Cuéllar’. 
However Lazarillo was not a nobleman, he was the orphaned son of a criminal and a whore 
who by dint of cunning, corruption and hard work had saved enough money to appear 
before the world like the young squire he had briefly served in Toledo as a boy. ‘Since the 
first moment in which I saw myself looking like a gentleman (hombre de bien), I told my 
master to take back his donkey because I no longer wanted to follow that occupation.’ 
Donning his new persona greater opportunities lay open before him and with the help of 
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some friends he ‘achieved [his] purpose which was an oficio real, realising that without 
having one no one can prosper’. Amadís became a prince and married his loyal and beloved 
princess Angelica; Lazarillo ends up as a town crier and wine hawker married to a maid who 
almost certainly cuckolds him with his socially superior patron. The bitter sting in the story 
came from Lazarillo’s interpretation of hidalguía as a purely practical career move which the 
lowliness of his actual achievement belied. It emphasised the shabby supremacy of 
appearance in the afan nobiliario over substance in the claims to hidalguía made by ‘new 
men’.118 
It came down to the attribute of trust. At court in Spain the conquistadores and 
settlers of New Spain were often seen at best as unknown new men come good, at worst as 
picaros out for their own self-interest: an archetype who like Lazarillo (perhaps even more 
literally) had ‘rowed themselves, through strength and guile, to a good harbour’ but lacked 
the real substance of a true noble deserving of autonomous lordship or as Cervantes would 
put it ‘A braggart with sword and wide breeches/ who sacrifices a thousand lives to his own/ 
tired of the office of the pike (pica)/ but not the picaresque profession (officio picaresco)’.119 
The conquistadores overplayed their hand in boasting of their military achievements 
against their various indigenous foes. Accounts of heroic deeds from the New World had to 
appeal to common cultural points of reference which led to the reflex use of rhetorical 
devices to help to convey the notion of their merit which they wished to portray. The 
distrust at court for the inherent qualities of the conquistadores rendered their boasts 
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almost meaningless: hallowed classical models, so ‘good to think with’, threatened to make 
the conquistadores who wrestled with them in their reports seem bombastic and ridiculous: 
could Cortés convince the crown he was greater than Alexander?120 A sceptical metropolitan 
audience interpreted their claims, not as a product of the seemingly superhuman qualities 
of the conquistadores, but as the feebleness of barbarism in the Indians. The Indians were 
soon seen as the victims of greedy bullies: Jerónimo López noted with frustration the 
common attitude of new arrivals from Spain: ‘…those who had come over with the viceroy 
had at first mocked the conquistadores, saying that they were merely conquerors of 
chickens but after [the Mixtón war of 1542] they said that they had never seen a Frenchman 
or a Turk that was as fierce [as the Indians].’121 The self-interest implicit in hypocrisy lent 
credence to accusations of tyrannous behaviour that discredited Cortés’s claims to useful 
service in the government of New Spain: the sort of authority that was coveted the most 
because it determined the just repartimiento of rewards and the political organisation of the 
kingdom.  
Courtliness became an attribute that the settlers had to master in order to present 
their services in the best light: Salazar was known for this ability122 and conquistador 
captains like Pedro de Alvarado, who picked the right ally at court when he became 
dynastically and economically allied to Cobos123, profited from his preponderance as much 
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as Cortés suffered from blunders at court where he alienated Cobos in favour of the duke of 
Béjar: Contemporaries like Díaz del Castillo, who chronicled these missteps, saw the 
importance of such blunders that have too often been dismissed by historians as mere 
gossip.124  
A preference for the intrinsic qualities of noble birth over the new man’s display 
continued to matter throughout this period. Popular stories abounded to demonstrate the 
difference such as the one where ‘emperor Sigismundo [who] was asked [by a loyal servant] 
to turn him into a nobleman, and the emperor answered rich and exempt I can make you, 
but not noble and the reason is this: there are two types of hijosdalgo in Spain: some are of 
blood and others are by privilege’.125 The original conquistadores were unable to fully shake 
off the disadvantage of their birth. In an illustrative outburst of sardonic contempt for this 
prejudice against the conquistadores, Cortés mocked don Luis de Castilla (his new kinsman 
by marriage and direct descended of king Peter I) after his humiliating failure to capture 
Guzmán in 1531, and with him implicitly all the arrogant recent arrivals with resounding 
names whose pretensions floundered in New Spain: ‘My lord don Luis, it pains me that 
things have gone so badly for your lordship... It seems to me that the Castilla in New Spain 
are more suited to very peaceful activities rather than to matters of high-spirits and 
warfare’.126 The epilogue to this anecdote is more revealing. Humiliated don Luis returned 
to Spain soon after. At court, where his brother Diego was master of the horse to the 
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emperor127 the emperor made Luis, scion of the old royal house, a knight of Santiago and 
granted him a life-long seat in the cabildo of Mexico City. Don Luis attached himself to 
Mendoza’s entourage before returning to New Spain. As with Gonzalo de Salazar and other 
courtiers the crown preferred to support their old courtiers and established nobility, despite 
their failures because they trusted them.  
In Spain Cortés was rewarded for his services with the title of marquess, a noble 
marriage and the title of captain general of New Spain but not with the governorship that 
he craved. It had the effect of reinforcing his personal ‘vertical’ links of service to the crown 
but diluted his ‘horizontal’ links with the conquistadores of New Spain, his natural 
constituency. It implied that the conquest in itself was intrinsically insufficient to 
automatically merit the highest mercedes. Unlike the heroes of Granada or the conquerors 
of southern Italy, the king could not even imagine the landscape of his distant possessions in 
New Spain: Mesoamerica had little of the deep emotional significance that imbued Granada 
or Italy with meaning for the judges of merit in Spain and its image was consequently 
dimmed in the royal imagination. All that the king knew about his American subjects’ 
performance came at the remove of accounts which were often conflicting or seemed 
untrustworthy. The disdain of the court for these showy new men and their unjustified and 
threatening new wealth grew entrenched. When Cortés returned to Spain again in 1541 and 
sought another audience, along with Nuño de Guzmán, Hernando Pizarro and Bernal Díaz 
del Castillo, each with their respective retinues, all in unsuitable mourning clothes a full year 
after the death of the empress, the viperous courtiers quickly turned the outsider’s 
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exaggerated punctiliousness in outward appearance of dress into a joke disparaging them as 
nothing more than ‘indianos peruleros enlutados’.128  
According to López de Gómara the king refused to grant Cortés back the government 
of New Spain in 1528 ‘so that no conquistador ever thinks that it is owed to him’.129 This 
verdict was pronounced despite the arrival of the first reports on the maladministration of 
the royal officials and it served as a warning to coincide with the eve of Pizarro’s expedition 
to Peru. Notions of what constituted merit in New Spain became increasingly paradoxical: 
Of the conquistadores no-one could claim greater rewards than Cortés but the crown made 
it clear that he could not be trusted to govern. His discredit affected the crown’s attitude 
towards its obligations to all the conquistadores. This may have had political or economic 
motives but the effect was to subvert the traditional benchmarks of what constituted the 
most deserving service and of the traditional ethos and expectations of warrior-hidalguía in 
New Spain without suggesting a new route to merit.  
Alternatives to conquistador government 
Justice was ‘the highest and most noble virtue in the world, especially because its 
defence, maintenance and execution was entrusted by God to kings.’ 130 This gave lawyers in 
theory a privileged position because they could deploy their expertise in the most useful 
possible service to the commonwealth. The failure of attempts at establishing conquistador 
government meant that the arrival of the letrados that composed the First Audiencia, with a 
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trusted courtier like Guzmán at its head seemed to fulfil the pleas of settlers like Albornoz 
who had warned that ‘nothing will be achieved nor mended until your majesty sends us, as 
soon as possible, the remedy in the shape of a governor and a prudent audiencia without 
covetousness and with authority’.131 The letrados enjoyed immediate ‘expert authority’ and 
consequently they acquired attributes that exceeded that of their counterparts in Europe. 
Their professionalism and links to the letrados of the Council of the Indies appeared to give 
them a greater authority to rule and theoretical proximity to the royal will than other 
settlers. With Guzmán at their head access to the court was guaranteed as well.  
Despite these hopes, the First Audiencia proved incapable of governing effectively. 
Guzmán won over his fellow courtier-officials but at the cost of alienating many followers of 
Cortés who were persecuted and dispossessed. Cortés was unable to protect his property or 
his adherents from Spain while other potential rivals to the audiencia like Alvarado were 
driven from Mexico City. Most seriously, in their bid to extract more tribute from indigenous 
polities Guzmán began revising the arrangements made by Cortés and the indigenous polity 
elites with the support of the mendicant orders.132 As a result the First Audiencia soon 
entered into conflict with the Franciscans led by Zumárraga, who had been appointed 
bishop of Mexico City and granted a potentially decisive authority as ‘protector of the 
Indians.’  
Guzmán’s conflict with the Franciscans and the complaints from the indigenous 
polities brought to the fore and exacerbated previously simmering questions over the 
morality of conquest and the rights of the conquistadores and settlers over the new 
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indigenous vassals of the crown. Fr. Antonio de Montesinos had inaugurated a tortuous and 
at times highly edifying debate taken up by a variety of influential Spanish thinkers about 
the nature of Spanish imperialism with his beautiful sermon on the Sunday before Christmas 
1511 in Hispaniola. The ensuing dispute distorted the traditional benchmarks of legitimacy 
found in the Siete Partidas and its historical manifestations, the very script that the actors 
on the American stage were trying to follow, by emphasising a new moral element to virtue 
that seemed at odds with the warrior ethos.  
Guzmán for example was self-consciously scrupulous about legal formalities, even 
comparing the legality of his own conquest to the illegality of expedition led by Cortés.133 
His discredit was on moral grounds and the expectations placed on royal justice upheld the 
claims of this morality over the letter of the law. From the pulpits of New Spain the 
Franciscans declaimed Guzmán and even excommunicated him. Cortesian foci of discontent 
coalesced around the sympathetic Franciscans to heap complaints on the audiencia.134 The 
mendicant orders had their own trans-Atlantic networks that could be very influential 
because they led back to the king, who was their patron through the Patronato Regio, and 
to the Vatican, from where Spain’s claims to half the globe were justified in exchange for 
evangelical responsibilities, and which consequently gave a European perspective to the 
discredit that could become embarrassing for the king if he did not react. The imminent 
return of Cortés to New Spain with the crown’s support was the final blow to the authority 
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of the First Audiencia. The letrados were recalled in disgrace and Guzmán reverted to the 
fundamental service of ‘increasing [the king’s] land and his honour’ setting off to conquer 
New Galicia in the hope of redemption.  
The moral basis of the complaints against Guzmán as an administrator and a 
conqueror could be used by men like Bartolomé de las Casas to condemn the whole secular 
Spanish presence in New Spain because it too had originated in violence. The new men who 
settled there were characterised once again as self-serving and consequently unfit to rule on 
behalf of the king.  
Many settlers became disillusioned with the possibilities available to them from 
remaining in Mexico City. They were driven away by the discredit they had encountered, the 
paucity of rewards and the political instability; they were lured instead by allegiance or 
dependence on a magnate like Guzmán or Cortés, by the news of new expeditions of 
conquest in other parts of Mesoamerica or stories of the vast moveable wealth that Pizarro 
had uncovered in Peru.135 The Second Audiencia was unable to provide an incentive to stem 
the flow of Spanish settlers from leaving Mexico City. Their policy of encouraging the 
escheat of encomiendas (53 encomiendas escheated under the Second Audiencia) was 
resented while they were unable to provide an alternative means of sustenance for the 
Spaniards that had depended on them. The corregidores that the audiencia appointed to 
run the royally administered polities were despised by the indigenous population because 
they changed every year and did their best to extract as much tribute from them as possible 
to increase their incomes. Furthermore the audiencia often had to turn to neighbouring 
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encomenderos to fulfil the role of corregidores because they were unable to find other 
suitable candidates, concentrating wealth and power amongst the settlers even more. 136 
These settlers reacted by reviving and strengthening the cabildo of Mexico City as a means 
of defending their oligarchic interests.137   
For the first time since the fall of Tenochtitlan indigenous unrest led to armed 
rebellions in central New Spain which were serious enough to result in the capture of 2,000 
prisoners in 1531 after its suppression by Cortés and his lieutenants.138 The foundation of 
Puebla, which already implied a large appropriation of fertile land around Huexotzinco 
faltered and was saved only by the forced labour, and eventually even the forced 
settlement, of indigenous workers from neighbouring polities which caused increasing 
resentment even in key polities like Tlaxcala which still worried Mendoza in 1537.139 
The audiencia relied on Cortés to repress the recalcitrant indigenous polities. There 
was nothing objectionable from the crown’s point of view in Cortés fulfilling his role as 
Captain General except that it made the audiencia beholden to him to the extent that they 
failed to even conduct the review of his marquesado and in particular the counting his 
vassals as instructed by the crown. Cortés was distrusted by the old conquistadores of the 
cabildo and by neighbouring magnates like Guzmán who distanced themselves even further 
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from the audiencia’s authority.140 The reliance on Cortés exacerbated the growing 
decentralisation of authority in New Spain and the rising power of the magnates like 
Guzmán, Alvarado, Montejo and Cortés himself who provided opportunities of traditional 
glamorous opportunities for many frustrated settlers.141  
All of these problems were highlighted in the royal instructions given to Mendoza on 
the eve of his departure.142 The letrado advisors in the Council of the Indies suggested 
sending a ‘Reformer of New Spain’ but Charles V opted for a similar solution to the question 
of governing New Spain as that which he had recently begun to employ in other dominions 
like Naples. The individuals that the crown chose as viceroys shared many characteristics, 
suggesting a similar intention behind their choice. Like Mendoza, Pedro de Toledo, who was 
appointed as viceroy to Naples in 1532, was a younger son of one of the most successful 
dynasties since the Trastámaran usurpation. Both had made their careers as courtiers and 
cemented their reputation for loyalty and merit by fighting for the king against the 
comuneros.143 The crown fell back on intimate representatives but men like Mendoza and 
Toledo belonged to more illustrious families and they were authorised to exercise greater 
powers than similar appointees in the past. Even Cortés’ biographer seemed to agree that 
Mendoza’s birth made him a suitable appointment to govern New Spain.144 The wealth that 
came from the conquest of Peru had reignited the royal imagination and restored the merit 
                                                     
140
 F. López de Gómara Cortés… pp. 395-6; J.L. Martínez Hernán Cortés…p.542-3. 
141
 See Ch.6. 
142
 VEA, docs. 1-4.  
143
 C. J. Hernando Sánchez, Castilla y Napoles en el siglo XVI. El Virrey Pedro de Toledo Linaje Estado y Cultura 
(1532-1553), (Castilla y Leon 1994), p.8f. 
144
 F. López de Gómara, Cortés the life of the conqueror by his secretary. tr.&ed., Lesley Byrd Simpson, 
(California 1965)p. 405. 
73 
 
of conquest. After the departure of so many Spaniards from New Spain the importance of 
secular Spanish settlers, willing to fight for the crown or launch expeditions of exploration 
and conquest, once again became evident to the judges of merit in Spain. Mendoza came 
with instructions to review and reinstate encomienda as a viable reward and the longed for 
promise of perpetuity was again dangled before the noses of the conquistadores. It would 
be in the gift of the viceroy to decide on the repartimiento. In troubled times the crown 
reverted to courtly patrimonial solutions. 
Uncertain legitimacy 
By the time of Mendoza’s appointment, the benchmarks of legitimacy in New Spain 
were contradictory and uncertain, debasing the ideal of hidalguía. The crown claimed to 
recognise that the conquistadores deserved rewards for their services but even the identity 
of the ‘true conquistadores’ was often disputed;  the encomiendas they received resonated 
of feudal titles during the Reconquista but they were not granted in perpetuity and never 
became the equivalent of a baronial grant of the style enjoyed by William the Conqueror’s 
Norman followers or the historical examples Cortés had had in mind, yet the crown did not 
deny this possibility categorically either. In the meantime the conquistador-encomenderos 
became the nominal elite of the Spanish settlers but they were deemed unworthy of 
administrative offices or rights to the dispensation of justice; while courtiers, officials, friars 
and letrados often enjoyed greater authority and wealth because of their implied link to the 
royal will. On the other hand legal formalities mattered but could be overridden by royal 
justice; mendicant morality affected royal justice unless it interfered too much with its 
economic or security interests.  
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The ideal of hidalgo liberty the secular Spanish elite in New Spain aspired to created 
an illusionary identity for them as direct vassals of the king.  This exaggerated the settlers’ 
intellectual link to royal justice but made them dependent on trans-Atlantic networks of 
patronage and dependence in order to represent their merits and interests to the crown: 
their ‘mind-forged manacles’ kept the settlers loyal to the crown rather than to each other 
or the local arrangements made by the hierarchical structures that were created in New 
Spain. This meant that the patronage of magnates became increasingly important fracturing 
authority in New Spain between the various foci of political power. The uncertainty and 
illusory quality of status and self-perception was echoed in the literature of New Spain: 
‘Mines without silver, or even real miners,/merchants greedily eager to possess them/  
knights, of being such wishful, but in fact pretentious tavern-keepers… a thousand 
pretenders hanging from the viceroy…’145  
Despite these uncertainties there remained a sense of potential for those that had 
been able to endure in New Spain. Most of them had improved their status or still hoped to 
do so, the others had emigrated. In addition to exemption from direct taxation, the 
conquistadores that applied for licences of hidalguía generally received them and were 
granted the coats of arms to carve, like Díaz del Castillo, above the entrance to their houses; 
and a large proportion of the conquistadores and prominent settlers enjoyed tributary 
rights, even if these were temporary or conditional. Service remained the avenue to self-
improvement and the chivalric ethos that it entailed endured:146 Hernando de Illescas for 
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example had been forced to sell his house in Santiago de los Caballeros in Guatemala and 
lived in an impoverished hut in the wilderness but people commented approvingly that 
‘despite his poverty he treated himself with honour and always kept two fine horses and 
weapons’;147 these and the hope of eventual recognition were always the last to go: Baltasar 
Dorantes de Carranza, like Bernal a polemical defender of the rights of ‘true’ 
conquistadores, insisted he had helped to bury men who had died of starvation rather than 
work for a salary or in some trade, in their stubborn insistence on their honour. The hope 
that honour and ennobled status would be rewarded eventually could drive men to such 
lengths. The ethos of service united the legitimate aspirations of the conquistadores and 
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Chapter 3: Tlatocayotl up to 1535 
 
Waiting to embark on the flotilla bound for New Spain in 1535 along with the newly 
appointed viceroy Antonio de Mendoza and his entourage, which included the nahuatlato 
Pedro Garcia,148 were three Tlaxcalan lords who, on being baptised, had taken the names 
don Diego Maxixcatzin (though strictly speaking his surname should have been 
Tlilquiyahuatzin), don Martín, and don Sebastián. They had been in Spain, petitioning the 
emperor for a year, accompanied at first by the judge Juan de Salmerón who had formed 
part of the conciliatory Second Audiencia that had been governing New Spain since 1530.149 
Charles V had taken a personal interest in his new American subjects, even making a habit of 
giving his visiting petitioners velvet capes to protect them from the cold.150 The Tlaxcalan 
lords’ effective personal presentation of their services to the emperor produced the desired 
effect: don Diego was confirmed as governor of Tlaxcala and head of the cabecera of 
Ocotelulco and the Maxixcatzin clan despite rival claims in Tlaxcala;151 the king also 
promulgated two cédulas to reward Tlaxcala: one guaranteed that Tlaxcala and her 
hinterland would always be governed directly for the crown by her own elites without 
further Spanish intermediaries; the second granted her a Spanish-style coat of arms and the 
title of ‘Loyal City of Tlaxcala’ in recognition for her services since 1520. What was not 
stipulated explicitly was that Don Diego Maxixcatzin would dominate Tlaxcalan politics 
throughout the 1530s until his death or that his kinsmen from Ocotelulco would hold the co-
                                                     
148
  VEA, ‘Mendoza’… Doc.8.  
149
  Charles V was in Spain from April 1533 to April 1535. See J.H. Elliott, Imperial Spain… p. 164.  
150
 H. Thomas, Conquest p.598, S. Wood Transcending Conquest (Oklahoma, 2003) p.40.  
151
 C. Gibson Tlaxcala en el siglo XVI, (Mexico, 1991), p.105.   
77 
 
governorship for the next decade; or that he and his two companions would be given 
preferential treatment by the viceroy, shown in part by granting them formal licences to 
carry European swords and for Don Sebastián to ride horses as well- a favour that would be 
extended to other relatives like Don Francisco Maxixcatzin.152  
Three vectors took a Tlaxcalan lord like don Diego Maxixcatzin to present himself 
before Charles V: indigenous concepts of nobility; the whirlwind of events that led to the 
overthrow of the imperial polity of Tenochtitlan and its rebirth as Mexico City; and thirdly 
developing Spanish notions of Mesoamerican political legitimacy which interacted with 
memories and representations of the conquest and pre-conquest past. 
Pre-Conquest ‘polity-nobility’ 
For the preponderantly Nahua-speaking polities the inherited sense of nobility was 
complicated by their particular foundation myths. Noblemen differentiated themselves 
sharply from the rest of the population. Pilli, the generic name for nobleman in Nahuatl, like 
the Spanish term hidalgo, meant ‘son of something’ and these patricians considered 
themselves as such because they were descended from past elites who claimed 
responsibility for the greatness of their communities.  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Castilian hidalgo’s creation myth in the 
sixteenth century sprung from a combination of the ennobling resistance in Asturias to the 
Moorish conquest with the subsequent re-conquest of the peninsula and of their ancient 
Visigothic and Roman inheritance. For the Nahuas, Otomi, Purehpecha, Mixtecs, Zapotecs 
and a host of other dominant ethno-linguistic cultures in Mesoamerica the sense of lordship 
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was more akin to the triumphalist usurpations of the competing Germanic barbarian 
leadership after they crossed the Roman limes, occupying and parcelling out parts the old 
empire. Both had two origin myths that justified the dominance of their elites: one that 
looked back to the dynasties that led their conquering migrations and another that 
identified with descent from the prestigious ancient cultures they had overcome. For the 
Nahuas who dominated central Mesoamerica and whose language, colonists and certain 
cultural attributes had spread even beyond, a nomadic warrior past combined with the 
inheritance of Tula.153 
The very titles of the Nahua princes, such as Chichimecatecuhtli, the appellation of 
the princes of Texcoco meaning Chichimeca-lord, proclaimed their nomadic origins; even if 
they adopted many of the customs of the settled populations they overcame, they retained 
echoes of their tough war-like nomadic past, like Ottoman horse-mane standards and 
Istanbul’s Topkapi palace’s evocation of camp-sites on the steppe. It was engrained enough 
that Don Francisco de Sandoval Acazitli, prince of Tlalmanalco, danced in armour and ‘sang 
the Chichimeca songs’ to celebrate Christmas 1541 under the peaks of Xalpa, deep in 
Chichimeca (more accurately Caxcan) country, with their recent (and excitingly authentic) 
Chichimeca collaborator Don Pedro during a cherished lull in the Mixtón War ending in the 
exchange of gifts and a firm friendship between the two men.154  
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These dual origin myths did not create a sense of solidarity amongst the Nahua-
speaking elites of the different polities or between them and other cultural and linguistic 
groups that inhabited Mesoamerica within and beyond Tenochtitlan’s empire. Instead they 
helped to justify the many levels of identity and dominance within these groups. For 
example the Nahua speakers considered their close Otomi neighbours as boorish even 
though they too were descendants of Chichimeca immigrants and often formed active (if 
unequal) part of close-knit confederations like Tlaxcala.155 These differences mattered even 
amongst the Nahua-speakers and created prejudices like those felt by the Texcocans 
towards the Mexica for being more recent immigrants barely escaped from their previously 
servile status.156 Within the Chalca confederacy, the lords of Tlalmanalco who claimed 
descent from the ‘followers of Red Tezcatlipoca,’ were by tradition a more exalted (possibly 
more anciently settled) group than the rest of the Chalca and consequently enjoyed 
precedence over their neighbours, embodied in their titles teohua teuhctli and tlatic 
teuhctli. Yet such was the mosaic of loyalties within a polity that despite the fact that the 
suburb of Sula within Tlalmanalco had long been considered as part of the larger town its 
inhabitants proudly retained the collective memory of two powerful independent ancestral 
leaders.157  
Nahuas maintained deep reverence for the more ancient cultures they had 
encountered and supplanted. Famously the entire Mexica nobility, who were among the last 
groups to migrate to central Mesoamerica liked to claim descent from their foreign prince 
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Acampichtli - a scion of the royal family of the more ancient polity of Culhuacan - and the 
various Mexica ladies he took as his brides. Motecuhzoma Xocoyotzin emphasised this 
aspect of his nobility throughout his life, taking as his first wife, when he was still only a 
promising young noble warrior, a princess from Tula- by the 15th century a provincial 
backwater, but in the collective memory of central Mesoamerica the capital of the seminal 
Toltec civilisation.158 Motecuhzoma was thus emphasising a lineage that dated back to 
Chalchiutlantzin who ruled Tula in 562 AD and an imperial tradition that resonated with 
Motecuhzoma’s image of the Tenochca Empire. These layers of identity and legitimacy 
mattered depending on the context in which they were expressed, and were often exploited 
for political ends before and after the conquest as we shall see. 
Another determining element that confused the issue of nobility was Nahua 
attitudes to marriage and succession. Regard for birth was ubiquitous in Mesoamerica and 
pre-conquest tlatocamecayotl (genealogies of lordship) amongst a tlatocatlacamecayotl 
(ruling dynasty) that survive to this day along with post-conquest dynastic accounts attest to 
its importance in determining status. Tellingly these genealogies tend to highlight the 
continuity between individuals that held lordship within a single extended clan, rather than 
lineal familial inheritance by primogeniture.  
In the polities of Mesoamerica all the offspring of a pilli (nobleman) could claim -if 
not always secure - the respective privileges of nobility. Potentially each new generation 
could produce a very large number of noblemen: prince Nezahualpilli of Texcoco for 
instance was reputed to have engendered 144 offspring with his various wives. This could 
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have important consequences for an individual’s status and the cohesion of a community’s 
nobility as a caste. Not all potential noblemen could be accommodated so that each 
generation saw a proportion of the nobility by birth displaced in favour of the new tlatoani’s 
favoured kinsmen and descendants. One of Motecuhzoma Xocoyotzin’s first acts after being 
elected was to purge the royal palace of a large number of individuals whose interests and 
status were linked to the previous generation, accumulated by the successive reigns of 
three brothers. This retrenchment was designed to redefine the nobility of Tenochtitlan and 
effectively meant the derogation of many from noble status. Impoverished noblemen or 
factions and branches that lost out in the political struggles faced being subsumed within 
the general mass of the plebeian population. In Tlaxcala (and elsewhere) the ambiguous 
status of these individuals earned them the denomination teixhuiuh literally ‘the grandsons 
of someone [important]’ to contrast them with pilli (son of someone) and in some cases this 
could be literally true if a ruler like Nezahualpilli or Acampichtli’s many offspring came to 
dominate an altepetl’s palaces to the detriment of their cousins.  
Individual Mesoamerican noblemen owned land that was worked for them by serf-
like dependents or tenant farmers known variously (from post conquest documents) as 
mayeques, naborias or terrazgueros. The majority of the population of most polities was 
composed of small land-owners with varying private and communal labour arrangements; 
these included rotations of communal labour for the polity directed by the nobility. 
Nevertheless, notions of Mesoamerican nobility tended to be in essence more lordly or 
seigniorial than property-owning or patrimonial.159 Noble status and its attributes were 
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intrinsically linked to political power within the polities rather than to clear-cut patrimonial 
structures of inheritance. 
Fears of such generational derogation are evident in the Huehuehtlahtolli: whatever 
you do, one dialogue warns: ‘don’t lose your station, don’t lose your command; don’t dive 
into the water, don’t jump from the cliff (ie. Don’t risk everything on an uncertain or risky 
venture), don’t lose strength, don’t lose consciousness.’160 Otherwise ‘there you will lose 
your lineage, the bond with your descendants; you will deserve the old truss, the old cape.’ 
To do so might condemn one’s family to live harsh lives far from grace or civilisation or the 
tecpan ‘…you will be cast away, you will be persecuted, you will make rabbits, you will make 
deer of your wife and your children. Nowhere will be your house, you will never see the 
interior of your home...’ 161 Laments over such a fate remained a common feature of post-
conquest literature and petitions. In pre-conquest polities the stakes were high enough that 
it was not unusual for a ‘blood-bath’ to accompany a disputed succession.162 
Such struggles and other more peaceful competition aimed at control of the fixed 
number of titles and benefices within each polity. These were inextricably linked to control 
of a polity’s palaces. In Mesoamerica, palaces harked back to the collective foundation 
myths of individual polities and were essential to a polity’s sense of identity. Etymologically 
the various names for palaces like tecpan or tecalli were derivations of ‘lord’s house’. 
Settlements had coalesced around the palaces of the leaders of the new immigrant elites. A 
similar pattern of political organisation seems to have arisen throughout Mesoamerica: a 
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polity, ruled by a prince, was composed of constituent units- ‘districts’-, in Nahuatl calpolli 
or tlaxicalli- ruled by a ‘lord’- teuctli in Nahuatl.163 Each of these districts notionally recalled 
one of the migratory groups that had come to constitute the polity; however, the number of 
districts (usually four, eight or seven) was tailored to artificial numerological or practical 
considerations, rather than historical accident.164 This suggests that the polities were 
organised around ‘rational’ lines, pointing to the power of the palace-dwelling elites in 
shaping their societies.165 The population of each district, however ethnically or linguistically 
diverse, identified with a dynastic governing palace –hence, for instance, the literal meaning 
of calpolli: ‘large house’- and their ancestral divinity’s temple; there were no other civic 
buildings of any significance like a Hispanic cabildo in the polities. A dominant district 
provided the prince of the polity as a whole, though this could change generationally.166  
Further sub-divisions could occur within some of the larger districts, each 
represented by its own smaller palace. The limits of an urban area did not necessarily 
denote the limits of an individual polity’s sense of community, which could include scattered 
hamlets or townships ‘beyond the pale’ or what Spaniards often took to be subject towns to 
a cabecera or capital city: identity was defined more accurately by loyalty and ties of 
obedience and tribute owed to the dynastic head of the palace to the lords of each district 
and through them to the prince of their polity as a whole. The very physical and 
psychological layout of indigenous districts within a single polity spoke to the importance of 
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the palaces and their noble inhabitants for a community’s identity and cohesion. As 
Lockhart has observed, ‘neither the teuctli nor the pilli existed separately from the teccalli 
(palace)’.167 
Fray Bernardino de Sahagún’s Nahua informants described such palaces often and 
unequivocally: ‘royal houses, where the lords live. They were the houses of the polity (‘casas 
del pueblo’) where the law-courts gathered and the lords came together to determine 
public affairs’. In surviving pictograms and codices stylised Mesoamerican lords are almost 
always depicted sitting inside or outside their palace in a linked conceptual identity. 
Conversly the conquest of a polity was represented using the image of a captured lord being 
dragged away from his toppled palace. Titles were linked to the control of palaces or to 
offices within them. They had entailed labour and tribute dues to maintain these 
institutional complexes that were independent of the individual holder but were enjoyed by 
the prince or lord that had been elected or selected to rule from there: the palaces were 
thus the embodiment of tlatocayotl in the polity. 
Sahagún’s Florentine Codex also contains a detailed chapter dedicated specifically to 
describing the role and importance Motecuhzoma’s tecpan.168 In it his informants listed and 
named various chambers in which justice was dispensed in courts and ‘audiencias’ for 
various different offences and social ranks (the tlacxitlan for criminal cases and the teccalli 
or teccalco for civil cases and the tecpilcalli to pass judgement exclusively on noblemen-
warriors. A different room housed the council of war (tequihuacacalli) where military 
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commanders were named and appointed; another chamber for the construction of public 
works (cuicacalli); there were quarters to host and entertain visitors and even enemy 
emissaries under the protection of safe-passage and store-rooms to see them leave with 
presents as guest-friends (coacalli- surely where Cortés and company were received) there 
was also a prison (malcalli); rooms for the many entertainers, musicians and hangers-on 
that made palace life pleasant (the mixcoacalli).169 
The palaces were the setting for all diplomatic relations and internal political 
decision-making: In times of crisis councils that included all the polity’s noblemen gathered 
in the principal palace. In Tlaxcala for instance a council of 220 noblemen continued to 
assemble into the post-conquest period.170 Motecuhzoma’s palace impressed those Spanish 
conquistadors who described it as well, not least because they were able to grasp the 
significance to Mesoamerican society of those palatial functions that seemed ostensibly 
familiar to those discharged within the European palaces. 
If, as Sahagún’s informants imply their descriptions can be generalised to palaces 
throughout Mesoamerica,171 then within the palaces there were also administrative offices 
(calpixcalli) that dealt with the collection and accounting of the goods accumulated and 
enjoyed by those in charge of the palace. These included tribute owed to the prince or lord 
of the palace along with the produce, especially the food-stuffs, of the palace’s entailed land 
and labour and presumably also including whatever private income the lord possessed as 
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well. Apart from the tributary or tax dues paid to a palace each was endowed with lands 
(tecpantlalli) and the labour service of tenant farmers and serfs for its upkeep, along with 
the rotating labour dues of free macehual vassals that were entailed to the palace itself and 
not the private property of its current lord.172 These goods were kept in the storehouses of 
the palace (petlacalco) and supervised by a further official. These storage rooms must have 
been very large since they sufficed ‘for the provision of the city and republic’ according to 
Sahagún’s informants who claimed that there was enough space in just one of the several 
maize storage-rooms (the total number is unspecified) in Motecuhzoma’s palace for 2000 
fanegas - about 110,000 litres - while similar rooms stored quantities of other staple goods 
including the all-important salt reserves and various seeds for future harvests. Díaz del 
Castillo also dwelt on the size of the palace, the number of rooms and its uses and added to 
those already described, Motecuhzoma’s large armoury and a room with many idols.173 
A palace’s practical influence over its polity or district was underwritten by its use as 
the community’s most important storehouse: there is no record of other communal 
granaries or public storage facilities. Even in times of plenty, the non-monetised barter 
economy of Mesoamerica meant that the palace nobility could corner valuable resources, 
control their distribution through patronage and regulate regional markets more easily.174 
This last was an attribute of their tlatocayotl and they could expect to collect dues from 
these markets as well, which were an important addition to their income.  
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Palace store-rooms also helped to concentrate power in the hands of the nobility 
because the surplus of goods within supplied the polity’s military activity or fed allied or 
imperial armies marching through their territory. Luxury products received as tribute or 
through trade were also kept in the palaces, allowing the princes to dispense largesse and 
patronage to their family and allies. Given perennial food shortages that plagued 
Mesoamerica –whose agriculture was so dependent on rain- and the importance of rare 
luxury products these reserves may have served to stabilise the community’s food supply 
and strengthen the paternalistic patronage-based power of the palace-nobility.175 
Unsurprisingly the palaces became the setting for the assignment of offices and 
appointments, leading to the development of a recognisably courtly and patronage-based 
culture of petitioners, negotiators and attendants at the palace.176 
A nobleman’s power, his sense of legitimacy and to some extent his identity was also 
bound up with his position within the palace hierarchy. This nexus was expressed in the 
convoluted rites and ceremonies that accompanied the inauguration of a new lordship, 
where only the temple and the image of the local deity competed with the palace as a 
setting for the legitimising ceremonial.177  
In order to try to resolve the potential political tensions that this concentration of 
power could create, Mesoamerican polities relied on elections or selections to complement 
dynastic inheritance and determine and emphasise the legitimacy of an office holder. They 
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considered ennobling attributes of excellence and virtue that the elected were supposed to 
possess. This has led some writers to view Nahua society as meritocratic.178 However, it 
should be emphasised that the electors, the elected and the disenfranchised were self-
consciously exclusive members of a jealous competitive and (if we can extrapolated from 
information of the viceregal period) large elite that emphasised noble virtues as a means of 
gaining and justifying political power and the favour of the gods. This in turn had important 
consequences for elite attitudes and behaviour.   
A concept of legitimising noble virtue developed as the operative intellectual 
justification for nobility. It followed a powerful paternalist ethos of government, personal 
service and loyalty to the polity, deeply rooted in the rituals and teachings that sustained 
Nahua notions of nobility and patriotism. These took many forms: palace walls were hung 
with what would later be termed lienzos or painted with frescoes that described the more 
glorious episodes of the polity or its dynasty’s past triumphs, from divinely inspired 
migrations to successful military exploits, in pictographic terms not too unlike in concept to 
the tapestries and murals of European palaces.179 The verses of the Huehuehtlahtolli, or 
‘ancient words’ expressed these ideals in memorable verses spoken as ritualised dialogues 
that Nahua noblemen learnt by heart and recited to the rhythmic beating of a Tlatol drum. 
The Huehuehtlahtolli that survive were compiled from various oral-sources throughout the 
sixteenth century, most notably by fr. Bernardino de Sahagún. On the whole they represent 
a pre-conquest tradition that survived the conquest, in part because they were so 
recognisable to Europeans- particularly the friars that lived amongst the Indians. It is also 
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remarkable how seamlessly the Huehuehtlahtolli came to incorporate Christian imagery and 
Castilian administrative titles into their traditional expressions of morality, beauty, and 
society. 
In worldly terms the advice given to young noblemen would not seem out of place 
amongst similar dialogues found from Homer to Castiglione’s courtiers, were it not for the 
references to Jaguars and Quetzal feathers. In one dialogue the father asked of his son ‘Will 
you defend and give lustre to your nobility; that of your descendants; that which carries the 
attribute of the eagle, the jaguar and will you work hard like the eagle, like the jaguar that 
you may walk tall like them?’180. Like most European nobles they associated nobility with 
predatory animals in contrast to the vulnerable rabbits and deer referred to later of the 
poor the vulnerable and the dispossessed. Later the nobleman was urged to take his 
opportunities and display his virtue to assure preferential treatment: ‘Only tell the truth, 
that which is straight with regards to whether you can accomplish a mission or if it is 
impossible; but don’t proclaim it half-heartedly, or someone else might get the command… 
position yourself well, take charge of things well, fix them well, throw down roots…’181. 
There is much emphasis on discipline and responsibility whether to parents, the community 
or in the versions we know to God, Jesus and the Virgin Mary. ‘Don’t become vain and 
boastful [along with those who exploit their lordship] just because you have lineage. It is 
meet that you should lower your head; that you bend down with humility, that you up-hold 
your self-respect… In this way [courteously] you will talk with [the people] and they will be 
grateful; they will recognise in you one of lineage, who doesn’t get drunk with power, who 
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does not become arrogant with his nobility, the bond of lineage.’ As leaders of men they 
had to struggle constantly ‘because you are the mother of the people, their father; because 
you educate men, you teach them; you are their protector, the one with the broad back 
who carries them; what you carry on your back is great indeed, great is your responsibility, 
because you are ceiba, ahuehuete; because you give shadow, you give protection; you give 
shelter; you are the relief and the remedy. Next to you come your vassals, those who share 
your blood and your colour; those who rise from you, your dependants, your family, your 
relatives, your kin…’ To behave like a true lord will guarantee that ‘your fame will never be 
forgotten or lost…God, lord of the earth has favoured you; let Him give you honour, 
heighten your attributes of mother, of father, your charge, your lordship, your government, 
your fame, your honour…’; They often end with the admonition to ‘work hard my son!’ Such 
admonitions were a constant reminder of the importance of lordship rather than merely 
received nobility within the polity and the competitive ethos that maintained it. As with 
Spanish hidalguía virtue played an important part in the ‘ideals of life’ of Mesoamerican 
noblemen echoed in other sources such as Sahagún’s tenth book.182  
Similar intentions are evident behind the rituals that accompanied the selection or 
election of a new lord or a prince. According to Sahagún’s understanding of his informants, 
when a lord or prince died all the more prominent nobles of various degrees and stations 
gathered in the tecpan to deliberate upon his successor by unanimous consent, choosing 
‘one of the most noble of the line of the previous lords, who was a brave man, well versed in 
war-like matters, daring and full of spirit, who did not know how to drink wine, who was 
prudent and wise, who had been brought up in the calmecac, who was eloquent and well 
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informed and honest and loving’. At the climax of the ritual process that followed the 
virtuous man’s election, after weeks and even months of rites that involved cleansing, 
fasting, self-sacrificial acts and the constant distribution of presents and the hosting of 
banquets to the nobility that had elected him and the priesthood that had blessed him; he 
was left (symbolically?) bereft of property and alone in his palace at which point his 
‘afflicted’ relatives and their plebeian vassals  would come to redeem him- renewing the 
bonds and covenants between lord and community tangibly represented in these 
memorable displays of a community’s renewed solidarity: ‘and though everything he had 
given and spent had come from them, they in turn offered to give him everything they 
possessed because he had been left with nothing, because they had pity on him and 
because he would take it anyway if they did not give it to him.’183  
Like their Spanish counterparts the Nahua nobility’s most prestigious service to their 
polities came from their leadership and participation in warfare which in pre-conquest 
Mesoamerica had become ‘procedural’:184 ‘The most principal office of a lord is warfare 
either to defend himself from his enemies or to conquer foreign provinces’.185 Prowess in 
warfare was often quantifiably linked to the capture of enemy warriors, destined to 
enslavement or the appeasement of the Gods and glory of the polity through prestigious 
human sacrifices; in both cases redounding to the fame of their captor: ‘…reports were 
made of who had done best in combat, that they may be rewarded with honour and gifts, 
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especially if they were of noble lineage.’186 As the quotation suggests, and as Spanish new 
men discovered in their own culture, the odds were stacked in favour of the established 
nobility because of their access to centres of patronage and material advantages in 
weaponry and training. Given the competition amongst the nobility and their extended 
kinship groups for the highest positions in the polity, conspicuous displays of martial virtue 
by individual noblemen were common. These were accompanied by the various symbols of 
prowess and the privileges or distinguishing accoutrements of dress that marked out a 
successful warrior from his peers. Other indications were the displays of bravado in the 
Tlacaxipehualiztli festival where warriors fought captured prisoners in single gladiatorial 
combat over ‘sun-stones’ like the totemic monolith often misnamed the ‘Aztec calendar’, 
now displayed in Mexico City’s Anthropology museum. The loser was offered to the gods. 
This suggests to me that capturing prisoners was difficult and dangerous compared to more 
common slaughter and not that pre-Columbian warriors were averse to killing on the 
battlefield. Certainly there are plenty of instances of very bloody confrontations like the 
reputed deaths of 20,000 Mexica soldiers at the hands of the Purehpecha in Axayacatl’s 
reign, whose bones were still visible on the battlefield, like those of Quintilius Varus’s 
legions, to Spaniards in the mid sixteenth century.187 
Noble ‘ideals of life’ mattered to the extent that if displayed by plebeians, they could 
be ennobling. Through military excellence macehuales were known to have ascended to 
positions of prominence, in the first generation at least as a cuauhpilli the term applied to 
nobleman by merit in Nahuatl (literally son of an eagle or noble eagle) who often served in 
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war councils and as commanders in subsequent campaigns and were ideally suited as 
independent cuauhtlatoani or outsider interim governors while a succession to a palace was 
decided and the rituals completed. In Mesoamerica, as in contemporary Spain, there was 
scope for merit to be rewarded within a ‘principle of association’ with noble values, as well 
as the notion of rewards in exchange for services to the commonwealth. As in Europe this 
was a particularly valid proposition for enterprising individuals in dynamic expanding polities 
like the Mexica who could afford to reward a larger proportion of their population. The 
cuauhpilli could preside over their own acknowledged household called a 
yaotequihuacacalli, though on a much smaller scale than a tecpan.188 
Wealth too seems to have eased the path to nobility; mercantile entrepreneurs or 
pochteca held a privileged position within the plebeian classes. They were exempt from 
direct tribute on staple agricultural products or from personal services to the lords in 
exchange for a levy on the more exotic products they traded and of course they were bound 
by the lord’s control and organisation of the markets. They also enjoyed social prestige from 
their knowledge of routes to distant areas, as well as their many distant contacts and for the 
news they brought from the territories they visited. Consequently the wealthier pochteca 
were known to have married into noble families and for their descendants to have enjoyed 
the attributes of nobility forming a part of the hereditary palace cliques within the districts 
or polities.189 
The pochteca and the cuauhpilli pointed the way to recognised paths for plebeian 
advancement within these hierarchical societies. On the other hand there were also many 
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impoverished noblemen and women who subsisted on the patronage of their wealthier 
kinsmen in exchange for various often lowly services which ranged from fighting in wars to 
serving in lowly administrative positions or even working as craftsmen, since learning 
various craftsmen’s skills formed part of the early education of a nahua nobleman. Like poor 
hidalgos these lowlier noblemen were constantly at risk of being subsumed within the 
general mass of plebeians. They evoke the hidalgos labriegos common throughout Spain or 
those who merely cherished the notional nobility of any ‘old Christian’ lost by the caprices 
of fortune, who offered potentially the most dynamic element of society.  
Supra-polity modifiers to traditional tlatocayotl 
A final variant to securing tlatocayotl that polity elites incorporated into their 
outlook involved the opportunities and dangers of forming part of one of the confederations 
or empires that dominated much of Mesoamerica. Confederations like Tlaxcala or the 
Chalca coordinated some elements of polity decision-making like foreign policy or the 
election of lords or the distribution of commissions and rewards that affected all 
communities. Even the highly unified confederacy of Tlaxcala which was composed of four 
principal altepetl that acted in close consultation, did not synoekise into a single greater 
altepetl in the pre-conquest period. An extension of this were the ‘empires’ of 
Mesoamerica, like the Cazonci’s Purehpecha domains in Michoacán centred around lake 
Pátzcuaro but maintained by territorial dynasts; or the confederation of altepetl led by 
Tenochtitlan which controlled the largest tributary empire in Mesoamerica. These supra-
polity organisations never supplanted the polity as the basic political unit. The Mexica even 
remained divided between the altepetl of Tenochtitlan and Tlatelolco within their lake-
bound island of eight to thirteen kilometres squared. The ‘Mexica’ Empire, was a shared 
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venture of mutual advantage between four altepetl (three after Tenochtitlan’s suppression 
of Tlatelolco in c.1473), each with its own dominion: Texcoco’s acolhua; Tacuba to the West 
and Tlatelolco to the north and Tenochca extended in all directions but predominantly to 
the south.190 Tenochtitlan’s empire was essentially parasitic and served the polity’s 
interests.  
From 1502 Motecuhzoma Xocoyotzin was the huey tlatoani (high prince) of 
Tenochtitlan but he had no other regal title that implied any identification, individual 
relation or rights over the polities subjected to his own beyond Tenochtitlan’s parasitic 
demands for tribute and military assistance or the dynastic bonds contracted with other 
ruling dynasties. Nor was the Tenochca Empire presented as a hyper-altepetl with the 
subject polities as its calpolli in the same way that European kingdoms included seigniorial 
and civic-republican traditions within one common identity as a kingdom.  
For Motecuhzoma and the Tenochca nobility the protective feelings towards their 
subjects that were extolled in the Huehuehtlatohlli extended only to the Tenochca polity or 
their kinsmen in other polities. Codex Mendoza illustrates the militaristic mind-set of 
dominion graphically in the depiction of Mexica rulers toppling the palaces and temples of 
conquered altepetl. Tribute and prestige through religious-military glory were the objectives 
of domination. There was no imperial institutional mechanism for the representation of the 
subject polity’s grievances apart from the diplomatic deputations one might expect between 
different polities. Instead remonstrance took the form of frequent rebellions, which may 
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explain why in the surviving catalogues of Tenochca conquest, the same provinces appear 
more than once.  
According to viceregal-period traditions, Tenochtitlan’s hegemony began as a 
rebellion of allied polities against the empire of Azcapotzalco and her allies, but had 
expanded into an empire by conquest or intimidation, as might be expected from this 
fractured world. This made relations between the subject altepetl elites and Tenochtitlan 
relatively simple, if not necessarily amicable. After they had been bullied into compliance, or 
overcome militarily, a subject altepetl’s elites could expect to maintain their own power and 
wealth within their communities.  By the time the Spaniards arrived, Tenochtitlan received 
the tribute or military support of around four-hundred other individual polities. With the 
influx of tribute and the accompanying commercial activity, the island-city’s population 
swelled with immigrants who were in turn increasingly dependent on the tribute of 
subjected polities. Tenochtitlan’s population and the expansion and experience of the city’s 
extended warrior-nobility, made her a formidable military power relative to any one of her 
neighbours.191 This dominance was expressed on Tenochtitlan’s ever larger pyramids where 
history’s rawest and most awe-inspiring spectacles of grandeur and power were played out, 
claiming more thousands of human sacrificial victims every year.192 At the same time the 
city’s success sustained an ever-larger martial nobility with rewards and benefices within 
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the city and in the form of land confiscated from subjugated polities that bound them to the 
city’s imperial venture in a hostile environment.193 
Subjugation of an altepetl could be accompanied by confiscation of land for 
distribution amongst the increasing numbers of deserving Tenochca noblemen or for the 
settlement of Tenochca warriors and macehual settlers.194 For strategic reasons this often 
came with the super-imposition of Tenochca Tlenamacaque and Papahuaque which 
Sahagún identified as ‘Satraps’. These appointments were particularly evident in remote 
provinces or those that had shown particularly stubborn resistance.195 After 1473, by 
traditional reckoning, Tlatelolco’s ruling dynasty was supervised by a Tenochca governor as 
were the twenty five lords and princes of the Chalca confederacy. Archaeological evidence 
from Castillo de Teayo in the rebellious province of Tochpan also offers interesting insights 
into this Tenochca colonization. The area has been identified as a likely Nahua colony given 
the range of architectural and material remains that are not only closely related to 
Tenochtitlan but in many cases were made and enjoyed locally, rather than imported, but 
imitating metropolitan tastes. Individual lords of Tenochtitlan also profited from confiscated 
lands in other states and with their wealth bypassed even the discipline of their own calpolli 
in their political struggles. By 1519 there were an estimated thirty-seven of these Tenochca 
colonies and garrisons.196  
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In some cases these colonies were maintained as a dominant class by the labour of 
the local population and in others they repopulated wholesale areas that been deserted 
following war or repression. Don Hernando de Tapia throws some light on the methods and 
purposes of this Tenochca colonization in his description of three colonies, including the rich 
but distant Soconusco, which were colonised by Mexica along with serf-like immigrants 
from other areas that had been forced to settle there and pay tribute to the Mexica 
presumably from the cultivation of those products that were most desired by the 
metropolis.197 Fr. Diego Durán offers perhaps the most detailed insight into the motives and 
organization of Tenochca colonization in the example of the re-foundation of Oaxaca, which 
the Tenochca re-populated following the extermination of a large proportion of the local 
population in retaliation for the murder of a protected pochteca.198  
There is an obvious strand of continuity with the Spanish and allied-Indigenous 
colonising efforts after the conquest as co-ordinated from Mexico City. There are clear 
echoes of Spanish repartimiento system of labour allocation and the development of distant 
mining settlements and the comparison extends to the encouragement of other allied 
polities to join in the venture. In both cases some of this colonising effort may have been 
made politically viable as a result of the severe depopulation that occurred in certain areas 
of Mesoamerica: a disastrous cycle of crop-failure and disease swept the region in 1454 and 
subsequent years when even the Tenochca were reduced to near starvation, much like the 
infectious diseases and agricultural contraction that followed the Spanish conquest, but less 
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enduring.199 The intentions of control and the distribution of rewards between the two 
assertions of Mexico City’s hegemony are also comparable.  
The Spaniards encountered many of these Tenochca settlements throughout 
Mesoamerica. They maintained a separate identity from their neighbours adding to the 
complicated identities of Mesoamerica in a way that often served Spanish interests. As late 
as the 1550s the Zapotec lord of the important province of Tehuantepec, was accused of 
‘tyranny’ to the Spanish authorities and one of the charges related to his beating of a 
member of a Mexica settlement within his province that persisted with its own identity from 
the time of Motecuhzoma and retained an almost Roman sense of its imperial immunity 
from such humiliation.200 Pedro de Alvarado also encountered various Tlaxcalan and other 
Nahua colonies and recruited them for his campaign to Guatemala.201 As in the Tenochca 
case, these allies settled alongside their Spanish partners, lording over defeated Maya 
kingdoms and spreading the Nahuatl language at least as fast as Spanish in the region so 
that to this day Nahuatl is spoken in parts of El Salvador. 
Within the Mesoamerican tradition a polity lost its liberty by being unable to 
determine freely its relations with other polities unbounded by obligations, coercion or the 
threat of force; by the arbitrary impositions of tribute, confiscation of polity land and the 
need to supply military assistance to its imperial overlord. Nevertheless even under these 
circumstances a polity rarely lost its autonomy- the ability to determine its own internal 
affairs- and this was embodied by the endurance of the tlatocatlacamecayotl (ruling 
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dynasty) as the legitimate bearers of authority. Thus after the final defeat of the Chalca 
confederacy in 1465, Chalca princesses were requested by the Tenochca and were visibly in 
attendance to Axayacatl (ruled 1469-81) who was encouraged by a Chalcan entertainer’s 
song to consummate the domination of Chalco in the bedroom. Compliant Chalcan princes 
were allowed to rule their province again by 1486 (according to post-conquest tradition), 
albeit subject to selection by the Tenochca tlatoani.202  
Cuauhtémoc, an exalted member of the Tenochca royal family, was also a 
descendant of the suppressed Tlatelolca royal house. Polygamous unions were the accepted 
corollaries to diplomatic alliances and even the harshest subjugations were often followed 
by such dynastic arrangements. Polygamous practices facilitated this diplomatic flexibility. 
Furthermore the importance of direct descent from a prince, who were known to have tens 
of offspring, cemented such practices and established a new governing generation. Indeed 
Motolinia claimed that some princes and lords had so many wives that there were scarcities 
of marriageable women within certain polities.203 Clearly it was prestigious to have many 
wives as it reinforced the paternalistic ethos of polity authority.  
For the favoured subjects of empire, the attractions have been similar throughout 
history: there may have been a glamour and security in being associated with the dominant 
power of Mesoamerica; the greatest, richest, most terrible city in the known world. 
Membership of the empire permitted reliable access to imperial markets: rare and prized 
products, often the most valued status symbols, as popularised by the imperial elite, like 
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Quetzal feathers, cacao beans and jaguar pelts, arrived in Tenochtitlan from the remote and 
rich lowlands of the south as did essential products like salt from Tehuantepec. Enemies, 
like Tlaxcala, were excluded from the bonanza, a fact they bitterly resented.204 In the 
context of Mesoamerica’s endemic warfare the Tenochca were winners, guaranteeing the 
status quo for governing elites as well as relations between polities that embraced the 
empire - some of whom had been previously subjected by their neighbours and others who 
feared their potential aggression.  Thus shortly before the arrival of the Spaniards, 
Huexotzinco, until then a proudly independent polity that had resisted the Tenochca 
advance began to consider submitting to the protection of the imperial altepetl. Her 
immediate neighbour the ritually prestigious altepetl of Cholula had submitted to the 
empire, giving the Tenochca access into the modern day valley of Puebla that Huexotzinco 
now shared with an implacably anti-Tenochca Tlaxcala to the east and a new Tenochca 
satellite to the West. Under pressure from Tlaxcala, Huexotzinco asked for Tenochca 
military assistance; in exchange they were ordered to surrender Camaxtli their local goddess 
to be displayed in the pyramid of conquered deities in Tenochtitlan. Huexotzinco vacillated 
until the arrival of Cortés radicalised the matter as we shall see.205  
In military and diplomatic relations with the imperial polity, individual members and 
their factions within a polity could lose their status only for more compliant kinsmen to take 
their place. Indeed ‘conquest’ rarely meant the obliteration of previous political 
organisations like the tecpan or the ruling nobility of the conquered polity. ‘Even when a 
polity was conquered or ‘destroyed’ ‘in Nahuatl only political sovereignty was lost… but as 
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long as the traditional royal lineage (tlatocatlacamecayotl) and rulership (tlatocayotl) were 
intact and operating, the society and polity continued.’ 206 Tlatocayotl within the polity and 
its domains remained the vital objective of individual members of the largely particularist 
polity nobility even when they had been subjected by Tenochtitlan.  
The support of a super-polity power could even guarantee the concentration of 
authority in the hands of fewer individuals. After the shock of conquest, subjection to an 
empire only added to the means by which patricians could compete for power and the ways 
in which they could perceive, present and enforce the legitimacy of their political projects to 
secure their status. Essentially the new element in the struggle for lordship was competition 
for ingratiation with the imperial power. Stable administration that allowed for peace and 
the regular supply of tribute to Tenochtitlan; military services; and dynastic alliances with 
the imperial house all traced the path to imperial acceptance. Participation in martial 
activities was costly and dangerous but it was also the most prestigious service a prince 
could perform for the empire and for his personal standing within his polity. This was not 
only because of Tenochtitlan’s almost perennial campaigning, but because, unlike the 
imposed protection-money called tribute and gifts, a prince, fighting under the insignia of 
his own polity, could win glory in his own right and bring advantage both to the grateful 
imperial hegemon and to his own polity.207 Successful campaigns brought booty and in some 
cases tributary lordship to individual polities and dynasts over their neighbours. The 
dominion and tribute enjoyed by the lord of Tepexi de la Seda on the eve of the Spanish 
arrival, known to us as Don Gonzalo Matzatzin Moctezuma, best expressed the successful 
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balancing act a subject tlatoani could perform: to appear to Tenochtitlan as the legitimate 
lord of his altepetl and to his own people as the friends of the Tenochtitlan. Matzatzin was 
related by birth to the Tenochca royal house, had proved a successful commander in 
Motecuhzoma Xocoyotzin’s campaigns against the Mixtecs and had consequently 
established and expanded a successful lordship for his altepetl over the strategic gateway to 
Oaxaca.208 In turn, his tlatocayotl was unquestioned.  
There is no indication that on its own the Tenochca political settlement was 
inherently unviable. Indeed not long before the Spaniards arrived in Veracruz, the empire 
had expanded dramatically in Oaxaca and had won over the ritually and strategically 
important altepetl of Cholula, giving Tenochtitlan a vital base in the fertile valley to the east 
of the volcanoes. Other known potential threats to the empire from the Mixe or Zapotecs of 
Oaxaca or the ‘Tarascans’ of Michoacán, or even the various Otomi and Chichimeca peoples 
to the north were known elements in the geo-political calculations Mesoamerica’s polities. 
Only the arrival of Cortés and his company was unaccountable and unexpected. The events 
that led to the death of Motecuhzoma and the complete breakdown in negotiations 
between the Spanish and the Mexica were enough to undermine the assumptions that held 
Tenochtitlan’s empire together.  
Adaptation to Spanish hegemony 
It has not been generally acknowledged how profoundly the polity-nobility’s search 
for secure tlatocayotl shaped the nature of the conquest of Tenochtitlan and the 
subsequent political settlement that emerged under the hegemony of the Spanish 
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interlopers. The legacy of the events that occurred from 1519 to 1521 and the combination 
of Mesoamerican political traditions with the attitudes and expectations that the newly 
hegemonic Spaniards brought with them, informed the way in which the indigenous nobility 
sought to safeguard their tlatocayotl within the new political settlement. The resulting 
indigenous attitudes towards legitimate lordship would affect the unfolding development of 
viceregal government after 1535.  
The insurrection against Tenochtitlan had echoes in Mesoamerican history and in 
similar political calculations by patrimonial elites throughout history. Comparable 
calculations applied in the case of the patrimonial elites of Europe where, for instance, the 
nobility of northern France (decisively in the case of the Duke of Burgundy, like Texcoco for 
Cortés) defected to Henry V en masse after he returned to France in 1417 almost two years 
after his fluke victory at Agincourt while retreating with a depleted army to the safety of 
Calais. Tenochtitlan herself had arisen as an imperial power out of an alliance of altepetl 
that sought to overthrow the previously hegemonic confederacy of Azcapotzalco and 
Coyoacan. 
Events moved much faster in 1520-21, encompassed a greater number of polities 
and occurred with a greater level of disruption than at any point in Mesoamerica’s tradition: 
while the Tenochca built up their empire by relying on two main allies over the course of a 
century, within two years the Spaniards came to head an alliance composed of more polities 
than Tenochtitlan’s empire at its height. Despite the Spaniards’ great numerical 
disadvantage209 and the fact that they did not count on the attributes of a constituted 
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polity, this suddenness had important consequences in minimising the dependence of the 
Spaniards on the interests of any single allied polity and consequently for the relative 
importance and claims to precedence of each individual ally. This was part of the ‘stranger 
effect’ that helped establish the Spaniards as credible external arbitrators throughout the 
Americas.210  
The number of allied polities meant that the Spaniards could afford to simplify 
matters, welcoming and promoting any supporters and attempting to destroy any real or 
perceived rivals. Tlaxcala offers the most illustrative example of the devaluation of 
individual polities in this context. The four altepetl of Tlaxcala soon displaced Tlacochcalcatl 
(the ‘fat cacique’) and the Spaniard’s original Totonac allies in importance. The first formal 
political settlement we know of between Tlaxcalans and Spaniards occurred soon after la 
noche triste (30 June 1520) when the remnants of the Cortesian forces arrived in Tlaxcala 
after suffering terrible losses in their near-run escape from Tenochtitlan and the plains of 
Otúmba. Tlaxcala’s lords concluded a treaty with Cortés that is illustrative of that altepetl’s 
original expectations: Tlaxcala would have control of Cholula, with its talismanic ceremonial 
centre and perhaps as revenge for her recent hostile volte-face and alliance with 
Tenochtitlan. They also wanted to occupy a fortress within Tenochtitlan itself to guarantee 
their security against their ancient rivals. Spoils and booty were to be divided between them 
and the Spaniards and finally they should be perpetually exempt from having to pay tribute 
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to whoever ruled in Tenochtitlan, which would otherwise go to the Spaniards. Clearly the 
Tlaxcalans were sowing the seeds of an alliance that might have resembled the origins of 
Tenochtitlan’s alliance with Texcoco and Tacubaya against Azcapotzalco, with Tlaxcala as the 
dominant or equal partner.211 Tlaxcalan noblewomen had already formed the mutually 
recognisable sexual-dynastic alliances with the Spanish captains that sealed such treaties in 
Mesoamerica. Henceforth the combined forces would fight to the cry of ‘Santiago y 
Tlaxcala!’  
As other powerful altepetl joined the Cortesian alliance, like Huexotzingo, which 
enjoyed a troubled relationship with Tlaxcala; or Texcoco, which had been the second polity 
of the empire and gave the Spanish alliance access to the shores of the lake; or the powerful 
old Chalca confederacy, that controlled the most fertile land in the basin, the individual 
bargaining power of Tlaxcala diminished: when the Tlaxcalan lord Xicotencatl the younger 
dissented during the siege of Tenochtitlan he was accused and captured by other indigenous 
allies of the Spaniards. Cortés tried and executed him without significant Tlaxcalan protests, 
only the Spanish captain Pedro de Alvarado, whose mistress Maria Luisa was the accused 
man’s sister, and hence his clan’s ally, raised a protest.212 In the end, even the defeated 
Tenochca and Tlatelolca ruling elites were redeemed and welcomed into the Spanish 
alliance.  
The breakdown of Tenochtitlan’s authority offered a chance for discontent within 
the various polities to radicalise and break out in civil strife. The situation was also 
exacerbated by the epidemics that spread throughout Mesoamerica from 1520 and could 
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carry with them some key individuals of the elite. These disruptions combined with others 
that affected tributary, agricultural and commercial patterns of resource allocation. Many of 
the defections to the Spaniards occurred in the context of stasis- internal strife- within the 
polities for control of palaces and lordship. In this respect an analogy can be drawn between 
the essentially provincial nature of the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 1910 and the 
even more localised upheavals that erupted in 1519-21: in both cases it ‘arose in the 
provinces, established itself in the countryside, and finally conquered an alien and sullen 
capital’.213  
Of the plethora of factors that determined the organisation and outcome of the 
overthrow of Tenochtitlan, from the diplomatic skill of doña Marina to the effect of Spanish 
steel, the internal political motivations and calculations of the competitive polity elites of 
Mesoamerica has been the least studied but arguably the most fundamental in explaining 
the course of their allegiances and in helping us to understand the subsequent political 
development of New Spain. After the Spaniards arrived varying degrees of internal strife 
affected almost every polity on which we have information. Thirty years after the event, and 
following a viceregal enquiry the victorious pro-Cortesian party in Huexotzinco confessed: 
‘In our town of Huexotzingo there arose amongst our ancestors two factions, until one of 
them defeated the other and killed them and then confiscated everything they had, both 
land and moveable property. They left nothing for the sons of the dead and instead 
distributed it amongst themselves; and their descendants have kept this even now that we 
are Christians’.214 Similarly, Texcoco’s crucial alignment with Cortés only came after a 
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generation-long family feud, aggravated by Motecuhzoma’s interference, was resolved by 
the victory of the previously excluded rebel prince Ixtlilxochitl and his faction.215 Even 
Tenochtitlan–Tlatelolco itself suffered from internal strife, as suggested by the claims of 
Motecuhzoma’s descendants with regards to the execution of Motecuhzoma’s son 
Atlixcatzin and others by Cuauhtémoc when he took over control and enforced the primacy 
of Tlatelolco in preparation for the last stand against the Spaniards and rebels.216  
The upheaval caused by the conquest campaigns offered many opportunities to 
rebels, usurpers and perceptive established elites who aligned themselves with the 
Cortesian alliance to increase their power. In Cholula a faction that had been excluded from 
power, reduced to the status of ‘secondary nobility’, (possibly as a result of the re-alignment 
of Cholula with Tenochtitlan in the early years of Motecuhzoma Xocoyotzin’s reign) and had 
even been imprisoned by Motecuhzoma’s agents aligned themselves with Cortés and 
became the main beneficiaries of the Hispano-Tlaxcalteca bloody suppression of the 
polity.217  The liberation of the Chalca confederacy from the Tenochca Empire came with the 
price of the elevation of the brothers don Francisco de Sandoval Acazitli and don Hernando 
de Guzmán Omacatzín. This was achieved by the timely delegation that their father 
Necuametzin, Motecuhzoma’s approved lord of Tlalmanalco, sent to Cortés. It forestalled 
any rival claims for recognition, not least from the 15,000 Chalca exiles in Huexotzinco,218 
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which allowed him to present himself and his dynasty to the Spaniards as the legitimate 
authority over all of Chalco, which had traditionally been divided into four main polities with 
twenty five lords and princes. The epidemic also helped by disrupting the leadership 
structure in Chalco and confusing the election of new princes but Cortés’s blessing bypassed 
the need to reconstitute the defunct mechanisms of the old Chalca confederacy. Instead the 
anointment of Acazitli and Omacatzin as tlatic teuhctli and teohua teuhctli respectively 
resembled the selection made by Tenochtitlan in 1486 (see p.100f.). For the ruling dynasty 
of Tlalmanalco, reliance on external support for their authority was essential in the face of 
the internal competitions for power within the province. Power remained centred in 
Tlalmanalco and seems at some point Acazitli extended his authority beyond the old 
confederacy up to Xochimilco on the shores of the lake.219 Their ascendancy through the 
mid sixteenth century still displeased the historian Chimalpahin from Amecameca a Chalca 
altepetl that came to dominate the region in the 17th century.220 Equally the cunning 
tlatoani of Tepexi de la Seda, Don Gonzalo Matzatzin Moctezuma, may have exploited the 
confusion in Tenochtitlan to seize various towns in Oaxaca for his own advantage, but he 
had done so with the blessing of Cortés and held them for a while only by his leave.221 
Cortés would later retain his self-perception as the guarantor of the new political order 
against the ‘old authorities’ of the polities of New Spain.222  
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Around many of these opportunistic new arrangements with the Spaniards clung 
doubts regarding the victors’ sense of political legitimacy.223 Their sense of entitlement 
traced its genesis only back as far as the services rendered nominally on behalf of the 
Spaniards during the conquest and inevitably every time one faction was supported, others 
were disappointed by the failed expectations the Cortesian shake-up had created. Their 
actions had been motivated by grievances born of exclusion or by shrewd political 
calculation in the search for lordship.  
Motolinia suggested that, with God’s intervention, it was largely these divisions and 
competition that saved the Spaniards from facing a successful Indigenous revolt despite 
their repeated mismanagement throughout the 20s and early 30s.224 But it was more than 
just ‘divide and rule’: Cortés’ letters to Charles V from these early years, especially the third 
(1522) and fourth (1524) deal with the ‘good governance of the land’ and are replete with 
his response to petitions from polities asking him for protection, for mediation in the 
selection of their leaders or to settle internal disputes. The resultant dynamic of competition 
within and amongst polities resulted in an indigenous pressure to recreate a stable 
hegemonic polity that could mediate this competition and ensure the stability of their newly 
won tlatocayotl. The Spanish outsiders, with the prestige they had accrued from their 
leadership in the revolution against Tenochtitlan, were a far more palatable option than 
indigenous neighbours like a vengeful Tlaxcala. Their neighbours in their polities or other 
influential polities, with whom they shared old complicated entanglements, could not be 
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trusted to secure the new status quo; only the more detached Spanish newcomers could be 
manipulated into guaranteeing a newly won status they did not fully understand. 
Consequently allied polities competed to help in the reconstruction of Mexico City and the 
great palace which provided the most tangible symbol of the restoration of the city as the 
hegemonic power of Mesoamerica.225 This dependence on the arbitration of the Spanish 
power-brokers was advantageous to the successful factions but would become the 
Mesoamerican nobility’s cross to bear in exchange for security of status.  
Cortés, who was followed everywhere by an indigenous entourage, to the chagrin of 
his fellow Spaniards, became the obvious first mediator.226 He overrode his original treaty 
with Tlaxcala and did not give them control of Cholula; instead he handed power to those 
Cholulan noblemen that appealed to him for protection in 1522, possibly the same as those 
who had also done so in 1520.227 The heirs of dispossessed Huexotzinca noblemen may have 
bemoaned the unjust confiscation of their lands but their victorious neighbours had been 
the ones to pick the winning side and they received the support of the Spaniards in Mexico: 
for commentators like Motolinia in the 1530s Huexotzinca loyalty entitled them to be 
considered as the second pillar of the Spanish alliance after Tlaxcala.228 Similarly, Ixtlilxochitl 
and his faction had finally gained control of Texcoco bringing to an end a tragic dynastic saga 
of internecine strife that had continued to simmer for decades right up to the arrival of 
Cortés. So too Tlaxcala may have been despised by her neighbours or the survivors from the 
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massacre at Cholula, in which they took such an active role; she may have been dismissed as 
an upstart by the haughty princes of Texcoco or the Mexica nobility that had hounded her 
until very recently, but Tlaxcala assumed a special status in Mesoamerica that she had never 
had before, as the second city of New Spain in the reconstituted empire of Mexico City all 
for their seminal role in the Cortesian alliance. It would amount to an even greater role than 
that played by Texcoco to Tenochtitlan. This co-dependence with Mexico City increased the 
prestige of its Spanish inhabitants and refashioned the polity-elite’s modes of thinking about 
political legitimacy within their polities.  
Just as Robert Ricard’s notion of ‘the spiritual conquest’ has been supplanted by the 
recognition that Catholicism in Mesoamerica adapted by emphasising those practices that 
coincided with native religious traditions,229 so it should be acknowledged that much of the 
agency behind the political settlement that followed the defeat of Tenochtitlan was founded 
upon the overlapping ideas of legitimate authority between indigenous and European 
cultures. These complemented each other most successfully at the level of shared notions 
of nobility: these shared values shaped the nature of authority in New Spain much more 
fundamentally than the Spaniards could have done through attempted coercion or 
imposition of their own ideas (even if Cortés and company had been political theorists as 
some of the later Spanish administrators claimed to be). Legitimacy in Mesoamerica would 
be determined by a combination of the traditional patterns of political arrangements of 
individual polities modified by Spanish expectations.230 These latter were simplistic but not 
wholly incompatible. For a simple conquistador the Indians of New Spain ‘had a great lord 
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who was like an emperor. They also had, and still have, others like kings, dukes, counts, 
governors, knights, squires, and men-at-arms. The lords have their governors, 
administrators and other officials in their own lands’.231 The Spaniards often expressed the 
hope of filling the role of Motecuhzoma and his nobility.232 The difficulty for the polity elites, 
as for the first Spanish settlers and conquistadors in the pre-viceregal period, was to know 
how to present their legitimising merits effectively and to whom, since the Spaniards did not 
initially act as a coherent imperial polity.  
At a fundamental level the Spaniards and Indians shared a mutual acknowledgement 
of the importance of sexual alliances and dynastic inheritance. The importance of legitimacy 
by blood for both cultures became apparent almost from the first contacts when the polity 
elites sealed their alliances with the Spaniards by giving them women. As such, these 
women have rightly been called ‘the first important mediators of meaning between the 
cultures of the two worlds’.233 Even if the Spaniards may have been loath to admit it to their 
royal authorities, their indigenous ‘concubines’ that even a lowly foot soldier like Díaz del 
Castillo was rewarded with, were in effect noble common-law wives which ennobled them 
and with whom they often co-habited for long after the conquest. In the eyes of their Indian 
allies and in the context of Mesoamerica these sexual alliances would have seemed at first 
sight indistinguishable from the polygamous traditions of the land.234 This link was made 
explicitly by certain unnamed lords in defending their own polygamous practices to 
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Motolinia.235 The effects of the sexual alliance between Cortés and doña Marina is the best 
known example. It has also been convincingly argued that the presence of women with the 
dynastic prestige of doña Luisa Xicotencatl was an important component in recruiting and 
convincing indigenous allies, in this case Tlaxcalans from Tizatlan, to fight and settle in 
distant campaigns under Spanish captains. The political importance of dynastic alliances 
may explain why friars found polygamy the most difficult indigenous practice to extirpate. 
Its usefulness was not lost to the Spaniards and it survived masked behind concubinage at 
least in the first generation in the shape of wide-spread Spanish cohabitation with 
indigenous women, at times alongside a Spanish wife.  
Apart from their inherent prestige, noble-women could also inherit and transmit 
rights and property, a fact accepted in both cultures, and as such, the more powerful of 
them became attractive prizes for the status-anxious conquistadores and first settlers. 
Conversely marital alliances to the new Spanish lords of Mexico City replicated similar 
dynastic links to the Tenochca nobility and were useful in making more tangible the 
advantages produced by the ‘stranger effect’. This gave some aristocratic princesses a 
degree of initiative, exemplified in the dynastic career of the remarkable Tecuichpo, 
allegedly Motecuhzoma’s favourite daughter, married to the two last Mexica huey tlatoani, 
mother of a daughter by Cortés and then, as doña Isabel Moctezuma, the holder of large 
dynastic properties and valuable tributary dues both in her own right and as the wife of 
three Spanish encomenderos. Motolinia mentioned with great satisfaction formal Christian 
marriages between Spaniards and Indigenous women were becoming common particularly 
among the first wave of Spanish settlers and most noticeably in Puebla with women from 
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important indigenous polities that surrounded the new ‘Spanish’ settlement.236 Indigenous 
noblemen like don Hernando de Tapia are also known to have married Spanish women.237  
In the documents that I have surveyed pertaining to the more famous and successful 
indigenous dynasties it is the norm to find within their lineages varying degrees of Spanish 
blood in spite of their legal definition as Indios: similarly, it has been estimated that half of 
the most noble families of the elite of Mexico City (the city with the greatest number of elite 
European immigrants) could trace their ancestry to indigenous nobility at the time of 
independence, despite their classification as ‘Spanish’.238  
Inviting prominent Spaniards, especially friars, to witness and even preside over a 
dynastic union within the indigenous nobility was an effective way of reinforcing its 
legitimacy and its importance within the community before the Spanish audience. Great 
displays at Christianised weddings became increasingly normal. Motolinia recorded the 
most glamorous occasion of Texcoco’s social (and political) calendar of 1526: the wedding of 
don Hernando de Alvarado Pimentel Nezahualcoyotl, the nephew of the usurping prince 
Ixtlilxochitl, along with seven other prominent lords in a Christian ceremony attended by 
prominent Spanish guests and their wives, including a representative of Cortés, that later 
grew to encompass very traditional indigenous dances, processions and pageantry involving 
thousands of participants.239 The importance of Spanish witnesses or Christian certificates of 
legal marriage become clear when one studies the claims and petitions for ‘legitimate 
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lordship’ later in the century, which abound with the testimony of prestigious Spanish 
witnesses. Approval from the metropolitan elite reinforced dynastic status within the 
altepetl. Don Hernando would in turn govern Texcoco from 1545.240 
The Spaniards always claimed to support the legitimate tlatocatlacamecayotl (royal 
blood-lines) of a polity. They Paralleled the previous Tenochca practice, even in areas that 
had been apparently ‘destroyed’ by the conquest, like Cholula or Tlatelolco, Tenochtitlan 
and the Huaxteca lordships of Pánuco but which soon seemed to re-emerge with members 
of their indigenous dynasties still in charge, their palace power structures intact and newly 
authorized by the Spaniards. López de Gómara’s description of the repression of Huaxteca 
‘revolt’ of 1523 offers perhaps the most vividly immediate example: after a drumhead trial, 
460 ‘caciques and principal men’ were burned alive before the eyes of their sons as 
punishment for their ‘rebellion’. When their fathers finally died, in a blend of brutality and 
legality the heirs were granted their rightful lordships in the name of the emperor Charles 
V.241  
Nevertheless, it was not always clear who the rightful lords should be because the 
Spanish expectations of rightful inheritance differed from the practices of many polities. 
Spaniards were unaware of the complexity and diversity of the indigenous titles and 
identities, while the chaos provoked by the fall of Tenochtitlan confused matters further. To 
the Spaniards what mattered was not whether Acazitli was descended from the followers of 
Red Tezcatlipoca but whether he was a principal or nobleman or even better if he was 
                                                     
240
 La nobleza indígena…p.47f & my ch.6.  
241
  J.L. Martínez, Hernán Cortés…p.368.   
117 
 
generally acceptable to his polity and a recognised señor natural or even more parochially to 
Spanish American thinking, a cacique.  
Inherited nobility or the internal political processes of a polity remained important 
elements in establishing lordship; but to Spanish eyes true legitimacy came when these 
traditional attributes were complemented by services that an individual had provided for 
the Spaniards. The most important services that an Indian could present related to the 
memory of participation in the campaigns against Tenochtitlan. After the conquest, the 
Tlaxcalans confidently assumed a role akin to that played by Texcoco to Tenochtitlan as the 
second city of New Spain. They continued to support the Spaniards militarily in almost every 
campaign they waged and their elite was the most effective at presenting their case for 
privileges.  
One reason why Tlaxcala did not become the dominant power in Mesoamerica was 
that as outsiders the Spaniards had a more detached relationship with the polities of 
Mesoamerica, unlike the ‘Triple Alliance’. The Spaniards were more willing to make any 
noble elite a participant in their shared interests; anyone could have taken the place of 
Tlaxcala- including the defeated Tenochca and Tlatelolca; the envious Texcocans or 
Huexotzinca; a different faction within Tlaxcala impatient with the dominance of the 
Maxixcatzin; or even the suppressed Otomi and Pinome polities within the province. The 
result was that the various polities of New Spain competed not to be outdone in their shows 
of loyalty to the crown in order to protect their newly won status, rather as the various 
Spanish explorers and conquistadores vied for their king’s attention in the distant reaches of 
the new world. On the other hand rebels were showily suppressed by combined armies, in 
the Tenochca tradition, pour encourager les autres.  
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The confidence trick worked beyond the conquest of Tenochtitlan. ‘Conquest’ 
beyond the limits of Motecuhzoma’s domains often involved a continuation of the earlier 
practice of supporting the pro-Spanish factions that continued to emerge throughout 
Mesoamerica. This occurred most remarkably in the Cortesian settlement with the 
Purehpecha kingdom of Michoacán (1522-30) which was mediated by Cuinierángari (later 
don Pedro) in part as a political manoeuver against his rival Timas at the court of Tzintzincha 
Tangaxoan II.242 The political interests and aims of individual noblemen were often the 
determinant factor in the process of expansion of Spanish authority.  
Warfare retained its pre-eminent position as the most obvious and most valuable 
service that an allied polity could provide. Spanish ambitions coincided neatly with normal 
martial traditions sublimated in the teachings of the Huehuehtlahtolli. Furthermore, Spanish 
Mexico City’s adoption of Tenochtitlan’s mantle as a protective imperial power with a duty 
to its vassals encouraged this martial dynamic. These mixed intentions combined and 
echoed the Tenochca imperial logic, for instance, in Cortés’s report to Charles V regarding 
the ‘province of Tepeaca and other neighbouring counties, vassals of your majesty, [who] 
received much harm from the naturales of a province called [Oaxaca]. Because they were 
our friends and apart from the necessity of remedying this situation, it was a good idea to 
secure the province of [Oaxaca] because it was on the way to the Southern Sea…’ His 
lieutenant had scouted the area and ‘because the Tepeacans urged him to make war on [the 
people of Oaxaca]’, Cortés agreed: the campaign was successful and the land taken from 
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their enemies opened up another area for settlement and colonisation for him and his 
Castilian allies.243  
By 1535 the Spaniards of Mexico City and their indigenous allies had explored and 
‘pacified’ far beyond the Tenochca empire: from Guatemala and Honduras to Pánuco and 
Compostela in their search for sources of wealth, moveable or not, and access to the Pacific. 
They had also settled about thirty colonies, often together with allied warriors from the 
heartlands of New Spain, almost as many as Tenochtitlan had planted by 1519. They 
achieved this partly because they counted on a more willingly mobile (Spanish) population 
than the Tenochca and on the man-power of more polities. Mesoamerican polities 
tolerated, rather than enjoyed, the increasing number of land confiscations and Spanish 
settlements in their territory as forming part of the compromises that were expected from 
association with an imperial polity as it had been at the time of Tenochtitlan’s dominance.  
The willingness of individual Indian lords, minor nobles and plebeians, to participate 
in wars and settlement was encouraged by the hardships and dislocation that epidemics and 
the legacy of the conquest in central New Spain had brought, combined with the Spanish 
willingness to include any allies in these ventures to support their meagre numbers. Military 
campaigns have long been associated with migration. In times of scarcity migration was 
common throughout Mesoamerican history.  Tenochtitlan had been a teeming city of 
immigrants supported by tribute and trade; the famine of the 1450s for example, had 
provoked a mass emigration from the city to the more fertile lowlands of Totoncapan near 
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the Gulf.244 After the conquest, polities with preferential conditions like Tlaxcala, which 
enjoyed a low tribute assessment, or Xilotepec, with its border-town opportunities, 
attracted immigrants which benefited the lords of the polities and allowed them to lead 
military and colonising ventures with the Spaniards despite overall population decline in 
Mesoamerica.245  
The appeal of military adventure began to encourage a phenomenon that combined 
the indigenous pochteca entrepreneurial tradition with ennobling martial values of the 
cuauhpilli and the hidalgo to form an ethos of service. Conin, later baptised as don Fernando 
de Tapia, an Otomi from Tlaxcala - and therefore one of the altepetl’s excluded- organised 
the extension and defence of New Spain ‘with his friends and dependants’ and other allies 
from Xilotepec that led to the eventual foundation of Querétaro in 1533 and the 
consequent establishment of two of the most remarkable indigenous dynasties of the 
period.246    
After warfare, the most obvious service that the Indigenous lords could provide was 
in governing their polities so as to maintain the peace and above all the continuation of the 
old tributary networks and the concomitant commercial activity that the imperial Mexico 
City had once enjoyed. Tribute was the most obvious nexus to the old imperial tradition. 
Under the auspices of Cortés and doña Marina, the lords of the central valleys travelled to 
Coyoacan (while Mexico was still uninhabitable in 1521) to re-establish the tributary 
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relationship between the Spaniards of Mexico City and the provinces. After proclaiming 
Charles V and the Spaniards, as his representatives, to be the heirs to Motecuhzoma’s 
empire, ‘each [Spanish encomendero] went off with the cacique and principal lord of the 
town he had been granted in encomienda to agree on the rate of tribute to be paid every 
eighty days’247. While the Spaniards could expect sustenance and wealth (albeit in kind not 
coin) the Indian lords had taken a useful step towards securing recognition of their status in 
uncertain times by virtue of the interdependent agreements they had established with the 
Spaniards. Tribute also linked the polity-princes notionally with Charles V, earning them his 
protection. 
The difficulty for the polity elites came in presenting their services to the Spaniards 
so as to gain the greatest possible advantage. They had to overcome Spanish ignorance and 
their different expectations of what constituted authority and justice. The letrados of the 
Second Audiencia (1530-35) who were convinced exponents of their legal training and 
political heritage, and therefore much less flexible than the conquistadores, informed their 
fellow letrados in Spain with some exasperation that ‘up to now we have no information on 
their government or system of justice or the true status of their señores and it all seems to 
have been tyranny’.248 Worse, the indigenous nobility could not easily adapt to Spanish 
expectations because of the changeability and divisions of the Spanish administration, which 
did not operate like a coherent Nahua altepetl in the early years of their government in 
Mexico City, to the frustration of the native elites. For Motolinia these Spanish divisions 
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were the 10th plague to afflict the indigenous population and brought them closer to a 
generalised rebellion than anything else.249  
This disorder, combined with interrelated interests, soldierly solidarity from the 
conquest or even dynastic links, meant that indigenous cliques and their polities sometimes 
aligned themselves to Spanish factions rather than the officially recognised authorities in 
Mexico City. The contador Rodrigo de Albornoz described the Indians as ‘many, free and 
tough and very enamoured of military matters… and quick to learn’: Hardly the fatalistic, 
demoralised and servile tools of Spanish interests of popular imagination. He believed that 
Charles V’s appointed officials were dangerously undermined in their authority by these 
alliances.250 They grew because they could be useful conduits to recognition and power.  
On the whole the lords of the principal polities played it safe and tended to side with 
whoever seemed in charge in Mexico City. Cortés had been the guarantor of the post-
conquest status quo and many individuals had benefited from his friendship, but it soon 
became evident for his close allies like Acxotecatl Cocomitzi lord of Atlihuetzia in Tlaxcala or 
Don Pedro of Michoacán, who were executed or brought low soon after Cortés’s departure 
to Spain in 1526, that reliance on even the most powerful individual Spaniards without the 
approval of Mexico City could be risky.251 So for example, no amount of conquistador 
camaraderie convinced the lords of the basin heartlands to defy the dictates of the First 
Audiencia in 1530 and feed Cortés and his retinue of 400 who became isolated in 
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Cuernavaca where half of them perished including Cortés’ mother.252 This was partly 
pragmatic and partly because prominent Spaniards like Cortés never fully identified 
themselves with their indigenous allies if it could be construed as rebellion against Charles 
V’s authorised agents. Unrest swept through New Spain in 1531, only to be suppressed by 
Cortés but it rumbled on throughout the early 1530s. By 1535, tensions were rising again, 
aggravated by rumours of the death of Cortés and the obtuse introduction of reforms by the 
Second Audiencia that fostered instability. The introduction of corregidores was particularly 
resented because their yearly tenure meant a new agreement had to be reached with each 
new abusive ‘inspector general’-like official that arrived.253 
The two constants that the Indian lords could look to were the reverence that 
Charles V elicited, which for most was a distant abstraction, and the association of the 
mendicants with Christianity that seemed the highest justification of all for Indians and 
Spaniards alike.254 As with dynastic weddings, the presence and support of mendicant friars 
secured political legitimacy.  
Success in the competition between individual lords to attract some of the few 
available friars to settle in their district,255 and then act as patrons to their monastic 
communities could produce some remarkable political benefits for them and their districts 
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or the polity as a whole.256 The construction of a monastery elevated the status of that 
district, sometimes to a predominant level within the polity. The convent of San Miguel, one 
of the first four to be established in New Spain, was built below the principal calpolli of 
Amillpan within the fractious altepetl of Huexotzinco. Its prestige and the Spanish emphasis 
on the ‘congregation’ of a community’s population into a more Mediterranean-style 
municipality, meant that Amillpan, became the centre of the new ‘City of Huexotzonco’, 
recognised as such officially by the further legitimising device of a coat arms granted by 
Charles V in 1553 and attracting wealth and immigrant population to it which benefitted its 
elite.257 On the other hand the smaller polities like Guaquechula, located in the fertile and 
desirable valley of Atrixco, which had long feared the dominion of its more powerful 
neighbours, Huexotzinco to the north and Izúcar to the south,258 affirmed its autonomy 
through its own displays of piety and Christianity. Leading noblemen like don Juan and the 
prince don Martín began building a monastery to his namesake, St. Martin, out of their own 
funds in 1533. The polity retained its recognition and independence becoming an important 
centre for Christian ritual in Atrixco. Their activity helped gain them the notice of viceroy 
Mendoza who rewarded Don Martín and Don Juan, with a licence to carry Spanish weapons 
for being ‘good christians’ and for fighting in Guatemala.259 
The use of mendicants to ensure political legitimacy and authority was 
commonplace and took many forms that echoed complex pre-conquest political 
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preoccupations. In Tlaxcala the palace of Maxixcatzin at Ocotelulco became the first 
Franciscan monastery and Cathedral, for a time, while the revered image of the virgin- 
probably the image represented at the start of the Lienzo de Tlaxcala in the centre of the 
four polities - that Cortés gave to lord Acxotecatl Cocomitzi – his personal friend and son in 
law of Maxixcatzin-, lay at Atlihuetzia nearby.260 The Maxixcatzin clan, associated with the 
Franciscans and Cortés became the dominant force in Tlaxcalan politics since the 
conquest.261 Their resentful neighbours in Quiauhixtlan demonstrated their discontent by 
encouraging rival Dominicans to their altepetl in an attempt to stamp their independence 
and equality of status.262 Similar wrangles over precedence arose in Amecameca between 
the dynasties of the five leading clans that also hoped to express their dominance through 
association with the friars; while Tlalmanalco the hegemon of the whole province of Chalco 
in the first half of the sixteenth century also emphasised its predominant status over the 
other polities of the enlarged Chalca confederacy by hosting the earliest convent, dedicated 
to St. Louis, and eventually housing there the talismanic remains of the revered fr. Martin de 
Valencia from 1534 until their disappearance in 1567.263 This phenomenon linking pious 
patronage to political advantage occurred throughout New Spain. It helps to explain the 
number and speed with which so many new monasteries were built throughout the land. 
The Franciscan bishop Juan de Zumárraga had direct authority from the king to deal 
with the Indigenous population in his title of ‘Protector of the Indians’ and genuinely seems 
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to have supported the claims to lordship of the ruling elites authorised in the Cortesian 
settlement over some of the more extravagant demands and redistributions of power 
attempted by the First Audiencia. Consequently the prestige of the mendicants grew during 
the early 1530s, as noted by Motolinia.264 Many Indians did convert sincerely to the new 
faith from these early days but almost regardless of genuine conversion, Christian display 
became the most obvious decoration with which to feather their crowns. Without it they 
could not achieve power with the grace of God demanded by the Spaniards and without 
which, no matter the amount of services or good birth, they were open to charges of 
illegitimacy or rebellion. The ceremony of baptism became essential as did displays of 
Christian piety and proselytising by Indigenous lords that included the smashing of the 
images of their old Gods.  
Christianity had practical benefits as did friendship with the friars who became the 
most accessible, useful and visible intermediaries between the polity nobility and the 
Spanish authorities, not least because they lived within the Indigenous communities and 
could help them translate Spanish language and codes of legitimacy. An indication of the 
prestige the mendicants were held in is that indigenous noblemen would dress in the 
normally unglamorous garb of friars, when they returned from visits to Spain.265 
Charles V became a tangible symbol of legitimacy to a few of the most important 
lords who were able to visit him and receive his mercedes much to the advantage of their 
positions back in New Spain, as we have seen the in the case of the Maxixcatzin at the start 
of this chapter. Motecuhzoma’s recognised heirs would mix their blood with the highest 
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Spanish nobility. But individuals with no formal tlatocayotl also benefited from this new 
conduit of prestige: don Hernando de Tapia (Motelchiuhtzin) the son of Motecuhzoma’s old 
cihuacoatl, was never appointed governor of Indian Mexico City like his (possibly non-noble) 
father. Instead he fought as a soldier, served in the vital role of principal nahuatlato 
(translator) for the various authorities of Mexico City and insisted on the services of his 
father during the conquest and subsequently. His role was so important to the success of 
the Second Audiencia in re-establishing the trust of the polities that Tapia was awarded a 
coat of arms by Charles V and made a Knight of the Golden Spur of St. Peter by Pope Paul III 
– greater honours than those granted to most Spanish conquistadores. In the kingdom of 
New Spain, part of Charles V’s composite monarchy, individuals began to find avenues of 
advancement that transcended the arena of the altepetl and the traditional elements of 
tlatocayotl.266  
Nothing was satisfactorily settled in New Spain by 1535 for either Indigenous lords 
or prominent Spanish settlers. However the terms in which the struggles for legitimacy 
would be conducted were becoming increasingly well defined as don Antonio de Mendoza, 
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Part III: The viceregal regime in 
practice 
Chapter 4: ‘Republic of Spaniards’  
 
New Spain’s Spanish population was composed of networks of patronage that 
entailed bonds of loyalty and economic dependence. The mix of Iberians, other Europeans 
and Africans, who defined themselves against the indigenous population as ‘Spaniards’, 
created in turn an exaggerated new notion of common identity that, when combined with 
the idiosyncratic legitimising factors of New Spain, complicated questions of status.267 Old 
Spanish identities of nobility, locality and kinship dissolved or acquired renewed impetus as 
they adapted themselves to the internal logic of New Spain’s networks of dependence - in 
the early 1530s don Luis de Castilla, direct descendant of Peter I, was under the command 
of new man Hernán Cortés from provincial Medellín.268  
The embodiments of these networks were the ubiquitous casas pobladas that 
constituted the few Spanish settlements scattered amongst ancient Mesoamerican centres 
of population on which they subsisted; or in the few new mining towns in the untamed 
semi-nomadic north. In these houses an established patron with a reliable income housed 
and fed relatives and useful newcomers in search of sustenance. Motolinia noticed the 
effect of this phenomenon on Mexico City which hosted by far the greatest concentration of 
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Spaniards: ‘…it is clear that more is consumed in Mexico City alone than in two or three 
cities in Spain of the same size. The reason for this is that all the houses are very full of 
people and also that since they are all very comfortable and without necessity so they spend 
copiously’.269 These networks sustained the bulk of the sedentary Spanish population, which 
never exceeded, and hardly ever reached the 16,180 (including Guatemala) mentioned in 
the first census of 1560.270  
As with much else in America these networks were a distorted reflection (that aimed 
to represent an attribute) of the Spanish nobility’s ethos of service. Spanish settlement was 
equated with royal service and not the occupation of the land for private profit.271 
Comparatively few Spaniards chose to settle as farmers or craftsmen, and the crown’s early 
efforts in this respect were remarkable for their failure, while contemporary literature 
confirms the feeling of entitlement of most recent Spanish immigrants.272  
Like the penniless young hidalgo in Lazarillo de Tormes, wandering Spaniards in 
search of their fortune were seeking a patron to serve with their person. On the other hand 
it was prestigious and useful for such a patron to preside over a well-armed casa poblada. 
The wealthy neighbours of Mexico City boasted of them as yet another vindication of their 
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status as ‘principal men’ and a symbol of their service to the commonwealth in ‘populating 
the land’ and providing a pool of armed men in case of an emergency.273  
When Mendoza arrived the encomenderos had been at the head of these networks 
since the conquest. The tribute dues of about 767 towns went to 506 different 
encomenderos in the period between 1521-1555 but to only about 300 individuals at any 
one time.274 With their regular tributary income, the encomendero families were at the 
pinnacle of most networks of patronage. The instability of the 1520s and the bluntness of 
the Second Audiencia in dealing with encomienda, combined with the allure of easy wealth 
in Peru, had reduced the Spanish population by half in the years preceding Mendoza’s 
arrival:275 the 300 or so encomenderos may have had to sustain no more than twenty 
Spaniards each to account for the vast majority of the Spanish population.276  
The justification for the encomenderos’ right to enjoy the tribute of the king’s 
indigenous subjects was that their settlement in New Spain was a service to the crown: their 
presence nominally sustained royal authority, defended it and fostered evangelisation. The 
need to guarantee the viability of these networks explains the urgency with which settlers 
clamoured for the king to ‘settle the land’ by defining a hereditary elite with the imagined 
stability of European nobility. Despite the encomenderos’ diminishing power over time they 
remained the backbone of Spanish society in economic and social terms throughout the 
period.  
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In 1542, hope of a perpetual grant of encomiendas seemed to evaporate when 
representatives from the crown arrived in New Spain and Peru to proclaim the ‘New Laws’. 
In New Spain there was great discontent: reportedly 600 settlers decided to emigrate at 
once, many with their families in tow.277 However New Spain’s settlers did not follow their 
Peruvian counterparts into rebellion. Rather, as many men as emigrated would enlist 
enthusiastically for an expedition to be led by their viceroy’s son to rescue royal authority in 
Peru.278 
Mendoza’s authority after many years as viceroy, rather than his titles –Blasco 
Nuñez de Vela was also a viceroy - accounted for the discrepancy between New Spain and 
Peru.279 Mendoza had consolidated the trust and loyalties of a critical mass of settlers 
behind him. Even after Velasco finally implemented the extent of the ‘New Laws’, the 
Spaniards remained loyal; once again the difference with Peru, where Francisco Hernández 
Girón raised another rebellion in 1554, is telling. In New Spain, the settlers trusted in the 
established norms of viceregal government. They allowed for negotiation and redress: as 
Suárez de Peralta noted Velasco was enough of a ‘father to them’.280 
In order to establish their authority, the viceroys sought to use their position to 
become the greatest patrons in New Spain and the most trusted intermediaries between 
the settlers and the crown.  
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Administrative reform  
Mendoza adapted pre-existing administrative offices to increase his ability to 
dispense patronage. The clearest example comes from the changes he instituted to the 
office of corregidor. The Second Audiencia had introduced 53 corregidores to administer the 
principal towns under control of the crown. Their term of office lasted one year and like 
encomenderos they were paid from the tribute they collected from the towns under their 
supervision, but they possessed even greater legal powers. This made them often even 
more exploitative than the encomenderos they replaced; or were local encomenderos 
themselves given extra responsibilities because the audiencia had been unable to find 
suitable alternative candidates281.  
Mendoza was aware of the complaints against the corregidores and was in favour of 
greater autonomy in indigenous self-government. His original suggestion for reform reveals 
his intentions: Mendoza originally wanted to eliminate the corregidores altogether and to 
replace them with far fewer (about 12) alcaldes mayores that would serve on a more 
permanent basis.282 Mendoza’s plan would have allowed him to appoint his household 
adherents to the powerful alcaldías mayores – each with authority over huge districts - 
making them more powerful than most encomenderos, and to gain access to part of the 
income generated by these towns for distribution at his own discretion to those he 
considered worthy. Unsurprisingly Mendoza protested pre-emptively that his intention was 
not intended to give him ‘too much hand’ in the running of the administration by these 
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reforms,283 but the crown rejected his plan nonetheless. The intention behind this failed 
reform is instructive because it illustrates the logic of Mendoza’s subsequent reform of the 
office of corregidor to achieve similar ends.  
Mendoza instead created a system of ‘quitas y vacaciones’, which he explained in 
some detail to his successor and was often commented on by officials, but has been largely 
ignored by historians despite its widespread use.284 Mendoza standardised the salary of 
corregidores to around 240d or less, rather than granting them the total tribute assessment 
of the individual towns they were administering. This reduction was justified by enforced 
shorter terms (‘vacating’). This allowed the viceroy to both increase the number of 
corregidores he could appoint from 53 to 159 a year by 1546 and to use the balance that 
was left over from the total tribute collected to reward various other individuals for specific 
services or merely to subsidise them at his pleasure. Because this system did not affect the 
level of previous tributary income that went into the treasury, the distribution of these 
remaining funds was effectively at the discretion of the viceroys, albeit with the approval of 
the royal officials or in specific cases where the crown directly ordered specific payments to 
particular individuals.285 The number of corregimientos kept rising as a result of the further 
escheat of encomiendas after the ‘New Laws’ and later the confiscation of the marquesado: 
in 1569 there were 155 corregimientos available a year, with more than one person 
occupying each position in that period.286 Furthermore other minor offices in the gift of the 
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viceroys like alguacilazgos and alcaldías mayores may have become subject to similar forced 
‘vacations’. 
The funds available in the quitas y vacaciones fund varied yearly but were 
considerable. When Velasco died on 31 July 1564, over 45,000d – more than the total 
salaries paid to all corregidores which was about 38,750d per annum- had already been 
assigned from this fund for the following year and more remained to be distributed.287 This 
source of viceregal patronage became even more important when price inflation took hold: 
while salaries in royal administration remained constant, tributary income decreased and 
Spanish immigration increased.288  
The viceroys already had the right to decide on the appointment of corregidores. 
These reforms, combined with their alliance with the treasury officials, gave the viceroys a 
king-like access and control over most of the resourced in the royal coffers. It amounted to 
an enormous potential for direct viceregal patronage. Gonzalo de Salazar, who had gone to 
Spain during a period of Spanish discontent and emigrations, returned to Mexico in 1538, 
and hardly recognised it because ‘this city [Mexico] is turned into a great court, because the 
voice of the viceroy has carried and sustained many people.’289 Mendoza turned the 
instruments of administration into a system of welfare and patronage under his control.  
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Mendoza claimed that there were not enough people to fill all the offices when he 
first arrived, but that soon there were too many legitimate claimants.290 As with much else 
in New Spain scarcity led to competition over both the offices and disbursements in the 
viceroy’s gift. The viceroys were able to determine who deserved these rewards and what 
criteria should be applied in establishing merit.291 During the visitas conducted on the 
viceroys’ administrations, a vocal minority accused each viceroy of bestowing offices and 
largesse on undeserving individuals. Clearly the viceroys could not accommodate for the 
wishes of all Spaniards. Those individuals that the viceroys selected for preferment, and in 
particular those appointments that caused the greatest controversy, reveal most clearly the 
internal logic of the viceroys’ political objectives in New Spain because their selection was 
potentially most at odds with the legitimising characteristics expected from the more 
abstracted perspective of Spain.  
There were points of divergence between the viceroys’ role of representing the king, 
their own ambitions and the practical necessities of establishing viceregal authority using 
personal courtly and patrimonial strategies.292 The bitterest complaints were levied against 
patronage that went to members of the viceregal households and to other recent Spanish 
arrivals that did not have the traditional legitimising claim of being a conquistador, an old 
settler, or descended from either. There were also complaints that too much of the 
patronage that did go to ‘worthy’ claimants went to those that were most closely allied and 
involved with the viceroys or their dependents. In short, the complaints from the two visitas 
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followed the same formula of earlier accusations made against previous governors and the 
crown for not rewarding the ‘right’ people. It was a symptom of perpetually scarce and 
diminishing resources on the one hand and the high expectations of many Spanish settlers 
on the other, combined with an uncertainty and instability of status produced by New 
Spain’s original sin. It led to intense competition for available sources of income and 
prestige. It is possible to identify a guiding logic to viceregal patronage that related to their 
governmental aims. 
Household government 
Both viceroys arrived from Spain with ‘very principal households, of many criados-
caballeros’293 of about thirty to fifty individuals drawn mainly from their seats in Spain: 
Granada and Guadalajara for Mendoza; Palencia, Navarre and the Basque country for 
Velasco.294 These would form the core of the viceregal court, which reproduced the royal 
and lordly households they knew from Spain, but also fit into a pattern that was 
fundamental to Spanish migration and settlement in New Spain. 
Like the viceroys other great patrons had travelled to New Spain with large retinues 
to help them establish their authority and carry out their commands. Hernán Cortés 
returned in 1530 with a retinue of close to four hundred people (nearly as many as those 
that crossed with him in 1519 from Cuba) ‘to discharge the offices’ in the marquessate and 
to man expeditions he had in mind as Captain General of New Spain. Similarly, Alvarado on 
his return in 1538 was accompanied by 250 men, many arms and munitions for further 
exploration and several nubile young doncellas for his battle scarred veterans in Guatemala, 
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all at a cost of 30,000d.295 Lesser encomenderos sought to maintain friends and relatives 
from Spain in greater dignity than they had been used to or useful new acquaintances to 
help them as tribute collectors or merely to display their own importance.296  
It was understood, therefore, that the viceroys would rely on and give preference to 
these dependants. They were known generically by a variety of names, like vassallo or 
criado that displayed the bonds of loyalty between them and the viceroys.297 None of these 
definitions implied formal servitude, and there was nothing institutional about their 
position. Indeed in all letters addressed to the king the signatories rather optimistically 
referred to themselves as ‘his majesty’s most loyal criados’ to suggest an idealised 
household proximity. 
Apart from the silver-miners, most patrons in New Spain were competing for 
diminishing resources, as the indigenous population declined while inflation increased the 
price of prized European goods erratically.298 This made reliance on a stable and adaptable 
source of income or at least food and shelter particularly pressing.  
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For the viceroys, deciding who to appoint to offices like corregidor or who deserved 
largesse from the treasury was not a choice between nepotism and highly qualified 
bureaucrats but rather between the viceroy’s trusted favourites that formed part of the 
viceregal ‘party’ and other settlers whom the viceroy did not know or trust and who had no 
particular allegiance to him. The viceroys assigned offices or granted benefices to relatives 
and other members of their household in imitation of the ‘intimate’ style of courtly 
government they knew from Spain. The crown itself recognised the patrimonial aspect of 
viceregal government in the immunity the viceroys received from paying the almojarifazgo 
on the household property they transported to New Spain.299 Furthermore, royal 
instructions to the viceroys and their defence of the appointments they made, are full of 
references to choosing ‘men of confidence’ to carry out the most delicate tasks of the 
administration. The viceroys defended their choices along the same lines: ‘and in this I did 
what I had to and what I considered to be most convenient for the service of your majesty 
and the good government of the land.’300 The duality of the viceroy’s identity as a mere 
representation and as a patron in his own right who was not sovereign but had appropriated 
king-like powers explains the discrepancy and justification for complaint from the excluded. 
The difference between household duties and more official services was blurred: 
Amongst the most mentioned individuals in Mendoza’s visita was Agustín Guerrero: 
ostensibly mayordomo mayor of Mendoza’s court and captain of the guard. He also acted as 
the viceroy’s most important ‘intimate representative’ carrying out a remarkable array of 
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missions: from overseeing the review of the treasury books from 1536 to 1544 to running 
the viceroy’s wool-making enterprise with Gonzalo Gómez, a task that was beneath the 
dignity of the viceroy but was essential for the private wealth that allowed him to run the 
viceregal household and maintain its dependents. Guerrero was also involved in other 
delicate missions such as brokering the deal over Pacific exploration with Alvarado and as 
the viceroy’s primary lieutenant in the Mixtón War; he even acted as bursar to the college of 
Tlatelolco. Guerrero also organised the court and controlled access to the viceroy.301 When 
Guerrero finally left New Spain it was to represent the viceroy at court in Spain following the 
accusations of Tello de Sandoval’s visita. Guerrero was rewarded with corregimientos from 
1540 to his return to Spain after 1545; not surprisingly, he was continually rewarded from 
the ‘vacaciones’ fund for specific missions as well. It seems highly probable that he had his 
own patronage network, delegating some responsibilities and sharing rewards with his 
trusted associates within the viceroy’s court like his nephew Juan Martínez Guerrero 
(Agustín himself did not have children in New Spain). Mendoza allowed Juan to enjoy the 
encomienda that came to him as his wife’s dowry even though she was an illegitimate 
mestiza making the transfer of dubious legality. Juan was left a very wealthy man by his 
uncle, eventually living in one of the grandest houses in Mexico City.302 His descendants 
were encomenderos into the 17th century and thereafter established a mayorazgo.303   
Household dependants, like Guerrero, were not supplanting professional 
bureaucrats in these offices, but rather what their accusers in the visitas considered more 
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‘deserving’ settlers and conquistadores. The members of viceregal entourages were at least 
as able in discharging these administrative offices as the conquistadores and needy settlers 
that their accusers suggested should have occupied these positions instead.304 For the 
viceroys, selecting household dependants and other trusted individuals served a dual 
function: firstly they could be more certain that these trusted individuals would carry out 
their instructions; secondly by promoting these favourites in society they were inserting 
them into the elite of New Spain, in positions where they could extend patronage and 
influence in their own right. This not only fulfilled the viceroy’s obligations as patrons but 
also proved expedient for the exercise of their power.  
Velasco famously promoted his brother Francisco and other relatives like the Viveros 
and the Ibarras as parallel sources of patronage to bypass the restrictions of the new royal 
decrees limiting the ties to the land that salaried officials like himself could possess. 
Francisco for instance, was able to maintain his own large and identifiable client network: 
Valderrama’s investigations often turned up individuals identified as ‘criados of don 
Francisco…’305 He supported them from the salaries he enjoyed from various offices granted 
to him by his brother; the disbursements he could arrange for his followers from the 
‘vacaciones’ fund; his encomienda; and eventually as one of the largest land-owners in New 
Spain as well. Francisco’s patrimonial wealth became crucial, after Velasco’s death in 1564, 
for the triumph of the ‘viceregal party’ over the ambitions of Martín Cortés and his 
partisans.  
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A faithful outsider like the Roman knight Luis de León Romano, who crossed to New 
Spain with Mendoza under recommendation from Charles V and continued to serve under 
Velasco, was a useful agent for viceregal authority as well. His commitment to the viceroys 
was such that he left much of his fortune to Velasco as well as to educational and religious 
institutions for Indians in his will after he died childless.306 Both viceroys gave Leon Romano, 
who was a committed partisan who depended entirely on viceregal largesse, various offices 
including corregimientos and sent him as their ‘intimate representative’ on specific missions 
like limiting the damage caused by cattle on indigenous lands in Oaxaca or to investigate 
sites to plant wheat; or entrusted him with delicate responsibilities like overseeing the 
supply of essential food-stuffs into Mexico City, where speculation amongst the members of 
the cabildo, who had controlled the supply in the past, had driven prices up even higher 
than in the rest of the kingdom.307 He was also versatile and able enough to be employed in 
less administrative positions as well like arranging the courtly feasts and pageantries for 
Mendoza in 1538 or designing the town-plan for new Spanish settlements in Michoacán and 
Oaxaca  for which he was rewarded from the ‘vacaciones’ fund by both viceroys.308 
There were also more discreet but practical issues where trusted dependents within 
the administration could be helpful in strengthening the viceroy’s hand. Mendoza made use 
of Martín de Peralta as corregidor from 1536 to his death in 1543 and with these powers he 
became an agent, at times, for the distribution of the viceroy’s patronage, most significantly 
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in arranging land swaps, grants and purchases of oidor Tejada in the area of Chalco.309 
Peralta, a ‘very honourable’ hidalgo from Santa Fe near Granada, was the sort of desirable 
settler for New Spain and he had committed to settling in the land by bringing his entire 
family. Mendoza considered Peralta a trusted dependent and a ‘good republican’, 310  whose 
help in carrying out the viceroy’s wishes had benefited the land and consequently the 
viceroy felt justified in rewarding him with an encomienda as well as offices.311 
The most glamorous opportunities for royal service also went to the viceroys’ ‘men 
of confidence’. Mendoza sent ‘some men from my household’ to deal with the ‘king and his 
lieutenants’ of a community of rebellious runaway slaves. His dependents then warned the 
mine owners across New Spain after the slaves confessed to the existence of a wider 
conspiracy. Francisco Vázquez de Coronado first made his name in royal service by being 
entrusted with this responsibility, personally carrying out the arrests and securing the 
mines.312 This led to an advantageous marriage and justification for his appointment to 
various offices. The viceroy was determined to build him up as his own magnate in the 
increasingly important north-west frontier, granting him encomiendas in New Galicia to 
support his appointment to the governorship. From his stronghold, Coronado represented 
the viceroy and supported the great projects of exploration of the Pacific North-West. 
Velasco built up a similar dependant-magnate in the shape of his page and the nephew of 
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his son in law, Francisco de Ibarra. Ibarra commanded his first expedition at the age of 
fifteen to the territory he later conquered and governed as the kingdom of Nueva 
Vizcaya.313 
The noblemen don Luis de Castilla and don Tristán de Luna y Arellano had originally 
come as part of the marquesa Juana de Zúñiga’s entourage in 1530, but had returned to 
Spain, disillusioned with their patron Cortés. They had returned with Mendoza who valued 
settlers of recognised nobility over self-made adventurers and consequently supported both 
of them with corregimientos and other offices.314 Mendoza also granted them opportunities 
for service through special commissions: Castilla was sent to represent the viceroy in the 
arrangements with Alvarado along with Guerrero and in the launching of Alarcón’s 
expedition; he also helped in the delicate matter of negotiating, supplying and paying 
Michoacáno conquistadores who accompanied Coronado during the decisive period from 
1539 to 1541 (like oidor Tejada who dealt with the Mexica contingent).315 Castilla, who had 
elevated to the cabildo of Mexico City by the king and become an encomendero by marrying 
the daughter of Alonso de Estrada was using his authority and judicial powers as corregidor 
to develop important mining interests.  
Luna y Arellano became a strong-man of the Míxe frontier in Oaxaca, especially after 
marrying the widow of Francisco de Maldonado, another individual favoured by Mendoza 
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who had occupied a similar role before Luna y Arellano316, and inheriting his rich 
encomiendas of Tecomastlaguaca which he added to his nearby holdings at Justlaguaca. In 
1548 and 1550 Luna y Arellano successfully defeated two uprisings in the area amongst the 
Tequipans and the Zapotecs.317 In 1551, Luna y Arellano strengthened his position in the 
area further when he became governor of the marquesado, which had many holdings in 
Oaxaca. Velasco continued to rely on Luna y Arellano and rewarded him by appointing him 
to the command of the most ambitious project yet to conquer and settle a new 
governorship in Florida, which, had it succeeded, would have turned him into another 
powerful territorial magnate associated with the viceregal court. 
 Noblemen from illustrious dynasties like Castilla and Luna y Arellano were also 
valuable to the viceroys for the prestige of their names and their dynastic contacts on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Both were also related to the marquesa which explained why Luna y 
Arellano was appointed governor of the marquesado in 1551.318 Castilla’s royal descent 
brought added charisma to his person. Mendoza justified giving him offices in part because 
of this legitimising attribute: ‘he is very honourable and a caballero and he is worthy of this 
[status] because he has given a good account of himself in the offices he has been charged 
with…’319 Castilla’s influential brother Diego de Castilla was lord of various towns in Spain 
and master of the horse to Charles V, which gave Luis a powerful ally at the heart of the 
Spanish court. Through Diego’s daughter with doña Beatriz de Mendoza, Ana de Castilla 
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who was married to viceroy Velasco, don Luis de Castilla, Mendoza and Velasco all shared 
ties of kinship. Castilla and Luna y Arellano were instrumental in bringing continuity to the 
power-structures of New Spain despite the change of viceroy.  
There were other useful individuals in New Spain whom the viceroys favoured for 
strategic reasons. Like Luna y Arellano in Oaxaca, Mendoza and Velasco relied on another 
noble adventurer, don Hernán Pérez de Bocanegra y Córdoba as a strong-man in northern 
Michoacán on the Chichimeca frontier. Bocanegra had established a fruitful alliance with 
Fernando de Tapia, the Otomí godfather of New Spain’s conquest and colonisation of the 
frontier north of Xilotepec. Mendoza empowered Bocanegra by granting him an 
encomienda at Acámbaro in the region (Fernando de Tapia’s wife came from this 
encomienda) and elevating him to regidor ordinario of Mexico City and perhaps more 
relevantly given the developing pastoral economy of the area under his influence, alcalde de 
mesta. In a further affirmation of their alliance Bocanegra represented the viceroy in an 
important purchase of cattle-breeding ranches in northern Michoacán. Both viceroys also 
used him as a military commander: Mendoza in the Mixtón war and Velasco in an attempt 
to pacify the increasingly violent Chichimeca raiders that were disrupting the access to the 
new silver-mining centre of Zacatecas.320  
As silver-mining became increasingly important in the later 1540s and throughout 
the government of Velasco, both viceroys sought to form important ties with the new silver-
mining entrepreneurs who were fast becoming the wealthiest settlers of New Spain. 
                                                     
320
 R. Himmerich y Valencia The encomenderos of New Spain: 1521-1555, (Austin 1996), p. 215; E. Ruiz 
Medrano Reshaping New Spain: Government and private interest in the colonial bureaucracy 1531-1550. Julia 
Constantino and Pauline Marmasse trans.,(Colorado, 2006), p. 121-2; P.W. Powell La guerra chichimeca…, 
pp.76, 84.  
146 
 
Mendoza had already established a relationship with Cristóbal de Oñate and Miguel de 
Ibarra when he was securing his authority over New Galicia in the 1530s, first through 
Vázquez de Coronado and after during his own tour of the area. Mendoza maintained the 
links with the Ibarras thereafter, for instance through Hortuño de Ibarra who became Juan 
Alonso de Sosa’s lieutenant treasurer in the late 1540s, and by promoting other relatives 
like Pedro de Ibarra who was recommended for a canonry by the viceroy.321 Oñate married 
Catalina de Salazar, the widow of Mendoza’s household retainer don Ruy Díaz de Mendoza 
and daughter of Mendoza’s ally Gonzalo de Salazar. The relationship became closer after 
the Mixtón war when both men emerged with great credit. Ibarra was given corregimientos 
both before the war in 1541 and after in 1543, while the viceroy heaped praise and honours 
on Oñate who became the effective governor of New Galicia and was trusted enough to be 
appointed as Francisco de Mendoza’s maestro de campo for the proposed expedition to 
Peru in 1547.322 These families became important beyond New Galicia after their discovery 
of the silver-deposits in Zacatecas. Their ties and loyalty bound them closer to Mexico City 
than to the new audiencia of New Galicia in remote Compostela.  
Velasco had very close ties to the Ibarras from allegiances that traced their origin to 
Spain: the viceroy and Diego de Ibarra had served Velasco’s kinsman the Constable of Castile 
early in their careers. Velasco seems to have travelled to New Spain with Diego’s nephew 
Francisco de Ibarra as a page in his retinue, but the alliance became dynastic after the 
viceroy married his daughter to Diego. Later, Velasco with the financial backing of Diego de 
Ibarra would support the expeditions of Francisco de Ibarra and convert him into the 
                                                     
321
 ENE, Vol.5. docs. 270 and 274. 
322
 A.S. Aiton Antonio de Mendoza …p. 176. 
147 
 
governor of Nueva Vizcaya. Elevating powerful allies into the elite of New Spain helped the 
viceroy to extend his influence over other potential rivals for authority in New Spain. 
These grand figures owed their success and newly-won status in New Spain to 
viceregal patronage. They were not generally drawn from the conquistadores or the most 
successful early encomenderos. They were accompanied in the viceregal party by less well 
known but important individuals of lesser social prestige who subsisted more directly from 
viceregal patronage. These other dependants fulfilled important administrative needs and 
advanced the viceroys’ agenda of establishing their authority over the Spanish settlers.  
Pedro Varela, for instance, became Mendoza’s agent at Veracruz where he looked 
after the viceroy’s personal commercial interests and ensured amongst other things, that 
the viceroy was supplied with the rare provisions he needed. Of particular importance were 
the supplies from Spain for his expeditions of exploration and to deal with the emergency of 
the Mixtón War and the relief of Peru.323 Mendoza provided him with the necessary offices, 
like factor of Veracruz and several corregimientos to carry out this preferential trade for the 
viceroy.  
Many of these associates lived at the palace or were fed by the viceroys. I have been 
unable to find any accounts for either viceregal household, but it seems clear from their 
own testimonies and the evidence collected by the visitadores that the viceroys used their 
administrative windfalls as well as their private wealth, from salaries, and their economic 
activities, to sustain large numbers of dependants at the viceregal palace.324 Velasco’s 
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salaries became relatively large compared to the incomes of many other patrons and the 
balance tilted increasingly in the viceroy’s favour as the ‘magnates’ were overcome and the 
number and wealth of encomenderos declined while the private enterprises the viceroys 
engaged in became more profitable. For a very rough comparison, it should be noted that in 
1560 Velasco enjoyed a salary of 20,000d while by then the average encomendero (taking 
into account that there were enormous variations and many had other sources of income as 
well) enjoyed tributary rents of 1,619d a year.325  
Mendoza supported around thirty of the permanent members of his household with 
the help of the 2,000d that the crown had granted him for the upkeep of a viceregal guard 
in addition to his salary of 6,000d. This use of funds for general household expenditure 
became part of the accusation against his tenure during Sandoval’s visita. As one witness 
pointed out, despite the viceroy’s official lists of guards, the only halberdiers he saw at the 
palace were those painted on the wall-paper on either side of the door leading to the 
viceroy’s quarters.326 Mendoza was using these funds to reward his favourites or to increase 
the dependants he could maintain at the palace without employing them exclusively as his 
guard. The list of the members of Mendoza’s bodyguard offers the closest information we 
have regarding the identity of Mendoza’s household dependants.327 Many seem to have 
been relatives of the more successful dependents that Mendoza promoted like the Peraltas.  
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Both viceroys were known for, and advertised, their generosity to impoverished 
conquistadors or other recent arrivals that were fed and even housed in the viceregal 
palace. This direct patronage over newly acquired dependants was an expected element of 
lordly behaviour, which displayed the viceroy’s power and virtue and was aped by other 
Spaniards,328 as when they joined the viceroy in the effort to house and feed the 300 
survivors of de Soto’s expedition. The viceroys’ emphasis on their magnanimity can be 
understood because it transcended the private sphere and helped to establish their 
authority in symbolic terms, as well as the more prosaic fact that they could count on large 
numbers of dependant men as their partisans. Many of the Spaniards in Coronado’s 
expedition had been new-comers that the viceroy had been feeding in Mexico City.329 By the 
end of Mendoza’s tenure, Andrés de Tapia calculated the viceroy fed 250 Spaniards at the 
palace and Velasco seems to have supported slightly fewer but more regularly, even 
indebting himself heavily to achieve this.330 Alonso Vázquez described the sort of individual 
sponsored by Mendoza: ‘[Mendoza] has and has had in his house and at his table many poor 
caballeros and other people who he has fed…sometimes they are a hundred sometimes less 
and this witness does not know if they are paid a salary but know that he has given silk and 
material to clothe them and shoes… he has seen no other guards except for these people he 
keeps in his house and who follow him around’.331  Amongst these could be the relatives of 
useful individuals that helped the viceroys establish strategic links across New Spain as was 
the case with Bernal Díaz del Castillo’s son who lived at Velasco’s court and helped 
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established at least an epistolary link between Velasco and an influential citizen in distant 
Guatemala.332  
The named beneficiaries from the ‘quitas y vacaciones’ fund also reveal the identity 
of some of the less official individuals that were maintained at court from treasury funds, 
like Velasco’s noble courtesan doña Margarita Pacheco333 or his hunters like the peerless 
Pedro Romero or Alonso de Nava (whom Suaréz de Peralta believed to have received a 
salary of 2,000d), along with doctors, barbers, musicians and others who made courtly life 
more pleasant and charismatic.334 
More intriguingly Valderrama mentioned several individuals, like Gerónimo del 
Mercado, who had been nicknamed alumbrados in Mexico.335 They benefited from direct 
viceregal patronage, but were also often associated with the friars as in the case of Agustín 
de Las Casas, a deudo of Bartolomé de las Casas and whose daughter married visitador 
Diego Ramírez. According to Valderrama, they were ‘one of those’ charged with finding 
ways to reduce the levels of tribute paid by indigenous polities.336 Such agents were 
instrumental in the viceroys’ policy for dealing with the indigenous polities discussed in ch.5.  
They seem to have been part of the identifiable viceregal ‘party’ who hoped to uphold on 
ideological, as well as practical grounds, the supremacy of the viceroys over the other 
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Spanish authorities, like the magnates and encomenderos, or the royal officials, oidores and 
especially the cabildos.337 
Influence over the encomenderos 
Most of the individuals discussed so far were not from among the ranks of the more 
successful conquistadores or early settlers.  They were ‘new men’, in terms of New Spain 
and were not only emotionally more important to the viceroys but also more dependent on 
them and consequently more reliable as allies for their patrimonial and administrative 
strategies of government. In a pattern that had repeated itself since the arrival of the Royal 
officials, they were considered to have displaced members of the existing elite or taken the 
resources that should have gone to more hard-pressed and deserving settlers.  
Like the great majority of the settlers in New Spain, both viceroys were in favour of 
perpetual grants of encomienda. They lobbied for it because it would have made them 
decisive one-time patrons and would have allowed them great powers to define a more 
permanent social hierarchy for New Spain. Mendoza certainly expected this 
responsibility.338 Instead both viceroys had to rely on an indirect influence over the 
encomenderos. The viceroy’s use of the administration as a patronage system softened the 
rancour at the elevation of their own allies to the rank of encomenderos, while attracting a 
decisive number of the more traditionally deserving and successful settlers with the benefits 
of alternative forms of patronage at the viceroy’s disposal.  
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Mendoza avoided giving offence to most encomenderos by not confiscating grants 
whose holders were still alive as had occurred with the Second Audiencia. Had he done so, 
he would have faced much more dogged opposition from the established elite as the 
wrangles over the encomienda of Alonso Lucas, which Mendoza reassigned to Alonso de 
Mérida rather than Lucas’ successors, suggest.  Such trespasses were exceptional enough to 
be unimportant to most encomenderos who did not see Mendoza as an enemy. Rather 
Suárez de Peralta’s most salient memory of the relative powers that Mendoza enjoyed 
when compared to his successors was that he was free to distribute these encomiendas 
according to his will.339  
Mendoza was able to rely on the flexibility of the system of quitas y vacaciones, 
which allowed him to raise the numbers of corregidores and still assign 11 crown towns to 
private encomenderos without confiscating them from existing holders first.340 These were 
allocated to his closest associates without alienating the existing encomenderos by making 
them fearful that their own holdings might be confiscated or forced to escheat. The viceroys 
also encouraged marital alliances between his adherents and members of the encomendero 
elite which cemented the link between the viceroys’ interests and the notion of encomienda 
as the reward and symbol of the Spanish elite. By the end of Mendoza’s first year in office 
three members of the viceroy’s household had become encomenderos: Martín de Peralta 
was granted a new encomienda and Alonso de Mérida was re-assigned one after the death 
of its holder; while Francisco Vázquez de Coronado was allowed to acquire one as part of his 
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wife’s dowry.341 All three were the type of trusted noble principal men that Mendoza 
envisaged at the head of his kingdom and who the settlers hoped to consider their peers. 
The association between viceroy and encomenderos that the Mendozan system 
allowed for grew strong enough for him to sponsor and represent the causes of the 
encomenderos generally and the dispossessed but deserving settlers in particular before the 
royal authorities. Mendoza was fortunate in that it was assumed, and his instructions 
suggested, that the task of determining which individuals deserved a perpetual grant of 
encomienda, in accordance with a cédula of 5 April 1528, was to be finally decided by 
himself. Mendoza supported the idea of perpetual and hereditary grants, with the legal 
proviso that these rights were ultimately dependent on the crown and not held 
autonomously by the encomenderos.342 This chimed well with his aim of creating a stable 
and ordered kingdom for him to govern where the encomenderos should be at the pinnacle 
of a Spanish ‘republic’ presided by himself and his successors. While the settlers believed 
that the final repartimiento was imminent, the stakes in bidding for viceregal favour were 
high because it could entail membership of the recognised perpetual elite of New Spain.  
In accordance with these expectations Mendoza presided over an assembly of 
aggrieved encomenderos and dispossessed conquerors who elected Miguel Díaz de Aux and 
Francisco de Vargas (two of their number) to go to petition the king in Spain for just 
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rewards. They hoped to do so with the viceroy’s blessing. Both men were consistently 
compensated by the viceroy for the loss of their encomienda with corregimientos and other 
forms of viceregal grace in recognition of the worth of their claims. In 1537 the assembly 
was eventually hijacked by existing encomenderos with their own interests and the original 
representatives never managed to leave New Spain; but in a letter Díaz de Aux emphasised 
his trust in the viceroy’s qualifications to resolve the matter of encomienda grants in 
perpetuity ‘better than anyone else’.343 This assembly was a precursor to the delegation 
which reached the royal court in 1550 and was joined there by another delegation from 
Peru to argue for perpetual grants.344 
The assembly of 1537 described by Díaz de Aux also points to the viceroy’s 
willingness and ability to summon assemblies of leading citizens to gain their consensus and 
consent for certain ventures. Another good example comes from the discussions that led to 
the abortive expedition to Peru in 1547 which Jerónimo López described as a ‘parlamento’ 
aimed at garnering support for the proposed expedition.345 Participation in such assemblies 
hosted by the viceroy reinforced the sense a Spanish ‘republic’ with the viceroy at its head 
and conversely recognition of the principal status of those that were invited to participate.  
Mendoza also represented the encomenderos throughout the crisis caused by the 
attempted implementation of the New Laws. His intervention helped to suppress some of 
the most grievous clauses, avoided an armed uprising and firmly established the viceroy as 
the champion of encomienda in the minds of most settlers.  
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Mendoza’s greatest critics during Sandoval’s visita were encomenderos who 
complained about the grants, transfers and confirmations of encomienda ordered by the 
viceroy. They represented a small though often powerful minority of settlers, like the 
Vázquez de Tapia clan and their allies the Albornoz who in the past had lost out in viceregal 
preferment. Most of the commentators in New Spain, like the traditionally Cortesian 
encomendero Andrés de Tapia, argued that the viceroy had only become more identified 
and familiar with New Spain as time had passed and argued vigorously for him to stay in 
charge and bequeath his duties to his son.346 Those with interests in encomienda generally 
felt supported and represented by the viceroy while it was the viceroy’s accuser, Tello de 
Sandoval, who had been tasked with implementing the hated anti-encomendero ‘New 
Laws’. Despite their minority, the accusations that arose from the visita damaged 
Mendoza’s reputation at court in Spain because they questioned his intentions in 
government and his virtue.  
By then Mendoza was fighting for his own perpetuity in office as much as for the 
elite that he had shaped during his fifteen years in power. Far from his image as the modern 
administrator keen to undermine the proto-feudal aspirations of the encomenderos, 
Mendoza was in a sense no more than a partisan arbiter in the tangled disputes over rightful 
encomienda ownership that had always plagued New Spain. The complaints against him 
during the visita were not that he had opposed the encomenderos but that he had only 
supported those he favoured with unwarranted offices, lands and rewards. The association 
between Mendoza and the encomenderos can be seen most clearly in the crown’s reaction 
against both viceregal and encomendero patrimonial aspirations in 1550: Mendoza’s 
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support for encomienda both in New Spain and at court alienated him from the council of 
the Indies because it confirmed many councillor’s suspicions about his own lordly 
aspirations in New Spain.  
Velasco’s instructions and his expectations on first arriving in New Spain were at first 
different to those of the outgoing viceroy. Even before Velasco arrived settlers like Andrés 
de Tapia and Jerónimo López were worried that the new viceroy would be too ‘severe’ with 
regards to the sui-generis even ‘secret’ arrangements of the Mendozan period.347 Velasco 
was constrained by the decisiveness with which royal legislation insisted in the matter of 
encomeinda after 1550.  Velasco himself repeatedly argued in support of the notion of 
perpetual encomienda along the lines of the negotiations of 1546 and failing that the 
extension of tenure for three generations rather than two, both of which the crown 
eventually denied as well. Instead he was charged with carrying out the extent of the 
clauses of the New Laws that undermined the profitability of encomienda tenure. Royal 
legislation did help Velasco’s authority, however: the new prohibitions on the 
encomenderos meant that their tributary incomes were decreasing and they were losing the 
potential for the lordly and jurisdictional attribute they craved, becoming instead little more 
than crown pensioners and consequently increasingly dependent on viceregal favour.348 At 
the same time silver-mining and activities associated with its development, like owning 
extensive agricultural lands whose produce would to feed the burgeoning new mining 
settlements, increasingly substituted tributary income as the most lucrative economic 
activity in New Spain.  
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The difference between the encomenderos and salaried corregidores or recipients of 
royal subsidies diminished in practice, as both were increasingly paid in money or equivalent 
produce from the royal treasury rather than directly by personal services and tribute drawn 
specifically from their towns. The viceroy, with the support of an amenable audiencia, could 
also determine when an encomienda escheated after considering the ambiguous legal 
manipulations involved in defining how many ‘lives’ the encomienda had been in one family: 
the acceptance of deathbed weddings to very young brides, inheritance between siblings 
and other manipulations were in the gift of the viceroy. For example many considered 
Velasco’s concession of an encomienda to Pedro de Castilla rather than its escheatment to 
the crown as an obvious case of favouritism.349 The good will of the viceroy became even 
more important for an increasing segment of the old encomendero class in securing the 
financial subsidies, supplementary offices and land grants at Velasco’s disposal if they 
wanted to sustain the level of wealth and status they had become accustomed to. Seen in 
this light, Velasco’s hold over the encomenderos became even stronger than Mendoza’s as 
the nature of encomienda became less patrimonial and more dependent on viceregal 
approval.  
Velasco’s economic assistance to needy conquistadors and their heirs softened the 
severity of the implementation of the New Laws. This not only came from the usual sources 
of patronage like corregimientos or the quitas y vacaciones funds, but Velasco also adopted 
and justified to the crown another kind of ‘vacaciones’ fund drawn from the tributary 
income of recently escheated encomiendas or from the dues of excessively large 
encomiendas, part of which was assigned instead to assist the impoverished, dispossessed 





heirs to encomiendas or other deserving conquistadors.  This manipulation recalls the 
changes made originally by Mendoza to the corregimientos and is an indication of the 
concentration of patronage that the viceroys were able to accumulate by appropriating 
access to the funds of the royal treasury. Velasco was able to run a selective welfare system 
where the viceroy determined who deserved to receive assistance, making an even greater 
proportion of the Spanish settlers dependent on his good will.350  
Like Mendoza, Velasco developed intimate ties to the encomendero class through 
the marriage or elevation of his allegados to that status. The individuals selected to 
represent the encomenderos as a whole at a meeting to discuss the issue of perpetuity and 
petition the king at an assembly in 1564 included Francisco, the viceroy’s brother and others 
like Bernardino Pacheco Bocanegra that were considered Velasco’s men.351 Velasco was 
able to identify himself as a patron of the encomenderos.  
The cabildo of Mexico City 
The natural forum in which the settler elite could come together and exert their 
common influence was the cabildo which formed the ayuntamiento of a municipal unit. As 
the basic unit of the Spanish municipal political tradition a cabildo was endowed with a 
relatively autonomous political legitimacy – a cabildo had legitimised Cortés’ leadership and 
planned expedition inland at Veracruz - and its regidores and other officials served 
voluntarily and without a salary. The cabildo elected alcaldes ordinarios and other regidores 
although the crown could also appoint individuals to the cabildo.  
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Mexico City, the ancient imperial polity, was the preponderant cabecera of the 
kingdom with by far the greatest Spanish population and an especially powerful cabildo 
composed of some of the richest and best connected members of the Spanish elite. The 
inherent legitimacy of these municipal organisations, and in particular the eminence of the 
cabildo of Mexico City, could be a potential source of competition to viceregal authority.352  
Bernaldino Vázquez de Tapia - a conquistador who had entrenched his influence 
through his judicious matrimonial alliances and his influence over the cabildo of Mexico 
City- complained vociferously against Mendoza, as he had done against Cortés, for 
attempting to control the cabildo and override or appropriate its powers.353 Vázquez de 
Tapia pointed out that the viceroy was trying to undermine some of the cabildo’s most 
important rights, like deciding on the distribution of lands in the hinterland of Mexico City; 
or riding roughshod over some of the authorities they had acquired from the crown like 
their right to conduct an official visita of the royal mint (run by Mendoza’s allegado Alonso 
de Mérida) for which the cabildo had a royal cédula but which the viceroy denied them: ‘in 
this it became evident that the viceroy wanted the power to provide for [everything] high 
and low.’354 
As with the royal officials and oidores, the viceroys were not able to affect the legal 
rights and privileges of the cabildo, so instead they influenced it through promoting the 
individuals of the ‘viceregal party’ within it. According to Vázquez de Tapia, the viceroy’s 
men in the cabildo were don Luis de Castilla, Juan Alonso de Sosa, Gonzalo de Salazar, 
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Hernando de Salazar, Juan Velázquez de Salazar, Francisco Vázquez de Coronado, Antonio 
de Carvajal and Hernán Pérez de Bocanegra.355As Vázquez de Tapia explained the cabildo 
was soon cowed ‘because, as the lic. Loaysa came to the ayuntamiento and there were 
other regidores who were very good friends of the said viceroy and of his party, the others 
were very suspicious of saying anything in the cabildo relating to the viceroy because they 
would report it to him…’ In one particularly injurious instance Mendoza was accused of 
bursting into the cabildo chambers and insulting the regidores. According to Vázquez de 
Tapia Mendoza’s reply to the cabildo’s complaints rang particularly hubristic and tyrannical: 
Mendoza claimed he was not acting as president of the audiencia ‘but as viceroy and if you 
don’t hold your peace I will gag you, put you in prison, and send you to Castile in chains.’ 
The viceroys were even accused of tampering with the mail, which their enemies claimed 
first arrived at the viceregal palace before it was distributed in New Spain or sent to Spain. 
Agustín Guerrero for instance, was specifically accused of tampering with the 
correspondence to keep the king unaware of the cabildo’s concerns. 356 The regidores 
lamented ‘…the grievances done to us by the removal of our pre-eminence and the denial of 
what we used to be able to do’.  The viceroy’s power seemed so unassailable that ‘for this 
reason [the regidores] have no liberty to discuss things that it is necessary to discuss and to 
write to your majesty about’.  
Public display 
The sense of viceregal supremacy was reinforced by their expenditure in self-serving 
public display. Until the unexpected death of Velasco both viceroys had been effective at 
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presenting themselves as the sole and most viable patrons of the Spanish ‘republic’ through 
these methods. Their household expenditure in theatrical public displays of authority had 
important ideological as well as practical advantages. They promoted the idea that Mendoza 
and Velasco were not just the representatives of the king, but also in their own right 
‘fathers’ or patrons of the ‘Spanish republic’ as whole. For settlers like Suárez de Peralta, 
Velasco fulfilled the expectations of lordly behaviour by ‘spending his income, very much as 
a lord should’ which gave him ‘the most principal house that a lord ever had and spent 
much in honouring the land’: hunts, like the enormous hunting expedition to commemorate 
Mendoza’s triumph over the Mixtón rebels involved 15,000 people and recalled European 
‘royal hunts’. More commonly races and bullfights on holy days were structured to reinforce 
the viceregally-sanctioned hierarchy: the viceroy presided and participation was limited to 
the accepted gentlemen of the elite so that status was exhibited very publicly in these 
events. This helped to establish an unwritten viceregal authority that ran beyond than the 
legal limits of the holder’s bureaucratic titles, and associated his patronage with the defence 
of the fragile status quo.357 As Suárez de Peralta recalled: Velasco was a fine horseman and 
‘played cañas himself, which honoured the city so much that I knew gentlemen do 
everything possible to participate in the fun; and those who took part felt they had a 
knightly habit about their chests, so honoured were they. Merchants didn’t even think of 
participating…’358 
The importance of such patrimonial display was clearest when there was 
competition in monopolising its organisation and motifs. Díaz del Castillo’s anecdote 
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regarding the festivities in honour of the peace of Aigues Mortes in 1538 was purposefully 
illustrative. Mendoza and Cortés competed to display their lordly attributes in organising the 
pageantry and hosting grand banquets: the personal and patrimonial intentions behind their 
patronage of these events were evident, down to the appearance of the two patrons´ 
individual insignias in the sweets that were distributed for the event. Mendoza, with the 
help of retainers used to regal entertainment, like Guerrero and León Romano, was shown 
to be much more able than Cortés. The viceroy astonished the Spaniards with his 
magnificence and ably represented the glamorous spectacle of kingship before the eyes of a 
Mexico City that yearned for its proximity and was deeply attracted by its displays.359  
Suárez de Peralta had no doubt about the importance of such regalia and went so 
far as to recall the claim of a friend during Velasco’s reign that ‘… “I swear to God that if the 
king sent orders to remove all the towns [in encomienda], that the viceroy would console 
them [the encomenderos like himself] and make them forget this damage, by sounding the 
music for a feast in the streets, so much do people love them". And he was right because 
the land was very good and quiet.’360   
These patrimonial displays also evoked the ambiguity of the viceroy’s status. There 
were complaints amongst Mendoza’s enemies regarding the celebration to honour the 
military victory of the viceroy’s brother Bernaldino: these celebrations were orchestrated by 
Alonso de Mérida, whose family had been criados of Mendoza’s father, and he had come to 
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New Spain with the viceroy.361 Within a couple of years of Mendoza’s arrival, his allegado 
Mérida had been elevated to treasurer of the mint and granted an encomienda turning him 
into a member of the elite of the Spanish republic.362 There were also concerns that money 
from the royal treasury had been used for the celebrations. Far less openly patrimonial 
displays would  be enough to discredit Martín Cortés and his followers.  
The viceroys’ interest in monopolising display as a means of representing royal 
glamour and associating it with their own power could lead to serious disagreements, not 
least because  theatrical displays provided a public platform through which to express 
discontent with the viceroys. When some regidores of Mexico City refused to attend a 
celebration organised by Luis de Castilla and Juan Alonso de Sosa, which glorified Mendoza, 
the viceroy was allegedly so angry he threatened publicly that if the matter had been more 
serious he would have made them attend by dragging them through the gutter.363 More 
dangerously, Velasco’s fury at the displays of lordship exhibited by Martín Cortés on various 
public occasions, like the reception of Valderrama, was an expression of the growing dissent 
that the presence of the second ‘Marquess of the valley of Oaxaca’ as an alternative source 
of authority had provoked. The lordly displays that Martín Cortés and his followers indulged 
in after Velasco’s death, most spectacularly after the dynastically-meaningful birth of 
Martín’s twins, were such a threat to the beleaguered viceregal faction, that they led 
directly to the pre-emptive attack on Cortés and his followers, which culminated in the 
destruction of their faction. The very same displays were amongst the main evidence, and 
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the most memorable, in support of the flimsy allegations of their alleged conspiracy against 
the king. 
Competition for access 
The glamour of the viceregal court and the obvious benefits to be gained from 
proximity to the viceroy, combined with the difficulty in finding alternative channels to royal 
legitimacy or patronage, encouraged the established Spanish elite to compete for viceregal 
preferment. In this period the competition would increasingly be mediated through the 
viceroy’s court, often in his palace where there was ‘a very broad corridor, of twenty arches 
over a large and beautiful garden, where the viceroy likes to go and give audience to the 
petitioners (negociantes literally: negotiators)’364      
Favour, rewards and advantages were mediated and distributed from the viceregal 
palace, to the exclusion of other foci of authority and other conduits that claimed to 
represent the ultimate authority from Spain. As Vázquez de Tapia explained regarding lic. 
Loaysa’s partisanship towards Mendoza, viceregal supremacy and patronage affected the 
independence and consequently the behaviour of other settlers: ‘if lic. Loaysa [did and said 
all this] it was to serve and please the said viceroy…because the said Loaysa and everyone in 
this land wish to please and keep happy the person that governs so that he may favour 
them and that their affairs might flourish.’  
During the same visita Jerónimo López gave an illustrative account of his attempts to 
gain access to viceregal grace. He was complaining, like so many conquistadores, of not 
being given an adequate encomienda as a reward for his services:  
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‘[I] first thought of writing to the marqués del valle because he knew how 
this witness had served his majesty, or perhaps to appeal to certain friars, 
since, [I] had been unable to convince the viceroy, and was seeking to 
remedy the situation favourably in some other way. Eventually [I] thought of 
talking with Agustín Guerrero, mayordomo of the said viceroy to ask a price 
of him in exchange for being favoured, and so that the said enterprise could 
be settled as his majesty had intended in the first place.’365  
With this anecdote Jerónimo López was keen to explain that royal grace and justice 
could only be achieved through the logic of viceregal patronage and to attack Guerrero for 
corruption.  
The elite of the Spanish population became increasingly used to depending on 
viceregal patronage through administrative offices for their wealth and status. As long as 
there was no viable alternative avenue for securing royal grace, the viceroys’ court and its 
logic of legitimacy became the medium for practical advancement within New Spain. 
Marriages to members of the viceroy’s family or even intimate courtiers could be 
another avenue to access and favour. Tello de Sandoval devoted two questions within his 
interrogation of witnesses to the issue of dynastic alliances. The viceroy’s accusers claimed 
that the viceroy exerted pressure or interfered in creating these alliances.366 Dynastic 
alliances served the interests both of the viceroys and of the settlers who allied themselves 
with their retinues because they helped cement the viceregal party and perpetuate it. 
Martín de Ircio’s marriage to María de Mendoza, the viceroy’s sister, offers perhaps the 
clearest example. In arranging this marriage, Mendoza associated himself with a wealthy 
conquistador who in turn was linked to the powerful clan of Comendador Leonel de 
Cervantes, whose daughter María married Pedro de Ircio. The link to the viceregal court 
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continued in the following generation when Luis de Velasco the younger married Martín de 
Ircio’s daughter and heir María. Their encomienda and estates eventually formed part of the 
Velasco family’s trans-Atlantic marquesado de Salinas. Similar associations between settlers 
and members of both viceregal households formed and acted as bulwarks for viceregal 
authority.  
Alternatives to viceregal patronage 
When Jerónimo López had hoped to press his claims he first thought of turning to 
the influential Hernán Cortés. The two men knew each other personally from the conquest, 
and Cortés’ wealth and trans-Atlantic contacts made him seem a viable alternative source of 
patronage and a conduit for access at court. After the eclipse of the magnates, a similar 
alternative to viceregal patronage would not recur as obviously until the arrival of the 
visitadors from Spain and the return of Martín Cortés. It was felt that these direct conduits 
to the Spanish court could bypass the arrangements of the viceroys and these alternative 
sources of patronage became lightening-rods for discontent within New Spain. The crisis 
that followed Velasco’s death exposed the fragility of the patrimonial, courtly and sui-
generis arrangements that underwrote viceregal authority: ‘[Velasco’s] death was the cause 
for the perdition of the land and of the marquess.’367 
By the end of Velasco’s life, Martín Cortés and Jerónimo de Valderrama appeared to 
have enjoyed the greatest support from those encomenderos who sought perpetuity. After 
the assembly of 1564, which had included members of the viceroy’s party, the telling choice 
of a representative to present the petition at court demanding perpetuity was Diego Ferrer, 
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not associated with Velasco but with Martín Cortés instead. The charisma of Martín Cortés’ 
name appealed to the more ancient legitimacy claimed by the true conquistadores: the half-
forgotten sense that they and their descendants should be the feudal lords of New Spain: 
heirs as much to the imperial lords of Motecuhzoma as the ‘counts and dukes of New Spain’ 
that Hernán Cortés had promised they would be; not merely the ‘principal men’ of a 
‘Spanish republic’ with an equal authority to that of Indian lords of a parallel ‘Indian 
republic’; and all under the leadership of some new-comer viceroy and his cronies.  
Martín Cortés’ also had power both in New Spain, where he could harness the 
wealth of his marquesado and count on the support of visitador Valderrama, and in Spain 
where he had grown up a well-connected courtier and a personal friend of Philip II. Matters 
came to a head after the viceroy’s death when the resultant power vacuum led to the 
formation of factions that coalesced around newly fractured sources of patronage: the 
viceregal ‘party’ on the one hand and the promises of the marquess and the visitador; the 
oidores and the resurgent cabildo on the other. This last, unshackled, proposed the 
suppression of the office of viceroy on 31 August 1564 only a month after Velasco’s 
death.368 
Conclusion 
The absence of an established viceroy for the four years following Velasco’s death 
(and without a new ‘Peru’ to absorb discontented emigrants) laid bare the underlying 
factionalism of Spanish settlement in the strife and repressive violence of the mid 1560s. 
Personal loyalty to the individual viceroy as a patron as much as a royal representative, and 
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to the accommodations that their presence permitted over the strict tenets of the law, 
came to override the polyarchic loyalties feared by Motolinia and realised in the mid-1560s.  
Mendoza and Velasco grounded their rule on the practical benefits they could 
bestow on the Spanish settlers. The viceroys achieved this by concentrating in their person 
as much power to dispense patronage, in the form of offices and direct disbursements, as 
possible: approximating their powers to those of a king. The viceroys would extend the 
dispensation of crown and private resources to benefit and sustain as many Spaniards as 
possible. Simultaneously, the logic they applied to deciding which individuals deserved the 
greatest rewards responded to their own individual patrimonial interests, administrative 
strategies and ideology rather than to an abstract bureaucratic or legalistic logic or even the 
exclusive interests of the crown. Conquistador Andrés de Tapia commented with regard to 
Mendoza: ‘He honours everyone… and harms no-one. If anything, he does more for some 
than for others. He is very poor because I understand that he feeds more than 250 [people] 
who are destitute.’369 The consequent competition for access to viceregal favour between 
members of the Spanish elite cemented the viceroy’s authority in the familiar patterns of 
courtly government. The grateful and dependent new elite that the viceroys fostered 
through their arrangements then in turn propped up the authority of the viceroys, whose 
idiosyncratic arrangements guaranteed their status and rewards. After Velasco’s death an 
orphaned viceregal party could only urge the king to appoint a new viceroy as soon as 
possible ‘because it is important and necessary for this land that it should have a head who, 
in your majesty’s name, everyone respects and complies with.’370  
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Chapter 5: ‘Republic of Indians’ 
 
By the time Mendoza arrived in New Spain, the changeability of Spanish 
administrations in Mexico City was provoking discontent amongst indigenous polities. When 
rumours that Cortés had disappeared in the Pacific reached central New Spain ‘it was 
believed and often repeated in Mexico that all the caciques of New Spain wanted to rebel, 
seeing that Cortés was not in the land’ recalled Bernal Díaz del Castillo; only news of the 
marquess’s safe return by April 1536 seemed to ease the tension.371 
Some authors have detected a strain of resistance at the heart of New Spain 
throughout the period, gleaned from the trials and executions of prominent men such as 
Ometochtli in Tlaxcala, don Martín Ocelotl in Mexico in 1537 and most dramatically of Don 
Carlos, prince of Texcoco, in 1539; or from the ‘Mixtón War’ and localised uprisings in parts 
of Oaxaca in the late 1540s.372 But the lack of any serious uprising in the polities of central 
New Spain suggests instead that these were becoming increasingly isolated and anomalous 
events. Despite the predictions of the Spanish cabildo and some encomenderos,373 the lords 
of central New Spain did not take up the invitation of Nahua-speaking Caxcan and Zacateco 
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emissaries of the successful, avowedly anti-Spanish and anti-Christian insurrection in the 
Mixtón, to overthrow the Spaniards as so many polities had done when Cortés suggested 
the same against the Tenochca. Instead their response resembled everywhere that of Don 
Francisco de Sandoval Acaxitli, prince of Tlalmanalco and hegemon of the fertile province of 
Chalco:  
I, Don Francisco de Sandoval, cacique and lord of this city of San Luis 
Tlalmanalco, having received the news that the lord viceroy don Antonio de 
Mendoza who resides in the great city of México and royal audiencia, needed 
to go to war in the land of the Chichimecas of Xuchipila, went to the said city 
and begged the lord viceroy to grant me the honour (merced) of going with 
those of my province of Chalco to serve in this war, and His Lordship thought 
it good that we should go to this war. When I returned to Tlalmanalco I 
readied all the people from this province of Chalco for the said war … and all 
of them of their own good will accepted to go and serve in the said war.374 
Without the help of Cortés-Malinche, which had seemed so important in 1536, the 
viceroy was able to raise a willing375 army of an estimated 60,000 Indians (and 1,000 
Spaniards). It was probably the largest army in Mesoamerica between the Conquest and 
Independence of Mexico and was drawn from Nahua, Otomí and Purehpecha polities of 
New Spain. Mendoza was able to begin the march on 22 September 1541, only a month 
after being advised to do so by his agents following the traumatic defeat and unexpected 
death of the adelantado Pedro de Alvarado (who died from his wounds on the 4th of July; 
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Mendoza’s agents including oidor Maldonado wrote their reports urging the viceroy to raise 
an army in mid-august which probably reached Mexico by late august.)376 
Acazitli’s account and other descriptions suggest that during this period each lord 
raised his own contingent from vassals who owed fealty to the lord of the palace ‘like 
continos’ , and were fed but not paid or equipped directly by the lord.377 As a comparison 
for the cost this implied for individual polities it is worth noting that in the same campaign, 
some Spanish participants were said to have spent 1,286-2,572d while the viceroy spent 
about 25,714d of his personal fortune. Achieving this voluntary mobilisation was an enviable 
accomplishment by contemporary standards on either side of the Atlantic.378  
New Spain would never face an indigenous rebellion comparable in scale to Manco 
Inca’s insurrection in the heartlands of the old Inca Empire or the subsequent organised 
resistance to Habsburg-Spanish authority of the long lived kingdom of Vilcabamba in Peru 
(1539-1572). The viceroys of New Spain did not even face the recurrent violent disorders 
that characterised morisco uprisings in Eastern Andalucía and did not need the draconian 
punitive measures that Spanish governors took against their own native but culturally alien 
population. Uprisings and armed resistance in New Spain, like the Mixtón War, never spread 
further than the newly absorbed periphery of the kingdom: beyond the Nahua-speaking 
heartlands of the old Tenochca Empire and the ‘foundational’ polities of the Cortesian 
alliance that stood around the enduring imperial capital at Mexico City and West to 
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Michoacán. This was not due to the exceptionally effective repressive abilities of Spanish 
settlers in New Spain and the continuing bouts of epidemics had not been severe enough to 
tilt the balance of fighting manpower decisively in the Spaniards’s favour: if anything, 
Spanish veteran settlers like Jerónimo López were afraid of Indian military superiority: ‘they 
are not lambs like the friars say, but ferocious lions and they are many, so that for every 
Spaniard there are ten thousand…’; and as he and others pointed out the Indians were often 
by then armed with Spanish weapons and could ride horses.379 Nor did the landscape come 
to be dominated by garrisoned castles like Norman England - royal instructions that 
Mendoza brought for fortifying Mexico City and other Spanish towns were never carried out 
because they were considered unnecessary. 
Viceregal authority was largely consensual, at least amongst the elites of central 
New Spain, and an increasing number of indigenous lords considered themselves as 
partners in the Kingdom of New Spain. The viceroys achieved this through a system of 
personal government that in many aspects was familiar to the native population. Jerónimo 
López, who openly disliked Mendoza, recognised that the viceroy was personally 
responsible for the salvation of New Spain when it seemed to him that everything had ‘hung 
on a thread of wool’ during the Mixtón War. ‘I certify to your majesty that he once again 
won the land with only his own person,’ he grudgingly admitted and hoped that ‘it please 
our lord to give him health because it is convenient for the good of the land, even though I 
have been unlucky with him.’380 What some Spanish settlers like Jerónimo López had not 
initially taken into account was that while the Indian nobility may have despised Spanish 
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settlers like himself, with whom they felt in competition, they generally approved of the 
viceroys and the friars.  
Friars  
In their turn both Mendoza and Velasco had to convince their indigenous subjects 
that they were reliable conduits for patronage and legitimacy, and that they could 
guarantee stability within the polities and amongst them. Mendoza warned Velasco that to 
achieve this he needed the support of the friars: ‘Without them one can only accomplish 
little and for this reason I have tried to favour them always and to honour them and love 
them as true servants of God and His Majesty and if Your Lordship follows this he will see 
the advantage that come from it. Not only in spiritual matters, but in temporal ones as well 
and I have found this very advantageous, even though it seemed wrong to some’.381 From 
the start of Mendoza’s government until the death of Velasco, the friars became the most 
important intermediaries between the viceroys and the indigenous polities.382 This was not 
envisioned in royal legislation: Valderrama in particular was horrified at the authority that 
the friars commanded.383 Nor was it popular amongst the Spanish settler elite who argued 
that it was they who deserved that responsibility as heirs to a reimagined Tenochca elite 
with the attributes of Spanish feudal lords.384  
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Both viceroys protected the friars politically against the encomenderos, mediated 
between the orders and supported the mendicant mission against the encroachments of the 
secular clergy; an issue that became especially pressing for Velasco after the return of 
archbishop Montúfar in 1554 and the resolutions of the Council of Trent the following year 
that attempted to impose the tithe on the Indians in order to fund the secular clergy as part 
of an attempt to curtail the influence of the mendicant orders. The concerted campaign of 
1559 and beyond where viceroy Velasco, the friars and the indigenous polities of central 
New Spain combined to protest against the encroachments of the secular clergy, are the 
clearest illustration of the informal but powerful bonds of conviction, interest and loyalty 
that had developed between them.385 
There were many political advantages to the viceroys in this alliance as well, not 
least for the influence that mendicant opinion carried in Spain. During the difficult 
transitional period after Mendoza left office for Peru and Luis de Velasco’s official 
administrative powers had been legally reduced, a chapter meeting of the leading 
Franciscans in Mexico City concluded by drafting an appeal to the king in support of 
viceregal authority over other magnates:  
Because he [the viceroy], as governor wants to provide that which is 
considered of the best use for the good government of the land, and the 
Audiencia, by way of appeal, undoes what our viceroy orders and provides 
for; with the result that the business of government is not carried out 
expeditiously, and those matters that deal with the Indians lead to conflicts 
between them, and as they don’t know how to defend themselves it ends up 
hurting them. The other result is that the person of the Viceroy, who 
represents your own, loses great part of his authority (‘auctoridad’); to the 
great detriment of the Indians because they have such great loyalty and 
respect for the representative of the person of your majesty, and all this they 
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lose, seeing that the Audiencia undoes what the Viceroy has instructed. For 
these reasons we beg of your majesty to order that it be decreed that the 
authority and power of your viceroy be extended, and if he provides for 
something as governor it should be carried out rather than the appeals of the 
Royal Audiencia; because otherwise here there exist those inconveniences 
already cited and others, and in any case we have never known or felt 
anything else from your viceroy apart from the great wish and will to favour 
and defend these poor natives, and to accomplish that which Your Majesty 
has charged and ordered him with.386 
More important were the practical advantages in using the idealistic first generation 
of friars as agents of viceregal government in the indigenous polities. Many friars were 
amongst the few Spaniards that could speak native languages and this allowed them to gain 
the greatest working knowledge of the Indian polities. Throughout this period the friars 
collected information about the polities they lived in often under commission from the 
viceroys as in the case of the Relación de Michoacán (probably) compiled by fr. Jerónimo de 
Alcalá.387 Some had lived amongst their flock since the mid 1520s where they quickly 
became charismatic figures, not least because the memory persisted of how Cortés himself 
publicly knelt before the ‘twelve apostles’ in 1524.388 As fr. Toribio de Benavente’s Nahuatl 
sobriquet Motolinia ‘the poor’ suggests they also impressed by their disciplined lifestyle, an 
ancient magnetism that was effective across cultures, as the later successes of mendicant 
orders in Asia demonstrated. Their seeming lack of attachment to worldly matters produced 
the ultimate ‘stranger effect’ in both Europeans and Mesoamericans meaning that they 
could generally be trusted by both sides: thus when Tlaxcala needed to send an emissary to 
Spain in the fraught year of 1550 fr. Pedro de Torres was entrusted with representing her 
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interests.389 In New Spain the friars’ wide-ranging and disciplined networks, combined with 
their captive audience from the pulpit - or in many cases the balconies to the courtyards of 
the monasteries where the Indians gathered - became perhaps the most effective means of 
transmitting viceregal commands to the indigenous polities. Even Valderrama came to the 
conclusion that the most convenient way to spread word of his arrival in New Spain would 
be through the friars and not the corregidores or other Spanish administrative 
mechanisms.390  
Apart from the ‘stranger effect’ produced by the mendicant lifestyle, the polity elites 
felt confident that they could trust the friars because their sustenance and the success of 
their evangelical mission depended on the goodwill and economic support of the indigenous 
lords– a fact that did not escape critics like Valderrama.391 The indigenous elite realised the 
importance of gaining access to the legitimising Spanish authorities, but visits to Spain were 
costly and time-consuming. Knowledge that the viceroys backed the friars made them a 
natural point of contact:392 mendicant authority grew to such an extent that they were often 
called ‘guardians’ and occasionally ‘governors’ by their host polities.393 Simultaneously the 
aggrandisement of the viceroys in the rhetoric of the friars created viceregal authority in the 
polities.  
                                                     
389
 C. Gibson, Tlaxcala en el siglo XVI, (Mexico, D.F 1991), pp.165-7.  
390
 CJV, p.30. 
391
 CJV pp.68-9.  
392
J. Lockhart Los Nahuas…p.296-7; CJV, p.140-3. on their influence over the viceroy as being like that of 
‘señores absolutos’; J.  Miranda El Tributo Indígena…p.154-5; M.J. Sarabia-Viejo Don Luís de Velasco…pp.334-
342; Ch.3. 
393
 Eg. Tlalocan Vol.V, 1966 Vol.2, Pedro Carrasco ‘Documentos sobre el Rango de Tecuhtli…’ p.153 and p.157. 
177 
 
Within two months of Mendoza’s arrival Zumárraga was granted an encomienda for 
his sustenance, and with viceregal patronage and financial backing - organised by Agustín 
Guerrero - the Imperial School of Santa Cruz in Tlatelolco was inaugurated soon after. These 
are strong indications of the close personal cooperation between Zumárraga and Mendoza 
that probably began as early as Zumárraga’s return to Spain (1531-4),  regarding a new 
notion of the status of the indigenous elites within the kingdom of New Spain.394 To them 
the polities (which they often called repúblicas) constituted a legitimate political entity akin 
to - but more autonomous than - a Spanish municipality. Legitimate polity authorities had a 
right to access to the viceroy as the representative of royal legitimacy in New Spain. These 
principles also implied the acceptance that the dynastic governing class of the polities 
should be considered as a nobility in the European sense, enjoying privileges and 
responsibilities that transcended their individual polity and applied to their status as 
principlal men of the kingdom of New Spain as a whole. The idea survived through the 
practice of viceregal courtly government at least until the end of our period. 395  
Personal and courtly government  
Both Mendoza and Velasco were careful to guarantee representatives of indigenous 
polities direct access to their person. When the viceroys were in residence at the palace in 
Mexico City they assigned specific times to deal exclusively with indigenous petitioners 
(Mendoza: all of Monday and Thursdays and Velasco: on Monday, Wednesday and Thursday 
mornings) although both emphasised that they could be seen at any other time if the need 
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arose.396 Mendoza even claimed that he did not like to walk around with his halberdier 
guard in part because the Indians were naturally timid and ‘so that they would have more 
recourse to seek me out by night or day in search for justice, and I always keep my doors 
open at all convenient hours and I have instructed my porters not to impede them so that 
they can come before me freely’.397 Equally, the purpose of viceregal progresses and 
visitations, encouraged by the crown, was to make the authority of the viceroys more 
widely accessible in the provinces. For example in August 1549 Mendoza, accompanied by 
the Tenochca interpreter don Hernando de Tapia, resolved a complicated dispute on tour in 
Ocuituco.398  
Princely government from a palatial seat fitted well indigenous patterns of 
government. Many palaces within the indigenous polities, even one as relatively close as 
Tlatelolco, were equipped with chambers to host the viceroy or his representatives.399 Other 
old patterns of Mesoamerican authority also endured: court interpreters like Hernando de 
Tapia were Nahua and Spanish speakers and Tapia was also a member of the old Tenochca 
imperial elite. Nahuatl remained the most common language of Mesoamerican empire, as 
most indigenous petitioners used it when communicating to the authorities in Mexico City; 
which accounts for the Spanish adoption of Nahuatl nomenclature when describing other 
cultures like the ‘Tarascans’ or ‘Chichimeca’ for example. The importance of such continuity 
appears in the Relación de Michoacán where don Pedro claimed that the Purehpecha lords 
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were persuaded to negotiate with the Spaniards because they recognised several Tenochca 
lords amongst the forces commanded by Olíd and seeing that they were treated 
honourably, agreed to parley.400  
Mendoza’s letter of advice to his successor contains a series of recommendations on 
how to approach negotiations with polity representatives when they visited the viceroy’s 
court: Mendoza made clear that they were ‘neither simple and innocent nor full of vice but 
just like any other race and should be treated as such’. On the allotted days the nahuatlatos 
of the audiencia brought in all the indigenous petitioners ‘and I hear them all’ before trying 
to rule on as many matters as possible himself while delegating other matters to judges, 
friars, crown officials, both Spanish and Indian and other lay Spaniards.401  From other 
documents we can learn that some more experienced petitioners like the Huexotzinca lords 
arrived at the palace with a formal petition already written out in Spanish using the 
rhetorical linguistic codes and formulas of legitimacy that the Spaniards recognised, but felt 
the need to present themselves before the viceroy in person to strengthen their case as 
well: ‘Don Cristobal de Guebara and Don Calisto Moscoso and Juan de Alamonte… in our 
name and voice and that of all the native inhabitants of the said town of Huexotzinco we 
appear before your illustrious lordship and supplicate and say to him…’; then at the end of 
the document all the recognised authorities of the town signed and dated it in Huexotzinco 
20 April 1554. On the same day, in Mexico City, Antonio de Turcios wrote on behalf of the 
viceroy: ‘…seen by the most illustrious lord Don Luis de Velasco, viceroy,…the contents of 
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the petition from this part, presented by don Cristobal de Guebara, governor of the said 
town of Huexotzinco…’.402 
The indigenous petitioners could be canny negotiators, often exploiting the relative 
ignorance of the viceroy by seeming to abandon a matter that had gone against them, only 
to present it again in a different light and as if it were a new petition: most cases relied 
heavily on witnesses and a polity’s painted documents, which were open to interpretation. 
The potential for retrials and confusion had persuaded Mendoza to order a book to be made 
where he kept a note of all the judgements and proceedings he and the audiencia had ruled 
upon.403 Unfortunately this book has not been found. 
Mendoza emphasised the importance of granting access to as many representatives 
of a polity as possible when a judgement was read out by the translator; otherwise the 
principales with privileged access to information could distort it when they represented it to 
their communities.404 The direct interaction between viceroys and indigenous petitioners 
allowed for negotiations and judgements which addressed the specific concerns of each 
individual polity on an ad hoc basis rather than through blanket rulings encompassing all 
‘Indians’. This was the approach that Mendoza insisted upon to his successor time and 
again: ‘…and this should be ruled upon with full knowledge of the quality of the people 
involved and the particular business at hand’.405 The viceroys encouraged this proximity as 
an essential aspect of their authority, as it reinforced their role as arbiters of justice and 
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legitimacy within New Spain. This held even when they felt that Indigenous petitioners were 
trying to exploit access for their factional or personal advantage. As Mendoza explained to 
his successor in a section of his memorial devoted to the importance of seeing the Indians: 
‘some believe that I turn them into liars by not punishing them: but it would be a worse 
fault to make them fear me so that they stopped coming to me with their concerns than 
wasting my time with their games.’406 According to Mendoza, what mattered for the 
creation and subsistence of viceregal authority was that negotiations were carried out 
under his auspices and that his final judgements were obeyed. It was a way of making the 
polity authorities clients of the viceroy rather than any other authority in New Spain.  
Tribute   
The two most important areas of negotiation centred on tribute and the arbitration 
of conflicts within and amongst polities. As the visitadores discovered to their dismay, 
tribute was not assessed per capita as they expected. The assessment of indigenous tribute, 
which was one of the prerogatives of the viceroys, was generally conducted as a process of 
negotiation between the indigenous polities, the friars, the encomenderos (though their role 
diminished with time) and the viceroys: the polities were assessed by what they could 
persuade the viceroys, or their representatives, to assess them.407 The polities sent 
‘argumentative’ representatives to reside at the viceregal court in Mexico City for this 
purpose ‘[they] learn more than well-informed Spaniards about this in order to be sent to 
this audiencia…and they hang around here with a multitude of Indians to serve them and 
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much money to spend.’408 In one instance when a corregidor was due to arrive in a province 
one Indian lord climbed the pulpit to explain to his assembled polity and visitors from other 
neighbouring towns ‘what they had to say in word and using their painted books… they say 
this to the letter though those witnesses in favour of one town one day can be against [their 
neighbours] on another’.409  
Negotiation allowed for flexibility. It took into account the variable circumstances of 
individual polities like participation in onerous martial services or the local ravages of 
epidemics.410 This arrangement created conventions within New Spain that were not 
officially recognised or even referred to the Council of the Indies. One example were the 
tributary exemptions enjoyed by Tlatelolco and Tenochtitlan in exchange for personal 
services to the viceroys and as compensation for the Spanish appropriation of lands and 
rights around the valley of Mexico that had previously formed the patrimony of their 
imperial elite. Most disturbing for external observers like Valderrama was the exemption 
enjoyed by all those whom the viceroys considered noblemen - and had ratified as such by 
personal decree - and the thousands of nominally tax-exempt terrazgueros who worked 
their lands.411 In any case this exemption was a notional means for justifying the reduction 
of the total tribute paid by a polity, because the lords contributed to tribute payment from 
the palace reserves. Lowering the tribute carried other advantages for the lords by 
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encouraging the good will of their people and immigration of workers from nearby polities 
more heavily afflicted by tributary dues.412 
The direct personal nature in which these negotiations were conducted bound the 
viceroys to the settlement they had reached with the polities. When Valderrama attempted 
to reform the tributary system and denounced what he perceived as the illegitimacy of the 
polity nobilities and their privileges, Velasco immediately sided with the latter, as did the 
friars. At one point the viceroy even set out in person to warn the authorities of Chalco to 
send people into the hills to reduce their numbers before Valderrama’s agents arrived to 
conduct a census.413 Valderrama soon realised that he was unable to collect tribute by 
coercion or using Spanish agents and was forced to revise his position.414 In Mexico City it 
was commonplace to assume that without the co-operation of the polity elites the Spanish 
administration could not function: ‘without [the principales] it is imposible [to collect 
tribute] well and without great difficulties’.415 Courtly negotiation assured that a 
compromise could be reached, viceregal authority could be reaffirmed and the tribute 
collected.  
The proportion of noblemen within individual polities could be as high as a third of 
the total population although the more usual proportion was of two to ten per cent, a figure 
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similar to Europe’s.416 Gibson has calculated that on average a polity paying 1000 pesos to 
the Spanish regime (the crown or the encomenderos etc.) might be paying 4,000 to 8,000 
pesos to their noble elite. The nobility was in direct competition with the crown and 
encomenderos for the surplus wealth of their polity and consequently the nobility had a 
direct interest in limiting the amount of tribute that went to the Mexico City. The viceroys 
de facto appropriated the royal prerogative of establishing the rate of tribute by basing 
tribute assessments for individual polities on ad hoc negotiations at their court. This turned 
tribute into another instrument of their personal patronage: a reduction in tribute was a 
redistribution of wealth back to those indigenous elites whom the viceroy favoured.   
Apart from the viceroys, the chief beneficiaries were the indigenous nobility that the 
viceroys acknowledged as legitimate. Observers believed that the tribute negotiators from 
the polities that came to Mexico City were acting principally ‘at the cost of the macehuales 
but to their own benefit and that of the principales.’417 Mendoza highlighted with some 
regret these subtleties to his successor, 418 but the principales had to be accommodated: ‘it 
is impossible that these services [to the principales] cease entirely if there is to be 
Christianity and good government amongst them because the day that there ceases to be 
principales amongst them there would be great troubles.’419 Viceregal authority relied on 
the viceroy’s ability to uphold the political arrangements that they had sponsored within the 
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indigenous polities. These arrangements focused on guaranteeing the pre-eminence of 
those that the viceroys had accepted as the legitimate nobility of their polities.    
Political patronage 
An unusually well documented and illustrative example of how indigenous elites 
negotiated with the viceroys over legitimacy and status comes from Huexotzinco. In 1550 
Mendoza admitted to his successor that in his eagerness to do good by the Huxotzinca, and 
with the support of fr. Antonio de Ciudad Rodrigo, he had made an error of judgement in 
earlier years by ratifying certain claims by Huexotzinca noblemen to allegedly unoccupied 
lands, which had since caused grave damage to that ‘republica’.420 Mendoza’s eagerness to 
please the Huexotzinca elite is understandable: the polity had been one of the first and 
most steadfast allies of the Spaniards and amongst the most Christianised, but had been 
mistreated by the First Audiencia, despite Zumárraga’s intercession.421 Since Mendoza 
arrived, the Huexotzinca had begun building a new town around their new convent of San 
Miguel, they had helped in the construction and sustenance of the fledgling Spanish 
settlement of Puebla and had served in Mendoza’s army during the Mixtón war and 
Mendoza had considered that these services deserved to be rewarded. 
 In an attempt to ease the concerns Mendoza’s warning had raised in Mexico City, 
Huexotzinca representatives visited Velasco. In Mexico City on 13 April 1554, the 
Huexotzincan representatives persuaded the viceroy to accept a change to the way in which 
their lords (tecuhtli) were chosen: from traditional election within a kinship group to the 
system of direct inheritance of Castilian mayorazgos, following a ceremonial reminiscent of 
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that devised by Mendoza for his ‘Order of Knights Tecle’.422 They then returned a week 
later, asking Velasco to support their plan to redistribute some of their own land back to 
dispossessed ‘macehuales’ in exchange for their tribute of a quarter of the land’s produce as 
recognition of their vassalage to the lords: ‘as vassals of His Majesty and Your Lordship 
[Velasco] in his royal name, we come to Your Lordship and implore your authority and 
humbly beseech that you confirm this agreement and authorise it’.423 To assuage any 
further concerns, they also asked that Fr. Juan de Alameda, prior of the convent of San 
Miguel, should oversee the redistribution. The viceroy granted his support for all of these 
requests as this ‘emphyteutic’ solution was familiar from similar cases in other polities 
suffering from social tensions.424  
Both viceregal judgements had acted to entrench the lordly status of the 
Huexotzinca petitioners because they retained lordly rights over the land they had 
distributed while their inheritance to their direct heirs was ensured by the redefinition of 
their inheritance rights rather than left to a risky election. By linking their lordship to the 
viceroy’s judgement and authority, the Huexotzinca principales had hoped to make their 
lordship unassailable both within their polities and in the eyes of the Spanish administrators 
in Mexico City. It became apparent soon after that their concessions were actually an 
                                                     
422
 Ibid. p.150-153, the written confirmation for this came a day later than for the land re-distribution. For the 
‘Knights Tecle’ see below. 
423
 P. Carrasco ‘Documentos Sobre el Rango de Tecuhtli’… p.155.  
424
 Ibid, p.146-149. 
187 
 
attempt to obfuscate a more serious abuse within their polity rather than voluntary acts of 
generosity.425 
By September of the following year the situation had deteriorated and the 
authorities of Huexotzinco were back in the viceregal palace urging the viceroy to confirm fr. 
Juan de Alameda’s call from the pulpit for a general amnesty ‘for the peace and tranquillity 
of our town and the salvation of everyone…of our own free will, we come and present 
ourselves before Your Lordship’.426 The lords finally explained that in the past Huexotzinco 
had succumbed to a bloody factional conflict in which the victorious faction -the ancestors 
of the present lords- had killed their enemies and dispossessed them of their lands and 
more importantly their lordship and palaces before becoming committed allies of the 
Spanish. Spanish administrations had protected these lords’ newly won supremacy and they 
reminded Velasco that Mendoza had ratified the status quo. The old wounds had been re-
opened because Velasco had sent oidor Quesada to supervise the enactment of the 
previous viceregal mandates and Quesada had discovered that there were unoccupied 
lordly palaces, which had presumably belonged to the defeated faction, that should be filled 
by election before the transition to Spanish style direct inheritance could apply to them. The 
latest delegation hoped to avoid civil war and the amnesty the lords sought would give time 
for an equitable restitution to be made, not only of property, but of lordship as well.427 
Perhaps tellingly, Velasco commuted the level of tribute for Huexotzinco in November of the 
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following year to its lowest level since he took offices and he then visited that polity along 
with several others in 1557.428  
Viceregal mediations fulfilled one of the functions that justified Spanish authority: 
the external arbitration of disputes. Similar cases abound throughout the period, for 
example very large restitutions of ‘usurped’ lands, vassals and moveable treasure made by 
the Tlaxcalan elite to their dispossessed rivals during Lent 1539; or the civil strife in Tepeaca 
and Cholula in the 1570s.429 
Representatives of weaker polities that wanted to liberate themselves from their 
stronger neighbours sought redress in appeals to the viceroys. Mendoza was generally 
willing to interfere on behalf of weak polities that had been annexed in pre-conquest times 
by members of the Triple Alliance, prompting Motolinia to comment that only these ex-
imperial polities had lost something from the viceregal administration of New Spain.430 But 
Mendoza advised caution to his successor, warning him that altering established 
arrangements could lead to trouble not least because this related to encomienda grants as 
well.431 Disputes over Tlatelolco’s claims to sovereignty over Ayatitcla, Tolpetlac, Acalvaca 
and Xoloc, for example, continued throughout Mendoza’s tenure.432 On the other hand, the 
most powerful and able polities like Tlaxcala even managed to expand their territory in this 
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period.433 The polities that suffered the most were those that refused to engage with the 
viceregal system altogether. The polity of Tamazulapa, for instance, decided to abandon its 
settlement rather than obey its encomendero Francisco Solís or appeal for protection from 
the viceroy. When its members tried to return they found that their lands had been 
appropriated by their more accommodating neighbours of Coixtlahuaca and Tequesistepec. 
Too late they sought legal redress but lost the case.434  
Direct Viceregal patronage could help determine an individual’s status within his 
polity and even within the Habsburg monarchy. During the visita conducted against 
Mendoza by Tello de Sandoval, the viceroy was forced to defend his approach to governing 
the indigenous polities by explaining:  
Being, as I am, viceroy and governor by the grace of his majesty, I have the 
authority to provide for matters relating to the governance of this land as 
best suits God and his majesty… it seemed to me, as a result of personal 
experience I have of what my father and the marquess my brother did with 
the moriscos of the kingdom of Granada, that it was convenient to 
distinguish between some Indians and others, because, although it seems to 
some people that these native Indians are bestial and so assume that there is 
no distinction between one and another, this is only because they don’t 
understand them. But I, who have dealt and conversed with them personally, 
find many of them of good judgement and with the characteristics of 
gentlemen (hombres de bien) eager to serve his majesty. Those that govern 
in his royal name do so with love and have demonstrated this in works and 
words and so it is right to gratify and honour them in order to keep them 
grateful and more obliged since it is in such ways that men are won over and 
virtue is fostered.435 
Mendoza’s argument highlights the most salient elements of his style of 
government. He was concerned to identify the Indians that deserved to be recognised as 
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meriting authority. The second was to keep them ‘grateful and more obliged’ in order to 
foster their ‘virtue’ through viceregal patronage. The viceroy would judge these matters; but 
the negotiation implicit in this personal style of government gave the Indigenous petitioners 
the opportunity to influence these decisions as well.436 For individuals within the 
competitive polities, viceregal recognition allowed them to aspire to higher status which in 
turn could be translated into greater wealth and opportunity to serve the viceroy in 
exchange for even greater rewards.  
Lordship remained the most pressing issue within the polities and viceregal 
patronage affected this vexed question. Spanish administrations in the past had relied on 
the cooperation of what they called indigenous caciques to govern. Spanish support for 
these princely allies had led to distortions in the balance of power within the polities as the 
Spaniards remained oblivious of regional idiosyncrasies. Mendoza by contrast claimed to 
have tried to ensure that the local traditions and ‘ancient laws’ dictated the succession of 
princes rather than letting encomenderos or even friars interfere and he always retained 
the right for himself to remove unworthy princes.437 These were difficult problems to 
resolve especially since most evidence of legitimate rights came from the testimony of 
witnesses or ambiguous ‘painted books’. Mendoza accepted that interference in the 
election of indigenous princes would occasionally be required, but he reserved this right 
only for himself as well. In 1539 Mendoza designated don Diego de Alvarado Huantzin -  
Motecuhzoma’s nephew - as the tlatoani of the Indian polity of Tenochtitlan, reinstating the 
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old royal line, but not that of Motecuhzoma II’s direct descendants.438 This was not alien to 
Indigenous notions of inheritance, but Mendoza’s influence was determinant in the final 
decision. A similar ambiguity occurred with regards to don Diego de Mendoza Austria y 
Moctezuma whose disputed claim to descent from Cuauhtémoc and therefore to the 
lordship of Tlatelolco was supported by Mendoza in appeals before the crown around 1545 
for the recognition of his lands and lineage; by 1547 he was already mentioned as cacique 
and señor natural even though Mendoza had not heard back from the crown. It is possible 
that the viceroy was not only the young don Diego’s godfather, but also that he felt an 
obligation towards him because of his services in the expedition to Cíbola and the Mixtón 
War and because the Spanish crown and oidor Tejada had appropriated many of the lands 
that had belonged to Tlatelolco before the conquest.439 Mendoza won over the firm loyalty 
of Michoacán, his favourite province, when he redeemed the royal family of the cazonci in 
1537, raising the younger of the cazonci’s sons don Antonio (another possible godson) at his 
side in the viceregal palace, and leaving don Pedro, architect of the original alliance with 
Cortés, and Don Francisco another son of the cazonci, to govern in the meantime.440 On the 
other hand, Mendoza could also act to depose legitimately appointed princes if they were 
shown to have acted against the interests of the regime for example when he supported the 
deposition and execution of don Carlos Ometochtzin the chichimecatecuhtli of Texoco in 
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1539 for idolatry. Interestingly in this case the crown rebuked Zumárraga and Mendoza for 
what it considered an excessive punishment.441  
The viceroys also appropriated the related power to create new hereditary princely 
dynasties from ‘new men’ that displayed virtues that most appealed to the viceroys and 
loyalty. The ennobled paladins Fernando de Tapia, Nicolas de San Luis Montañes and Pedro 
Martin de Toro who founded powerful and long-lived dynasties on the northern Chichimeca 
frontier offer the best example of the aggrandising potential that came with direct access to 
the viceroys for members of a previously excluded or subordinate group like the Otomi. In 
their probanzas and artistic endowments like the murals of the church at Ixmiquilpan they 
glorified their appealing attributes of Otomi-Christian crusading spirit: their role as soldiers, 
city builders and pacifiers of the expanding ‘Chichimeca frontier’ north of Mexico City. The 
viceroys bestowed upon them lordships, lands and honours which the crown duly ratified 
and increased.442  
Mendoza’s most influential administrative reform within the polities was his 
universal introduction of gobernadores into the official administration of the Indigenous 
polities. The office had no equivalent in Spanish or indigenous tradition and it illustrates 
Mendoza’s recognition that the polities were more than just the equivalent of Spanish 
municipal units. The hereditary princes retained their patrimonial wealth and unofficial 
‘auctoritas’ as heads of the noble clans they led: Acazitli boasted of being a ‘cacique’ not a 
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gobernador; and gobernadores were appointed in theory for only one or two years.443 
Furthermore the princes were allowed a seat and a vote in the cabildo which often met in 
their palaces in any case. However the gobernadores were paid from part of the 
community’s internal tribute that was then discounted from the tribute destined for 
Mexico, again creating the conceptual link between the office and the viceroy. The 
administrative responsibilities of a gobernador included many of the functions that until 
then had been carried out by the princes, most importantly judicial functions and the 
collection of tribute and a role in appointing lower administrative offices. The viceroys had 
to ratify the election of the gobernadores and increasingly they addressed instructions to 
them as the highest authorised power in the polity.444 The governorship was ‘a further 
position of local authority, one created and endorsed by the viceroyalty…’445 The link 
between this new office and viceregal endorsement underpinned its authority within the 
polity. This link and the powers that the office entailed made it highly coveted.  
Of particular interest within the polities was the gobernador’s right to appoint lesser 
municipal officials, something that occurred in a ‘courtly air’446 at the polity’s principal 
palace and allowed for internal patronage similar to that enjoyed by the viceroys at a 
grander level. It amounted to the transmition of viceregal authority through patronage 
networks down to allies and clients by bestowing upon them equally Spanish sounding 
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titles.447 Possessing a Spanish title became a legitimising element both within the polities 
and before the viceregal regime: the Huehuehtlahtolli adapted to encompass these office 
holders in their didactic verses: in an ‘exhortation’ addressed to a polity’s ‘alcaldes and 
regidores’ they warned:  
You have arrived at lordship, you have approached nobility; but take care not 
to inebriate yourselves with it, don’t become proud; answer with meekness… 
you will do your duty calmly and you will establish yourself peacefully. 
Answer the lord who has lineage, with meekness and cheerfulness; with the 
words of the common people. That is how you will take the land; the hills; it 
is how you will make your lordship, your nobility. Never create disputes 
amongst the lords, amongst those with lineage anywhere; don’t ruin the 
matting, the place of honour.448  
These office holders could be considered ennobled or aspire to nobility in the 
uncertain hierarchies of the Indigenous polities. The increasingly common practice of 
appending ‘don’ to their Spanish names further suggests the link they felt between office-
holding, services to the polity and ennoblement.449 This aggrandisement with all it entailed 
was in the hands of the gobernadores.450 
In some cases holding the title of gobernador helped to consolidate the authority of 
princes like don Diego de Mendoza, mentioned above, who was able to hold both a princely 
title and the Spanish office in Tlatelolco from 1549 until his death in 1562. In other more 
‘complex’ polities, like Tlaxcala, the introduction of the governorship helped to resolve 
inherent political tensions of their previous political arrangements: until 1545 viceregal 
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favour had fallen disproportionately on the Maxixcatzin clan of the polity Ocotelulco, some 
of whose most able members Mendoza had first met in Seville on their way to Mexico in 
1535. This clan monopolised the governorship, together with the Xicotencatl of Tizatlan who 
had strong links with the Alavarados, until 1545. There are hints of the growing resentment 
in Tlaxcala during that period: when Velasco intervened in 1556 to depose the gobernador 
don Martín de Valencia of the constituent polity of Quiahuiztlan, his angry kinsmen recalled 
that their polity had temporarily seceded from Tlaxcala in the past and might do so again.451 
After a presumed negotiation in 1545 that may have resembled the Huexotzinca case cited 
above, Mendoza sent oidor Gómez de Santillán to mediate a solution whereby four princes 
from the four dominant polities could sit in the cabildo and each polity would elect a 
gobernador that would serve for two years in a specified order of rotation amongst the 
polities.452 
The link to viceregal authorisation implicit in holding the office of gobernador (and 
those of the other municipal offices), threatened the authority of those hereditary lords 
who did not also possess these offices. The quick turnover of officials allowed increasing 
numbers of able macehuales or individuals with an ambiguous social status or differing 
dynastic affiliations to hold these offices. It was an indication that the hereditary nobility 
was losing its exclusive hold on patronage and government a condition exacerbated by the 
general decline in population that increased the bargaining power of the macehuales, 
lowered the tributary income of the princes but not the allotted proportion to pay the 
salaries of the gobernadores and officials. Although many lords complained, this 
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institutional access to status nonetheless helped to release some of the generational 
pressures to avoid derogation that had periodically affected political stability.453  
The viceroys also fostered Indian officials whose authority was completely 
independent from their polity and relied entirely on a direct appointment and patronage 
from the viceroys in the name of the king: these included court translators and Indian jueces 
gobernadores. The court interpreters played a crucial part in the interactions between the 
viceroy and his indigenous petitioners. The most influential interpreter of this period 
remained the afore mentioned don Hernando de Tapia. Apart from the importance of his 
office Tapia carried his own authority, and helped create a sense of continuity, as the son of 
Andrés de Tapia, Motecuhzoma’s cihuacoatl and later governor of Mexico City.454 He was 
also respected amongst the Spaniards because of the honorific titles and rewards he 
received from Charles V and Pope Paul III. Apart from having some influence in determining 
access to the viceroy for indigenous petitioners at the palace in Mexico City, translators like 
Tapia travelled with the viceroys on their tours outside the capital- as we have seen in the 
case of Ocuituco- and on military campaigns like the Mixtón War where amongst other 
responsibilities, which included combat and relaying battlefield commands, Tapia was 
placed in charge of the prisoners by Agustín Guerrero, with whom he was familiar from 
court.455 Tapia was especially favoured by Mendoza and was a very close friend and 
business associate of the enterprising oidor Tejada. His friendship and usefulness was 
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rewarded from the ‘quitas y vacaciones’ fund456  and he received land grants from Mendoza 
west of Mexico City.457 In 1538 he was granted a licence to ride a horse which was 
supplemented in 1541 with another allowing him to carry a sword and dagger in public.458 
Tapia spanned Mendoza’s ‘two republics’ more successfully than anyone else down to his 
marriage to a Spanish wife. His descendants who chose to identify with either the Indian or 
the Spanish ‘republics’ remained prominent for generations in both.459 
Indian jueces gobernadores were appointed directly by the viceroys and prided 
themselves on being royal officials. Their primary task was to visit polities other than their 
own, carrying a staff of justice, that remarkably common symbol of authority across time 
and cultures, as representatives of royal authority. Often their role was that of external but 
culturally expert intermediaries in a dispute: Mendoza explained to Velasco that after an 
audience with petitioners he might delegate to ‘Indian judges to go and explore their 
differences, named with the agreement of both parts’.460 By the 1550s these judges had 
become more common; they were selected from amongst well regarded noblemen and 
often took over as gobernadores of the polity they were visiting for the duration of their 
commission. They seem to have been particularly active in Xilotepec and Querétaro, the 
bases for the expanding ‘Otomi-Chichimeca’ frontier. The best known was don Esteban de 
Guzmán, lord of Xochimilco: a well-integrated participant of the viceregal system, who 
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defended the precedence of Indigenous officials over Spanish ones when it came to judicial 
authority within the polities.461 He effectively governed Mexico City from 1554-7 and then 
Tlatelolco while he conducted the residencia of don Diego de Mendoza.462  
Lordship and nobility remained the most important aim of the polity elites. A census 
carried out in Huexotzinco in 1560 showed that despite the redistributions of land only 42% 
of the population were considered macehuales - plebeian but free land-owners - of the sort 
that that had formed the overwhelming majority of the population of a polity and their 
essential component before the Spanish conquest of Tenochtitlan. Ten per cent of the 
population were considered noblemen. Their lands and those entailed to the palaces they 
dominated were worked by 48% of the population who were officially known as 
‘terrazgueros’, a Spanish term sometimes associated with the Nahua term ‘naboria’ or 
‘mayeque’ which described landless or tenant farmers tied to a lord’s estate and sometimes 
known as their ‘vassallos’. Within New Spain the practice arose under the viceroys of 
exempting the indigenous nobility from tribute and because their terrazgueros were 
considered part of their entailed inheritance these were not included in the Spanish 
calculation of a polity’s tribute assessment either; to the horror of Valderrama who made it 
one of his key complaints against Velasco’s administration.463 Polities that were able to 
negotiate the best tributary settlement with the Spaniards, through an effective 
presentation of their virtue and with the support of the friars, often attracted immigrants 
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from other more hard-pressed areas. As in pre-conquest times, these settlers were 
accommodated as terrazgueros on noble lands, in turn enriching noble incomes further.464    
Bastard feudalism  
Mendoza realised the importance of displays of association with his viceregal 
authority for the competitive indigenous elites. As early as December 1537, he informed the 
king that he had created the ‘Order of Knights Tecle’ an honorific title derived from the 
Nahua term tecuhtli.465 In Mendoza’s re-fashioning, the knights would be considered ‘like 
caballeros’ in Spain. Their display and association was with royal authority rather than their 
polity, symbolised through the display of imperial motifs like the two ‘Plus Ultra’ columns of 
Charles V. As comendador of the order of Santiago, Mendoza understood the importance of 
chivalric orders and ‘bastard feudalism’. Its use had been revived as a tool for propagating 
allegiance to Charles V in allowing membership to the order of the Golden Fleece to anyone 
from within his multifarious European domains, keeping them ‘obliged’ to him by this 
honour and to his imperial mission, above regional loyalties. Mendoza devised for the tecles 
an overtly crusading Christian ritual followed by an oath of loyalty to the king and the 
defence of Christianity. These ideals were arguably more immediately resonant in New 
Spain than in Europe because the recently established frontier of Christianity lay within the 
loyalist polities as well as on their borders.466 Unlike the lordly tecuhtli, the tecle specifically 
‘carried no tribute or seigniorial rights’ with their title. Like a European chivalric order, they 
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bound the knight to the lord that had knighted him - in this case Mendoza - with personal 
bonds of loyalty.467 Mendoza’s defence of his personal government had been that it was 
more immediate and practical than the handful of royal grants of coats of arms to Indian 
lords before 1535. It was controversial because Mendoza was appropriating for himself the 
right of ennoblement with the potential creation of new rights without prior reference to 
the king and of creating a new knightly order under his control whereas the Spanish crown 
had been trying to bring the three Spanish knightly orders under its own control since the 
late 15th century.  
Overt references to the ‘Order of Tecles’ disappeared from official Spanish sources 
and indigenous proofs of merit probably as a result of the discredit of Mendoza’s political 
project in the eyes of the crown. It seems also that Indigenous lords understood it as just a 
Christianised tecuhtli, which is why the Huexotzinca lords in the case mentioned above 
adopted the ceremony of the tecles as the official ceremony for accession to polity lordship 
in 1554. 
 However the underlying intention survived in other titles like that of conquistador 
that Velasco bestowed upon don Nicolás de San Luis Montañés.468 The intention behind the 
knights Tecle survived in viceregal licences allowing individual noblemen to own and carry 
Spanish weapons or ride horses openly and display royal insignia on their cloaks and outside 
their houses; privileges that were granted to those Indians that the viceroys trusted the 
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most. Mendoza first issued these licences in direct contravention of royal instructions and in 
the teeth of Spanish settler opposition, as early as the spring of 1536.469 It is yet another 
indication of his early conception of the ‘Republic of the Indians’ and it became one of the 
key accusations raised against him during the visita of Tello de Sandoval.470 After Mendoza’s 
removal, the king seems to have conceded the viceroy’s right to issue such licences,471 but 
the condemnation of Mendoza’s actions has left us an illustrative record of the grants that 
Mendoza made with the dates in which his licences were issued and sometimes even a brief 
description of why they were issued.472 The justification behind the granting of these 
licences related to exceptional services performed by the beneficiary to the cause of New 
Spain and Christianity; for loyalty in war or government and for leading exemplary lives of 
virtue as determined by the viceroy. The recipients were described as caciques, lords and 
governors. The geographic spread of these licences indicate that direct viceregal authority 
over indigenous lords reached even remote areas like Soconusco and Guatemala but not yet 
the fledgling advances in Yucatán: it surpasses the extent of the Tenochca Empire, 
particularly with regards to the valley of Puebla and large areas to the West and North but, 
it traces its main strategic routs South remarkably closely, suggesting similar strategic 
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considerations. Strategic locations, like Tehuantepec or Soconusco or the valleys that 
connect central Mexico to Oaxaca, that the viceroys wished to secure are well represented. 
The recipient lords governed polities that were directly under the crown but also those held 
by encomenderos and even magnates like Cortés and Alvarado, again suggesting the reach 
of viceregal patronage over the local pretensions of rival Spanish authorities.   
Even though the unofficial use of horses and Spanish weapons had spread quite 
generally amongst the indigenous polities, official recognition mattered a great deal 
because it allowed the indigenous lords to display openly these symbols of authority and 
viceregal trust, like the Spanish hidalgos they saw roaming the streets. On the other hand, 
unofficial use of Spanish weapons could have the opposite effect and lead to trouble and 
the disapproval of the viceregal authorities if it was brought to Spanish attention, as in the 
case of a nobleman from Chalco in early 1536 who had several swords confiscated from his 
house by a hostile Indian alguacil because he did not have a licence; or the indignity of 
having to hide their weapons whenever an alien official appeared in the area, as happened 
to Mixteco lords known to Suárez de Peralta who had otherwise become expert hunters 
with the harquebus.473 Viceregal licences did not determine whether Indians were armed or 
not, they symbolised that they were trusted and enfranchised. These displays of status were 
highly valued by the Indigenous lords: Acazitli’s ‘Chronicle’ begins with a detailed 
description of his indigenous and Spanish martial regalia, including his sword.474 Suárez de 
Peralta recalled the image of Indian lords who had received such viceregal licences in his 
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chronicle: wearing their cloaks embroidered with eagles, carrying Spanish weapons and 
riding in saddled horses.475 
Competition for viceregal patronage became an important factor in establishing 
viceregal authority over New Spain. Tlaxcala had an early advantage for her role in the 
conquest: ‘It is reasonable that they be favoured’ explained Mendoza to the King ‘for their 
part in winning this land, and for my confidence in finding in them all protection and 
assistance if by chance any uprisings in the land made it necessary.’476 However Tlaxcala 
‘found early and expert imitators. In the sixteenth century other Indian towns resented 
Tlaxcala not because, as the twentieth century has tended to feel, they were traitors for 
turning on the ‘Aztecs’ but because they seemed to be getting all the credit for doing the 
same thing everyone else was doing all over the country.’477 The search for viceregal favour 
motivated indigenous lords to act according to viceregal expectations in government and 
war.   
By far the greatest concentration of licences, was amongst the populous ‘heartland 
polities’ of New Spain, the area traced by the highland valleys that follow the line of 
volcanoes from Tlaxcala west to Michoacán and south to the valley of Oaxaca: those areas 
with easiest access to the viceroy and the greatest sense of participation in viceregal New 
Spain. Díaz del Castillo described their lords in the 1560s: ‘in Tlaxcala and Texcoco and in 
Cholula and in Huexotzingo and Tepeaca and other big cities, when the Indians form a 
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cabildo…they perform justice with as much skill and authority as amongst us…and apart 
from this most caciques are rich and own horses… they go around…with pages and followers 
and they play cañas and on feasts they bullfight’. Elsewhere he commented: ‘…most sons of 
principales tended to be gramáticos (knew Latin)…and many sons of principales know how 
to read and write and compose books of song…’ 478   
Conclusion 
The first two viceroys achieved a ‘natural authority’ over the elites of the ‘heartland 
polities’ of New Spain. Stephanie Wood has pointed out the importance of the figure of 
both of the first two viceroys in a variety of indigenous representations and records of 
collective political memory, even decades after their death. Indigenous documents spanning 
our period often incorporated Mendoza and Velasco into an indigenous identity, along with 
their agents like the friars, while other Spaniards were described as alien parasites.479 The 
viceroys for instance were not just called ‘visorrey’ but also ‘tlatoani’ while members of the 
audiencia were often referred to as ‘tecuhtli’ (lords) and, like the viceroys, depicted with 
name glyphs, somewhat like the lords that were painted sitting in the pre-conquest palaces 
alongside the prince.480 At least by the time of the Mixtón war, the Indians had appropriated 
Mendoza’s name probably pronouncing it ‘Metuza’ as suggested by the glyph they 
associated with his image in their pictograms which was that of a maguey plant Metl and a 
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mountain dog or Tuza. They were so familiar with his ubiquitous mayordomo mayor and 
‘intimate representative’ Agustín Guerrero that they referred to him as the viceroy’s ‘Ytachi’ 
or honoured father.481  
Viceregal authority over the indigenous polities came from the implementation 
through courtly personal government of shared convictions regarding the political 
participation of the indigenous elite. Each polity, often called a ‘republic’, constituted a 
legitimate political entity, more autonomous than a Spanish municipality, and enjoying the 
right to access to the person of the viceroy, as the representation of royal legitimacy in New 
Spain. These principles implied the acceptance of a legitimate governing class within the 
polities endowed with noble status: privileges and responsibilities that could transcend their 
individual polity and applied to the kingdom of New Spain as a whole. These included 
exemptions from tribute and the expectation of their obligation to serve the king in 
governing their polities and fighting for the kingdom. These assumptions and the strategies 
that the viceroys employed to realise them constituted the ‘republic of the Indians’ of 
viceregal rhetoric.  
The way in which the status of the provincial elites was considered since 1535 was 
self-consciously a new departure from Tenochca imperial practice and differed from the 
official position of the Spanish crown and previous administrations in Mexico City. Royal 
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recognition of a tribute-exempt fully fledged indigenous nobility did not come until 1572.482 
The crown had only recognised a few exceptions that included the imperial nobility of the 
Tenochca empire or other individual cases who had been awarded arms by the king for 
performing renowned services to the crown. In New Spain this notion of an indigenous 
nobility, with all its implications, had existed since Mendoza’s government. In the fraught 
year of 1555, Motolinia, who played a direct role in this endeavour, defended the legitimacy 
of the political project of New Spain from the accusations of tyranny levied against it by Las 
Casas, recalling the contractual origins of this new vision of the Indigenous elites: ‘I 
remember well in years past, after Your Majesty sent don Antonio de Mendoza, the lords 
and principal [indigenous] men of this kingdom assembled and solemnly and of their own 
free will again gave their obedience to Your Majesty’. He continued by claiming that only the 
polities that had constituted Tenochtitlan’s Imperial triple alliance had lost out as a result of 
the Spanish conquest because they had lost the tribute and power they had enjoyed in the 
past.483  
The recognition of indigenous nobility’s privileges shocked newly arrived outsiders 
like the visitadores. Francisco Tello de Sandoval complained to the king in 1545 that ‘under 
no circumstances should (indigenous) governors or caciques or principales be involved in 
the governance of their towns’;484 Jerónimo de Valderrama, almost twenty years later, 
complained that the royal treasury had suffered because ‘in some towns by ordinance of the 
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friars many individuals are exempted from tribute, singers musicians and others who serve 
the church… and these are many because the viceroy makes them principales by writ, and 
whoever a friar calls a don becomes one’485; and also disgusted conquistadores like 
Jerónimo López who identified himself more with Tenochca imperialism: ‘Moctezuma 
subjected the land giving it in repartimiento to the principal men of his court, and keeping 
the rest…In this way the kingdom was peaceful under Moctezuma, who your majesty has 
succeeded just as we [the encomenderos] have done with the lords of Mexico.’486.  
In the midst of these debates, don Esteban de Guzmán, a lord of Xochimilco who 
held the viceregal appointment of Indian juez visitador in Mexico City composed, along with 
other indigenous lords, one of the most illustrative defences of the viceroys and the sui 
generis viceregal political project of New Spain:  
What now keeps us much afflicted, then, o powerful prince, is that in this 
year of 1554 there has been an attempt to take from us the administration of 
justice of our republic and to give it to be administered by Spanish people, 
which would have occurred already had not the friars of San Francisco 
challenged those who attempted it, and had they not acted we would have 
become perpetual slaves and deprived of our ancient and natural jurisdiction 
… seeing the authority [the Spanish officials] were receiving we appealed to 
the lord viceroy don Luis de Velasco together with the Franciscan fathers, 
and he ordered that they not act as anything more than our protectors, with 
no more authority than to defend us from damages caused by Spaniards 
mestizos and blacks…487  
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This type of defence of New Spain’s sui generis viceregal arrangements 
formed part of the language of legitimacy that developed in this period and the 
























Chapter 6: Magnates 
Juan Suárez de Peralta reflected that Mendoza had suffered most from the attempt to 
conquer the illusory kingdom of Cíbola ‘because the issue went so badly when he had been 
so certain of it and of becoming greater than the greatest lord in Spain’.488 Behind their 
personae as ‘the king’s living image’ and the legal boundaries of their nominally 
administrative titles, Mendoza and Velasco were ambitious noblemen who had risen as 
courtiers and aspired to become magnates of the Habsburg monarchy. They shared this 
sense of potential most keenly with those other Spaniards who enjoyed the mutually 
reinforcing attributes of official recognition from the crown and practical power in New 
Spain. Royal Officials, oidores, the marquess, provincial governors and the authorised 
explorers of New Spain enjoyed these attributes in parallel with the viceroys.  
With the notable exception of the Marquess of the Valley of Oaxaca, these magnates 
lacked the entrenched titles of their counterparts in Spain that assured them of stability and 
continuity of status. Instead they depended on the royal will for legitimacy in the possession 
of their offices.  
The 1520s and early 30s had seen Cortés, various royal officials, the oidores of the two 
audiencias and other adventurers secure for themselves in turn the government of New 
Spain and despite the appointment of the viceroys these ambitions continued. The effective 
removal of Mendoza from New Spain; the instability caused by the visita of Velasco’s 
administration; the calls to suppress the office of viceroy altogether; and later the recall of 
viceroy Peralta in 1567 after just over a year in power point to the fluid and evolving nature 
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of authority in New Spain where viceregal government was not the absolute certainty it 
became later. In 1552 one royal official remarked of the competition for authority that ‘the 
ambition of many to rule the land is extreme in both temporal and the spiritual matters. 
They do everything to achieve this for the great credit given to them if they provide for 
many matters [of government] as they please and, under the excuse of zealous service, they 
ask for many things…’489 Viceregal authority over the magnates of New Spain was in part a 
result of the personal ambitions of the viceroys and their ability to achieve many of them 
rather than a deliberately contrived system of government implanted from Spain.  
Managing officialdom 
Both viceroys occupied ambiguous positions. Their offices were not part of a well-
defined hierarchical structure that avoided parallel or overlapping competencies between 
them and the other administrative and judicial authorities in New Spain.490 The royal 
officials and oidores of New Spain were appointed and paid by the crown: according to the 
standard formula in their letters to the crown, they did not answer to the viceroys but to the 
king as his direct criados: under their own authority they ‘granted’ such and such a ‘request’ 
from the viceroys. In theory they did not depend on the viceroys for their authority or in 
order to discharge their duties. These administrative magnates could and were even obliged 
to appeal directly to the Council of the Indies or their patrons at court even on matters that 
did not necessarily pertain to their offices if they believed that in so doing they were serving 
the crown most effectively. Their offices did not define them: they were a marker of the 
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trust in which they were held by the crown and an expression of their pre-eminence within 
the governing elite of New Spain. 
The viceroys were not sovereign and they could not count on unfettered access to the 
financial resources of the royal treasury. They found it necessary to link the interests of the 
administrative magnates to their own as closely as possible in order to achieve their own 
objectives and authority: from implementing royal instructions like the New Laws to gaining 
access to resources for the distribution of patronage. Cortés had found the division of 
authorities equally damaging to coherent governance and believed that he knew ‘that … 
governing the land through a diversity of authorities, like the [Caribbean] islands, [New 
Spain] will end up in the state that they are in.’491 The crown tried to encourage agreement, 
as in the real acuerdo expected between viceroy and audiencia, but the administrative 
structure of New Spain had developed through the aggregation of authorities rather than as 
a coherent hierarchical bureaucracy. There was no legislative, elective or bureaucratic 
mechanism to enforce a unitary decision if the different administrative magnates disagreed 
on the interpretation of the royal will.  
The viceroys came to rely on unofficial but accepted courtly means to create the 
alliance of interests that would allow them to achieve coherent, enforceable and 
unchallenged policies in New Spain. Courtly strategies involving dynastic alliances and the 
distribution of patronage helped to create interdependent associations between the 
viceroys, the royal officials and letrados. This continued after Velasco was appointed despite 
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the crown’s legislative efforts to try to limit these associations and maintain autonomous 
officials unaffected by the viceroy’s authority.  
Mendoza, like Guzmán before him, was fortunate in that he knew many of the royal 
officials he encountered in Mexico from court in Spain. As we have seen their background 
and allegiances in Spain were similar: their associations with Francisco de los Cobos in 
particular helped in this respect until his eclipse in the mid 1540s. Salazar recalled during 
Sandoval’s visita that he had known Mendoza ‘for over thirty-five years’ since their shared 
youth in the Alhambra where they had cut their administrative teeth together working 
alongside Cobos under Mendoza’s father and older brother.492 These Spanish associations 
remained important in New Spain: Ruy Díaz de Mendoza, a member of Mendoza’s 
household and previously a principal citizen of Granada, married Catalina de Salazar, the 
factor’s daughter and both came to Mexico in the viceroy’s entourage.  
These links continued into the second generation when Juan Velázquez de Salazar 
married a daughter of Alonso de Mérida, another member of Mendoza’s original 
household.493 The crown allowed both Hernando de Salazar and his brother Juan Velázquez 
de Salazar to inherit in turn the office of factor from their father and that of veedor from 
Chirinos.494 On the other hand, contador Rodrigo de Albornoz, who remained hostile to the 
Salazars from their disagreements in the factional struggles of the 1520s, received few 
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rewards from the viceroy; which led to the enmity which became obvious during Sandoval’s 
visita.495 
Velasco could not count on a common patron like Cobos to help align officialdom. 
Nevertheless the viceroy exploited similar dynastic and courtly associations harking back to 
Spain as illustrated in his promotion of Hortuño de Ibarra to the offices of factor and veedor. 
Hortuño was a kinsman of the richest mining entrepreneur in New Spain, Diego de Ibarra, 
who, like Velasco, had been a dependent of the latter’s kinsman the Constable of Castile.496 
In New Spain, this relationship became even more entrenched after Diego’s marriage to the 
viceroy’s daughter. The association between the Velascos and the Ibarras became so close 
that Velasco lived his last months in Hortuño’s house in Mexico City.497  
The viceroys enjoyed greater confidence from the crown and court than the members 
of the administration they replaced because they were appointed more recently and 
consequently retained a greater intimacy with the politics of the Spanish court. This 
confidence was demonstrated in their charge to conduct residencias of the sitting 
administrators. Both viceroys used this as a means to enhance their authority or promote 
their own men of confidence to key positions within the administration. To achieve this, the 
viceroys kept as much personal control over this process as possible by using trusted 
members of their household or other allies: for example, Mendoza  appointed his household 
mayordomo Agustín Guerrero to supervise the residencia of the previous officials and 
                                                     
495
 AGI, Justicia, 258 testimony of contador Rodrigo de Albornoz & Bernaldino de Albornoz.   
496
  J. F. Scwaller ‘The Life of Luis de Velasco’ in Estudios de Historia Novohispana 29. Jul-Dec 2003. 
497
 M.J. Sarabia Viejo, Don Luis de Velasco Virrey de Nueva España 1550-1564 (Seville 1978), p.471. 
214 
 
oidores.498 Treasurer Juan Alonso de Sosa described the power that the viceroy’s role as a 
judge of the previous administration could give them: he explained  that Velasco was 
helping his investigators to extend their commission despite no royal instructions to this 
effect: ‘in order for [the investigators] to become perpetual contadores, which is what they 
have always wanted… in order to enjoy always that pre-eminence that they have and have 
had from being contadores, and to have me in a state of discredit with Your Majesty by 
implying that there are grave charges against me… the viceroy helps them in this because he 
believes that by [helping them extend their commission] he has extended his own over 
them.’499 
The crown’s confidence also offered a window of opportunity for the viceroys to 
position their closest adherents in positions of influence and authority. Apart from his 
general supervisory role, Guerrero was commissioned alongside oidor Ceynos, to the 
delicate task of auditing the accounts of the royal tribute books;500 he was also made the 
chancellor of the audiencia and was placed in charge of the royal seal without which no 
document could be considered legally binding.501 Guerrero was even made the bursar of the 
new College of Tlatelolco which Mendoza eagerly supported on behalf of the crown.  
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The creation of the first royal mint allowed Mendoza to make Alonso de Mérida its 
treasurer and to justify giving him useful living and an important role in the administration 
along with the other minor offices associated with the mint which duly went to other 
household dependents. Mendoza was then able to justify Mérida’s purchase of conqueror 
Alonso Lucas’s half of the Meztitlán encomienda in late 1535 as a means of supporting the 
new treasurer of the mint’s administrative position socially and economically.502 The viceroy 
was also able to grant treasurer Sosa, for example, valuable encomiendas that had belonged 
to the crown rather than other encomenderos - a right that neither Guzmán nor the Second 
Audiencia had enjoyed - and allowed him to extend his mining interests. Sosa’s daughter 
then married don Luis de Castilla who was increasingly associated with the viceroy. Sosa, 
who had been originally allied with Cortés, never became a full partisan of Mendoza but he 
did not oppose him either except briefly for opportunistic reasons during Sandoval’s visita.  
Mendoza won over the audiencia using similar methods. He first appeased the 
remaining members of the Second Audiencia by concluding their residencia with 
uncharacteristic speed and without charging any of them, despite some insistent 
accusations from the cabildo in particular against Vasco de Quiroga.503 Instead the viceroy 
subsequently gave two of them special responsibilities: Quiroga, who also had Granadine 
connections, was to count the vassals of Cortés until he finally took up his post of bishop of 
Michoacán the following year and devoted himself to creating Utopia on the shores of Lake 
Pátzcuaro. The viceroy appointed Maldonado to hold a residencia of Pedro de Alvarado in 
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Guatemala. The oidor arrived in Santiago de los Caballeros on the 16th of May 1536.504 At 
first this left only the young oidor Ceynos and the elderly but newly-arrived Loaysa in the 
royal palace with the viceroy. These two had the least experience in New Spain and in the 
palace they soon established a comradely relationship with the viceroy based on mutual 
solidarity, to the extent that Loaysa was tasked with representing Mendoza in meetings of 
the cabildo, in a move of contested legality.505  
In 1538 Lorenzo de Tejada arrived to replace Quiroga as oidor, and the viceroy soon 
came to enjoy a personal and economically profitable alliance with him, underscored by 
shared private enterprises and land speculation which were facilitated by their control of 
the political and legal processes of the administration.506  Such cooperation was also helped 
by the generally accepted notion that the oidores would reside in Mexico for life and 
Mendoza’s conception of New Spain as a stable kingdom where he was promoting an elite 
that they wished to belong to. After Ceynos returned to Spain in 1546, Mendoza, possibly 
with the help of his brother who had been made president of the council of the Indies, got 
their relative Rodrigo de Quesada, who already resided in Mexico, selected as the 
replacement oidor.507 This reinforced the viceroy’s association with the audiencia at a time 
when Sandoval’s visita had divided them.508  
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Until 1544 there were no other audiencias in any of the provinces of New Spain, and 
Mendoza’s alliance with the oidores in Mexico City meant a high degree of co-ordination 
between viceroy and the highest authorised judicial institution in a vast territory extending 
from Honduras to the northern frontier of New Galicia and Pánuco.  This co-ordination 
became crucial in the struggle for legitimacy over rights of exploration as the audiencia 
consistently ratified Mendoza’s actions and recommended them to the crown, as we will 
see. In all these cases of collusion, the interests of the oidores were tied directly to New 
Spain through encomienda grants or direct land-ownership, as well as by royal policy which 
at the time favoured long or even perpetual terms of office in New Spain.  
Mendoza’s administration had been discredited, in the eyes of the crown, by the 
accusations levied against it during Sandoval’s visita. The crown’s reaction was to try to limit 
‘horizontal’ allegiances within New Spain while emphasising the autonomy of individual 
salaried officials or oidores and their individual ‘vertical’ links to the crown. The crown 
prohibited its salaried officials from engaging in private entrepreneurial activities or 
accumulating private property in New Spain: ‘because experience has shown the harm and 
inconvenience that follow when those that govern in the Indies are involved in land-
ownership and discoveries’,509 and it rotated oidores more frequently than in the past 
throughout Velasco’s reign. These adjustments were designed to reinforce the crown’s 
supremacy as the greatest patron in New Spain over viceregal political arrangements.  
The crown still favoured sending an ‘intimate representative’ as viceroy. Furthermore, 
Mendoza’s political arrangements were not discredited in New Spain where both the 
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Spanish and indigenous elites had campaigned for Mendoza to remain as viceroy or for his 
son to succeed him. Their demands and expectations from the viceregal government 
remained the same. This left Velasco with an ambiguous legacy when he arrived in Mexico 
City.  
As long as Velasco retained the confidence of the crown above that of any other 
official, however, he was able to take advantage of the stricter royal prohibitions on the 
acquisition of patrimonial wealth by salaried officials as a double-edged sword to assert his 
own authority over other members of the administration. Velasco was able to convince the 
crown to increase his salary to 20,000d over the years, arguing for the need to uphold the 
dignity of his office, while the salaries of other officials remained stagnant for 40 years 
despite the general inflation of prices in New Spain and they claimed that they could hardly 
maintain themselves without viceregal assistance.510  
Velasco could also appeal to the letter of the law to undermine anyone in the old 
administration who opposed him while elevating his own allies. For example Velasco 
persuaded the crown to replace Sosa in 1553 and Velázquez de Salazar in 1558. Both had 
remained in their posts from the previous administration. Their wealth and entrenched 
interests and dynastic contact in New Spain had given them too much influence Velasco’s 
linking. They had become intractable enemies of Velasco’s authority, but they were also 
relics of the old regime and suspect in the eyes of the crown.511 Velasco was able to justify 
replacing Sosa with the more malleable and grateful Fernando de Portugal, and Salazar with 
his ally Hortuño de Ibarra. The same held true for oidores Santillán and Tejada, both of 
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whom had accumulated a great deal of wealth and property from the long tenure of their 
offices and their association with Mendoza.512 The repayment of debts and the escheatment 
of property or tributary rights to the royal coffers that accompanied the prosecution and 
persecution of these administrative magnates also helped Velasco’s political standing in 
Spain. Philip II repeatedly expressed his support for Velasco in these seemingly exemplary 
reforms to the administration and provided the necessary legislation to ratify his actions for 
most of Velasco’s government.513 
Simultaneously Velasco used Mendoza’s unofficial strategies to circumvent the legal 
restrictions imposed by the crown to co-opt newly arrived officials and to promote his own 
allies to offices as they became available. While Mendoza was able to enrich his favoured 
officials or oidores directly Velasco merely rewarded their close relatives or associates (and 
his own) instead. They both relied on the system of quitas y vacaciones or the appointment 
to corregimiento. Valderrama identified several rewards going to the viceroy’s family as well 
as relatives and dependents of the Montealegre and Villanueva families whose members 
came to hold positions both as royal officials and oidores by 1560.514 The same was true of 
even more dependents of the treasurer don Fernando de Portugal and Hortuño de Ibarra. 
Velasco also managed to enrich his family and household to such an extent that within a 
generation they became amongst the most preponderant citizens of New Spain:  two 
branches of the Velascos were amongst the first criollos to gain titles of nobility. It was their 
wealth and the consequent networks of dependence they created that offered the greatest 
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bulwark to Velasco’s authority and rallying the viceregal party at the time of the so-called 
Cortés-Ávila conspiracy.515  
Cash reserves were particularly valuable in this period because New Spain was not 
very well monetised but coin was essential for the acquisition of valued products from 
Spain. The royal treasury in Mexico City probably accounted for the largest concentration of 
coin in Mesoameica because a good part of the tribute collected by the crown in kind was 
sold in the market for coin before it was transferred to the royal coffers.516 Immediate 
access to capital often involved contracting debts against the royal treasury. The viceroy and 
officials allowed individual or collective indebtedness because it played an important part in 
creating a lasting collusion between them and of extending their collective authority over 
affairs in New Spain: Hortuño de Ibarra for instance was careful to keep a list of the many 
towns and people that had been allowed to owe money to the royal coffers.517  
Some of the prime beneficiaries of this access to royal funds through debt were the 
royal officials themselves and the viceroys. After Guerrero and Ceynos completed their audit 
of the royal officials in April 1537 it turned out that all the officials owed money to the royal 
coffers. Rather than punish them, Mendoza allowed them to refinance their debts with 
continued borrowing.  In this way the royal officials became politically indebted to Mendoza 
and became more willing to cooperate.518 Hernando de Salazar died in 1551 owing the 
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enormous sum of 250,000d to the treasury. Hernando had been ‘well-loved throughout the 
land’ and in order ‘to avoid dissent and scandals in the land’ Velasco and prosecutor Sedeño 
arranged for his brother to inherit the office of factor in exchange for guarantees that he 
and other named individuals would stand surety for the debt. These other individuals 
included ‘ten of the most prominent individuals’ in New Spain like Cristóbal de Oñate. The 
debt placed them all under obligation to the viceroy.519 
The collusion between the viceroy and the treasury officials was beneficial for both. 
The officials believed that they could not maintain themselves properly without the 
viceroy’s patronage and the viceroy needed their support to dispense his patronage freely 
and govern effectively.520 This community of interests allowed the viceroys almost 
unfettered access to the cash reserves of the royal treasury, legitimised by the seal of 
approval of the royal officials and without fear of disputes that might result in complaints 
made to Spain. It was this collusion that allowed them to exercise the distributions from the 
‘quitas y vacaciones’ fund in a discretionary way or even to borrow money themselves. In 
February 1564, a newly arrived Martín Cortés observed to the king that he: 
 marvelled at [the Royal Officials] because they are always so much in 
agreement with the viceroy and they never exceed his will even when it is 
not convenient for the service of Your Majesty, nor do they know any other 
king than him because… he grants them mercedes and gives them lands and 
livings. And they have believed until now that there would be no-one to 
make a reckoning of their actions, and that if, in collusion, they and the 
viceroy wrote [to Spain] helping each other that Your Majesty would give 
them great credit.521  
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At the time of Velasco’s death six months later in the middle of Valderrama’s visita it 
was discovered that the viceroy had left an outstanding debt of c.23,142d. Fernando de 
Portugal and the other officials who had authorised this debt explained that the viceroy had 
borrowed it against his salary and had needed it ‘for the furniture of his house… to pay for 
what is left over of the salaries owed to his dependants and for other little debts... in this we 
were serving your majesty because of how important it is to govern in liberty without 
depending on anybody.’ They added that in any case the viceroy had been waiting for 
remuneration from the crown for all his voluntary services and suggested that these debts 
should be wiped clean altogether and not transferred to his son in recognition of these 
services.522 The effectiveness of such arguments, on either side, in determining whether 
such collusion was considered corruption or a strategy for ‘good government’ did not 
depend on bureaucratic procedure but on the political judgement of the crown.   
Velasco was never able to associate the audiencia of Mexico City with his aims to the 
extent that Mendoza achieved.523 Furthermore, Velasco had to contend with audiencias in 
Guatemala and New Galicia who enjoyed even greater autonomy. He was thwarted by the 
more frequent changeover of oidores which made any arrangements he could organise in 
New Spain less durable. Disputes over jurisdiction and the personal ambition of the oidores 
to serve the king in their own right led to disagreements over the viceroy’s policies 
regarding the Spanish and Indian republics and most seriously over his elevation of his 
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relatives and household within New Spain’s society.524 Even so until about 1560, the crown 
sided with Velasco almost invariably, while his arrangements within New Spain gave him 
enough support from within the administration and from oidores like Quesada, Zorita or 
Villanueva to allow him to govern: whether by aggrandising his retinue or implementing the 
unpopular New Laws. 
In the increasing disputes between the audiencia and the royal officials over questions 
of precedence the viceroy generally sided with the royal officials: as in the right to let the 
latter arm their black servants ostensibly to assist in their tax-collecting duties, or the 
insistence of the royal officials on scrupulously charging the oidores for all sorts of dues to 
the crown.525 Subsequent complaints from the audiencia and discord between them and the 
viceroy prompted the visita of Valderrama who arrived in Mexico in the summer of 1563.  
It was also worrying for Velasco that the king had shown such evident favour for 
Martín Cortés. With a single cédula the king had settled all the disputes over the tributary 
and seigniorial rights of the marquesado, which Hernán Cortés had never been able to 
resolve, in Martín’s favour and against Velasco’s explicit advice.526 Martín Cortés returned to 
New Spain shortly before Valderrama. Until then, Velasco’s authority had not faced a 
magnate who could combine enough practical power in New Spain with support from Spain 
to challenge the viceroy in Mexico City. Ominously when the visitador arrived in Mexico City 
he chose to reside with the marquess rather than the viceroy. 
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Rivalling the Conquistadores 
Exploration and the control of military expeditions in the name of the king became 
the most obvious arena for competition over authority, rewards and status. They remained 
the most prestigious and quantifiable services that could be rendered to the crown. 
Command of such expeditions was also important within New Spain because it meant 
patronage over many restless recent Spanish immigrants with few alternative means of 
sustenance. Authority over the administrative magnates went hand in hand with the 
viceroy’s efforts to rival the glory of the conquistadores by appropriating their command of 
expeditions of conquest and exploration.  
The conquest of Mexico and the aggrandisement of Cortés and his captains 
confirmed the wildest fantasies of Spanish explorers in America. By the time Mendoza 
arrived, Pizarro’s exploits in Peru had revived the faith of many Spanish settlers in the 
potential of new conquests: the summer before Mendoza’s arrival the cabildo of Mexico 
City calculated that over half of the Spanish population of Mexico City had left to join new 
expeditions since news had come of the conquest of Peru.527 Late in 1536 Alvar Núñez 
Cabeza de Vaca and his three companions were brought before the viceroy and citizens of 
Mexico: they came with tales of the distances and peoples of eight years-worth of 
wandering in the terra incognita to the north. A rich kingdom called Cíbola was soon 
commonly believed to lie within reach and for those Spaniards that had remained in New 
Spain or arrived recently in search of their fortunes ‘a new glamour was thrown around the 
work of discovery’.528 This excitement heightened the pre-existing competition between 
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Cortés, Alvarado and Guzmán for control of exploration especially along the Pacific coast 
and by extension the revival of the ambition of reaching Asia by sailing west.  
At first Mendoza was at a severe disadvantage. The crown was so nebulous - or 
purposefully ambiguous - in its understanding of the territory of New Spain and the 
authorities within it that no mention was even included of Mendoza’s jurisdictions or lack 
thereof over New Galicia, Pánuco or Guatemala in the viceroy’s instructions.529 This meant 
that if he wanted to gain the initiative in the provinces with the greatest potential as bases 
for exploration, he would have to enforce his rights in a competition for authority with the 
territorial magnates of New Spain.  
The viceroy’s most serious disadvantage was with the amount of money that New 
Spain’s magnates could devote to expeditions of exploration. Detailed accounts do not 
survive, but ‘snapshots’ provide an impression of the scale of these enterprises in this early 
period. Cortés spent an estimated 48,000d to launch Olíd’s ultimately treacherous 
expedition to Hibueras in 1524;530 closer to our period Alvarado sold the remnants of his 
battered invasion force of Quito in 1534 for 120,000d. This expedition had included 12 ships, 
and 500 Spaniards along with 200 slaves and ‘many Indian auxiliaries’ from Guatemala. In 
1536 Alvarado proposed to raise a slightly smaller expedition at a cost 48,000d to explore 
the ever beckoning Pacific to the east ‘and islands’.531 Finally according to López de Gómara 
Cortés spent an enormous 200,000d on his four Pacific voyages of exploration during the 
1530s (The figure seems high and López de Gómara was trying to justify Cortés’ position in 
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his struggle with the viceroy over the rights of exploration, as we shall see. However, judging 
by the other figures I have quoted it does not seem excessively high).532 The proportion of 
Spanish settlers that participated in them speak to the importance of these activities and 
their role in establishing relations of patronage over the Spanish population of 
Mesoamerica. 
Such figures also indicate that the practical means to conduct exploration or martial 
ventures were concentrated in a few individuals in New Spain, rather than with the royal 
administration: New Spain was far more decentralised than Spain in this regard. At the start 
of Mendoza’s administration Agustín Guerrero and Antonio de Almaguer’s inquiry into royal 
tribute (completed on 17 March 1536 from the 101 towns under the crown and 
administered by corregidores) valued the total income at 33,929d a year of which 16,514d 
were left over for the treasury after just the salaries and expenditures of the corregidores 
were deducted. A further 20,340d were sent to the king from the collection of the royal fifth 
paid on precious metals. Upon the crown’s request, Mendoza converted all tributary value, 
most of which was paid in kind, and including the royal fifth of silver into its monetary value. 
It should be pointed out that the crown controlled many of the most populous towns 
around the central Mexican plateau, however a proportion of their tribute assessment was 
commuted in exchange for manual labour, at this time especially for the re-construction of 
Mexico City. This was obviously not disposable to the king or viceroy for any other use.  533 In 
1546 Cortés earned more than that amount (37,478d) just from the tributary revenues of 
the marquesado holdings within the modern state of Morelos, excluding his many other 
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tributary holdings and his commercial enterprises.534 He could also count on large reserves 
of moveable wealth: the famous emerald necklace (the one he notoriously kept from the 
empress for his wife) that he lost in the debacle in Algiers in 1541 was valued at 100,000d; 
while his fame and the rumours of hidden treasures in New Spain meant that he was always 
able to borrow and at the time of his death he owed in total about 127,516d to various 
creditors.535 More completely comparable figures of royal vis-a-vis magnate income are 
found towards the end of our period. In 1569 Hortuño de Ibarra calculated that the crown 
received 275,661d in tribute from royal towns and the marquesado produced 144,000d 
(when the royal officials took over the running of the marquesado in 1569, they estimated 
that the estate generated 110,571d per year just from the tribute of 60.903 tributaries. The 
totals are calculated by subtracting the earnings of the marquesado from total royal 
revenues).536 These rough figures serve to illustrate the relative magnitude of the economic 
power of the marquesado even at a time of decline when it was not engaged in commercial 
and mining ventures on the same scale as before and the estate was being exploited by 
crown agents since 1565 ‘like an enemy’s enterprise’ for their own benefit.537 The crown 
was also relatively richer in the 1560s as many more encomiendas had escheated by 1569, 
and its income was more diversified. Mendoza’s position in 1535 had been relatively much 
weaker.  
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In Spain, by contrast, the crown’s relative income was much higher than that of any 
individual magnate and it was all at the disposal of the king as sovereign. Charles V’s annual 
revenue as King of Spain, which at the time may have had a similar population to New Spain, 
was on average about 1,000,000d a year, rising to 1,500,000d after 1542, and through the 
sale of juros and by borrowing he was able to raise an additional 39,000,000d.538 By 
comparison, the wealthiest magnates in Spain, such as the duke of Medina-Sidonia earned 
around 50,000d a year in 1558, while the lordly favourite Los Cobos enjoyed around 53,042d 
gross earnings by 1546. The total rents in 1525 of all the grandes de España have been 
estimated at 1,100,000d.539  
Mendoza was also disadvantaged by the expectations of the time. The Spanish crown 
relied on the ethos of service of its magnates, particularly for military or exploratory 
ventures. In Europe the Duke of Alba died in 1582 after a lifetime of devoted service being 
owed 474,000d by the crown, a burden that descendants still bore generations later.540 In 
America, it had always been private enterprises and competition between explorers that 
had expanded the empire without any practical royal support. This voluntary ethos 
represented the pinnacle of virtuous services that had elevated men like Cortés.  
There was therefore nothing inherently undesirable, from the crown’s point of view, 
in the multiple authorities competing over exploration and martial matters that existed in 
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New Spain. The relative stability enjoyed by the Second Audiencia had much to do with its 
surrender of direct control over these martial activities or the provinces where magnates 
ruled. This was even the case with regards to their political accommodation with Cortés 
whom they needed as an occasional enforcer and consequently they surrendered any 
authority over him when it came to exploration, keeping only control over justice and 
appointments in Mexico City.541 
Cortés held the title of ‘Captain General of New Spain and the Southern Sea’ with the 
specific intention of serving the crown through defence and exploration. The viceroy’s 
claims were even weaker in the provinces and ‘kingdoms’ conquered separately by 
Alvarado, Guzmán and Montejo, (and to a far lesser extent Hernando de Soto’s claims to 
north America) which they had the right to govern autonomously as the accepted 
adelantados, governors and captains general of their domains.542 Guzmán retained some 
influence at court which supported his conquests. 543 Cortés and Alvarado had more recently 
forged alliances with influential members of the royal court. Mendoza’s first year suggested 
that the pattern established by the Second Audiencia might have continued viably for the 
crown along these polyarchic lines; it was only subsequent events that show that Mendoza 
actively sought to overturn this situation and to control such activities himself. 
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In 1536 Cortés was recalled by the viceroy to calm indigenous disquiet at rumours of 
his disappearance, much as the Second Audiencia had done in the past. Mendoza was then 
forced to ask the Captain General to fund and organise an expedition to rescue Pizarro in 
Lima who was under siege from the resurgent Manco Inca. The marquess responded 
immediately, ostensibly spending his resources in serving crown’s interests in Peru, but also 
exploiting the opportunity to further his own because the potential glory Cortés would have 
accrued from saving Lima by his intervention would have enhanced his prestige in Spain at a 
time when judicial and jurisdictional concerns hung over him. A similar motivation can be 
seen when the opportunity to save Peru for the crown arose again in 1547 and Mendoza did 
not hesitate to fund and organise an expedition himself and to place his son Francisco in 
charge of it.  
In both cases news from Peru forestalled the need for an expedition. In 1536, Cortés 
made the best of Pizarro’s victory by using the resources he had assembled to lay claim to 
what he hoped would become a lucrative new maritime commercial route to Peru, where so 
many Spaniards were emigrating. Two ships subsequently sailed to Lima, via Panama, every 
year with passengers and goods from bases controlled by the marquesado and handled by 
kinsmen and local commercial agents of Cortés. The expedition also gave Cortés an 
opportunity to continue his explorations of the Pacific with a view to discovering the elusive 
western route to Asia that continued to fascinate Spanish adventurers (In Tehuantepec he 
had his astillero del Carbón and he controlled the excellent ports of Huatulco and Acapulco 
further to the north).544 When the viceroy and the marquess finally met around June of 
1536, they did so in the most affectionate terms. In a festive atmosphere, they agreed on a 
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code of conduct towards each other that placed them on a par: each would address the 
other as señoría and when they coincided in the street or in church or in banquets there 
would be no clear precedence of one over the other (indeed so indistinguishable was the 
difference that there was a small row once over which chair was a few inches in front of the 
other in church).545  
Cortés cooperated, which might have redounded to Mendoza’s favour as an 
administrator, and the polyarchic system could have endured without affecting the crown’s 
interests. The situation, however, was not satisfactory with regards to the viceroy’s personal 
interests and authority. Mendoza soon experienced the limits of his practical ability to 
command the over-mighty subjects of New Spain and its consequent cost to his authority 
and ambitions. Mendoza sent oidor Alonso de Maldonado to Guatemala to take over the 
governorship of the province and begin the residencia of Pedro de Alvarado. It could have 
been an early opportunity for the new viceregal administration to make its authority felt as 
the crown’s supreme representative even in the distant periphery of its domain. After 
reaching Guatemala, Maldonado appointed his scribe Juan de Herrera to notify Alvarado of 
his impending trial; however, the scribe spent a month and a half trying to reach the 
adelantado without success; suffering beatings, threats and sequestrations from the latter’s 
supporters in the process. Simultaneously, Mendoza was trying to make himself the arbiter 
in the disputes between Montejo, who was in Mexico City after a devastating Maya 
rebellion, and Alvarado over control of Chiapas and Honduras. However in another example 
of the varied forms of legitimacy that operated simultaneously in the Americas, Alvarado 
had by then already ‘formally’ assumed the governorship of Honduras, without having to 
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give up Chiapas, from Andrés de Carceda and the local authorities who were desperate for 
the resources of a strong-man like Alvarado to protect them from indigenous reprisals.546 By 
early August Alvarado set sail for Spain to present his case directly to the king and to settle 
the issue of his authority over Honduras, without having to answer to Maldonado or the 
viceroy. He rightly trusted in the support of Cobos with whom he already enjoyed dynastic 
and economic ties since their first meeting in 1527.547  
Maldonado, meanwhile, faced such united resistance from the Guatemalan 
encomenderos and bishop Marroquín, who had relied on Alvarado’s authority above any 
other, that the unfortunate oidor eventually backed down from his enquiries and promised 
to do only ‘whatever was necessary for the pacification of the land and the service of the 
king’.548  Even Montejo ignored the viceroy’s attempts at mediation and, taking advantage 
of Alvarado’s absence in Spain, sailed to Puerto Caballos in March of 1537 without the 
viceroy’s blessing from where he proceeded to snatch back the governorship of Honduras, 
cloaking his actions in the legitimacy of an out-dated royal instruction of 1535 to that effect. 
Mendoza was left in Mexico City holding a newly arrived royal instruction, with the relevant 
blanks left for him to appoint the governorships as he saw fit, but which was now obsolete 
or at best could only confirm events beyond his control. Such episodes serve to illustrate 
how the combination of entrenched local interests and the expectations of alternative 
forms of legitimacy in Mesoamerica could be recognised and ratified in Spain; and how 
these factors combined to undermine the ability of the administration in Mexico City to 
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enforce its authority and sustain its claims to monopolise the enactment of royal will in New 
Spain by merely promulgating its own paper orders.  
This arrangement suited the crown (which was spared a great deal of cost) and 
certain courtly interests in Spain. It did not sit well with the viceroy’s ambitions and self-
perception. At first Mendoza could hardly have been able to compete. The viceroy had no 
access to any patrimonial wealth in New Spain counting only on a yearly salary of 8,000d 
and the services of 60 Mexica every day to provide his household with food, fuel and water 
for the the palace. Nor could the viceroy automatically dispose of royal income as he wished 
in the way that the crown could in Spain, in theory having to justify any expenditure from 
the royal treasury to the officials in Mexico and Spain. In 1537, for instance, during the 
urgent early competition to stake a claim to Cíbola, Mendoza sought to launch a relatively 
small reconnaissance expedition costing only an estimated 4,200d – 4,800d. He could not 
finance it himself so he was forced to ask the crown to let him fund it from the royal 
treasury, arguing unconvincingly that the cost could be covered by chasing up tax-evaders. It 
was an admission that in 1537 Mendoza could not serve his king voluntarily with his person 
and resources like the magnate he imagined himself to be.549 
In order to enforce his supremacy over the magnates, Mendoza had to become one 
himself in practice and to persuade the crown that concentrating powers in his person 
would serve its interests. Other governors of New Spain had reached the same conclusion in 
order to attempt to enforce their authority, and in every case their all-too-naked 
factionalism and heavy-handed redistribution of resources had worked only temporarily. By 
1542, through opportunism and political acumen Mendoza managed to centralise power in 
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his person and by extension the viceregal regime in Mexico City. As we have seen, his 
methods were ‘courtly’ and their intention was patrimonial. This intention was the result of 
personal ambition rather than a bureaucratic design. His instructions to Fr. Marcos de Niza 
in 1538 already bear out the viceroy’s self-perception: ‘And although all the land belongs to 
the emperor, our lord, you will take possession of it in my name for his majesty’.550   
 Mendoza’s predicament was not unusual. The Spanish crown underpaid its officials 
both because the royal purse could not afford to pay them higher salaries (which also 
explains why it preferred to use wealthy noblemen for the more financially onerous but 
glorious occupations in the first place) and because there was an expectation that ‘an 
official with a small salary would work all the harder in the hope of eventual mercedes and 
rewards’.551 From the start Mendoza sought to enrich himself and his allies. Mendoza’s 
household accounts have not been located but he seems to have increased his wealth very 
rapidly. The viceroy’s most important source of wealth came from the various and well 
known entrepreneurial activities that he engaged in.552 By 1542 he had privately funded an 
expedition led by Niza, had become the largest contributor to Coronado’s expedition, lent 
Alvarado funds in 1541 and had still been able to spend between 20,000d and 30,000d of his 
own resources for the campaign against the rebellious Caxcanes and Zacatecos in New 
Galicia.553 His increasing strength in New Spain confirmed and enhanced his reputation at 
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court as the most reliable and effective conduit for royal authority and matters of 
exploration or military activity. 
The ‘second theatre’, in Spain, was decisive for the viceroy’s ambitions but was more 
difficult to control or predict than that in New Spain. In early 1537 the crown sent the 
licenciate Pérez de la Torre to arrest Guzmán and conduct his residencia. This undermined 
the viceroy’s first attempt at gaining influence over New Galicia, which he had been 
attempting to accomplish by allying himself with Guzmán who was in a precarious position 
and needed the viceroy’s support. As an illustration of the viceroy’s impotence in the face of 
royal intervention, Pérez de la Torre burst into the viceroy’s palace, where Mendoza had 
been protecting and honouring Guzmán, his one-time fellow courtier, and threw the 
governor in jail despite Mendoza’s complaints.554 Without even consulting the viceroy, 
moreover, the crown had granted Pérez de la Torre the governorship of New Galicia where 
he took his large household and retinue. New Galicia, the key province for the promising 
north-western exploration, had passed from the control of a weakened potential ally to a 
fully authorised new intimate representative of a faction at the Spanish court that was not 
Mendoza’s own. As Guzmán noted bitterly from prison, it was no coincidence that Pérez de 
la Torre was from Extremadura, like his enemies Cortés and Fuenleal, whom Guzmán 
considered to be responsible for orchestrating every coup against him.555 
In his letter of December 1537, Mendoza openly asked the king to grant him the right 
to explore Cíbola, in an attempt to pre-empt Pérez de la Torre in the eyes of the court. A 
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letter, however, was not enough to represent the viceroy given the urgency of the situation 
so it was accompanied by Mendoza’s own intimate representative, Juan de Aguilar who 
would ‘explain in person’.556 Effective representation at court was an essential element of 
the stability of the viceroy’s authority. This practice continued to hold with Velasco who 
sent and paid his criado Salvago de Guzmán explicitly for the same purpose.557 These 
‘intimate representatives’ can be considered as the ambassadors of the viceroys in Spain, 
those other settlers, Indians or magnates who could not afford them were at a severe 
disadvantage in presenting their case.   
Aguilar in particular was crucial for the court’s acceptance of Mendoza’s bid for 
supremacy over exploration. Aguilar successfully negotiated for Coronado, the viceroy’s 
close friend, to be appointed as visitador to New Galicia, with powers to suspend de la 
Torre’s administration and conduct a residencia of the governor’s tenure. The royal cédula 
was promulgated on the 18 April 1539 after de la Torre’s death, by which point Mendoza 
had already managed to convert Coronado into a magnate by giving him the governorship of 
New Galicia with eleven encomiendas to support him, a decision that the crown would also 
ratify retrospectively.558 It is also highly likely that the negotiations that led to the contract 
between Alvarado and Mendoza in 1541 began at this time in Valladolid during the spring of 
1538 between Aguilar and Alvarado, under the auspices of Cobos (with whom Alvarado had 
associated himself dynastically and economically like the viceroy) and the Council of the 
Indies. When Alvarado received his new capitulación of 16th April 1538 they already 
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included the provision that Mendoza might participate with one third of any expedition 
Alvarado wished to engage in. Hernán Cortés would be excluded from further exploration 
despite his titles and offices. 
By late summer 1539 Mendoza felt secure enough in his power within New Spain and 
in the support of the crown to challenge Cortés directly. On the 24 August 1539, presumably 
very soon after hearing that fr. Marcos de Niza had returned with promising news,559 
Mendoza ordered that all ships and crews leaving and entering any port along the Pacific 
Coast should be ‘inspected’ by his chosen representatives, which effectively gave the 
viceroy’s men the right to sequester the marquess’ vessels. Over the next year his agents 
sequestered the returning ships as they docked along the coastline of New Galicia he now 
controlled, much as Nuño de Guzmán had done in the early 1530s, and arrested their crews, 
according to Cortés even torturing some of them for information. Soon after, Mendoza also 
sent his men to seize Cortés’ docks at Tehuantepec. On the 4th of September, the viceroy, 
supported by the audiencia, refused Cortés permission to send a ship with 30 men to rescue 
Francisco de Ulloa. Legally these actions were debatable to the extent that the crown would 
overturn them later. But by then it was too late for Cortés to dislodge Mendoza’s position in 
order to regain the initiative in exploration. 
Mendoza’s confrontation with Cortés had been the most obvious result of the unclear 
boundaries of authority within the Spanish administration, perhaps because for once there 
could be no accommodation. López de Gómara commented on the dilemma: ‘Cortés and 
Don Antonio de Mendoza quarrelled bitterly over the expedition to Cíbola, each claiming it 
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as his own by the emperor’s order: Don Antonio as viceroy, Cortés as Captain General. They 
exchanged such words that they were never reconciled, although they had been close 
friends.’560 During the urgent struggle to enforce competing rights to exploration, 
Mendoza’s immediate practical power in Mexico City was decisive. Cortés could only try to 
recreate his own and Alvarado’s past success at court by presenting himself there directly. 
Within months, Alvarado’s fleet was due to sail up the Pacific to New Galicia. Mendoza 
decided to visit Michoacán and New Galicia ostensibly to see off the expeditions of his 
household companions Coronado and maestresala Hernando de Alarcón; but also, almost 
certainly, to wait on the shores of the Pacific to finalise the arrangements with Alvarado in 
person. In its combination of legalistic language and chivalric ceremony the contract 
between Mendoza and Alvarado exemplifies the complementary dual facets of the 
signatories as both servants of the crown and patrimonial magnates in their own right. 
Preliminary negotiations were established in New Spain for the viceroy through his most 
trusted ‘intimate representative’ mayordomo mayor Guerrero and one of the viceroy’s 
closest allies, Don Luis de Castilla, both of whom went to meet Alvarado at the coast. In late 
November 1540, the viceroy and the governor met in the town of Tiripitío, Michoacán, the 
encomienda of Pedro de Alvarado’s nephew Juan de Alvarado, to finalise and sign the 
compact. They would cooperate in all future exploration, including the much desired 
navigation to the ‘Spice Isles’ and of course in the conquest of Cíbola, sharing the costs and 
the benefits by halves and excluding all others from participating without their mutual 
consent. To that end Acapulco would have the monopoly as the point of entry and 
departure of any ship; the official dry-docks would be in Alvarado’s province of Guatemala. 
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The captains of the present expeditions would be Alvarado on the one hand, while the 
viceroy’s grandest and most trusted household appointees like Coronado, Alarcón and 
Tristán de Luna y Arellano would be given their chance of glory by leading the search for 
Cíbola on the other. Indigenous noblemen that had become beneficiaries and associates of 
Mendoza and were presumably keen to display their services further, were given the 
opportunity to participate voluntarily in the expedition as explained by don Juan Tlecanen, 
the commander of the self-proclaimed Mexica conquistadores of Cíbola; they provided most 
of the manpower.561 The rest was made up of the many new arrivals that depended on 
viceregal largess in Mexico City. In a reproduction of the courtly system of confidences that 
had promoted men like Mendoza himself, these associations provided the best possible 
hope of controlling the expedition and ensuring its loyalty at a distance; something that had 
proved difficult for patrons of exploration throughout the early expansion of the Spanish 
empire.  
 The compact was in the name of the king and was finalised before his appointed 
secretaries Juan de León and Diego de Robledo, but the wording of the treaty hardly 
mentions Charles V and is remarkably patrimonial with regard to the two signatories: the 
provisions were binding on their heirs for a period of twenty years and as in the instructions 
of Niza the new lands would be claimed by the signatories personally, in the name of the 
king. In practice the arrangement was remarkably ambitious. It established that all future 
Spanish exploration of the Pacific would have to be mediated through Alvarado and 
Mendoza. The final act in the compact reveals most clearly the spirit in which it was made: 
before their brother knight of Santiago, don Luis de Castilla, who administered the oath, 
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Mendoza and Alvarado swore to uphold the coalition using the ceremonial of their knightly 
order. Even the leading ship of the expedition was named the Santiago.  The witnesses 
included familiar faces of the viceroy’s entourage like Hernán Pérez de Bocanegra as well as 
Alonso de Maldonado, Peralmíndez Chirinos and Francisco de Marroquín, bishop of 
Guatemala.562 In a royal cédula dated 26th of July 1541 the crown ratified the compact 
retrospectively, with only minor alterations: the Spanish court considered these two men 
the most trustworthy partners for the crown in the expansion of Habsburg dominion in 
northern America, the Pacific and Asia, and were willing to grant them and their heirs the 
concomitant rewards for the risks they were undertaking in the service of the crown.563  
By the time the cédula was ratified in Spain, however, Don Pedro de Alvarado had 
become the most famous casualty of the Mixtón war.564 With Cortés and other claimants to 
rights of exploration stuck in Spain and the Montejos bogged down in Yucatán, Mendoza 
became more dominant than ever before. In Spain, Cortés, Nuño de Guzmán, and even 
Hernando de Soto, along with representatives from Alvarado, tried to stake their own legal 
claim to Cíbola. The official reply in May and July invented the legal fiction that Mendoza 
had commissioned all the voyages of exploration and that anyway it all belonged to the king. 
Furthermore Cíbola was not in any of their jurisdictions: effectively the crown backed 
Mendoza.565 Alvarado died without leaving an undisputed male heir and Mendoza, who 
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already controlled New Galicia, immediately tried to make his authority felt in Guatemala, 
appointing as governor Francisco de La Cueva and then the oidor Alonso Maldonado in 
March 1542, after the citizens of Guatemala had only half obeyed his instruction and 
appointed as co-governors Alvarado’s widow Beatriz de la Cueva herself and then bishop 
Marroquín to try to defend their autonomy. However, even when in May 1544 the 
Audiencia de los Confines was created by royal order, Maldonado remained its president. 
Meanwhile Maldonado had married the ageing Montejo’s only legitimate daughter, closing 
another circle of dynastic alliances that bound Yucatán into the viceroy’s web of dynastic 
alliances. No other viceroy would be able to concentrate so much unchallenged power to 
determine appointments, conduct exploration and political matters over the whole territory 
claimed under New Spain as Mendoza did between 1541 and 1544. There was no other 
magnate to compete with the viceroy’s authority or resources in New Spain. The legacy of 
Mendoza’s victory would be that all subsequent viceroys added the title of Captain General 
of New Spain to their other honours.  
At this juncture Francisco, the viceroy’s son, came from Spain to share his father’s 
responsibilities in preparation for his planned succession to the viceroyalty. However, 
Francisco, later known in Spain as el indio, would never inherit the title of viceroy or be 
given any formal responsibilities in the Americas after his return to Spain in 1552. It is 
important to note that this developed out of patrimonial interests and the accident of 
political competition rather than any bureaucratic design. The viceroy’s political triumph in 
New Spain coincided with changes at court in Spain that, combined with the disappointment 
of the actual expeditions to Cíbola, led to concerns about the benefits of Mendoza’s 
unchallenged power to the interests of the crown. 
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Changes at court in Spain beyond the viceroy’s control had a determinant impact on 
how his activities were perceived. Queen Isabella, often Charles V’s regent, who had 
expressed such personal confidence in Mendoza and animosity towards Cortés, died in 
1540.566 That same year, Cortés returned to Spain seeking revenge against Mendoza. He 
followed the itinerant court, dispensed largesse to members of the council and gained some 
access to prince Philip’s circle, which, thanks to Hernán’s efforts came to include his young 
son and heir Martín.567 Most importantly, the hegemony of Cobos began to decline after 
1543 when prince Philip was made regent of Spain with Gonzalo Pérez as his favourite, 
bringing new preferences to the court and new subjective criteria for judging the actions of 
the crown’s representatives.568 Even the appointment of Mendoza’s brother to preside over 
the Council of the Indies may have been a qualified advantage as the two had quarrelled in 
the past over their father’s affections and then his inheritance, with don Luis de Mendoza 
even gossiping that his brother’s great height must have been the result of illegitimate 
birth.569  
Unfortunately for Mendoza this change at court coincided with devastating news 
regarding of his ventures of exploration. Cíbola turned out to be an illusion which 
discredited Coronado, and the viceroy by association. Many of the resources originally 
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allocated to exploration had to be diverted to fighting the Mixtón rebels, delaying the 
search for access to Asia and the Philippines. The maritime expeditions that took place along 
the coast of California and to the Philippines were remarkable nautical feats that produced 
few tangible results, especially as the latter failed to find a means of returning to New Spain 
across the Pacific and led to embarrassing conflicts with the Portuguese. All of these were 
viewed by the less sympathetic court as the ills and ‘inconveniences’ of Mendoza’s 
uncontested power. The viceroy and his regime began to lose credibility.   
At the same time the moral self-questioning of the Spanish imperial mission that Las 
Casas had reignited made the ambitions of freelance conquerors and explorers increasingly 
suspect to the new sensibilities of the crown. Mendoza’s successful repression of the Mixtón 
rebels and the association of the rebellion with Coronado’s expedition were not seen in the 
favourable light in which past conquests had been regarded. In this context the New Laws 
were to be promulgated by specially commissioned judges: under Cortés’ recommendation 
and promotion, the crown sent visitador Francisco Tello de Sandoval with full powers to 
investigate Mendoza’s administration.   
In Spain ‘…When one wanted to overthrow a valido or a patron, he was accused of 
corruption, and the monarch was incited into organising a visita of the body controlled by 
said person… The true purpose of visitas was not to cure the administration, as we might 
say nowadays, but to change the group holding government power.’570 In New Spain, 
visiting judges like Tello de Sandoval or Valderrama in the case of Velasco, were particularly 
effective because they acted like lightning rods for discontent and offered a chance for the 
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opportunistic advancement of individuals. They represented direct and accessible royal 
justice, unimpeded by any established power-structures in situ. Tello de Sandoval 
occasioned a political crisis in Mendoza’s administration because the mere action of 
investigating Mendoza showed royal displeasure and dishonoured the viceroy, undermining 
his authority.571 Royal officials like Sosa and Albornoz and most seriously the audiencia no 
longer uniformly cooperated with Mendoza: ‘because that black ambition to command 
meant that each oidor wished to be the most powerful and they devoted themselves to 
gaining friends rather than dispensing justice. Then there began discords amongst them that 
survive to this day.’572  
Mendoza’s network of representatives at court still included Aguilar and Rodrigo Arias 
Mansilla who had gone from Mexico years previously. They were now joined by Agustín 
Guerrero as the viceroy’s most recent attorney, sent specifically in the wake of this crisis.573 
There they were supported by the viceroy’s brothers, in particular Luis and a nephew, who 
now rallied around their dynastic honour. They managed to have Tello de Sandoval recalled 
and discredited and his accusations were thrown out before they came to trial. Mendoza re-
established his authority in Mexico City, whose friars, residents and officials supported his 
campaign to have Francisco succeed him as viceroy. However, Mendoza never again 
convinced the crown that his personal style of government and the power he had 
accumulated suited its interests. Coronado was deposed from his governorship and the title 
suppressed. An audiencia was appointed instead by the crown in 1548 and the precedent, 
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whereby the viceroy in Mexico City appointed the highest authorities of New Galicia, was 
undone. The same held true for Alvarado’s governorship in Guatemala.  
In a strange parallel to Cortés a last opportunity of glory arose when news of Gonzalo 
Pizarro’s initially successful rebellion in Peru gave the viceroy the prospect of organising a 
large and well equipped expedition under the command of his son. Even before it set sail, 
however, news came of Pizarro’s defeat and the Mendozas of New Spain were denied their 
chance of being hailed as the saviours of royal authority in Peru. Finally Mendoza was 
appointed to govern Peru instead. Despite effectively governing New Spain for most of 1549 
his son Francisco would not inherit the viceroyalty or ever again be granted authority in the 
Americas. Mendoza’s older brother Luis was forced to warn the viceroy to stop promoting 
the idea of a hereditary viceroyalty because it was believed in Spain that he wanted to rise 
up with the land against the crown. He urged him to make the journey to Peru ‘even if only 
your bones get there’ for the sake of the Mendoza family honour.574 The notion of the 
viceroy as only a servant of the crown rather than an autonomous dynastic junior partner in 
the manner of a titled lord reasserted itself in 1550: political accident, not bureaucratic 
intention that provoked it. Ironically the crown would not have found it so easy to impose 
its new doctrine if Mendoza had not tamed the magnates in the first place. 
The failure of the Mendozan patrimonial project contributed to the decline of 
traditional, royally-sanctioned lordship as the aim that the Spanish settlers of New Spain 
sought. The crown’s reaction to Mendoza’s concentration of power and the perceived 
causes of Spanish abuses towards the native population, was to try to emphasise the 
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absolute supremacy of the crown by limiting the agency and practice of government 
through magnates as patrons in their own right, in favour of authorising salaried officials 
and judges with no other patron than the crown.575 Concomitant changes were taking place 
at court in Spain where individual patrons no longer aspired to exert control over and 
benefit from the Spanish expansion in the Americas through their courtly networks of 
patronage like Fonseca and Cobos had done. After 1550 the rents that the Cobos family had 
enjoyed from the royal hacienda in Mexico were taken away by royal decree.576 
Nevertheless the viceregal title, with all its ambiguities, was not supplanted. Velasco 
was chosen like Mendoza because he was a trusted and successful nobleman-courtier rather 
than a bureaucrat or expert; and he travelled to New Spain with a large household in the 
manner of the great magnate he also considered himself to be. Although the expression of 
power in New Spain became less lordly, it remained patrimonial: Velasco’s ambitions and 
the logic he had to follow to exercise his power within New Spain meant that in practice his 
regime continued to combine his patrimonial and patronal interests with the discharge of 
his duties. 
Velasco did not have to compete with magnates who combined both the degree of 
power in New Spain and the networks of support in Spain that Mendoza faced, until the end 
of his tenure. Only the marquesado remained an enormous centre of alternative patronage 
beyond Velasco’s immediate control. The marquess was in Spain but the viceroy was 
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concerned enough to recommend to Philip II that the estate be deprived of the strategically 
sensitive possessions in Tehuantepec, Oaxaca and Cuilapa in 1554 and again in 1560.577  
Mendoza’s qualified success in monopolising exploration by 1542 established a norm 
and an ambition for subsequent viceroys, embodied in the addition of the title of Captain-
General for Velasco to the other titles that Mendoza had also possessed. As importantly 
Velasco found it easier to access the funds of the royal treasury to finance his expeditions. In 
early 1564 Valderrama complained, for instance, that the planned expedition to the 
Philippines had taken seven years to plan with a cost of over 350,000d  even before setting 
sail ‘It seems that money is spent with no purpose’.578 All of this would still redound to 
Velasco’s favour in New Spain as the organiser of the expedition and the patron responsible 
for the monetary distribution implicit in its funding, as well as the appointments of its 
leaders.  
On the other hand Mendoza’s centralisation of power and patrimonial attitude to his 
office had also frightened the crown and prompted it to separate New Galicia and 
Guatemala from viceregal control through the appointment of autonomous governors and 
other officials there. New audiencias were established in those provinces to replace the 
governors that Mendoza had appointed. Authority over the outlying provinces of greater 
New Spain, which were the natural bases for exploration or military campaigns, was once 
again fractured and disputed.  
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Velasco inherited the notion of launching expeditions to Florida and the Philippines 
from Mendoza as well as the drive to exploit and pacify the untamed north-west frontier. 
This last became particularly pressing after the discovery of silver deposits at Zacatecas in 
1548 which required safe passage for settlers and provisions there and the cargoes of silver 
back. A more entrepreneurial than lordly illusion of Cíbola remained in the search for the 
rich silver mines of the etymologically related Copala. Velasco had to compete for control of 
this on-going military and colonising venture with the enthusiasm of Spanish entrepreneurs 
eager to explore and exploit new deposits further north in the ‘Chichimeca frontier’ and 
with the authorities of New Galicia.  
Silver remittances to Spain and the royal fifth were increasingly appreciated by the 
bankrupt Spanish crown and the most successful miners were rapidly becoming the 
wealthiest men in New Spain. The most profitable mines had been discovered to the north 
of New Galicia and the mountains there promised even more silver, giving the frontier a 
renewed importance. The various semi-nomadic indigenous peoples in this ‘chichimeca’ 
frontier resisted the encroachments of the Spaniards and profited by raiding their convoys 
as they marched to and from the isolated mining settlements. Both the viceroy and the 
audiencia of New Galicia vied to pacify the land in order to exert some control over it. 
Despite the viceroy’s capacity as Captain-General, both the audiencia of Mexico City and 
that of New Galicia had organised their own expeditions to the area, in the case of New 
Galicia at one point in alliance with Juan de Sámano, steward of the marquesado, and with 
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the visiting judge Pedro de Morones.579 This exacerbated previous tensions between the 
viceroy and the audiencia over conflicting rights to appoint offices in New Galica.580 
Ibarra capital funded the expeditions of Francisco de Ibarra, a page at the viceregal 
court since 1550, to search for Copala while the viceroy provided the necessary political 
legitimacy and support to establish his governorship over what the viceroy designated as a 
separate kingdom of New Vizcaya, to the fury of the authorities in New Galicia who claimed 
the territory as their own.581 The success of this venture allowed the viceroy to reclaim 
authority over expeditions to the chchimeca frontier. It also provided an opportunity for 
Velasco to recreate the political control that Mendoza had been able to assert over New 
Galicia with the elevation of Coronado by creating a governorship for Francisco de Ibarra. All 
of this enhanced Velasco’s authority in the eyes of the settlers of New Galicia who were not 
all convinced partisans of their audiencia.  
Velasco’s control of the legitimising organs in Mexico City, where many of the silver-
miners chose to live, was essential for authority over northern exploration. It allowed 
Velasco for example to dispatch visitas, such as that conducted by Lebrón de Quiñones, to 
try to intimidate the authorities of New Galicia in 1554. Control of New Galicia and the 
North-West remained important. Part of the political reorganisation of New Spain that 
Martín Cortés proposed to the king involved the recommendation that the expensive and 
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querulous audiencia of New Galicia should be eliminated in favour of appointing Martín 
Cortés ‘el mestizo’ as governor ‘for being an old criado of your majesty’s and his father’s son 
and my brother’.582 The struggles for territorial control of the area nominally claimed as 
New Spain continued under different guises through the wars of independence at least into 
independent Mexico’s disputes between centralisers and federalists. In our period they 
resulted in hardening relations of power between the many officials that shared parallel 
authority from the crown. 
Conclusion 
Viceroyalties under the Habsburgs would never become hereditary as Mendoza 
hoped. The more important legacy for the continuity of viceregal authority was not 
patrimonial or institutional aggrandisement of their offices, but came instead from the 
direct relationship that both viceroys established towards key elements of the indigenous 
elite as well as the preponderance of both viceroys’ family and closest allies who fused and 
were promoted to the top of New Spain’s Spanish society over this period. The 
interrelations between these elites and viceregal power sustained the viceroys’ legacy and 
entrenched the principle of viceregal supremacy, particularly in the turbulent years after 
Velasco’s death. Velasco’s more subtle methods of self-presentation, more in tune with the 
ethos of his times, brought him closer to achieving the aim of perpetuating his dynasty’s 
success than Mendoza: Velasco died in Mexico City and his son returned to govern New 
Spain on two separate occasions before he was finally rewarded for his services with a 
coveted marquessate in Spain at the end of his life in 1617. Less than a year earlier, 
however, Philip III granted the first title to a criollo in Mexico: the Count of Santiago de 
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Calimaya who carried both Mendoza and Velasco blood, as well as descending from don Luis 
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Chapter 7: ‘Another Jerusalem’ 
New Spain’s inhabitants, natives and newcomers alike, were addicted to political 
debate throughout our period. ‘This is true of people in every station,’ Mendoza wrote to 
his successor in 1550, ´that they have an opinion about issues that are not their own rather 
than their own business. But above all they concern themselves with the government of the 
land. They especially love to change and judge everything that is done in it… Everyone is 
from somewhere different and they want to have this land governed according to the 
tradition of their own land and nation’. He went on to explain, that this concern with politics 
was a reflection of practical competition for advantage within New Spain: ‘their only criteria 
are their own aims and their own interests and ideas’. Nor could his successor expect to be 
able to dictate matters to them easily: ‘But if ever those in charge try to contradict them or 
explain otherwise, they immediately complain, call him arrogant etc. and say his plans will 
end in doom.’584 
Contrary to the accepted view of New Spain, the indigenous and Spanish elites 
including the viceroy, the visitadores and other administrators, felt that they were free 
participants in shaping political arrangements, not unreflective bureaucrats or impassive 
servile subjects. The crown formalised the norms encouraging the participation of its 
principal subjects in America with a cédula in 1558: ‘those who are from the Indies and live 
there… [are to] give account to our viceroys and audiencias of events and on what they 
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think should best be implemented for the good government of those lands and of the 
grievances they might know about that are committed against the Indians…’585 
The opinions expressed in this participatory debate mattered to the formulation of 
royal policy. ‘In 15 years of service’, complained Mendoza after he had been forced to leave 
New Spain for Peru in 1551, ‘the manner of government has been altered three times, each 
so different from the other that one has been opposite to the other.’586 Bernal Díaz del 
Castillo agreed: ‘in this way we go on like a lame mule from bad to worse; from one viceroy 
to another and from governor to governor.’587 In 1564 even the future of viceregal 
government was in doubt for the second time in thirty years and from then until 1568 the 
new viceroy was deposed and two audiencias governed New Spain. Royal legislation 
developed in an ad hoc manner, often in response to these debates and was consequently 
often overlapping or contradictory.588 The many changes in administrators and royal policy 
are evidence of the vitality of the political discourse and the receptivity of the royal 
audience to the participation of its American subjects. Confusion about who properly 
embodied royal authority and the consequent uncertainty as to what constituted political 
legitimacy meant that the language of debate reverted to matters of principle.   
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Language of legitimacy: Influencing policy 
Oidor Tejada wrote to the Duke of Mondéjar explaining that Tello de Sandoval’s true 
motivation was that he ‘had ill-will towards the viceroy and wanted him thrown out of his 
offices and government, and what is worse to take away his reputation by making him out 
to be a tyrant’, in the hope of taking over the government of New Spain himself.589 Linguistic 
codes were adopted as rhetorical devices designed to affect royal policy in favour of a 
particular agenda.  Themes of liberty, tyranny, suffering and civic service became the most 
common rhetorical ideals used to underscore particular arguments. The way in which they 
were used illustrates the benchmarks of the common ‘language of legitimacy’ of New Spain.  
Liberty and Tyranny 
Liberty was expressed, at first glance paradoxically, in conjunction with the 
insistence by Indians and Spaniards that they were the king’s criados and loyal vasallos. 
These were reassuring statements to both the petitioner and the king. They suggested 
fidelity and the intention of acting for the good of the king. They also signified the ideal of 
direct unfettered access to the sovereign fount of legitimacy with a household familiarity 
unimpeded by intermediaries. It was a presumption that most Spanish settlers would not 
have entertained if they had stayed in Spain.590  
This liberty through proximity implied an enfranchisement that came as a result of 
royal recognition of an individual’s status as a member of the ‘small political nation’ who 
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had the king’s ear and his confidence in council. 591 Jerónimo López was proud that the king 
had asked for his advice: ‘continuing the command your majesty gave me, to always write to 
your majesty from these parts and to inform your majesty of whatever I deemed convenient 
for the royal service of your majesty that you should be informed.’592 In 1562, royal officials 
hoped that the king would read their letters and answer them because: ‘as faithful criados 
of your majesty we wish to accomplish correctly your royal will in everything.’593 Díaz del 
Castillo hoped that his insistence on recounting the voluntary years of suffering in service to 
the crown in conquest and administration594 demonstrated his virtuous liberty and lent 
credence to his bluff assertions of speaking ‘muy verdaderisimamente’ (very extremely 
truthfully). In his view this virtue should also have allowed him his ‘ardent ambition to serve 
the king in your own household as a true and humble criado.’595 It is clear he did not 
necessarily expect to move to Spain and to live in the royal household, but to be considered 
as having a direct personal and vassalic connection to the king like a trusted friend and 
advisor.  
This vocabulary of liberty as enfranchisement was taken up by the indigenous lords 
to assert their autonomy and seek the king’s protection for their status. The Indian cabildo 
of Mexico-Tenochtitlan, for example, also appealed to the king as ‘the fount of our 
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protection’ and they begged him to obviate a plan to ‘take away our right to administer 
justice in our republic and give it to Spaniards… so that we would remain perpetual slaves 
deprived of our ancient and natural jurisdiction’. After the intercession of the Franciscans, 
the viceroy had intervened in their favour but they explicitly wanted to reaffirm their link 
with the king’s grace and legitimacy: ‘that the attempt to take away our administration of 
our republic should have no effect whatsoever. If there is concern over our ability [as 
administrators] then give us just laws that are necessary for the good of our republic and if 
we don’t match up to implementing them, then punish us but don’t deprive our successors 
of their lordship. And if our loyalty is in question then here and now we render homage in 
our name and that of our descendants.’596   
The various political settlements after the conquest had left many unresolved 
tensions amongst the indigenous polities and competition raged between indigenous rivals. 
In a letter composed in such fluent Latin and with such classical concepts that it could have 
been understood by Cicero as well as Charles V, don Antonio Cortés Totoquihuaztli reserved 
the most rancorous phrases to attack doña Isabel Motecuhzoma over her insistence on 
tributary rights of a region claimed by Tacuba ‘who although was of our blood and 
fatherland, nevertheless proved so alien to common humanity that instead of the  natural 
piety and love with which people of a common land are to be held, she exerted her tyranny 
(tyrannidem exercuerit) and us, who were born of famous and noble fathers, she held back 
in a place of slaves (servorum tenuerit).’597  
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Jerónimo López, does not seem to have understood Latin and he felt threatened by 
the greater enfranchisement that indigenous education afforded them; he felt it bred in 
them a new self-confidence and even arrogance towards the Spaniards that was 
dangerous598. López noted that since the promulgation of the New Laws ‘which they have 
translated in their own tongue’ the indigenous lords had felt vindicated in their attacks on 
the encomenderos because it seemed that even the king did not recognise their claims: ‘[the 
friars] tell them that they are so free that even if they rebel the king will not enslave them. 
All the towns now come and complain about their encomenderos and bring suits against 
those who they used to see as fathers and now see as enemies.’599 López believed that the 
natural order in New Spain would have been to follow the precedent of Mexica lordship 
over Mesoamerica with the conquistadores as the heirs to Motecuhzoma’s lords. Instead 
their legitimacy was undermined by the friars who exposed them: ‘they used to 
acknowledge [that the Spaniards were lords] and they did so because that had been their 
custom but they were told by the friars that we were not lords but macehuales, which 
means common people and that the lords remained in Spain.’600 Worse still, by teaching 
them Latin some Indians had learnt about the Spaniards’ own pagan past and their 
submission to the Romans but ‘that we were converted to Christianity and rose in arms and 
rebelled’ against the unrighteous Romans. Indigenous knowledge of Spanish alerted them to 
the wars in Europe the petty squabbles and unrighteousness of the Spaniards.601 This 
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subversion of natural order in New Spain, caused by undermining of the Spanish elite, López 
argued, made the land difficult to govern and posed a threat of rebellion. 
Many debates in this period related in practice to competition for local authority 
between indigenous lords and Spanish settlers. The former, often in conjunction with their 
mendicant allies, became adept at presenting the illegitimate power of their Spanish rivals, 
especially the encomenderos who were ‘competitors of the provincial [indigenous] 
authorities and clergy in the pursuit of local influence’ and tribute. Indigenous depictions of 
encomenderos showed them as violent tyrants, oppressing indigenous communities 
violently or cheating them of their land: Gonzalo de Salazar for instance was named and 
depicted memorably holding the decapitated head of an Indian along with horrors 
performed by other encomenderos or their slavish, occasionally African, dependents who 
administered the collection of tribute more directly.602 The principales of Xilotepec were 
equally keen to list the names of all the Spaniards whose cattle invaded their community’s 
agricultural plots.603  
After his surrender and deportation to Spain, don Francisco Tenamaztle, a prominent 
Caxcan rebel leader of the Mixtón uprising became a cause célèbre in Spain after arriving 
during an intensification of the debate surrounding perpetual encomienda that occurred 
during the mid-1550s. In a remarkable letter co-written in Spain in 1555 by Las Casas and 
Tenamastle, the latter presented himself as a truer vassal of the king than the tyrannical 
Spanish encomenderos of New Galicia like the much lionised Cristóbal de Oñate and Miguel 
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de Ibarra. Tenamastle admitted he had risen in arms against bullies and tyrants but: ‘This 
natural act of fleeing and defending oneself… the Spaniards call and have always called, 
abusing such language throughout the Indies, ‘rising against the king’’.604 The implication 
was that while Tenamastle’s actions were natural, those of the encomenderos were a 
tyrannical offence against royal justice even when they used force to suppress the rebellion. 
The assertions of liberty that led to the enfranchisement of the Indians were 
dangerous to the interests of encomenderos like López because many of the justifications 
for subjecting them had to do with their unrighteousness and, specifically, the supposed 
offences against natural law that deprived them of its protection. To try to undermine their 
claims, the Indians were constantly accused of sensual slavishness; the lack of rational self-
discipline had long formed part of the accepted flaws of the barbarian or the tyrant and 
consequently excluded both from the protection of the law.  
It is in this context of competition for legitimacy that the many accusations of 
drunkenness, listlessness, laziness, heterosexual and homosexual lasciviousness levelled 
against the Indians should be interpreted.605 These moral flaws also lent credence to 
Spanish accusations that the indigenous lords tyrannised and abused their vassals and that it 
was only because their mendicant allies profited from this that they defended them. This 
became the main theme that Valderrama developed during his three years as visitador: for 
example ‘most of the lands that the principales hold are usurped… and because the 
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principals were stronger and were favoured by the friars they usurped many [more] 
lands’.606  
Status-linked liberty was nervously defended and invoked in the political debates of 
New Spain. Mendoza warned his successor that ‘the Spaniards [in Mexico] are docile and 
eager to please their governors so long as they are treated respectfully.’607 Fifteen years 
later, Suárez de Peralta believed that one reason why Martín Cortés lost the support of the 
inhabitants of New Spain was that he did not treat them as equals.608  
The prominence of concepts of liberty meant that they were often appealed to for 
political motives. Vázquez de Tapia had been instrumental in discrediting Cortés as a tyrant 
during a judicial proceeding in the early 1520s.609 In 1544, he felt aggrieved because 
Mendoza had not granted him the rewards that he considered that he merited, in particular 
a licence to donate his encomienda to a mestiza daughter as her dowry, whereas the viceroy 
had allowed this in the case of Juan Guerrero’s wife. He also objected to the viceroy’s 
degradation of the autonomous authority of the cabildo of Mexico City, the political arena 
that Vázquez de Tapia had devoted himself to and dominated for over a decade, and which 
provided him with his social prestige and political influence.610 In short, Vázquez de Tapia 
felt excluded and harassed by the viceregal regime despite his wealth, nobility and 
prominence in Mexico City. Neither he nor his closest allies had gained the viceroy’s favour 
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and relative to those others, who were mostly not even conquistadores like himself, he had 
not benefitted from the administration or seemed to have many prospects of prospering in 
the future if Mendoza remained in charge. Unlike other men of similar wealth and standing, 
Vázquez de Tapia had an interest in denigrating the viceroy’s authority even if it only meant 
forcing Mendoza to redress his grievances. His best opportunity came during Tello de 
Sandoval’s visita of Mendoza’s administration. 
Visitas of the viceregal regime became the most obvious crucibles of legitimacy 
because they brought a cheaper and more direct representation of Spain’s royal judgement 
face to face with the internal logic of the internal political arrangements of New Spain.  The 
visitas were launched from Spain and acted as agencies of political reform and a means of 
judicial supervision by the distant monarchy.611 Simultaneously they provided a forum for 
the inhabitants of New Spain to present their political projects, criticise the viceregal regime 
or support it, and undermine rivals or support allies within New Spain. As such the visitas 
combined a discussion between the viceregal regime and the crown with internal debates 
about political arrangements that had developed within New Spain and competition for 
status. They provide the most accessible evidence of the beliefs, rhetorical norms and 
political divisions of the period.   
Criticism of the viceroys during the visitas aimed at disqualifying them from the right 
to hold their office by demonstrating their unworthiness for such responsibilities, or merely 
to exert pressure on the viceroys to recognise the particular claims or their accusers. As 
Mendoza warned his successor, accusations of ‘arrogance’ were used to undermine the 
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viceroy’s political arrangements. ‘Arrogance’, was the fundamental attribute of the 
‘tyrannical man’ from classical notions of hubris to the biblical unrighteousness of self-
regarding rebels from Lucifer to Absalom. Tyranny was the hallowed expression for the 
antithesis to legitimate power and consequently a form of rebellion against the king and his 
justice. The first consequence of tyranny was the destruction of the liberty and therefore 
the virtue and consequently the worth as royal servants of those subjected to the tyrant’s 
whim. Tyranny acquired particular resonance in political discourse because it played on the 
crown’s fear of losing control of New Spain and secondly because it was a means of 
invalidating not only the legitimacy of the accused but also, by association, all of his political 
arrangements. These last could include, by association, the royal legislation that the viceroys 
had promoted or implemented. Attacking the viceroys became a useful foil for political 
objectives within New Spain and as a means of criticising royal legislation without seeming 
disloyal to the crown: presenting themselves instead as truly worthy free men willing to 
stand up to the threats of tyrants in service of the king. By pointing out the faults in 
viceregal government, aggrieved parties that had been excluded from viceregal favour could 
hope to stake a claim to the rewards that had been denied them or even to reverse or 
modify structures of power or royal commands.  
In a prologue to his testimony to Tello de Sandoval, Vázquez de Tapia summarised 
the link between what he wished to portray as Mendoza’s tyrannous excesses and how they 
suffocated the liberties of the inhabitants of New Spain to the detriment of the king’s ability 
to govern.612 He began with the notion that New Spain’s remoteness from Spain was a 
negative attribute ‘because your majesty is in lands that are so different and distant from 
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this one, the people who govern are absolute lords’. Distance kept her inhabitants from 
recourse to the safety of true royal grace and absolved her masters from the need to worry 
about upholding royal justice: Power, absolved from grace and justice, led, according to 
humanist aetiology, to tyrannous abuses, particularly if the individual was morally corrupt. 
‘[A]nd they cause grievances to the citizens (vecinos) and because the remedy is so distant, 
the citizens suffer it and don’t dare to complain, if they did, having already received a 
grievance or bad deed they would then [by complaining] receive many others’. I have 
translated the term ‘vecino’ as ‘citizen’ because it signified the participation of ‘free men’ in 
the vocabulary of the municipal entities that composed the basic blocks of Iberian political 
organisation:613 free men who should have been protected from tyrannous abuses by royal 
justice and allowed to participate freely in the political nation. Instead these citizens were 
reduced to the condition of dependence on the whim and caprice of the passions of the 
viceroy and oidores:  ‘…And because they have so much power, if one of those that govern 
has a particular hatred or indignation against a citizen, he can destroy him under the 
pretence of doing justice and this is a great charge on the conscience of your majesty…’ 
Terms like ‘hatred (odio)’ and ‘indignation (indignación)’ aimed to imply that the viceroy was 
morally corrupt because he was himself a slave to his passions and self-love where a 
governor should be ‘serene’ and rational to be truly free and trustworthy. A viceroy should 
represent the will of the king rather than his own wilfulness.  
Fear of such inherently unjust irrationality in those that held ‘absolute’ power drove 
the citizens down the well-known progression from dependence to fearful slavishness: 
‘There is no-one who doesn’t fear speaking out against [the governors] to avoid making 
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them angry, so your majesty can guess who will dare testify or tell the truth in something 
that will prejudice them.’ Self-censorship, caused by fear of retribution was yet another 
recognised template that indicated the loss of liberty: an un-free individual’s words and 
actions were no longer trustworthy because they were conditioned by his emotion of fear at 
the retribution of his master and he consequently lost the virtue that justified his 
participation as a citizen. Vázquez de Tapia and others were careful to point out that they 
had only testified after much fearful soul-searching and guarantees from the visitador. The 
implication was that the king’s attempts at finding the truth or guaranteeing justice through 
his visitas or any other means would not prosper unless the ‘tyrants’ were removed from 
office first.  
By extension, the king could not govern New Spain justly if he relied on ‘tyrants’ to 
administer it. However, ‘they have many tools with which to [oppress the citizens] as a 
result of the ordinances regarding those that have Indians in encomienda or who have 
mines and other enterprises.’ Vázquez de Tapia could not place all the blame on the viceroy 
because he was not the author of the hated royal legislation against encomienda. These had 
been promulgated along with Tello de Sandoval’s visita and were another target of settler 
opposition. By associating the viceroy with tyrannical use of bad laws he hoped to discredit 
both in the eyes of the king and thus influence royal policy.  
Corruption was the final confirmation of the viceroy’s unreliability as a royal 
representative because it demonstrated once again the supremacy of his personal ambition 
over royal justice and true service to the king: ‘Furthermore those that are his friends he 
favours and makes rich as is public and well known.’ The enrichment of officials was 
generally accepted in Spain, but the implication of corruption in these allegations made 
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obvious the allegation that the viceroy served personal interests rather than those of the 
commonwealth or the crown. In other words his promotion of trusted associates was not 
beneficial to the king and commonwealth, in the way that royal appointments of trusted 
courtiers could be, but only to Mendoza.  
The vast majority of the 117 questions Tello de Sandoval posed to each one of his 
witnesses attempt to establish tyrannous or corrupt attributes that could be pegged to the 
the viceroy and the oidores. These included unjustified favouritism towards certain 
individuals, their self-interest and their unwillingness to implement royal instructions and 
legislation.614 Apart from discrediting the viceroy the hostile witnesses could use the 
opportunity to name and disqualify those individuals on whom the viceroy had bestowed 
the greatest favour.615 They were portrayed as unworthy in different respects: in relation to 
the requirements for office and rewards stipulated in royal legislation, (such as not being 
married or being too young or too recently arrived); for cruelty to their charges; for violence 
towards other Spaniards or abuse of their women; for slavish subservience to the viceroy 
rather than the true service of the king.  
Spaniards in New Spain were particularly vulnerable to accusations of unworthy 
dependence on the viceroy because so many of the offices depended on his gift; many of 
the more favoured individuals formed part of the viceroy’s family or household; and as time 
passed an increasing number of Spaniards subsisted direct disbursements arranged by the 
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viceroys.616 Terms such as criado, allegado, paniaguado, vassallo, deudo or even privado 
and amigo were avoided by the inhabitants of New Spain when they described themselves - 
except in relation to the king - but they were ubiquitous as terms of discredit in attacks on 
the integrity and legitimacy of rivals.617   
The most impressively successful construction of an image of rebellious tyranny in 
this period, however, was drawn from the flimsy evidence that served to condemn Martín 
Cortés of conspiracy to overthrow the king and make himself lord of Mexico. The inevitable 
link between tyrants and their of dependents led to a frenzied persecution that 
encompassed increasing numbers of Spaniards once the investigation fell into the hands of 
newly arrived judges from Spain. The new and inexperienced oidores believed more in the 
image that had been projected of rebellion than they understood of more immediate 
factional goals of the original accusers.618 Soon Velasco’s faction needed to defend 
themselves from associations to the ‘rebels’ that new judges unfamiliar with the coded 
rhetoric and factional rivalry of New Spain thought they had unearthed.619 Even viceroy 
Gastón de Peralta was accused of corruption and loyalty to the French king and deposed 
within months of taking office because he was from the marches of Navarre and had been 
lenient towards Martín Cortés620. The oppressive atmosphere prompted from Suárez de 
Peralta a description of Mexico City that echoed that of Rome after the murder of Caesar: 
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the shopkeeper Villarbeche replacing the poet Cinna as the archetype of the innocent victim 
unjustly caught up in the unmeasured repression.621  
Suffering and civil service 
Rhetorical norms dictated that suffering and victimisation were caused by unworthy 
individuals holding power or enjoying royal mercedes in the place of more worthy 
individuals. Their moral flaws led them to act in ways that perverted true royal intentions, 
which were always just, and consequently threatened the survival, prosperity or existence 
of justice in New Spain. Their unworthiness manifested itself in their behaviour and in their 
disregard for royal laws or, paradoxically, in their support of ‘misguided’ royal legislation 
that actually harmed the commonwealth and king but which they advocated because it 
benefited their own interests. This unworthiness corrupted the virtue of those subjected to 
it or provoked suffering in the virtuous or innocent. Suffering, with its connotations of 
martyrdom, heightened an individual’s merit when it was endured in the service of virtue 
and the king.  
Since Montesinos’ electrifying sermon on Hispaniola in 1511 much of the blame for 
the suffering of the Indians and the depopulation of the Americas had fallen on the brutality 
of the Spanish settlers. With time this had become an accepted commonplace and 
competition for attention at court had exaggerated the tone of the vocabulary used to 
describe indigenous suffering. In their self-representation to Spain, the indigenous lords 
found it expedient to identify with their vassals and other indigenous groups generally as 
the ‘Indians’ of Spanish rhetoric to highlight a common identity as innocent victims. They 
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apportioned the blame for their ‘destruction’ on the generic ‘Spaniards’ as well: ‘…we suffer 
everyday so many needs and we are aggrieved so much every day that soon we will be 
finished, as every day we are consumed and finished…’622   
At the height of the debate over the perpetuity of encomienda in the mid 1550s the 
indigenous lords of the polities that had constituted the old Mexica imperial alliance, who 
had lost the most from the conquest, made an urgent plea to the king. ‘we and those under 
our care need protection and succour from your majesty for the many grievances and 
molestations that we receive from the Spaniards because they live amongst us and us 
amongst them’.623 Spain’s imperial dialogue had grown accustomed to descriptions of 
extreme deprivation as a result of the tragic depopulation that had accompanied the arrival 
of Europeans and Africans in America. The assumption of Spanish vices and indigenous 
innocence influenced  many people’s understanding of New Spain and convinced Mendoza’s 
regime of the need to create two parallel ‘republics’ to protect the latter: the mention by 
these valley lords that the two populations lived intermingled was a reproach that this 
Mendozan-Zumárragan principle was being violated under Velasco’s new administration. 
Their interests lay in restricting the Spanish encomendero’s or other administrator’s rights 
and authority over their communities. 
It is indicative of the lords’ familiarity with the terms of the imperial discourse 
regarding Spanish conquests of indigenous populations generally in the Americas that they 
went on to beg the king to send Las Casas to New Spain ‘so that he can take up the role 
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being our protector’ because ‘for the remedy of our needs we have great necessity of 
someone who would be our protector and reside continually in this court’. Las Casas had 
become a pioneer and the greatest advocate of the indigenous language of victimisation. 
After Las Casas’ debates with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1551 he had become synonymous 
with opposition to secular Spanish authority in the Americas: Valderrama for instance 
attributed opposition to his planned increase in the level of tribute to ‘the doctrine they 
suckled from the bishop of Chiapas’624.  
The call for Las Casas from such prominent lords implied that the viceroy was not up 
to the task of protecting the Indians. The reproach was made at a difficult time when 
Velasco seemed to be wavering in his implementation of the New Laws or attempting to 
appease the encomenderos in other ways. There was also a clear mendicant agenda behind 
it. The last holder of the title of ‘protector of the Indians’ had been fr. Juan de Zumárraga 
from 1528 to 1530. Despite the suppression of this formal title, Zumárraga’s influence 
survived as archbishop of Mexico and as Mendoza’s close collaborator, which had obviated 
the need for the title itself. His successor, archbishop Montúfar was more ambiguous 
towards the indigenous lords and far less supportive of the mendicant orders. The conciliar 
meeting of 1555 called by Montúfar attempted to assert Episcopal authority over the 
mendicant orders following the resolutions of the Council of Trent.625 The reproach against 
Velasco could undermine his authority not least in the eyes of the crown. The pressure 
exerted by such political campaigns conducted by the indigenous lords on a range of issues, 
ranging from perpetuity of encomienda to the role of the mendicant orders and their own 
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authority, proved to be effective. Their success can be seen in that as time passed 
encomienda became more akin to a royal pension than a fief and as Valderrama noted 
repeatedly Velasco continued Mendoza’s reliance on the mendicants and the indigenous 
lords increased their power.626  
The success of indigenous presentations of their victimhood encouraged secular 
Spanish settlers to adopt a similar turn of phrase for their own purposes: Gonzalo de Salazar 
argued in favour of perpetual encomienda, by claiming that without it there would be ‘such 
discontent and so little possibility of remedying it [that it would lead to] their destruction 
and the destruction of the land…’627. Like many Spaniards he worried for the survival of the 
Spanish settlers, and the ideal-type of the starving and impoverished encomendero unable 
to sustain himself or his household became commonplace.  
The language of aggrieved victimhood was even used by royal officials from the 
viceroy down: Velasco for instance repeatedly asked to be allowed to return home to die 
because he was so poor and miserable as early as 1553. He subsequently received the 
higher salary he had been asking for and stayed in Mexico City.628 Similarly, Zorita asked to 
be relieved of his office for his alleged blindness, but this was before the opportunity arose 
to lead an expedition to the Chichimeca for which he lobbied vigorously, despite his 
apparent ailments.629 
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The tradition of displaying worth through suffering for the royal cause existed in 
Spain; but the stakes in the rhetorical tradition of New Spain became much greater as 
hardship became related to the argument that the Spaniards might be forced to abandon 
New Spain altogether if they were unable to sustain themselves. News of the promulgation 
of the New Laws prompted claims that the Spaniards would be forced to emigrate from New 
Spain or ‘kill their wives and daughters lest they go to a life of shame’ and the king ‘would 
lose New Spain to the great loss of the faith and the Crown.’630 The end of Spanish control in 
the Americas raised the stakes of suffering with all that that implied for Christianity, the 
royal conscience and the royal purse.  
Just as the indigenous lords could identify with their communities naturally in their 
self-presentation to Spain, the Spanish settlers could associate more clearly with the cause 
of royal authority in America. The assumption remained that without a Spanish population 
the Americas would not retain their loyalty to the Habsburgs. Spanish settlement and 
procreation in the Indies was a service in itself. The lack of financial support for their 
sustenance could be construed as a betrayal of the mission they were undertaking in 
America.  
The disqualification of rivals using the rhetorical devices described above was 
deployed with increasing ferocity as partisan conflicts intensified, first during the two visitas 
and then during the turmoil caused by Velasco’s death. Part of Mendoza’s defence consisted 
in painting many of his accusers as either ‘impassioned’ against him or as dependents and 
allies of Cortés who had personal interests in destroying his reputation.631 The same 
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techniques repeated themselves during Valderrama’s visita where much of the concrete 
information collected by the vistador had to do with identifying the relatives, dependents 
and allies of the viceroy who he felt had benefitted unduly, proving the corrupt arbitrariness 
of the regime.632 Velasco died before he could answer the charges, but his allies, most 
notably Hortuño de Ibarra and Fernando de Portugal did their best to discredit Valderrama, 
Martín Cortés and the governing audiencias that held power until the return of viceregal 
rule with Martín Enriquez, in the same terms633.  
Viceregal legitimacy 
The debate surrounding the nature of New Spain’s government continued unabated 
to the end of our period. Both Tello de Sandoval and Valderrama would propose the 
suppression of the viceroyalty, because the interests of the viceroys were too prone to 
distort the royal will. Sandoval advocated greater control from Spain: ‘under no 
circumstances should [indigenous] governors or caciques or principales be involved in the 
governance of their towns’; instead, they proposed that indigenous alcaldes and regidores 
would inform the local Spanish alcalde mayor de letras of every decision for his ratification. 
Furthermore these alcaldes mayores de letras would each run a ‘province’ which would 
form the basic administrative unit of New Spain and would each contain a Spanish cabecera. 
These alcaldes de letras would be ‘chosen from Castile for the said purpose and in no way 
should they come from over here’634.   
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Almost twenty years later, Valderrama would make a similar proposal and justify it 
with reference to the apparently inherent corruption surrounding the viceroy who ‘throws 
down many more roots than are good if others are to live in freedom’. The viceroys’ power 
was also to blame for ‘many inconveniences… since he is free to distribute everything there 
is to give in this kingdom. He distributes [these benefices] amongst his relatives and the 
allegados of the oidores. They depend on the viceroy every day, and depending on him, a 
man needs to be especially upright to contradict the viceroy in his presence’.635 Valderrama, 
made a point of demanding the suppression of the office of viceroy, which he saw as 
unnecessary and harmful, more openly than his predecessor. An archbishop and a letrado 
could replace the viceroy as president of the audiencia like in Granada or Valladolid, so that 
one could keep an eye on the other.636  
These accusations reflect a widening gap between Spanish and New Spanish 
perceptions of legitimacy and an ensuing mutual distrust. The defence of viceregal 
legitimacy as the guarantor of New Spain’s particular arragnements reveals the 
development of a particular self-perception and internal linguistic codes of legitimacy. 
The viceroys became associated with the political arrangements of New Spain and 
consequently their reputation and their decisions became bound up with the nature of 
government in New Spain as a whole. The viceroys could not legislate; but they could 
present their actions as representing the true royal intention: ‘The viceroy and the audiencia 
who reside in Mexico represent the person of the emperor and great monarch Charles V, 
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guiding and governing the land and administering justice.’637 Both viceroys transgressed 
certain inconvenient royal laws or directives while in office, they favoured certain 
individuals more than others and did not always adhere to the letter of the law in the 
practice of government or the distribution of rewards.638 There was nothing inherently 
illegitimate in this as long as the intention was seen to be in service of the crown: this 
attitude was extolled for example in Castiglione’s Courtier639 and forms part of the well-
known Spanish formula of ‘obeying but not implementing’ royal legislation because royal 
servants did not see themselves as rule-bound bureaucrats but participants in the political 
nation.640 The royal officials of New Spain, for instance, explained to the king that: ‘after 
having obeyed with all due reverence and acceptance, they said that there were certain 
difficulties and great inconveniences that meant that if everything in the said decrees were 
to be kept and implemented in full that the said decrees would actually redound in notable 
damage and prejudice for the royal treasury...’641  
In the opinion of many contemporaries the viceroys’ arrangements and the 
justifications behind them represented New Spain’s internal legitimising criteria and the 
viceroys themselves became associated with the sui generis, autonomist reclamation of 
New Spain. Even opponents of the viceroy like Jerónimo López defended the practice of this  
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form of autonomy: ‘there was found [during Tello de Sandoval’s visita] little memory and 
obedience of his majesty in this land or of the fulfilling of his commands; and even though I 
have come out the worst from [the implications] of this charge, I think it was wrong to make 
[the accusation] because I have always known the viceroy to be of such great rectitude and 
firmness and loyalty in the service of your majesty and with such wishes for [this land] to 
increase with all his will and his life, I have known nothing else from him.’642  
Defending the viceroy’s autonomy as the figurehead of New Spain’s political 
arrangements was often a response to unpopular royal legislation such as the denial of 
perpetual inheritable encomienda. To reconcile any ostensible discrepancy between this and 
royal service these expressions of autonomy harked back to abstract moral principles of 
‘good government’ because these transcended the letter of the law by emphasising the 
fundamental intention behind them. These appeals were designed to express the greater 
legitimacy of New Spain’s political arrangements when compared to the crown’s Spanish 
minister’s unknowing impositions. For this it relied on a vocabulary that exalted both the 
civic and moral virtues of New Spain when compared with Spain: a combination of the 
particularist seigniorial conceptions of the ‘caballero renaissance’ that Mendoza favoured643 
with mendicant idealism and indigenous assertions of participation.      
Perhaps the most complete representation of the righteous self-perception of New 
Spain comes from the Tlaxcalan celebrations of the peace of Aigues Mortes on Corpus 
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Christi, 1539.644 Tlaxcala’s leaders possessed an acute ability for representing their merits. In 
concordance with the city’s mendicant community, they created an allegorical display that 
affirmed Tlaxcala’s self-perceived role in the Habsburg Empire and in cosmic history. In their 
newly-built square, the ‘conquest of Jerusalem’ was performed as a theatrical 
representation of the Spanish empire as seen through the eyes of fully fledged indigenous 
participants in the notion of New Spain as ‘another Jerusalem’: a crusading kingdom of 
virtue in which the Tlaxcalans played a leading role. Virtue was the ultimate benchmark of 
its legitimacy in an ideological framework set up primarily by the alliance of viceroys, friars 
and newly converted indigenous lords and whose rhetoric was then adopted by the Spanish 
settlers. 
Ostensibly, Tlaxcala was commemorating Charles V’s peace treaty at Aigues Mortes, 
the standard rhetorical nod to royal authority. Tlaxcala, however, was also reacting to 
Mexico City’s celebration of the same event held the previous year with such magnificence 
that several official chronicles of the pageantry had been sent to Spain to impress on the 
monarch the city’s efforts and loyalty. Tlaxcalan competitive patriotism demanded a riposte 
intended to please its audience – friars in particular - who would relay it to the viceroy and 
the crown. 
The organisation of the Christian forces seeking to liberate ‘Jerusalem’ reflected 
Christendom’s hierarchy as they understood it: The American forces were led by Mendoza 
and fought under a standard that bore the Mendoza family coat of arms. They were divided 
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into national units with the nahua Tlaxcalans and the Mexica taking prominent roles with 
various other lesser Mesoamerican contingents and particularly weak Caribbeans and 
Peruvians. The European forces were similarly divided into national units with those from 
the various Spanish kingdoms being equated with the Nahua contingents and acting at the 
head of the European army led by Antonio Pimentel, Count of Benavente, and patron of 
many Franciscans like Motolinia. Mendoza and Pimentel’s equal status was emphasised, 
mirroring the parallel republics of Indians and Spaniards that was so fundamental to 
Mendoza´s conception of New Spain, but placed on an imperial scale. Both ‘republics’ were 
under the command of Charles V whose headquarters were in the ‘camp of Santa Fe’ -the 
ideal grid-iron castrum that the Christian forces had built in the last great Iberian crusade 
against the infidels of Granada - a name of such resonance that it was given by Vasco de 
Quiroga to his experiments in American Utopia - and who brought with him newly acquired 
French and Hungarian allies. The emperor in turn was subordinate to the Pope in Rome who 
sent Bishops and friars to place the Christian armies in a state of grace.  
The layers of authority exhibited in the spectacle were familiar from the Tlaxcalan 
self-perception within New Spain rather than the European view of the Spanish empire: 
Tlaxcalan identity survived in the display and was elevated to the pinnacle of leadership of a 
shared indigenous-American identity, to which Mendoza was incorporated. The Tlaxcalans 
had, after all, fought and often defeated all of the other American peoples that were 
represented as their new allies, including the Peruvians under Alvarado, and always in the 
name of Tlaxcala for the emperor and Christ- in the same way that the Spaniards had fought 
and beaten the French who now joined them as part of Charles V’s army. The Tlaxcalans’ 
brilliant attire betrayed their greater glory when compared to the drab Europeans who were 
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nominally their equals in the hierarchy. Charles V, whom several Tlaxcalan lords had met in 
person, was given his place as the point of contact between the two parallel worlds in the 
symbolic space of Santa Fe that in New Spain was occupied by Mendoza. Almost 
embarrassingly self-evidently, however, an ecclesiastical hierarchy dominated by the 
mendicant orders and divine Christian authority superseded all other temporal powers.   
The idiosyncrasies of the siege displayed the virtues and vices of the participants and 
were reported up and down the Christian hierarchy – and so to the audience - to explain the 
action. These included recommendations of rewards that mirrored the real letters, 
memorials and probanzas that Neo-Spanish elites were becoming accustomed to mediating 
through Mendoza to the crown: ‘Emperor, semper augusto. Your Majesty will know how I 
came with the army to Jerusalem’ wrote ‘Mendoza’ to ‘Charles V’ in a ‘letter’ that was 
presumably read out to the spectators, ’your vassals of New Spain did things very well 
defeating many moors…’ whereas ‘the squadron from the islands’ was defeated ‘in great 
shame’ as were several European contingents allied to the Spanish. In turn Charles V called 
Mendoza his beloved kinsman and great captain, while the American armies were 
addressed as ‘knights and soldiers’.  
It was only as the action of the siege progressed that true virtues beyond military 
service, the ultimate civic justification, were revealed. Every time a new favourite 
contingent appeared or a superior secular commander took control the Christians morale 
was boosted but their bravery and martial skill was always matched by those of the Turks. 
The balance began to shift in the Christians’ favour only when the Pope united all the forces 
in prayer and placed them in a state of grace: ‘even though you are new to the faith, God 
wanted to test you and wanted you to be defeated that you may know that without his help 
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you are worth little, but now that you have been made humble, God has heard your prayers 
and in your favour will come your advocate and patron Saint Hippolytus on whose day the 
Spaniards, with you the Tlaxcalans won Mexico.’ Even so the battle seemed undecided until 
the appearance of the archangel Michael who made a powerful speech on the highest tower 
of the city walls which convinced ‘Cortés’ the ‘tlatoani of Jerusalem’ and his vizir, ‘Pedro de 
Alvarado’ (for the significance of their roles see below) to convert to Christianity and 
become a vassal of the ‘Roman emperor, beloved of God’. ‘Cortés’ explained his change of 
heart: ‘we have seen clearly how God has sent you favour and help from heaven; before I 
saw this I thought I would hold my city and my kingdom and to defend my vassals and I was 
determined to die for it; but since God in heaven has illuminated me and I know that you 
alone are captain of his army; I recognise that the whole world must obey God and you who 
are his captain on earth. Therefore we place our lives in your hands and we beg you to settle 
near this city that you may give us your royal word and you grant us our lives, receiving us 
with your continual clemency as your natural vassals. Your servant the great Sultan of 
Babylon and tlatoani of Jerusalem.’ The enemy had been convinced by divine grace rather 
than military force.   
Motolinia, who spent much of his life in Tlaxcala, would write of Mexico City ‘you 
were then [before the conquest] a Babylon full of confusions and evil. You came and you 
went as you pleased, guided by the will of a gentile tyrant [‘idiota’ literally someone who is 
self-involved and therefore arbitrary] who executed barbarous laws in you; now you are 
another Jerusalem mother of provinces and kingdoms…more does your subjection to the 
invincible Caesar Charles ennoble and aggrandise you than the tyrannous lordship with 
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which in the past you wished to subject everyone else.’645 The allegorical significance of the 
conclusion of the spectacle is obvious. In the play the Tlaxcalteca had acted out the 
implications of the New Jerusalem’s virtuous expansionism that mirrored the idealised 
expansion of Christian authority in New Spain and anticipated Mendoza’s well-known plans 
for the forthcoming conquest of Cíbola. Cortés the tyrant of ‘Babylon’ and ‘tlatoani of 
Jerusalem’, two names Motolinia associated with Mexico City, had become, of his own 
voluntary submission a ‘natural’ vassal, a term applied by the Spaniards to refer to 
indigenous lords, of the ‘Roman emperor, beloved of God’. The Tlaxcalteca were recreating 
an image of their own and their fellow Nahuas’ voluntary and virtuous transition to 
participants in the Indian Republic of New Spain: which was not the result of Spanish 
military superiority but of the undeniable transcendental truths of Christianity. To be 
convinced by God was not a defeat and it implied obedience to him and his legitimate 
representatives like the viceroy, the emperor and the church, but not the Spanish 
conquistadores. Cortés was popular with the Maxixcatzin clan, Alvarado with the 
Xicotencatl: the Tlaxcalans were not ridiculing them but rather identifying them with their 
own polity’s story  and with the parallel reconciliation between France and Charles V and 
simultaneously making a plea for them to submit to Mendoza’s authority (who in 1539 was 
engaged in intense competition with both of them over exploration in the Pacific) as the 
true representative of Christian virtue, just as all indigenous peoples were encouraged to do 
by the friars. The native and mendicant agendas here are difficult to distinguish and 
probably influenced one another.  
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 The festivities represented the two most important conceptions of New Spain that 
developed in this period. It was a defence of the policy that established New Spain as a 
kingdom composed of two ‘republics’, a principle that was not enshrined in law until 
decades later but became incorporated into the political discourse of the time; and secondly 
that these republics were guided by universal Christian virtue not secular Spanish power.   
The alliance between the mendicants and the viceroy in the government of New 
Spain meant that the dialogue of legitimacy acquired even more abstract justifications for 
legitimacy that were tied with the mendicant and particularly the Franciscan morality. The 
lords of Huexotzinco, where the murals of the convent of San Miguel attest pictorially to the 
importance of the idea of New Jerusalem, expressed their own post-conquest legitimacy in a 
way that echoed the allegorical Tlaxcalan play of 1539. In their appeals to viceroy Velasco 
for recognition of their land re-distribution in 1555 they explained that: ‘…we were baptised 
and made Christians and received the faith and Christian customs with the most complete 
free will, which, when compared with our previous style of life, we found that our former 
life was all lies and trickery…knowing this great equality, truth, honesty and goodness of 
Christianity we are determined to subject ourselves to it and keep it and work for it…’646 
Unlike their tyrannical ancestors ‘who wanted everything for themselves’ they believed in 
‘charity to help the poor’ and ‘helped by divine grace’ they convened to grant the poor and 
dispossessed their lands. As we have seen the Huexotzinca would have faced social unrest647 
if they did not, but the language of their legitimisation is still revealing. 
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Noblemen like don Antonio Cortés Totoquihuaztli echoed the crusading idealism of 
the Tlaxcalan play in expressing his view of the greatest attributes of Charles V: 
Greatest defender of the Christian faith, indefatigable fighter against the 
assaults of infidels and heretics…always engaged in fighting barbarous 
nations, infidels and idolaters of demons… In pacifying the defeated, 
illuminating them and finally winning them for Christ, which Your Majesty 
has done amongst us…This very thing gives us the greatest consolation 
encourages us to be in good spirits and convinces us that there is no reason 
to fear addressing Your Majesty by letter648.  
Like many other lords don Jerónimo del Aguila from Tacuba at the heart of the old 
Mexica empire soon adopted the posture of crusader; he claimed in 1564 to have spent 
forty years destroying idolatry wherever he found it, often endangering his life, in particular 
when he served with viceroy Mendoza in the Mixtón war. This was reminiscent of part of 
the oath of the Tecles, by then superseded but clearly still resonant in the language of 
legitimacy: ‘And as regards my person I will pursue and destroy the sacrifices and idolatries. 
In the same way I swore to be a loyal vassal to the emperor Don Carlos, king of Spain…’ to 
which don Jerónimo was possibly referring when he mentioned that this lifelong quest was 
the result of ‘a certain selection that was made of my person to accomplish this.’ 649 Similar 
ideas were represented in the Otomi crusading murals at Ixmiquilpan which glorified the 
dynasty of the San Luis Montañés; or Sandoval Acaxitli’s emphasis on his role in fighting the 
heathen Chichimeca but also in forging alliances with their chiefs and cementing them with 
song and dance to inaugurate Christmas. Despite their traditionally regionalist perspective 
of identity, the most active indigenous lords also expressed the concept of New Spain as the 
kingdom within Charles V’s universalist Christian empire that they belonged to and fought to 
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preserve and increase.650 The expressions of self-justification that survive speak to the 
emergence of a new identity as the most adaptable indigenous lords identified themselves 
with their newly expanding horizons.651    
Indigenous lords generally advocated the authority of the viceroys more openly than 
the Spaniards in this period.652 The alliance between the viceroys and the mendicants 
legitimised the viceroys in indigenous eyes. Petitioners from Huexotzinco addressed the 
viceroy as ‘Your lordship, in His royal name, is our peace and tranquillity and the salvation of 
our souls.’653 The Indian lords from the central valleys who gathered in Mexico to 
accompany Velasco’s coffin to burial in 1564 bestowed the titles of ‘father of the fatherland’ 
and ‘protector of the Indians’ to the dead viceroy.654 These titles were at once a display of 
affection and a pointed criticism of the reforms proposed by Valderrama who was dubbed 
instead the ‘afflictor of the Indians’.  
Spaniards exalted viceregal authority over that of unwarranted royal interference: 
López sought to convey to the king why Mendoza and his son were indispensable to the 
government of New Spain. He explained how well the viceroy knew the land and its ‘secrets’ 
and the importance of such internal knowledge: ‘others… would not know [these secrets] or 
the land or the people here because the language here is another and it is essential to 
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understand it and know it.’655 Similar reasoning justified the many appeals for Mendoza to 
remain in New Spain and for his son to succeed him after 1548 - both statements in 
themselves of the lordly autonomy envisioned by many in New Spain. Such appeals were 
often made even by those who had previously attacked the viceroy like Andrés de Tapia or 
even Vázquez de Tapia.656 They were echoed in the defence of record of Velasco’s tenure 
after his sudden death and in support for the appointment of a new viceroy.657  
These justifications appealed to the sense that the viceroys had a superior authority 
to that of new arrivals from Spain who came with a more recent royal licence but little 
understanding of the arrangements in New Spain. The greater experience of the sitting 
viceroys implied that they were able to act in good faith for the service of God, the king and 
the common good. By virtue of their experience, the argument ran, the viceroys were the 
most adept of the king’s vassals at governing the land in ways that fulfilled the most basic 
principles of the royal will: guaranteeing justice and ‘good governance’. These arguments 
verged on a more ancient lordly autonomy that both viceroys attempted to practise, and 
which sought to establish their indispensability as arbiters of New Spain’s political 
arrangements. In the most daring defence of viceregal proto-autonomy, Mendoza 
complained bitterly to the king against meddling in the affairs of New Spain from Spain: 
‘what does your majesty expect that will happen [with this continual interference] at two 
thousand leagues distance if not that everything will end in ruin?’ All that was needed 
according to the viceroy were well meaning and just people to be left alone to administer 
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the land.658 For this plea of autonomy to work its supporters had to convince the crown that 
the inherent virtue and intentions of its agents in New Spain were good and aimed at 
serving the crown. Once this was established their greater experience could be trusted more 
than the dictats of letrados or courtly opportunists in Spain. 
When the viceroy himself was in favour, a mere assertion that the viceroy trusted an 
individual’s ability to carry out the duties of his post was legitimisation enough. When 
Velasco appointed Hortuño de Ibarra, his friend and relative through marriage, to the office 
of contador in 1555, a post previously filled by a crown appointee, he justified his decision 
by explaining that ‘and as there is knowledge of the quality and sufficiency of Hortuño de 
Ibarra, and that he is a person in which I have full confidence and for the experience that he 
possesses in the matters of the royal hacienda and his good discharge of his offices so 
far.’659  
Claims of civic service for the common good of New Spain served as counter-
arguments to the allegations of tyrannical corruption. Mendoza justified appointing his rich 
ally don Luis de Castilla to so many offices instead of distributing them to some other 
impoverished conquistador ‘because [Castilla] is very honourable and a caballero and he is 
worthy of the post because in discharging the offices he has been granted he has comported 
himself very well and I have known him to have particular love for the Indians, favouring 
them and treating them well.’660 In the ambiguity of what defined inherent worth and 
merited rewards it was best to include all possible advantages: birth, services and civic 
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virtues, combined with pious attributes such as the protection of the Indians, in particular 
the macehuales who were held to be the most victimised group of all.  
Both viceroys justified ignoring specific royal legislation appealing to their experience 
to discern the best course of action for the good of New Spain. Mendoza explained his 
controversial approval of Juan Guerrero’s marriage to the illegitimate daughter of 
conquistador Rodrigo Gómez, and his inheritance of the latter’s encomienda, in terms of 
pleasing a worthy conquistador and to ensure the ‘population and settlement of the land’; 
added to which Guerrero had in him the usual attributes: ‘the qualities, especially good 
intention towards the Indians’ that the king looked for in an encomendero.661 These qualities 
could legitimise the contested legality of the marriage because they served the greater 
good. 
He went as far as to ignore the unquestionable illegality of distributing licences to 
select members of the indigenous population to carry Spanish weapons and ride horses. In 
Mendoza’s view the Indians ‘are neither simple and innocent nor full of vice but are just like 
any other race and should be treated as such.’ What counted in deciding whom to reward, 
as in so many of his justifications, was experience: ‘this can only be sorted out with 
knowledge of the people and business involved’662. He distributed swords because ‘as I am 
viceroy and governor for your majesty I have the faculty to provide for matters of 
governance as best fits service to God and your majesty’ even if it meant acting against a 
specific, but misguided, law. He only gave weapons to the individuals he trusted and who 
had shown themselves, in his view, to be morally worthy: ‘Some people might think that 
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these Indians are bestial and they assume there is no difference between them because 
they don’t understand them, but I who have dealt with them and spoken to them find many 
to be of good judgement and with the attributes of gentlemen and a willingness to serve 
your majesty and he who governs in his royal name (i.e. Mendoza) with love and they have 
shown it in words and actions and it is right to gratify them… for in this way are men won 
over to virtue’663.  
Mendoza defended his private entrepreneurial activity in New Spain with similar 
appeals to the good of the commonwealth: the hostile witnesses who claimed this was 
corruption or abuse of power were confused ‘because they were referring to governors and 
judges appointed for specific time’ and not as he saw himself ‘perpetual governors and 
judges’. Any settler in New Spain should be encouraged to engage in economic activity in 
order that they ‘become rooted to this land’; and it was particularly important for the 
viceroy to do so because it was ‘useful for the republic in the provisioning of armies and 
expeditions’664. Mendoza felt he was fashioning a kingdom with its own internal logic of 
legitimacy attributes that were to be judged by him.  
Both Indians and Spaniards complained during Sandoval’s visita that Mendoza’s 
collaboration with Tejada had fostered the latter’s entrepreneurial activity to the detriment 
of Indian communities and the impartiality of his legal judgements. Mendoza defended his 
support for Tejada’s entrepreneurial activity by claiming that not only were the lands Tejada 
owned previously the patrimony of Motecuhzoma - and therefore eligible for viceregal 
distribution or sale rather than a violation of the rights of communities or individuals - but 
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also ‘because it was good for the governance of the land. Because he is a good republican 
and entrepreneur who has persuaded and encouraged many others to do the same and 
thanks to them this republic is now well provided for and supplied of all it needs for its 
sustenance’. Mendoza went on to explain that Tejada’s appointment was notionally 
perpetual and he had committed to settling in New Spain. This meant that he had no 
interest in acting to his new homeland’s detriment because by damaging it he would have 
damaged himself: ‘especially since he is a judge in perpetuity and therefore enjoys and will 
enjoy that which the other neighbours of this city and of New Spain enjoy.’665  
Tejada echoed Mendoza in defending his enterprises:  ‘not only do I not offend 
anyone but I serve God and his majesty [with his entrepreneurial activities] even more than 
with my office because so many have followed my example and have made for themselves 
very rich estates, the land has been populated and grown and this city has been ennobled 
and supplied...’ Those that best served the crown and commonwealth were entitled to the 
greatest rewards: ‘the judge that is appointed by the will of the prince without a limit to his 
tenure should consider it in perpetuity and should be allowed to own property and 
businesses like in other audiencias… otherwise it is to be understood that those that 
govern… would live in need and poverty with their salaries alone and our children would 
remain unprotected and would emigrate… and that they and their fathers would be in 
worse condition for having served your majesty.’666  
A similar emphasis on civic justifications governed Mendoza’s attitude towards the 
enfranchising of the indigenous elite. Already by 1538, the crown had warned Mendoza not 
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to allow Indians to call themselves ‘lords (señores)’ of their towns but ‘principal men 
(principales)’ only. Yet Mendoza actively sought to recognise the authority of the ‘legitimate’ 
nobility of New Spain and to encourage them to govern themselves through the adoption of 
recognisable offices.667  
The viceroys encouraged the particularist notion that their power and authority 
guaranteed moral righteousness, freedom and justice in New Spain. The prohibition on 
public gambling, the constant attempts to limit drunkenness668 and the insistence on hiding 
the misdemeanours of friars669 are all examples of attempts at enforcing a high level of 
public morality for both Spaniards and Indians.  
Mendoza claimed that ‘the regidores never had so much freedom in their cabildo as 
when I came to this city’, not least because he only interfered ‘when there is discord 
between them and they appeal to me’,670 a claim which other favourable commentators 
also expressed.671 Cristóbal de Benavente thought that thanks to the viceroy ‘in temporal 
matters these natives are placed in good order and political organisation … they have their 
alcaldes, regidores, alguaciles and ministers of justice and they understand it and practise it 
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so well that we have little advantage over them because they understand the liberty and 
grace that every day your majesty and his royal intention make for them’.672  
The royal officials agreed that ‘were it not for the favour and help that the viceroy 
gives us for the collection and ordering of the royal funds, it would only be collected with 
difficulty’ because their many enemies in the audiencia ‘intend for us not to have the liberty 
we have and must have.’673 
The discourse of liberty became well known to the indigenous lords. Ultimately this 
harked back to mendicant arguments about the illegitimacy of any forceful conquest in the 
Americas and claims about the excessive and unnecessary violence of the conquistadors. It 
was also a reflection of the enfranchisement of the indigenous nobility that Mendoza had 
promoted. Indigenous testimony from Tello de Sandoval’s visita emphasises their voluntary 
participation in the expeditions to Cíbola: ‘[Tejada] informed them that [the viceroy] was 
sending people [to Cíbola] that if some Indians wanted to go of their own free will they 
should seek him out because he did not want to force them or take them against their will 
like Nuño de Guzmán had done… and they said that they did want to go and that and they 
went there of their own free will… ’. When they found the viceroy in Jalisco ‘[he] asked them 
if they were going on their own free will or whether they were forced to go and they 
answered that they went of their own free will and not through force.’ Similarly, the Codex 
Osuna portrays Indian lords sitting on their icapilli (reed-thrones) in open conversation with 
the viceroy, sitting on his curule chair, on the terms of their voluntary participation in the 
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expedition to Florida. Their subsequent disputed over the compensation they received in 
return was a result of the contractual nature of the negotiation that led to their 
participation.674 
Underlying these justifications were certain concepts that had become commonly 
accepted in New Spain as a result of their rhetorical importance. The most obvious was to 
justify almost every decision as intended for the good of the indigenous population, 
particularly the ‘poor macehuales’. As the royal officials wrote in 1552, ‘in this land some 
have planted the idea that to serve the king one must do good to the Indians and harm the 
Spaniards.’675 Even Valderrama the ‘scourge of the Indians’ claimed continually that his 
attempts at reducing the power of the friars and indigenous lords, his support for the 
encomenderos and the increase he proposed in the level of tribute, were all designed to 
help the ‘poor macehuales’: ‘in the macehuales there is no resistance [to abuse by the friars 
and their nobility]…they are lost and destroyed… it is a matter of great shame’.676 The ‘poor 
macehuales’ became the fundamental symbols of victimhood in this strand of the dialogue 
of legitimacy, to which all had to pay at least lip-service. The consensus about the need to 
protect the indigenous population would play an important part in the development of New 
Spain’s internal framework of legitimacy through righteousness.  
Spanish participants in the military expansion of New Spain began to add moral 
justifications for actions to supplement the traditional virtues of war: Julius Caesar proudly 
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boasted in his account of the Gallic Wars that he killed one million Gauls; Bernal Díaz del 
Castillo defensively devoted three chapters to attempting to detail the benefits that the 
indigenous population accrued from the conquest in terms of their evangelisation, new 
political systems and trade and technical skills that they learnt from Europe.677 Similarly 
Alonso de Zorita presented his project to pacify and settle the Chichimeca in ideal terms 
worthy of the expectations of the empire of New Jerusalem.678 Hernando de Alarcón, 
Francisco de Ibarra and Miguel López de Legazpi did their best to present their expeditions 
in the most favourable light with regards to the conquered population.  
Conclusion 
The danger of appealing to the superiority of viceregal arrangements or to abstract 
moral principles was that it implicitly undermined the authority of the crown and its latest 
and most trusted envoys. By the time of Valderrama’s visita the term alumbrado began to 
appear in Mexico as a description for individuals like Gerónimo de Mercado: ‘He was sought 
out to lower tributes, and is one of those who in Mexico are called alumbrados’.679 
Valderrama believed that the term had peculiar Mexican connotations - one of the many 
adaptations of the term throughout the Hispanic world680 that probably had no formal links 
to traditional alumbradismo in Spain. Its use probably referred to the irreverent aspect of 
the Spanish mystics who had an ambiguous relationship with the established church 
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hierarchy and acknowledged only the authority and legitimacy of their direct links to God. 
Moreover this denial of intermediaries had formed part of Zumárraga’s plans for New 
Spain.681 Oidor Zorita was similarly resented by the secular clergy for what they considered 
his peculiar almost mystical religiosity682 and amongst viceroy Gastón de Peralta’s 
instructions was  insistence on the expulsion of friars that had ‘apostatised’ and on how to 
punish ‘ungovernable friars’ more loyal to their local arrangements than the instructions of 
European hierarchies.683  
The fear of disobedience or rebellion against royal authority born of the crown’s 
general distrust of its American agents and subjects encouraged the promulgation of royal 
legislation to oppose any particularist autonomy. Within New Spain, on the other hand it 
was the inexperience, intentions and ambitions of new arrivals from Spain that were 
distrusted except by those with a grievance against the status quo.  
The reigns of Mendoza and Velasco created the self-perception that New Spain was 
special and more virtuous than Spain or other parts of her American empire. This was 
expressed in many ways, from the insistence by New Spain’s Franciscans that Cortés rather 
than Columbus was the central figure in New World History as the ‘Moses of the New 
World’ or that Mendoza (not Las Casas) was the ‘true father of the Indians’, to more prosaic 
observations that manners in New Spain were more refined than those of Spain.684 This 
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attitude was generalised:  Díaz del Castillo blamed the brutality of Peruvian encomenderos 
for the bad reputation of the institution in Spain;685 Mendoza sighed to the emperor in 1551 
that there was more potential in New Spain than in Spain, but that too much interference 
was ruining everything.686 Juan Suárez de Peralta similarly claimed that ‘She [New Spain] 
was unique and unrepeatable, before we find another Mexico and her land we will all 
meet… in the final judgement.’687 Motolinia aggressively defended the righteousness of New 
Spain’s arrangements, including her support for perpetual encomienda in his letter of 1555 
against the generalisations of Las Casas who was then writing from Spain. The successful 
presentation of New Spain’s sense of exceptional righteousness made Las Casas concede 
that ‘the only place where cruelties have diminished is in Mexico: there we find justice and 
public inhumanities are not tolerated, though tributary exactions are still immense and 
unbearable, but the homicides are not frequent’;688 while Valderrama fretted that ‘more is 
given to [the Indians] here than Las Casas asks for there’.689 
This sense of New Spain’s righteousness developed from the competition that 
surrounded the failed attempts at establishing a viceregal lordly autonomy in this period. 
Subsequent displays of patriotic righteousness attest to its effect on the internal political 
arrangements and self-justification of the land. Examples abound of this self-image from the 
idealisation in the 17th century ‘enconchado series’– the first art of globalisation and 
                                                     
685
 B. Díaz del Castillo, Conquista…pp.588-9 
686
 VEA, Mendoza, Doc.6.  
687
 J. Suárez de Peralta, Tratado… ch.XXII. 
688
 G. Kubler, Mexican Arquitecture of the 16
th
 century, Yale, 1948,pp.20-23. 
689
 CJV, p.68 
295 
 
themselves a symbol of New Spain’s reach across the Pacific – of the conquest as a 
prefiguration of the parallel Mendozan ‘republics’ in Motecuhzoma’s voluntary invitation for 
Cortés to rule beside him from an audience chamber with two parallel thrones;690  the 
criticisms of royal policy in ephemeral display;691 Mexico City’s identification with the 
allegory of ‘the Pegasus’;692 or to the mixture of demands for both independence and social 
and racial justice in the struggle for Mexican independence, which one historian has 
described as ‘[t]he expression of Neo-Hispanic patriotism, whose roots were in the pro-
indigenist struggles of bishop Palafox and the utopian Franciscan projects of the time of 
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Part IV: Conclusions 
 
Chapter 8: New Spain’s Parasitic Civic Nobility 
‘Hunc librum legi Mexico año 1539’ announces a final scribble in an annotated 
volume of a 1512 edition of Leon Battista Alberti’s de re aedificatoria. A note in the lower 
margin of the front cover reveals the reader and proclaims his title: ‘Es de Antonio de 
Mendoza, Visorrey’.694 For Alberti architecture dealt with more than aesthetics; it was a 
function of town planning, and towns expressed the politics and constitution of society.695 
An orderly society was necessarily stable, hierarchical and specialised with each individual 
playing a teleological role within it. A town’s buildings should echo this division and 
reinforce it in permanent structures. ‘A certain type of building is convenient for the whole 
community, another for the principal citizens and another for the people… these division are 
drawn from the first rudiments of the philosophers’696 Alberti assured his readers. Since the 
revolution that led to the conquest of Tenochtitlan, establishing who deserved to be 
recognised as ‘principal citizens’ of New Spain had been the most pressing political issue for 
both the indigenous and Spanish populations. The success with which the viceroys mediated 
the competition for elite status led to the acceptance of viceregal authority over New Spain. 
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Mendoza, who grew up in a lonely bastion of Spain’s ‘caballero renaissance’ and 
near the ideal crusading castrum of Santa Fe, was already directing much of the physical and 
theoretical construction of New Spain in the year he finished reading Alberti’s book. Mexico 
City was being rebuilt in earnest under the viceroy’s auspices after a royal cédula dated 23rd 
August 1538 confirmed the episcopal and viceregal request to dismantle the old Mexica 
pyramids that Cortés had intended to leave standing ‘for memory’ amidst Alonso García 
Bravo’s simple grid-iron plan retracing the ruined Tenochca scheme. In their place would 
rise the impressive new Spanish quarter, designed with straight wide avenues and buildings 
of uniform height, re-orientated to the rationale of cosmographers, like Alonso de Santa 
Cruz, the viceroy’s friend and correspondent, for which ‘[Mendoza] brought with him many 
master craftsmen to ennoble his provinces, especially Mexico.’697 The ‘Spanish’ district of 
the island-city would stand separated from the ‘Indian’ quarters of Tenochtitlan and 
Tlatelolco giving physical expression to the viceroy’s policy of recognising two parallel 
republics within the kingdom of New Spain.698  
Almost uniquely amongst Spain’s American territories the capital of New Spain did 
not stand on the sea-shore looking back to Spain or even on a navigable river. Instead it 
remained on the highland ‘mountain-crowned’ valley lake at the centre of the Nahua 
heartlands of Mesoamerica. Mexico City, the old indigenous seat of imperial power, 
endured as the capital of the ‘kingdom of New Spain’, facilitating a recognisable transition of 
imperial power in Mesoamerica. Construction became the most visible sign of the Spanish 
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presence throughout Mesoamerica and one of the most important activities in New Spain 
after the conquest. Similar architectural transformations as that undergone by Mexico City 
occurred first in the indigenous polities in the valleys of Mexico and Puebla-Tlaxcala, south 
to Oaxaca west to Michoacán, North to the plateaus from Xilotepec to Querétaro and then 
beyond as Spanish, indigenous and mixed settlements regrouped around large squares with 
civic buildings and new Christian centres of worship, often with fortress-like monasteries 
acting like outposts of an expanding, crusading, American Christendom. López de Gómara 
believed that like Santa Fe they were intended to resemble ancient Roman colonies.699 
These urban centres became the physical expressions of the developing political culture of 
the ‘kingdom of New Spain’ whose viceregal style of government was increasingly particular 
to its circumstances. 
The indigenous polities of New Spain did not rebuild their civic centres in their own 
ancestral style nor did the new Spanish urban centres look like the towns which the settlers 
had left behind in Europe;700 all followed the template of the new Mexico City. Inside their 
palaces and new civic buildings noble indigenous families re-affirmed their old power, while 
‘new men’ from Spain expressed their newly-asserted status in similar ways to each other: 
both did so with expressions of loyalty to and legitimacy from the Habsburg dynasty that 
they quickly adapted from the developing look and language of the old imperial capital and 
its new viceregal court. The ‘traditional’ and ‘charismatic’ influence of Mexico City over 
Mesoamerica both helped to create viceregal authority and was renewed by it as the 
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viceroys established, from their court, a stable system for safeguarding political settlements 
in New Spain. 
New arrivals certainly remarked on the peculiarity of New Spain. Viceroy Gastón de 
Peralta expressed his surprise at the workings of the government he had been sent to head. 
It involved not just an excessively large number of salaried officials but also encomenderos 
asking for offices in the ‘servicio ordinario’ that were a drain on the treasury. There were 
also powerful indigenous lords and pretentious friars whom he considered ‘díscolos’ even 
‘apóstatas’; with a seemingly unusual religiosity, and who expected to act as agents of the 
viceroy in governmental matters. The viceroy’s personal authority seemed well entrenched 
even beyond his role as the crown’s representative and his court and person much solicited 
by the inhabitants.701 Other newly arrived commentators like the visitadores also expressed 
their surprise at how unusual, uncontrolled and unofficial the administration of New Spain 
appeared to be compared to what they had expected from the reports they received in the 
council of the Indies. Tello de Sandoval thought ‘20 leagues outside Mexico there is little 
justice or none at all…I am told that there are parts where the Indians consider as kings the 
señores (local Indian lords) and encomenderos of their towns and know no other king’702. 
Valderrama meanwhile seemed shocked that the Indians in New Spain had been given 
‘much more than [Las Casas] asks for [in Spain]’ particularly with regard to the recognition 
and attributes of their lordship.703  
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New Spain was never a blank slate where the crown ‘starting from scratch’ was 
‘better placed than in the Iberian Peninsula, with its accretion of historic municipal 
privileges and corporate rights, to create a system of government directly dependent on 
imperial control’.704 Spanish conquistadores, settlers and officials brought with them 
traditional European expectations that the crown did not ignore; consequently they enjoyed 
many rights and privileges that the vast majority of their fellow countrymen in Spain, 
particularly those of comparable backgrounds, did not possess, like exemption from tribute 
which likened them to hidalgos and emphasised their autonomy from formal bonds of 
vassalage to any lord but the king. More importantly most of the population of New Spain, 
for most of the time, lived and operated under the legal norms and political traditions of 
their own indigenous polities. As we have seen in preceding chapters their autonomy was 
far greater than that of Iberian municipal units as was their variety of customs. The polity 
authorities were not directly dependent on imperial control nor did the viceregal 
administration in Mexico City have the means of exerting much control over them without 
their consent.705 Indigenous polities trusted primarily in the unofficial authority of 
mendicant friars and in personal negotiation with the viceroy to arrange those matters like 
the propagation of Christianity, the collection of tribute, maintenance of peace and 
participation in war that could be considered of imperial concern. Their autonomy was 
respected so long as it did not overtly conflict with loyalty to the crown or Christian 
doctrine; this practice was recognised by the crown in the New Laws.706 
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A political settlement between the viceroy and the elites of New Spain was the only 
way of ensuring their indispensable cooperaition in governing New Spain. Such a settlement 
involved an interaction between the interests of crown, viceroys and elites of New Spain. 
From these interests arose not a modern bureaucracy or a ‘feudal’ regime but what I define 
as a ‘parasitic civic nobility’ that governed New Spain for the Habsburg monarchy and for 
themselves:  New Spain’s elites, including the viceroys, were maintained by tribute and 
formed part of socially circumscribed groups who served the commonwealth with their 
person. But their status was justified by criteria that related to civic virtues above other 
justificatory elements like blood, law or tradition. These civic virtues were determined by a 
combination of Spanish and Mesoamerican ‘ideals of life’ and traditions that were 
interpreted by the preferences of the viceroys within the limits of legitimacy set by the 
crown.  
Law 
Royal legislation has been credited with shaping New Spain and explaining how and 
why it could be governed from Spain. However the assumptions behind this thesis do not 
accord with how viceregal government operated. 
One ‘structuralist’ historian, in a meticulous recent study of New Spain’s legislation 
and its role in the formation of authority and ‘the state’, has classified the period up to 1564 
as only ‘formative’. She considers much of the legislation and most of the royal commands 
devised in Spain as vague, overlapping or contradictory and she categorises the following 
thirty years as merely a ‘consolidation’ of what came before.707 Nor does the classification 
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of New Spain as merely an appendage of Castile, governed by the same laws unlike 
Habsburg brother-kingdoms such as Naples that were governed by aeque principaliter, 
stand up to scrutiny.708 She has argued that the development of the corpus of legislation 
that ‘defined the state’ in New Spain and even the territorial extent that viceregal authority 
encompassed were not the result of a rational effort by Spanish letrados to create the rules 
for an imperial administration but rather a process that developed from the daily issue of 
viceregal commands, judgements and appointments.709  
These conclusions are important in highlighting the self-contained nature of New 
Spain’s legislative and political practice and the importance of the viceroy’s commands as 
valid internal legal precedent for New Spain. They also suggest that there were no clear-cut 
rules or boundaries of authority in place from Spain to define the operation of 
administrators in New Spain and consequently that the administration of New Spain was not 
a ‘modern’ bureaucracy of the sort described by Weber.710  
However, the more general conclusions drawn from this investigation, and others 
like it, miss the larger point by subjecting their arguments to narratives that lead to the 
development of the ‘state’.711 The legal ambiguities discovered by Semboloni were not, as 
another structuralis historian has puti it, the ‘blemishes’ and ‘ad hoc parts’ of the ‘machine’, 
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its ‘frictions making it creak and groan’ despite its modern intention which kept it 
nonetheless ‘undeniably running’.712 The intention of royal legislation was not the creation 
of the ‘state’ or the formulation of abstract rules for a bureaucracy. Investigating the 
operations of the law and judicial systems in practice suggests that the laws did not exist in 
the realm of ‘the state’ independently of the sovereign or authorised individuals in Mexico 
City: there was no neat division between the ‘Spanish state, the colonial bureaucracy and 
society’.713 Rather as Timothy Anna has noted with regards to the end of the viceregal 
period: 
The king was the creator of the law and could ignore the law in the name of 
equity if he chose. In his ultimate role of moderator, the king could, and did 
hear petitions from any level of his subjects and address his subjects directly. 
As moderator he could hear petitions against the actions he himself had 
taken as administrator and law-giver. This was made possible by the fact that 
the kingdoms were considered to be the patrimonial property of the Crown, 
of the Señor.714  
In preceding chapters we have seen how the sense of a direct link between the king 
and his enfranchised Mesoamerican subjects encouraged the participatory ethos of the 
Spanish monarchy, prompting the elite of New Spain, for example, define themselves 
optimistically in letters as the king’s ‘criados’: idealised household dependents serving the 
king’s interests with their person. This entailed the responsibility to advise him if they felt 
his actions were not in his own best interests. Royal legislation and the rules that defined its 
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administration had little authority in their own right while trusted individuals like the 
viceroys had increasing authority as representatives and advisors to the king.  
As we have seen the number and purpose of offices in New Spain like 
corregimientos, alcaldías and tenientazgos and the accompanying creation of the quitas y 
vacaciones fund715 was the result ot the viceroys’ strategy of becoming the most important 
patrons in New Spain rather than any bureaucratic logic. A similar motivation can be seen 
behind the viceroy’s de facto enactment of the notion of two parallel republics with 
themselves as the lynchpin. Viceregal interests in the practice of government influenced 
even the legal development of the administration of New Spain. 
Visitas and residencias have been interpreted as the judicial-administrative 
mechanisms that enforced the rules of a modern bureaucracy and the laws of the state. In 
their proper context they should be seen as a political vehicle used to try to effect a change 
of individuals in power; of undesirable policies; or merely as a means of political control. 
Visitas or residencias launched by the crown and by the authorities in New Spain had similar 
objectives. Consequently Nuño de Guzmán explained to the distant crown that the language 
used to condemn him served political motives in New Spain more than the exposition of 
truthful facts: ‘I beg that you do not look at the surface of what appears in these charges’ he 
pleaded with the king from prison in 1537 ‘but to the manner which has been followed in 
taking them, and the animus that existed in taking them… and the nature of this land where 
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if a hundred witnesses are needed to condemn one, they can find them, and the same again 
to save him.’716  
Reference to the law was only one element in establishing the legitimacy and merit 
of an individual’s actions: the overriding benchmark was the benefit their actions and 
intentions accrued to the crown. Judicial proceedings were above all an investigation into 
the virtue and trustworthiness of the accused where his adherence to or interpretation of 
the law was only one factor in the judgement of his worth. A royal servant’s discharge of his 
duties may have included favouritism, nepotism or personal enrichment but these were not 
objectionable in themselves unless they were shown to have been committed to the 
detriment of the crown, in which case they were classified as corruption.  
Mendoza was particularly offended by the public nature of the visitas because it 
highlighted its political intention of discrediting him.717 For those that the visitador involved 
in the process, participation became a political act in itself. All sorts of individuals acquired a 
public forum with a direct channel to the crown through which they were encouraged to 
express their grievances against the viceroy or any rival or enemy within New Spain and also 
to address fundamental matters relating to the nature of government. Hortuño de Ibarra for 
example explained to the crown that the attacks he suffered for his friendship with Velasco 
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and his recent appointment as veedor and factor over García de Albornoz were part of an 
internal competition for power that had merely been exacerbated by the visita.718 
Judicial proceedings served as a weather-vane for the favour in which the individuals 
being investigated were held by the crown. 
…When one wanted to overthrow a valido or a patron, he was accused of 
corruption, and the monarch was incited into organising a visita of the body 
controlled by said person… The true purpose of visitas was not to cure the 
administration, as we might say nowadays, but to change the group holding 
government power.719   
As we have seen political considerations at court motivated the launch of the visitas 
after the crown had come to lose full confidence in its viceroys. The loss of confidence in 
Mendoza’s intentions coincided with the death or eclipse of his friends, patrons and allies at 
court, most notably the death of Queen Isabella, and the eclipse of Los Cobos. These 
combined with the presence of a resentful Cortés at court and the rise of a new clique 
around Prince Philip, to whom, tellingly, Tello de Sandoval’s dispatches were normally 
addressed.720 Tejada noted a clear political motivation behind Tello de Sandoval’s method of 
conducting his investigation of Mendoza’s administration. The personal animosity between 
Cortés and Mendoza was well known as was the former’s resentment against the royal 
officials and oidores who had supported the viceroy in their struggles. The visita combined 
the crown’s interest in justifying Mendoza’s removal from office with its desire to suppress 
the more patrimonial elements of the administration of New Spain. Mendoza, the oidores 
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and highest royal officials of his administration had served at the pleasure of the king on the 
assumption of perpetuity and even of passing on their offices to their descendants as had 
happened with officials like Salazar and Albornoz. Tejada argued that salaried officials and 
oidores could consider their ‘benefice as if it were perpetual with the rights of a citizen 
(vecino) and can therefore own property and businesses like in other audiencias and 
councils.’721 Mendoza was also associated with the creation of perpetual and hereditary 
encomienda and the visita was also intended to attack that aspect of New Spain.  
As a titled nobleman Cortés lost nothing from an end to perpetual encomienda or 
the prohibitions against the viceroy, oidores and officials. Instead the marquesado would 
have become relatively richer, more stable and consequently more preponderant in New 
Spain increasing its relative importance as a centre for the distribution of patronage when 
compared to the viceregal regime. Similarly Tello de Sandoval gained the most credit with 
the Council of the Indies from accomplishing his original commission of implementing the 
New Laws or whatever seemed most favourable to the crown without the need for 
considering local interests. Tello de Sandoval’s case was thrown out before it was judged, 
but his career did not seem to suffer and by the time Jerónimo de Valderrama’s visita was 
organised Tello de Sandoval had risen to the presidency of the Council of the Indies. This 
suggests that he achieved the objective of discrediting Mendoza and giving the crown the 
justification it sought for removing him from New Spain. 
Mendoza’s discredit affected the nature of the administration of New Spain by 
allowing the crown to justify changes to the operation and rights of its salaried officials, 
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oidores and other patrimonial elements in New Spain that had become associated with 
Mendoza’s regime. The instructions given to Velasco forbade the viceroy, royal officials or 
oidores to own property or engage in business in New Spain. The oidores continued to serve 
without official time limits but after Velasco’s appointment they were rotated more often 
than before. The royal officials and viceroys still seemed to enjoy longer tenure and to be 
able to expect that their appointment would be for life. This may reflect their generally 
higher social status than the oidores.  
The intentions of the crown might not always accord with the popular perception of 
the merit of the accused, but rather with courtly or metropolitan political interests. In Spain 
the politically motivated trial of Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba ‘el gran capitán’ had led to 
the popular expression, ‘las cuentas del capitán’ (the captain’s reckoning), to denote the 
unfair suspicion of a faithful vassal.722 In New Spain there was a similar regret by many over 
the effects of Tello de Sandoval’s visita on Mendoza’s authority. Some of Mendoza’s fiercest 
critics during the visita - encomenderos like Bernaldino Vázquez de Tapia or Andrés de Tapia, 
who had not benefited from Mendoza as much as they believed they deserved - realised this 
only too late before they began eschewing Tello de Sandoval. It also helped that the political 
pressure that the visita placed on Mendoza’s authority meant that he became more willing 
to engage with and distribute patronage to the most discontented indiviuals. Their regret 
became evident when they all participated in the last epistolary lobbying campaign by New 
Spain’s elite to revindicate Mendoza and name his son Francisco as his successor.723 
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Valdarrama’s visita had similar origins and intention. The crown only reacted to 
complaints about Velasco after Martín Cortés had risen in favour with Philip II and declared 
his desire to return to Mexico. Personal and courtly considerations also prompted Philip II to 
settle with one stroke the disputes surrounding the number of vassals of the marquesado 
that had haunted Hernán Cortés’ authority. Martín was guaranteed autonomous wealth and 
status in New Spain with a security that his father had never enjoyed. This not only went 
against Velasco’s advice but also challenges the notion that Philip II favoured centralising 
bureaucratic government. It suggests instead that, at least before the personal and political 
tragedies of the mid 1560s, Philip was not averse to employing powerful ‘intimate 
representatives’ from court (the Duke of Alba in the Netherlands is another example) to 
achieve his objectives. Valderrama succeeded in discrediting the mendicant orders whose 
influence, along with the whole Mendozan system, declined after the visita.724 
Political considerations at the Spanish court affected the authority of the viceroys 
more profoundly than the formal rules describing their offices. In New Spain the internal 
arrangements were generally satisfactory as the testimony of most witnesses from the 
visitas demonstrates and the defenders of the viceregal regime insisted.   
Visitas also served to announce a change or redefinition of royal policy by 
discrediting the ministers that had abided by the previous expectations and thus absolving 
the crown of accusations of inconsistency, misjudgement in its choice of appointments or 
injustice. The crown used Tello de Sandoval’s visita to justify denying Mendoza his rational 
expectation of retaining the viceroyalty in his line despite rewarding the viceroy’s brother’s 
line with the governorship of Granada. Valderrama’s visita would have had similar 
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consequences for Velasco but for his premature death. These visitas aimed to discredit the 
viceroys individually as well as justifying changes to the operation of government in New 
Spain generally.  
Both the viceroys and the audiencias could launch or oversee similar judicial 
investigations within New Spain with similar intentions. Mendoza and Velasco oversaw the 
trials of the administrators that had preceded them and used the opportunity to stamp their 
authority over them. Equally proceedings like the one Mendoza attempted against Alvarado 
and Pérez de la Torre or more dramatically the manoeuvrings and conflicts occasioned by 
Lebrón de Quiñones’ visita of New Galicia were viceregal attempts at asserting their 
dominance over the distant reaches of their kingdom or affecting royal policy.725 
Judicial proceedings conducted within New Spain acquired particular attributes. The 
regular trials of residencia, conducted of officials like corregidores after they finished their 
term in office, were the most common form of judicial enquiry in New Spain. Their 
regularity combined with the general political attributes of such judicial proceedings helped 
to foster the sui generis legitimising ethos of the viceregal regime in Mexico City. Alonso de 
Sosa and other royal officials explained, for example, that the corregidores tended to act in 
the interests of the indigenous towns they were sent to administer, rather than the royal 
treasury, because ‘they aimed to keep the Indians happy for anything that they might need 
from them and because they might ask for their support in their residencias and for this 
reason they are always their partisans and favour their affairs.’726 The residencias of the 
                                                     
725
 J.H. Parry, The audiencia of New Galicia, p.72-87; Ch.6. 
726
AGI, Gobierno, México, 323, 2
nd




corregidores did not prompt an enforcement of the bureaucratic rules that these salaried 
officials should follow but rather fostered the political culture of New Spain by creating 
political legitimacy from the civic virtues of the discharge of their duties, expressed through 
the goodwill of their charges, and in accordance with the perceived attitudes of the viceroy 
and audiencia. Indeed Sosa, like others, argued that the administration could do without 
corregidores and with far fewer ‘three or four’ officials to oversee greater districts.727 These 
and other similar calls were never heeded or implemented because the logic of New Spain’s 
viceregal regime did not strive for bureaucratic efficiency but for viable political 
arrangements that satisfied the needs of New Spain’s parasitic civic nobility and the viceroy 
which headed it. Offices like corregimiento became an essential component for the survival 
of the parasitic civic nobility.       
Some studies of this period have concluded that this was purely a form of 
corruption, inevitable companion to any imperfect human institution, however modern the 
intention, with the added sting that: ‘…corruption in America took on the character of a 
system and it will be necessary to explain it in terms of a more or less permanent tension 
between the Spanish state, the colonial bureaucracy and colonial society.’728 One recent 
study has concluded that this corruption was accentuated in particular by the fact that 
viceroys rather than legal experts like oidores ruled over New Spain.729  Acknowledging the 
role of legislation - not as the framework for state-building or the rules for the 
establishment of a modern bureaucracy - but as an element in establishing the legitimacy of 
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competing political interests and ideas about justice and good government of the time, 
allows us to avoid the false dichotomy between state bureaucracy and society. It helps to 
avoid the perception that there were firm rules that the viceroys and others were 
purposefully breaking for mere self-enrichment.  The promulgation of royal legislation 
cannot explain on its own the creation of either royal or viceregal authority over New Spain 
without understanding how its implementation affected the practice of government. Laws 
did not shape the kingdom or create the state; nor did they create a modern rule-bound 
bureaucracy.    
Tribute 
New Spain’s elite should be considered ‘parasitic’ because they maintained 
themselves principally from the tribute collected from New Spain’s labourers. The elite 
became increasingly defined by its role in government but those involved were not paid a 
salary that was drawn from, or generally determined by, the treasury of Castile as might be 
expected from a modern bureaucracy unattached to the land they were sent to govern. On 
the other hand the members of this elite did not serve on a purely voluntary basis by relying 
on their private wealth (except in a very few cases) as recommended by the classical 
precepts of public service and the example of contemporary Spanish titled noblemen with 
an ethos of service and the wealth to practise it.  
The centrality of tribute (in kind, money or labour) remained a practical necessity for 
the sustenance of New Spain’s elites as it had been in pre-Columbian times. The crown had 
no means of substituting tribute as the way to remunerate its administrators and sustain 
experiments like Puebla, where Spanish settlers were encouraged to become self-sufficient 
on their own labour and enterprise, but failed in their original intention and only the 
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support of neighbouring indigenous polities and indigenous immigration to the city allowed 
the town to survive. A reliance on tribute was also an ideological choice with regards to its 
distribution as a means of rewarding the crown’s servants. Distance from Spain, the ‘original 
sin’ of the conquest and the uncertain social origins of most Spanish settlers discouraged 
the crown from creating a hereditary Spanish nobility based on entailed patrimonial and 
tributary titles in New Spain. It nontheless recognised its responsibility to reward them for 
their ongoing services with the tribute that specific towns had theoretically paid to 
Motecuhzoma and now paid the king. The crown’s use of tributary grants as a reward was a 
means of reaffirming the encomendero’s lack of lordly autonomy. Its indigenous subjects, 
whose traditional and dynastic claims were stronger than those of the Spaniards though not 
unblemished from the confusion of the conquest, were also distrusted for their alien 
cultural and religious differences and the novelty of their loyalty and vassalage to the 
Habsburgs. 
For the king’s Spanish vassals, public remuneration and tribute exemption implied a 
reward for civic or administrative merits. Cervantes observed that in Spain administrative 
service was easier to reward than military service ‘…because the former are recompensed at 
the expense of the public, by giving them employments, which of necessity must be allowed 
on those of their profession, but the latter cannot be gratified otherwise than at the cost of 
the master that employs them…’730 The distinction did not exist in New Spain where the 
tribute payers bore the whole cost of sustaining the Spanish elite, suggesting that any such 
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distinction had become blurred. All tribute collected in New Spain nominally belonged to 
the crown. In assigning it to Spanish settlers it was rewarding a civic service.  
It also equated all Spaniards in Mesoamerica because the mere act of settlement in 
New Spain was considered a virtue in itself. The Spanish population was exempt from paying 
tribute but it was expected to fulfil certain duties: poverty, marriage and procreation was 
justification enough for the crown to grant deserving settlers mercedes in the shape of 
offices with salaries that represented a proportion of the tribute for their sustenance. 
Wealth on the other hand could disqualify others from receiving these rewards: regarding 
Velasco’s arrangements, for example, Valderrama complained that ‘Of those mentioned [in 
the list of office holders he drew up] most could be excused from office, some because they 
have very good Indians [in encomienda] and others because they are incapable…’731 
restating the parasitic and civic justifications for Spanish settlement and office-holding.  
The indigenous elites sustained themselves from their private estates and the 
remainder of the tribute generated by their community after whatever proportion was due 
for the Spanish population was subtracted and taken to Mexico City or the relevant 
encomendero. This corresponded to some extent to pre-colombian imperial traditions. It 
also meant that the tributary incomes of the Spanish and indigenous elites were inversly 
proportional to each other. The parasitic dependence of the Spanish and indigenous elites 
on tribute encouraged a sense of competition between and amongst them to secure the 
tribute available.  
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Inevitably this competition for tributary rights should be seen as part of the more 
general definition of boundaries between the indigenous and Spanish ‘republics’. In 1563 for 
example when the issue of perpetuity of encomienda and indigenous tributary dues seemed 
to be returning to political debate (with Vasco de Puga’s new assessments; criticism of the 
viceroy by the oidores; Montúfar’s attacks on mendicant authority; the arrival of Martín 
Cortés and news of Valderrama’s visit) several indigenous lords of New Spain proposed to 
Philip II that in exchange for a servicio of 2,400,000d to be paid over 5 years all Indian lands 
would to be placed under direct royal-viceregal administration and not encomienda. A friar 
and Zorita would oversee and guarantee the implementation of the various points of the 
contract.732 It echoed similar attempts by the encomenderos of Peru for instance to offer a 
bankrupt Philip II a similar subsidy in exchange for perpetuity of encomienda. The appeal is 
emblematic of the self-perception of the indigenous nobility and of the continued jostling 
for power between the elites of the two competing ‘republics’.  
Court and patronage 
The crown accepted the principle that its share of tributary income should be 
distributed by the administration of Mexico City almost in its entirety to deserving Spanish 
settlers. In any case apart from the stamped silver quinto real the tributary wealth of New 
Spain was not easily moveable. The equation between royal mercedes and personal services 
and the theoretical link between serving the crown in person and noble status meant that 
the granting of rewards was a sign of recognition of an individual’s status and his 
enfranchisement into the political nation of New Spain. All the attributes of this kind of 
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recognition could last only as long as the term of office, the length of commission, or the 
recognition of subsidy-worthy merit granted to them by viceregal command.   
New Spain’s ‘original sin’ meant that there was no established hierarchy supported 
by entailed wealth, autonomous rights or the full recognition of its status by the crown. 
Instead recognition of elite status became inextricably related to viceregal patronage. I have 
shown in preceding chapters how the viceroys attempted to concentrate in their persons 
the ability to dispense enfranchising patronage throughout New Spain. The forms their 
patronage took included: temporary offices (such as the development and extension of 
corregimiento, alcaldías, tenientazgos and other Spanish offices and the creation and 
ratification of indigenous offices, most importantly the gobernador); monetary 
disbursements (through the quitas y vacaciones fund, loans from the treasury); tribute 
assessments for indigenous polities (which affected the income of encomenderos and more 
importantly the income of the indigenous lords of those polities and indirectly the friars as 
well); land distribution (by encroaching on Indigenous and Spanish municipal rights of land 
distribution);  and various other forms of official recognition to individuals (like knighthoods, 
swords and other displays of ‘bastard feudalism’ to both Spaniards and Indians). The 
parasitic dependence on tribute meant that the viceroys were able to extend their authority 
in accordance with their ability to appropriate royal prerogatives such as appointing offices 
and controlling the treasury in Mexico City. 
All officials, including the viceroys, as well as unofficial agents of government, like 
encomenderos or indigenous lords or friars, ultimately held their status by selection or 
ratification from the crown. The viceroys (pro-rex when rendered in latin) acquired many of 
the attributes of the king on the ground in the same way that the proconsuls of Rome had 
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many of the attributes of the sovereign Roman citizenry over the provinces. In both cases 
they were ultimately dependent on the sovereign authority in the metropolis and in both 
cases they were its most important but not its only agents and representatives. Other 
authorised individuals could still expect to have access to the crown directly over the head 
of the viceroy.733 Naturally the monarch reserved the right to override the viceroy or to 
make his own appointments; but as the crown’s most important representative in New 
Spain, the viceroy was also the king’s most trusted advisor on matters pertaining to New 
Spain. His advice, his selections and appointments played an important part in the royal 
decision-making and legislative process so long as he was able to keep the king’s trust, 
rather than merely relying on his viceregal title.  
The offices of New Spain were granted according to courtly-political not 
bureaucratic, traditional or legal considerations, but there were problems with this system 
that troubled many observers. Andrés de Tapia, who had not been close to Mendoza but 
rallied to his defence after Tello de Sandoval’s visita, said of the viceroy that ‘he honoured 
everyone, was slow to anger and never harmed anyone, but if he could be accused of 
anything it would be of doing more for some than for others.’734 By describing the viceroy in 
this way to the crown, he was defending him from the principal charges that Tello de 
Sandoval had laid against him: in admitting that Mendoza had honoured everyone he was 
implying that the viceroy had fulfilled his fundamental role as the guarantor of status to the 
deserving; in claiming that he had not lost his temper or actively sought to harm anyone he 
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was exonerating him of the charge of possessing a tyrannous personality ruled by angry 
emotions. Only Tapia’s exclusion from the full extent of the viceroy’s favour still rankled.   
Viceregal favouritism was an inescapable aspect of the courtly style of ‘government 
by confidence’ that the concentration of power in the person of the viceroy created. It was 
also in part a consequence of the elites’ own political struggles. The viceroys were not 
sovereign and they needed to justify their preferences to the elites of New Spain and to the 
crown. This was particularly pressing given the uncertainty of legitimacy in New Spain and 
the competition for rewards. The viceroys had to show that their favour served the interests 
of the crown and not just their own, which was difficult to do since there were identifiable 
links of kinship or friendship between the viceroys and his favourites - something the 
visitadores charted meticulously, - and also because the power of patronage that the 
viceroys had accumulated meant that almost anyone they rewarded could be considered a 
de facto client. The worse than zero-sum mentality of New Spain made such favouritism 
particularly resented (see note 737 below).  
The viceroys’ main justification for the logic behind their preferences in the 
distribution of their patronage emphasised civic virtue and their right to determine how 
best to foster it as a result of their experience of New Spain. This harked back to theoretical 
‘first rudiments of the philosophers’ as laid out in an ethos of noble service found in 
European and pre-hispanic Mesoamerican cultures. Crusading Catholic ideals and 
aspirations to ancient uncluttered Christian piety that the friars added to this discourse also 
played a part.735 The viceroys’ most effective and trusted agents deserved greater rewards 
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because their contributions to the ‘republic’ were greater than those of others. This was 
legitimate so long as it did not impinge on the basic rights of the more excluded. Those 
closest to the viceroys were given the greatest responsibilities and opportunities for service. 
Their subsequent wealth, demonstrable experience and consequently merit allowed them 
even greater opportunities of noteworthy service in the future. For example, the young 
Francisco de Ibarra was allowed enormous scope to carve out an autonomous governorship 
in New Vizcaya because the Ibarra were close to the viceroys, much to the chagrin of old 
conquistadores who had carved out the North-West frontier in New Galicia like Diego de 
Colio.736 
The importance of the viceregal court meant that its ethos was adopted by the elites 
that were vying for its favour. The mendicants contributed much of the idealistic and 
crusading element to New Spain’s ethos and they were instrumental in transmitting it and 
its benchmarks of legitimacy to indigenous lords across New Spain. The governing elite’s 
ethos became increasingly civic and its motivation in complying with its ideals was 
competition for viceregal favour and the limited rewards it could provide.    
Montaigne restated in one of his essays a commonplace that had shaped people’s 
imagination since classical times, when he wrote that ‘no profit is ever made except at 
somebody else’s loss. ’737 It is a mind-set that has more recently been described as a zero-
sum game. The parasitic political nation of New Spain was aware that it was living through a 
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situation that was even more desperate as periods of severe demographic decline recurred 
throughout the sixteenth century. Tributary contributions from indigenous polities dropped 
continually as the periodic return of devastating epidemics to different regions caused 
terrible dislocations. The viceregal administration responded by lowering the tribute 
asssessments of the share demanded by Mexico City to keep the good will and assure the 
status of the indigenous lords.738 The monetary value of tributary income received by the 
Spaniards increased in this period in response to rapid price inflation.739 Tribute was still 
paid primarily in kind but it was given an estimated monetary value by the officials in 
Mexico City. The produce was either consumed in Mexico City or sold at market to convert it 
into coin.740 This explains the apparently large increase in tributary income throughout the 
period: less produce was arriving in Mexico City but its monetary value was greater. By the 
end of our period the royal officials claimed that the prices of some products had risen four-
fold in the 42 years in which their official salaries had remained unchanged.741 Officials, 
indigenous lords, and encomenderos all complained of decreasing incomes that were 
inadequate to their expectations. 
On the other hand more of the imperial tribute was taken directly to the royal 
treasury in Mexico City rather than paid to individual encomenderos or officials. The viceroys 
re-distributed the tribute to encomenderos, officials and worthy claimants from Mexico City. 
Political competition for status and a share of the tribute became an essential condition of 
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New Spain’s civic nobility. Mendoza claimed that not too long after he took up the 
viceroyalty there were more worthy claimants with similar justifications for rewards than 
available offices.742 In 1552 the royal officials explained that ‘the ambition that many people 
have to command in the land is very great both in temporal and religious matters…’743 
Similarly the post-conquest Huehuehtlahtolli urged office-holders to ‘Only tell the truth, that 
which is straight with regards to whether you can accomplish a mission or if it is impossible; 
but don’t proclaim it half-heartedly, or someone else might get the command… position 
yourself well, take charge of things well, fix them well, throw down roots…’744  
As the royal officials also noted, ‘corregidores and alcaldes mayores especially… 
could not support themselves for more than half the year on their salaries and given their 
necessity the viceroy supplements their income from the quitas y vacaciones fund, as he 
also grants mercedes and subsidies to the sons and wives of worthy but impoverished 
conquistadores and settlers…’745  By the time viceroy Peralta arrived in Mexico City, the 
nexus between office-holding, sustenance and viceregal grace was obvious enough and 
different enough from the situation in Spain for him to comment upon it to the crown: ‘and 
as the people of this land are in much need they do not wait for a man to come looking for 
them for this office [in this case a position in the viceregal bodyguard] and that they be 
given a salary but rather they come to one’s presence and beg every day to be received.’746 
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The combination of scarcer income and its greater concentration in the treasury of Mexico 
City increased the viceroy’s authority and the zeal of the competition amongst members of 
the aspiring elite to ingratiate themselves with the viceroys by conforming to viceregal 
expectations of virtue or by incorporating themselves into dynastic networks or webs of 
patronage and interdependence. We have seen in preceding chapters the form that this 
took and how the viceroy’s household and court were at the centre of this process.  
As previously noted distance from Spain, the ‘original sin’ of the conquest and the 
uncertain social origins of most of the Spanish settlers discouraged the crown from allowing 
the formation of a hereditary Spanish nobility based on entailed patrimonial and tributary 
titles in New Spain.747 Equally the indigenous nobility, whose traditional and dynastic claims 
were stronger than those of the Spaniards, were nevertheless distrusted for their alien 
cultural and religious differences and the novelty of their loyalty and vassalage to the 
Habsburgs. However the crown’s distrust of traditional and hereditary status does not mean 
that its only alternative was to create a modern bureaucracy or even that it intended to. 
Contemporaries did not see themselves as part of a ‘formative’ period that progressed 
teleologically towards the creation of the state in the future; instead they beheld the past 
before them. Their ideals were shaped by the experience of the practice of viceregal 
government and authority in Mesoamerica and traditional notions of service to the 
commonwealth that translated across boundries of hidalguía and tlatocayotl. It represents a 
sui-generis political arrangement that established a viable regime to govern New Spain: 
references to particular cities and polities as ‘repubilcs’; or to the parallel indigenous and 
Spanish ‘republics’ composing the ‘Kingdom of New Spain’ speak to their own idealised 
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definitions of New Spain. Dynastic or traditional elements of government were not 
suppressed out of a desire to create a modern state; nor was the role of royal officials and 
oidores enhanced to encompass governmental duties as a sign of a ‘second conquest’ by 
bureaucrats. Traditional European patterns of government were transformed, like 
everything else from Catholicism to food that came from Europe to New Spain, by dynamic 
and particular local circumstances. 
It was understood that ideally any civic competition for office and honours would 
have taken place before the king in his court. As the sovereign authority and ‘fount of all 
grace’, it is possible to equate the crown with historical precedents and principles whereby, 
for instance, Roman patricians competed for office or proposed policies before the 
sovereign citizenry directly in the forum. For the principal inhabitants of New Spain distance 
from the royal court compelled them to replace personal appearances before the sovereign, 
first with what I describe as ‘paper representation’: the voluminous reports, letters, and 
‘proofs of merit’ that they addressed to king and which form the bulk of the imperial 
archives. This form of presentation was not very effective on its own: ‘every time a fleet sets 
sail from New Spain we write to your majesty informing him of those things we deem 
necessary and convenient to the royal service and others relating to our offices and duties…’ 
explained the royal officials, but, as these correspondents admitted, the letters often 
remained unread and unanswered. 748   
In partial consequence, the most common and effective presentation of merit 
occurred at the viceregal court in Mexico City where the king’s authority was represented 
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before them in a familiar courtly setting and where decisions and appointments could be 
made immediately. Zorita recalled in the palace ‘A very broad corridor, of twenty arches 
over a large and beautiful garden, where the viceroy likes to go and give audience to the 
petitioners (negociantes literally: negotiators)’.749 The viceroy’s efforts which I have charted 
in preceding chapters mean that the court of Mexico City substituted the royal court as the 
‘fount from which flowed all grace’.750 Its attributes within New Spain were to some extent 
even more important than those enjoyed by the royal court in Spain. Viceregal grace 
redeemed and guaranteed legitimate status for New Spain’s elite. The offices and rewards 
in the gift of the viceroys became the surest way to enfranchisement and status; whereas 
the more clearly stratified Spanish society did not need such confirmation.  
The viceroys were not senior civil servants sent merely to oversee the 
implementation of the law or the running of an alien, rule-bound and professional 
bureaucracy dispatched from Spain to govern its Mesoamerican empire; nor did they see 
themselves as such. They saw themselves as the king’s alter-ego charged with governing the 
‘republics’ of New Spain. Their attributes were primarily political, not bureaucratic. Studies 
have shown that viceregal commands originating within New Spain were far more 
numerous and important than those issued by the crown,751 but their effectiveness 
depended on the mutual acceptance of authority between the viceroy and the recipient of 
the command, a condition that was established at court or through mutually trusted 
                                                     
749
 A. Zorita, Historia de la Nueva España, Madrid 1909, an edition of Relación de la Nueva España 20
th
 
October, 1585, ch. 12 , p. 176. 
750
 Paraphrasing Instituciones y elites de poder en la monarquía hispana durante el siglo XVI. J. Martínez Millán 
ed., (Madrid 1992), p. 17. 
751
 L. Semboloni, La construcción de la autoridad virreinal … Vol.2, p.296ff Conclusions. 
325 
 
viceregal representatives. The viceregal court’s fundamental importance for the 
government of New Spain consolidated and enhanced the authority of the viceroys in their 
own right rather than merely as a representation of the king, so long as their practical pre-
eminence was not challenged by a rival authority with equal credibility at court in Spain. 
Even individuals with non-tributary sources of wealth, accrued from private property 
or entrepreneurial activities like silver mining, often relied on the supply of labour and 
security of tenure that was determined or at least influenced by political factors in Mexico 
City. Often those most able to invest in private enterprises and to safeguard their 
investment were those who held positions in the administration of New Spain or enjoyed 
the confidence of the viceroy. Access to loans from the treasury or accumulation of wealth 
from gaining access to a share of the tribute of New Spain were the only ways to raise the 
capital necessary to invest in private enterprises. Recognition in Mexico City of legitimate 
ownership of land and benefices was essential to secure tenure from rival claimants.752  The 
silver miners in particular became closely associated with the viceroys because their activity 
provided the bulk of remunerations to the crown in Spain. The viceroys fostered their 
activity through allocations of labour and by guaranteeing security along the access routes 
that led to the burgeoning mining settlements in the Chichimeca frontier.753 
Beyond these more recognisable governmental agents, mendicant friars had an 
unofficial role which is often overlooked perhaps because fewer official cédulas and 
instructions were addressed to them. They too competed for viceregal approval. Although 
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they did not seek formal office in the administration they contended for influence over 
indigenous polities and the sustenance they derived from them. This influence affected their 
importance to the viceroys, who had the power to grant licences for the construction of 
monasteries, and who could help define areas of influence amongst the mendicant orders 
and defend them against the encroachments of the secular clergy. The viceroys also 
supported some of the mendicants’ allies or relatives through direct patronage of offices or 
subsidies for their services in their interactions with the indigenous polities: as Vázquez de 
Tapia observed ‘little was denied them’754 by Mendoza, and Valderrama highlighted the 
most obvious cases in the lists he drew up of Velasco’s suspect viceregal patronage.755 The 
way in which friars presented their worth to the viceroys, and in turn to the king and the 
Catholic hierarchy in Spain, was in terms of their civic achievements in reordering and 
pacifying the indigenous polities under their charge. The emphasis they placed on their 
governmental role was enough to become the cause of the most severe criticisms levied by 
the mendicants’ detractors. The clear deviation from the usual roles of the mendicant clergy 
in Europe again suggests the particular nature of political culture in New Spain.  
Debates regarding political legitimacy in New Spain were carried on both in Mexico 
City and between the enfranchised elites of New Spain and the crown in Spain. The resulting 
language of legitimacy and the legislation that followed it conditioned the behaviour and 
aspirations of recognised members of the elite and the nature of rewards that they hoped 
for.   
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Valderrama argued that the accumulation of power in the hands of the person of the 
viceroy led to ‘many inconveniences… since he is free to distribute everything there is to 
give in this kingdom. He distributes [these benefices] amongst his relatives and the 
allegados (dependants) of the oidores. They depend on the viceroy every day, and 
depending on him, a man needs to be especially upright to contradict the viceroy in his 
presence.’756 However, without rivals to their authority, the viceroys were able to keep New 
Spain remarkably peaceful both against Spanish factionalism and indigenous insurrection 
when compared to Peru, which shared similar characteristics, at a time when it had not 
established a viceregal regime able to assert its authority to the extent that the viceroys had 
achieved in New Spain. 
Alternatives to the Viceroys  
After Velasco’s unexpected death on the 30th of July 1564, other crown agents, 
principally letrados, were authorised to rule over New Spain. Despite their earlier criticism 
of the viceregal regime, they were forced by the demands of the parasitic civic nobility to 
adopt similar methods to establish their authority and enforce their commands. Even then 
they never enjoyed the success, authority or stability that the viceroys were able to achieve. 
Their failures highlight some of the salient administrative techniqies that explain viceregal 
success.  
After Velasco’s death official authority in New Spain splintered between the oidores, 
the visitador and the Royal Officials; less officially it was also contested between networks 
of patronage that coalesced around Martín Cortés, his kinsmen and adherents on the one 
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hand and Velasco’s brother, son and adherents on the other. Unrestrained by the 
concentration of power enjoyed by Velasco the competition to attain the attributes of 
political authority and patronage that the viceroy had enjoyed intensified and led to the 
development of increasingly well-defined and antagonistic factions. A similar disharmony 
had occurred when Tello de Sandoval began to undermine Mendoza’s authority except that 
Hernán Cortés had not been allowed to return to New Spain and Mendoza was still alive and 
in office. This created fewer challenges to viceregal support and avoided some of the worst 
potential instability as that which might have occurred by crass attempts at implementing 
the New Laws like those that led to Peru’s rebellion.757  
In 1564, it did not take long for the royal officials to begin complaining of the abuses 
and incompetence of the more recently arrived oidores like Vasco de Puga and of the 
alliance between Valderrama and Cortés.758 Hortuño de Ibarra and Fernando de Portugal 
had been close allies of Velasco and felt particularly aggrieved. They claimed that since 1560 
the new oidores led by Puga had damaged Velasco’s administration by their opposition and 
had offended the royal officials through various arbitrary judicial attacks on them. The 
accusations mirrored those levied against Velasco’s alleged tyrannous preponderance.  
Puga’s first action was to seek to control all the viceroy’s attributes of patronage 
over the distribution of funds that sustained so many agents of government, claiming that 
‘since the day when the viceroy died it fell on [the audiencia] to dispense these funds’. 
Much to the disgust of Velasco’s allies the audiencia refused to allow distributions to 
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individuals already selected by Velasco before he died, ‘people that were convenient for the 
fulfilment of the viceroy’s commands’, from the quitas y vacaciones fund.  Puga preferred to 
channel these funds to his own agents of government: ‘he now wants to compel us to pay 
and reward the people that the audiencia commands and wants to make mercedes too and 
because we do not wish to carry this out they show us hatred.’759 Echoing the attacks made 
on the viceroy, Ibarra described Puga’s allies as ‘without merits and not of greater quality 
than those chosen by the viceroy nor chosen from among those that could have been 
provided for more justly.’760  
Calls by the audiencia to end viceregal discretion for the distribution of funds were 
soon forgotten when they came to power. The quitas y vacaciones fund had become a 
fundamental instrument of government because it allowed for flexible distribution of 
patronage and compensation for services which had turned it into an essential attribute of 
authority in New Spain. Access to treasury funds in general had also become increasingly 
important because it allowed further disbursements in the shape of loans, not least to the 
viceroy himself761 but such access could not be achieved without the the compliance of the 
treasury officials. This strained relations between the officials and the audiencia even more.  
Complaints levied against the use of treasury funds prompted the crown to 
promulgate, along with viceroy Peralta’s other instructions, a royal command forbidding the 
distribution of funds from the treasury without prior royal approval. The royal officials who 
had remained of the ‘viceregal party’, amongst others, insisted that ‘it should be noted that 
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it matters to his majesty’s royal service that the viceroy be allowed to liberate funds from 
these quitas because without them the viceroy will not have the funds to maintain and 
make mercedes to many who have served and serve because as there are not enough 
offices for all those who are deserving, they are subsidised with this fund…’762 The amounts 
available in the quitas y vacaciones fund represented a considerable proportion of the royal 
income.763 Even such legalistically minded experts as president Vasco de Puga and his 
audiencia had to rely on the instruments of patronage developed by the viceroys in order to 
govern New Spain. 
Ibarra fretted that Valderrama was busy concerning himself with ‘matters of 
government’ while continuing to reside in the marquess’s house. Valderrama interpreted his 
governmental activity as a service to the crown, potentially of more importance than 
finishing his visita, and he wanted to retain his power in New Spain: A proposal for the 
visitador and the marqués to share power in New Spain was mooted by several of Cortés’ 
adherents. Valderrama’s most important bid for recognition was attempting to raise the 
level of tribute paid by indigenous communities to the treasury. He attempted to implement 
his ideas in collaboration with Puga, who had already suggested similar higher assessments 
in previous visitas he conducted round New Spain in opposition to the policy of Velasco and 
his allies. All those individuals whom Valderrama had identified as Velasco’s agents in the 
conclusions to his visita favoured lowering the Indian tribute: they included ‘what they 
called in Mexico alumbrados’ and others associated with the friars as well as several 
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dependants of viceregal patronage.764 He deprived these of their commissions and their 
subsidies. The new agents appointed by Puga and Valderrama applied a different 
interpretation of the law in their assessments, counting indigenous lords and therefore their 
terrazgueros as tribute payers and refusing to consider other mitigating factors that the 
previous political negotiations at the viceregal court had allowed for.765  
Meanwhile Martín Cortés was increasingly establishing himself as an unofficial 
patron of Spanish society in Mexico City. He displayed his dynastic insignia as he walked the 
streets with armed dependants to display his power, and he forced people he came across 
in the streets to follow him in attendance as a mark of deference on whatever business he 
was conducting.766 Objections were met with threats and even violence.767 He also used his 
influence in matters like arranging marriages for his allies, such as forcing the elderly Pedro 
Paz to marry a lady in waiting to the marchioness two days before the former’s death in 
order to claim his inheritance for a dependant. He was also trying to enlarge his holdings 
over crown lands in Matalcingo. Ibarra concluded he was generally ‘looming large’ over the 
politics of New Spain.768 His declared aim aim was to be made a Duke by the king for his 
services in New Spain but he needed to extend his influence in order to achieve a degree of 
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authority that would allow him to perform services for the crown that his adherents in New 
Spain could vouch for.769 
 All the attributes of government that the viceroys had been able to concentrate in 
their persons were dispersed between these various foci of authority. The division of 
authority and patronage in New Spain dissolved the assumptions that supported viceregal 
authority and invalidated the courtly negotiation with both the Spanish and the indigenous 
‘republics’ that had formed the basis of the regime’s operation. This was accentuated by the 
inexperience and more legalistic-mindedness of the newly arrived letrados who distrusted 
both the viceregal style of government they had condemned but had been forced to engage 
in, and the more European ideas of noble patrimonial authority that Martín Cortés was 
trying to revive. The Spaniards divided into increasingly radicalised factions seeking security 
of access to patronage and offices. Outbursts of violence between different factions began 
erupting in Mexico City.770  
Far more worrying for the Spanish presence in New Spain, the indigenous elite began 
to distrust the authority of Mexico City.  Political negotiation at court was replaced by Puga 
and Valderrama’s interpretation of some of the laws that theoretically guided the 
relationship between the Spanish authorities and the indigenous polities. This was not even 
a universal interpretation of the law as other letrados like Alonso de Zorita profoundly 
disagreed with it, but the former were in power and hoped that the crown would recognise 
their services if they could limit the rights and privileges of the indigenous nobility and their 
mendicant allies and as a result to increase the crown’s tributary income. Soon the 
                                                     
769
 CJV, p. 340. 
770
 J. Suárez de Peralta Tratado del descubrimiento de las Indias ed. Silvia Tena, (Mexico, 1990) pp. 181-3. 
333 
 
principales, claiming that they had been ‘made to feel like macehuales’, refused to collect 
any more tribute. Important lords began taking to the hills to avoid the punishment and 
imprisonment that befell many of their fellow lords and macehuales in an act of resistance 
familiar to Mesoamerican polities at least since Nezahualcoyotl’s rebellion that had led, 
according to pre-conquest traditions, to the overthrow of Azcapotzalco’s hegemony. The 
polities of the central valleys, who were indispensable in upholding the authority of Spanish 
Mexico City in Mesoamerica, were the most agitated at this apparent betrayal of their 
political arrangements. Intimidation by the Spanish authorities did not take long to fail as 
tributary income dropped and fears of rebellion increased. Valderrama and others were 
soon forced to admit that there was no way of collecting tribute771 or maintaining the ‘good 
government and Christianity’ of the polities without the cooperation of the indigenous 
nobility.772  
As complaints flooded into court, those most obviously in charge were discredited 
and the ‘viceregal party’ enjoyed a renewed legitimacy after the discredit of the visita: 
Valderrama was recalled and Martín Cortés began to seem suspect for his championship of 
perpetual encomienda. In this context the viceregal party, led by the viceroy’s relatives, took 
the opportunity presented by particularly extravagant celebrations arranged by adherents 
to Martín Cortés to celebrate the birth of his twins to launch a preemptive attack: arbitrarily 
they arrested the most prominent Cortesians justifying their actions under the cover of the 
state of emergency they proclaimed and supported by unsubstantiated accusations of 
treasonous plots they levied against their rivals. The so-called Ávila-Cortés conspiracy was 
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not a first outburst of creole patriotism but the tragically violent dénouement of political 
competition in New Spain unrestrained by viceregal moderation: a return to instability not 
seen since the 1520s.   
 By the time Peralta arrived and tried to moderate the obvious injustice of the 
imputations against Martín Cortés, the situation had become so radicalised that any 
restraint or compromise was inadmissible. Rather Velasco’s men used the old tricks of New 
Spain’s political conflict: they controlled communications to the crown. The new viceroy was 
discredited and accused of collusion in the rebellion of New Spain. All the evidence was 
circumstantial; Peralta’s French ancestry was the main accusation against him, but it fed on 
royal fears of a rebellion they would have been helpless to repress and which coincided with 
increasing royal concern over the challenge that the Netherlands was posing to royal 
authority at the time.  
Velasco’s party overplayed their hand. The crown replaced Peralta with a violent and 
repressive audiencia with no knowledge of or interest in the factional alliances in New 
Spain. Velasco’s party, including some members of the Bocanegra clan and even don Luis de 
Castilla and his son Pedro were tortured or imprisoned along with adherents of Cortés and 
other neutral actors as the crown tried to reassert its threatened authority. Repression 
eventually failed to work on the Spanish population just as it had not worked with the 
indigenous elite when Valderrama and Puga had tried imposing their higher rates of tribute. 
The new oidores were recalled in disgrace as complaints against them mounted from within 
New Spain.773 
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Jerónimo López never got the encomienda he wanted from Mendoza, but he had 
changed his mind about the viceroy’s vices after Tello de Sandoval’s visita. López admitted 
that no-one knew the land and its ‘secrets’ as well as Mendoza and that other governors 
from Europe 
would not understand them or the land or the people, because here the 
language is another and it is necessary to understand it and know it: all this is 
well known and understood by the viceroy… better than anyone else here or 
there [in Spain] because no-one equals him in this because in public matters 
he achieves more than anyone else here with his good judgement and his 
great experience and no-one knows the secrets like he does, and he procures 
them by every means because it is a matter of such importance to the 
service of Your Majesty.774 
Empires are notoriously difficult to define because they are so varied as to have little 
in common except that in every case it is possible to identify a dominant group that benefits 
from the status quo and acts to try to perpetuate it. Asking cui bono? reveals the nature of 
an empire by identifying its principal agents and beneficiaries. The Habsburg dynasty and 
some of its courtiers clearly benefited from their Mesoamerican Empire; but the main 
beneficiaries of the first fifty years of Habsburg rule over Mesoamerica were those Spanish 
and indigenous inhabitants of New Spain who became enfranchised into the political nation 
by virtue of belonging to what I have defined as New Spain’s parasitic civic-nobility. Its 
members became the elite of what should be considered, as it was by its inhabitants, a 
largely self-contained Mesoamerican sub-kingdom, run mainly from Mexico City with the 
viceroys as its ‘head’. Habsburg authority rested by necessity on the result of a political 
compromise with and among local participants. For the enfranchised, both Spaniards and 
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Indians, Habsburg authority was not imposed from Spain by force or coercion, nor were 
they governed by an alien bureaucracy. As the accepted local elites they were themselves 
the direct agents and beneficiaries of royal authority. Royal authority would not have 
survived in Mesoamerica without the willing consent of the local elites because the crown 
had no external force to impose its will otherwise.775 A voluntary acceptance of royal 
authority in Mesoamerica was not the inevitable result of the fall of Tenochtitlan. It involved 
political, rather than bureaucratic, arrangements that were developed and then 
safeguarded at the viceregal court. In return the authorised elites were expected to perform 
civic duties of government and administration. The viceregal court became the point where 
New Spain existed as a unitary political entity. In this period, the success with which the 
viceroys established personal authority in Mesoamerica determined the success with which 
Habsburg rule became accepted in New Spain.    
Viceregal government, as it developed from political competition in New Spain, 
became desirable and indispensable both for the elite of New Spain and for the Spanish 
Habsburg Crown. In 1547 Alonso de Montemayor had argued from New Spain that ‘were it 
not for ... [Mendoza’s] good government and prudence and great guile that he has shown in 
everything I think that the land would be lost and worse in New Spain than in Peru.’ He 
suggested that all the Indies should be ruled by viceroys with good salaries and many 
mercedes to keep their dignity so that ‘no inhabitant believes he is more powerful than the 
oidores and the viceroys’, but most importantly ‘may it please God that the viceroys and the 
oidores and the royal officials and your majesty’s criados were settled here and deeply 
rooted here and their sons and descendents too…’ because otherwise ‘the head and 
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government of the república’ would be in the hands of ‘defective and self-interested men’ 
who would only want to make money and return to Spain.776 Voluntary adherence to 
Habsburg authority developed in this period because the elites of Mesoamerica’s two 
‘republics’, and the viceroys that headed them, identified with the idea that New Spain was 
their kingdom within the Habsburg monarchy. As López de Gómara observed ‘Mendoza 
would have preferred to remain in Mexico, with which he was now familiar; nor did he wish 
to leave the Indians, with whom he got on very well (they had cured him of the gout by 
means of baths and herbs) nor did he wish to give up his estates, cattle and other 
interests….’777 Not only was the government not a modern imperial rule-bound 
bureaucracy, but the Habsburgs would have failed to govern New Spain if it had been.  
Epilogue 
The crisis occasioned by Velasco’s death eventually reasserted the importance of 
viceregal power, as the inhabitants of New Spain called for the appointment of a new 
viceroy. However, the appointment of Martín Enríquez did not bring about the sort of 
viceregal restoration that its supporters in New Spain had hoped for. New Spain’s elite had 
hoped to appropriate the viceroyalty as their own in the way that the first two viceroys had 
identified themselves with New Spain. The benefits for both were obvious: hereditary 
security for the dynasty of the viceroys, stability of internal political arrangements for the 
elite of New Spain.  
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The Spanish empire over America developed from the accumulation of experience 
and the conclusions of debate between Europeans and Americans; there was no past 
tradition that European administrators could draw to guide them in administering a 
territorial empire overseas. The first concerted effort was made in the package of legislation 
that accompanied Enríquez in 1568, described as ‘a complete revision of the imperial 
administration of New Spain’.778 As we have seen the effort had its origins in similar 
attempts made already in Naples and Castile in 1559, but the outcome was different. In 
Naples the authority of the viceroy was weakened by the ‘Collateral Council’ which united 
the royal chancery, the royal audiencia and the ‘council for the affairs of state’: ‘its functions 
would evolve until they reached a degree of pre-eminence relative to the viceroy by 
1559.’779 In New Spain the calls of the visitadores and other letrados to limit the local 
authorities in making appointments or taking political decisions, even to suppress the office 
of viceroy were, not adopted. The divisive and oppressive government of the audiencias 
that had followed Velasco’s death had finally discredited the notion of rule by letrados in 
New Spain. The result was an assertion of the supremacy of viceregal authority. Care was 
taken to limit more formally their patrimonial or dynastic ambitions by limiting the length of 
tenure of their office. On the other hand while they were in office, their power was better 
legally defined and consequently less easily challenged which meant that they became more 
supreme than Mendoza and Velasco ever were. The internal negotiation that had 
underpinned earlier regimes was limited though not eliminated; as was the identification of 
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the viceroys with the land. To those born in New Spain the outlook was that ‘in this land 
there is no more King than the viceroy… the counts and marquesses are his criados.’780  
Compared to European viceroyalties, the supremacy of the viceroys in New Spain 
and consequently the scope for local decision-making were increasingly affirmed in the 
legislation the crown enacted; but the personal association of the individual viceroys, 
oidores and officials with New Spain was limited by their terms in office. This was not an 
exceptionally modern bureaucratic reform either. In New Spain as everywhere else in the 
Spanish Habsburg ‘composite monarchy’ the patrimonial aspirations of its crown 
administrators outside of Spain became distrusted by the crown and were rejected. 
In New Spain the nature of political competition had undermined individual viceregal 
administrations but it had also made clear the indispensability of viceroys as ‘the head’ of 
the kingdom. The same became true of the oidores but most of the administrative offices 
were still appointed within New Spain, at least until the Bourbon reforms. The future 
careers of the subsequent viceroys of New Spain tended to become more associated with 
the court at Madrid than in Mexico City, and less engaged with the inhabitants of New 
Spain. Instead, the parasitic civic nobility turned to secure their status through the 
acquisition of private wealth, like haciendas, rather than engaging in political competition 
and relying on civic success and official rewards for their status. Nevertheless, at least until 
the Bourbon reforms began to undermine the relative political autonomy of New Spain, the 
essence of royal authority over the inhabitants of New Spain remained linked to political 
enfranchisement mediated at the court of the viceroys in Mexico City. Local participation 
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and identity was symbolised by increasing worship of autochthonous cults and rituals like 
the virgin of Guadalupe or the continued exaltation of Mexico City. Amongst other 
outcomes, New Spain developed its own sub-empire in North America and more 
impressively in the Pacific through the settlement and garrisoning of Guam, the Marianas 
and the Philippines, largely by criollos, Indians and mestizos from New Spain. It was an 
expansion driven by a conjunction of interests created by the elite of New Spain and mostly 
shared by the Spanish crown: don Rodrigo de Vivero y Velasco, a kinsman of the Velasco 
viceroys who was born near Mexico City, established the first treaty between New Spain 
and Japan in 1609, after his shipwreck off the coast of Onjuku, and returned to Mexico City 
via Acapulco with the first Japanese delegation to cross the Pacific before it continued on to 
Europe. It was done in the interests of New Spain and in the teeth of commercial opposition 
from Spain and the Philippines. The contact proved short-lived but is illustrative of the 
confidence and ambition of New Spain’s enfranchised elite. The Habsburg Empire over 
Mesoamerica was predicated on local participation, consent and shared mutual interests. 











Acolhua:  A name often used to describe Texcoco’s domain.  
Adelantado: Spanish commander of an expedition or the highest authority of a 
peripheral territory which was not under a formal governor or an 
audiencia.  
Afán nobiliario: Fascination with nobility identified as a Spanish phenomenon of the 
early modern period.  
Ahuehuete: Literally the ‘Old man of the water’, Taxodium Mucronatum known in 
English as the ‘Montezuma Cypress’ is a characteristic tree of central 
Mexico that can grow to an enormous size. 
Alcalde mayor: Spanish official typically with authority over of larger area than a 
corregidor. 
Alcalde: Municipal magistrate who formed part of the cabildo and could 
preside it.  
Alguacil: An oficial associated with the implementation of certain judicial duties 
like surveying weights and measures or conducting arrests and other 
police-like duties.   
Allegados:  A term that denoted intimacy or proximity. Used of family or 
dependants.  
Almojarifazgo: Customs taxes. 
Altepetl:   Nahua polity. 
Alumbrado: Spanish term with evolving meanings normally associated with certain 
types of Catholic mysticism. As I discuss in the text, in New Spain it 
also seems to have acquired connotations of disregard for immediate 
authorities and the appeal for legitimacy directly from moral 
principles or from the highest authorities like the viceroy, by the 
1560s.  
Astillero:  Dry-dock  
Audiencia: Court which normally heard appeals and in the Americas took on 
administrative functions. 
Ayuntamiento: Municipal governing council.  
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Caballero:  Knight. 
Cabecera: Capital city of a district, a kingdom or any other defined territorial 
unit. 
Cabildo: Gathering in council of a municipal unit or a polity’s representatives 
(elected and/or appointed).   
Cacique: General Spanish term, taken from a Taíno word, for the dynastic head 
of an indigenous polity.  
Calmecac:  School for the Tenochca elite.  
Calpixcalli:  Administrative offices in a Nahua palace 
Calpolli: Nahuatl term meaning the district of a polity, but literally a ‘large 
house’.  
Cañas:   A type of game that simulated combat on horseback.   
Capitulación: A form of contract between the crown and the leader of an 
expedition which involved the ‘capitulation’ or transfer of rights from 
the crown to the latter. 
Casa poblada;  A household with dependents.   
Cazonci:  Dynastic head of the Purehpecha polities of Michoacán.  
Cédulas: Writ or decree issued by an authority dealing with a broad range of 
issues from appointments to office to judging a dispute. They could 
constituted a legal precedent.  
Chichimeca: Generic Nahua term for the nomadic and semi-nomadic populations 
of their northern frontier.   
Cihuacoatl:  Chief adviser to the Tenochca ‘emperor’ (Huey Tlatoani ). 
Coacalli: Nahua term for the chamber within a palace used to host, house and 
entertain visitors under the protection of safe-passage and included 
storage-rooms from where they could be provisioned and granted 
presents or supplies for their onward journey.  
Compadres: Denoted intimacy and friendship; from the close relationship between  
a child’s parents and god-parents.  
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Comuneros: Rebels of Castile against the authority of king Charles I and his regime 
with a variety of grievances and aims..  
Contador:  Treasury official.   
Contino:  Member of the king’s bodyguard.     
Corregimiento : A office granted by the viceroy or the King as a reward for merit.  It 
implied changing administrative and judicial powers over a defined 
territory usually corresponding to an indigenous polity.   
Criados: Denoted the relationship and bonds of loyalty between a patron and a 
dependent. It referred to individuals ‘created’ ie., supported, and 
promoted by a patron.  
Cuauhpilli: A term applied to nobleman by merit (literally son of an eagle or 
noble eagle).  
Cuauhtlatoani: Interim governors for the period between the death of a prince or 
lord and the election or selection of his or her successor. They were 
normally chosen from without the governing nobility which 
theoretically encouraged his autonomy.  
Cuicacalli: Nahua term for the chamber within a palace used for organising the 
construction of public works  
Encomendero: Holder of an encomienda. 
Encomienda: A changing and developing term in this period that at its most basic 
meant a right to a proportion of a polity’s tribute in exchange for 
certain responsibilities like readiness for war or support for 
evangelisation.  
Factor:   Treasury official. 
Hidalgo: Generic Spanish term for nobleman meaning literally ‘son of 
someone’ or ‘son of virtue’ according to the Siete Partidas. 
Huehuehtlahtolli: ‘Ancient words’ referred to a series of didactic lessons in conversation 
form.  
huey tlatoani: High prince: the Nahua term normally applied to the Mexica 
‘emperor’. 
Icapilli:    Nahua term for the reed-thrones used by figures authority. 
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Legajo:  Bundle of papers.   
Letrado:  A university educated lawyer.  
Lienzos: Literally a canvas, the term is used to describe the ‘painted books’ and 
other documents produced by or on behalf of indigenous 
communities or individuals.  
Macehual:  Nahua term for a plebeian member of a polity. 
Maestresala:  Household position.   
Malcalli: Nahua term for a prison within the palace complex. 
Malinche: Name given to Hernán Cortés by the Nahua during the conquest 
campaigns.  
Mandamiento: Command or instruction given by an authority.  
Mayeque: Landless serfs tied to a their lord’s land. Also called naborias or 
terrazgueros.  
Mayordomo Mayor: Highest household position.   
Mercedes:  Rewards granted by a lord to his vassal.   
Mestizo/a: An individual classed by society or those in authority as being legally 
neither an Indian nor a Spaniard but a mixture of both and 
consequently not harmoniously integrated into either ‘republic’. 
Mixcoacalli: Nahua term for the chamber within a palace to house entertainers, 
musicians and hangers-on. 
Naborias:  See Mayeque. 
Nahuatlato:  Nahuatl speaker. Used to describe translators.  
Oidor:   A judge that forms part of an audiencia.   
Papahuaque:  Provincial governor, translated by some authors like Sahagún as 
‘Satrap’.  
Pastel: Refers to Isatis Tinctoria, also known as woad in English. A valuable plant 
used to create indigo coloured dyes for fabric.     
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Pechero: An individual liable to contribute to the commonwealth through 
direct taxation or tribute (unlike a nobleman who contributed with his 
personal service).  
Petlacalco:   Nahuatl term for a palace’s store-house. 
Pilli:  Nahuatl term for nobleman. Like hidalgo it was taken to mean literally 
‘son of someone’. 
Pochteca:  Nahua term used to describe a a commercial entrepreneur.  
Quinto real: The ‘royal fifth’ or the 20% owed to the crown from any presious 
metal extracted. In this period it was more normally a tenth than a 
fifth.  
Regidor:  Member of a municipal cabildo.    
Repartimiento: A ‘distribution’. It was another way of saying encomienda.  
Residencia:  A judicial review of an individual’s term in office.   
Teccalli or Teccalco: Nahua term for the chamber within a palace where civil cases were 
heard.  
Tecpan/ teccalli:  Nahua term meaning palace, literally ‘lord-house’. 
Tecpantlalli:   The lands and rents endowed to a palace. 
Tecpilcalli: Nahua term for the chamber within a palace used to pass judgement 
exclusively on noblemen-warriors.  
Teixhuiuh: Nahua term, used in Tlaxcala and the Puebla valley, literally ‘the 
grandsons of someone’ 
Teohua Teuctli: Lordly title with authority over the Chalca confederacy. 
Tequihuacacalli:  Nahua term for the chamber within a palace that housed the council 
of war where military commanders were named and appointed.  
Terrazguero:  See Mayeque. 
Tlacxitlan:  Nahua term for the chamber where criminal cases were heard.  
Tlatic Teuhtli:   Lordly title with authority over the Chalca confederacy. 
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Tlatoani: Prince, dynastic leaders, (meaning literally ‘he who speaks’). 
Tlatocamecayotl:  Nahua term for genealogies of lordship. 
Tlatocatlacamecayotl: Nahua term for ruling dynasty. 
Tlenamacaque:  Provincial governor, translated by some authors like Sahagún as 
‘Satrap’. 
Tlatocayotl: Nahua term for lordship. However it could also mean, state, kingdom, 
crown, patrimony, dignity, greatness, genealogy, eloquence, majesty. 
There are many related and derivative verbs, adverbs and adjectives 
in Nahuatl. 
Válido:   An acknowledged favourite.   
Veedor: An oficial charged with overseeing the activities of certain enterprises 
or guilds.  
Visita: A general inspection the conduct of an administration.   
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Appendix A: Favoured Indians and 
Spaniards 
 
This appendix is intended to support many of the assertions made in the main text of the 
thesis. It includes selected and organised prosopographical information from unprinted 
documents in the Archivo de Indias. Its intention is to serve as a point of reference for the 
reader and to further our general knowledge of various individuals that were politically 
active in this period; their role in promoting viceregal authority and their position in 
viceregal webs of patronage. This appendix is not an extant work of reference to all the 
individuals mentioned in the text and it should be used in conjunction with the printed 
sources of prosopographical information I have cited there. Much further research and 
organisational work need to be done to integrate the increasing number of printed 
prosopographical studies. I hope this may be a useful addition to this important effort.    
I. Favoured Indians 
Indigenous recipients of viceregal licences to bear European arms or ride 
horses.   
 
The names are taken from the memorial produced by Antonio de Turcios for 
visitador Francisco Tello de Sandoval in AGI Justicia 258. I have listed the names in 
alphabetical order within nine broad geographical regions plus one section where it is 
impossible to determine the exact origins of the recipient given the information available in 
the memorial.  
All the individuals in the memorial received the honorific style ‘don’. The list provides 
very little information in itself about the individual, usually: a Christian first name, the polity 
they belonged to (with all the idiosyncrasies of Spanish spelling of indigenous names) the 
date the licence was issued and occasionally their rank within these polities (principal, señor, 
gobernador, cacique) and occasionally a reason for the grant. For the sake of clarity I give 
the standard names of the towns rather than as they appear in the manuscript unless the 
discrepancies in spelling are so great that I cannot be sure of the identity of the area, in 
which case I cite the spelling in the manuscript in quotation marks before hazarding a guess 
as to where it refers to. I assume that in the memorial the names are placed in chronological 
order by year so when only the day and month were provided I have assumed that they 
correspond to the last year cited.  
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I have tried to cross-reference some of this information to add some biographical 
detail only in the cases of greatest possible certainty of an individual’s identity. This list is a 
much longer version of that found in Mendoza’s defence published by Lewis Hanke (VEA, 
Mendoza, doc.7 ‘cargo xviii’) which was ostensibly the same list. The names that appear in 
both are marked with an asterisk (*). I have also added some relevant geo-political 
information regarding the area, which is all taken from P. Gerhard’s A Guide to Historical 
Geography of New Spain (CUP 1972) and R. Himmerich y Valencia. Any other references are 




Cristobal   ‘Prince of Jalisco’. Sword- 7 Jan 1544. 
Hernando  Gobernador of Amula (Amunla?). Horse - 20 May 1542.Amula 
in southern Jalisco-Colima- towards Navidad- its corregidor 
would be in charge of inspecting the ships.  
Mexico Basin and Chalco 
 
Antonio Of Cuitlahuac Horse - 23 May 1542. Polity considered as part 
of greater Chalco on the shores of the lake. They probably 
owned the adjacent island of Xico. 
Carlos Of Chimalhuacán. Sword - explicitly for ‘going to the war in 
Jalisco’ - 12 September 1541. In Chalco’s border with 
Texcoco’s domains; encomienda of Juan de Cuéllar Verdugo (el 
Gitano) in 1547 sold to Blas de Bustamante. The polity had a 
long-standing border dispute with Ocuituco involving the 
village of Acacingo or Ecacingo, By 1535 Chimalhuacán had 
‘usurped it’.   
Diego Gobernador of ‘Tepeta’ Horse - 30 December 1536. Possibly 
Tepetaosto/Tepetaostoque/Tepetlaostoc? Near Texcoco in 
1536 under Juan Velázquez de Salazar who had it from his 
father. 
Diego Gobernador of Mexico City. Horse - 30 October 1538. Full 
name don Diego de Alvarado Huanitzin, died 1542. Nephew of 
Motecuhzoma I (son of Tezozomoc Acolnahuacatl 
Motecuhzoma’s brother and therefore grandson of Axayacatl).  
At the time of the conquest, Diego was tlatoani of Ecatepec 
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(later his cousin doña Leonor Moctezuma’s encomienda) and 
seems to have continued in this position. He asked for the 
estancias of Tizayuca, Acayuca and Tulcuayuca but did not get 
them as the first two were awarded to Tlatelolco in 1539 after 
a lawsuit with doña Leonor. The Second Audiencia had been 
willing to grant him only enough for his maintenance until 
Mendoza decided to reinstitute the ‘royal line’ as governors of 
Mexico City and he was elevated to the govrnorship. Don 
Diego formed a matrimonial alliance with his cousin Francisca 
de Moctezuma (Motecuhzoma’s daughter) and his daughter 
would marry don Antonio Cortés Totoquihuaztli, Tlatoani of 
Tlacopan, maintaining pre-conquest dynastic links. His son 
became gobernador of Mexico City under Velasco from 1557-
62 and his other daughter Isabel married the indigenous 
humanist and future gobernador Antonio Valeriano and later 
the chronicler don Fernando de Alvarado Tezozomoc. Diego 
and his dynasty were at the heart of the indigenous 
establishment of the early colonial period. (see La Nobleza 
Indígena del centro de México. Pérez-Rocha & R. Tena eds. 
(Mexico, 2000) p.79. 
Francisco Gobernador ‘of part of Xochimilco’. Horse - explicitly ‘for going 
to the war in Jalisco’ - 12   September 1541.  
Francisco* Prince of Tlalmanalco Sword and horse 20th March 1542. Don 
Francisco Sandoval Acazitli: ‘an honoured person, friend of the 
Spaniards who served in person and with the people of his 
province in Mixtón war’(H).  
Francisco  Prince of ‘Olaque’ (Olac )Horse-  7th October 1542. Xochimilco 
area; one of the three rulers of Xochimilca kingdom along with 
Tecpan, Tepetenchi.  
Hugo  Nobleman of Xochimilco. Sword - explicitly ‘for going to the 
war in Jalisco’. 12 September 1541. 
Juan*  Of Coyoacan. Sword - 12 July 1542. Probably don Juan de 
Guzmán Itztlolinqui ‘el Viejo’. Prince and gobernador of 
Coyoacan, ‘always treated like a Spaniard, he converses with 
them.’ (H). One of the most distinguished participants in the 
Mixtón war. Son of noble Mexica lady and Cuauhpopocatzin 
tlatoani of Coyoacan at contact who was allegedly killed by 
Mexica forces for helping the Spaniards escape the massacre 
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of the ‘Noche Triste’. His brother went to Hibueras in 
command of 400 men while Juan was educated by 
Franciscans. In 1536 Juan wrote to the King asking for his 
polity to be placed under the crown rather than as part of 
Cortés’ domain.  His request was turned down but his personal 
patrimony and lands were recognised and ratified very early 
on.  Mendoza made him gobernador in 1540 after he had 
already been recognised as hereditary prince of Coyoacan. He 
became extremely wealthy and was granted coat of arms in 
1551 dying in 1569 after ratification of his holdings and status 
from Martín Enríquez. His son, however, died indebted. 
Purépecha and Spanish lines took over to form a mestizo 
dynasty that remained powerful into the 19th century (La 
Nobleza Indígena … p.84). 
Juan    Nobleman of Mexico. Sword - 28 November 1544. 
Luis de Leon* Nobleman of Santiago (Tlatelolco). Horse and sword - 14 June 
1543. An interpreter for audiencia who ‘served in the journey 
to the new lands’ (Cíbola?). Due to ‘his drunkenness’, 
however, the viceroy later denied him his sword and the 
position of interpreter. (H) 
Pedro  Of Xochimilco. Horse - 27 August 1541.Possibly don Pedro de 
Santiago who claimed he had participated in all major wars of 
New Spain. In 1563 he compared the assistance he and 
Xochimilco had given to the crown with that of Tlaxcala. He 
also claimed that of 30,000 inhabitants of Xochimilco in 1521 
there were 6-7,000 left after plagues and services in wars. This 
and the new offices introduced by the viceroys resulted, he 
argued, in the loss of authority of the dynastic lords over the 
macehuales.  
Tapia*  Nobleman of Mexico. Horse - 6 March 1538. Hernando de 
Tapia, son of Andrés de Tapia Motelchiuhtzin (cihacoatl to 
Motechuzoma- despite alleged macehual origins- and 
denouncer of Cuauhtemoc in Honduras, according to Bernal 
Díaz del Castillo, and ruler of Mexico City 1525-1530, dying 
during Nuño de Guzmán’s expedition to New Galicia). 
Hernando’s military service included the Mixtón war but his 
main occupation was as interpreter for the viceregal regime 
for 17 years. In the process he became a close friend of 
Mendoza and oidor Tejada, probably lived in the palace and 
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was rewarded several times from the quitas y vacaciones fund. 
Hernando went to Spain with Cortés in 1527. At some point he 
visited Rome where he was knighted by Pope Paul III as a 
member of the order of the golden spur and returned with 
Mendoza to New Spain with a further coat of arms from 
Charles V. This was supplemented by a royal pension of 
unknown amount but which was increased by 5,000 maravedís 
after an appeal to Charles V, though he was never granted the 
encomiendas he repeatedly requested. In Europe he married 
doña Isabel de Caceres and then seemingly the daughter of a 
Spanish settler in New Spain: ‘always treated like a Spaniard 
and married a Spanish woman and is currently married with 
the daughter of a Spaniard’(H). (La Nobleza Indígena… p.39). 
Michoacán 
 
Antonio* Gobernador of the province of Michoacán. Sword - 10 february 
1546. Son of the last Cazonci Tangáxoan II; became gobernador 
of province of Michoacán after his brother Francisco Tariacuri 
who became governor after the death of don Pedro Ponce in 
1543, dying himself in 1545. Antonio governed till 1562 (The 
Conquest of Michoacán Benedict Warren, J. Oklahoma 1985, 
pp.244-5). Considered a ‘good Christian, since he was a boy’, 
he grew up in the viceregal palace, and then studied in the 
College of Michoacán where he learnt Latin. He ‘has always 
been treated like a Spaniard and is their friend’ (H). 
Bartolomé   Son of the gobernador of Michoacán (presumably Pedro 
Ponce). Carriage- 6th December 1542 ‘to allow him to travel in 
a carriage, as requested by the Bishop of Michoacán’. 
Francisco   Lord of Tinhuindín (?) in Michoacán. Sword- 26 July 
1537.Possibly the last Cazonci’s older son don Francisco 
Tariácuri. Tinhuindín was part of the cabecera of the larger 
pre-conquest polity of Tepehuacán which had proved 
intractable at contact in 1522. 1528 Antón Caicedo held the 
encomienda of Tarecuato and Tepeguacan which included this 
polity. He died in 1535 or 6 and it passed to the crown. Widow 
kept towns of Periban and Tarecuato but the rest became a 
crown corregimiento by July 1540. The encomendero’s widow 
Marina Montesdoca remarried Francisco de Chavez (one of 
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Mendoza’s closest allies) There was also a Franciscan 
monastery there.  
Francisco  Prince of Guaniqueo(?)Carriage- 6th December 1542. Another 
son of the gobernador of Michoacán Pedro Ponce. The bishop 
requested a carriage for him as well. Situated 10 leagues north 
of Pátzcuaro. 
Juan  Nobleman of Cuiceo. Horse - 25 Feb 1542.Northern Michoacán 
by the lake of same name: Tarascan outpost on the 
Chichimeca frontier. The area and subject settlements had 
been ruled by a military governor in pre-contact times. 
Gonzalo López (el camarero) held the encomienda.  A 
Corregidor was appointed in the 1550s. 
Juan  Of Taximaroa. Horse – 21 March 1545.Maravatío district of 
Michoacán c. 10 miles N.W. of Zitacuaro. Had been run by 
military governors appointed by the Cazonci as marcher lords 
against the Mexica. Factor Gonzalo de Salazar and veedor 
Peralmíndez Chirino appropriated it; Salazar kept it and gave it 
to son Juan Velázquez de Salazar.  
Juan      Nobleman of Michoacán. Sword - 10th february 1546. 
Luis  Prince of Cuzamala Carriage- 6th December 1542. Also called 
Apazingan, possibly another son of the governor of 
Michoacán. Situated on Purehpecha – Mexica frontier the 
encomienda was granted to Francisco Vázquez de Coronado 
and inherited by his daughter who married Bernardino 
Pacheco de Bocanegra.  
Pedro (Cuinierángari) Gobernador of Michoacán. Sword and Horse - 13 January 
1537. Governed until 1543 (See The Conquest of Michoacán 
Benedict Warren, J. Oklahoma 1985, pp.244-5). The son of a 
high priest he claimed that the Tangaxoan II had considered 
him like a brother. He became the chief informant of the 
Relación de Michoacán where he presented himself as the first 
and chief architect of the settlement between Castilians and 
the Puréhpecha and there is nothing to doubt his claims or the 
fact that he played an active and personal role in these events. 
He was tortured and imprisoned by Nuño de Guzmán and later 
restored to grace and power by Mendoza. He was the main 
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informant for the Relación Michoacán commissioned by 
Mendoza. 
Pedro Ponce* Gobernador of Cuiceo. Horse and sword - 28 November 1544 
and possibly also 25 Feb 1542. Described as a ‘great friend of 
the Spaniards and treated as one himself: served from 
beginning to end of Mixtón war. There has always been much 
trust for him’ (H). He could either be Pedro (Cuinierángari) 
who therefore did not die in 1543 but was rather given the 
principality of Cuiceo to make way for the restoration of the 
Cazonci’s son Francisco to the government of Michoacán; or 
this is one of his sons. Cuiceo in northern Michoacán. 
Purépecha was an outpost on the Chichimeca frontier. The 
area and servant settlements ruled by a military governor. 
Gonzalo López (el camarero) held the encomienda. Corregidor 
sent in 1550s. 
Pedro  Of Ucareo. Horse- 22 July. Northern Michoacán on the 
Chichimec (Pame) frontier south of Acambaro, Hernán Pérez 
de Bocanegra y Córdoba’s encomienda. Half way along 
province that stretched almost to Mexica frontier too and to 
Cuiceo on the other side: the frontier alliances sealed. Crown 
town by 1536 with a corregidor for whole area advantage of 
lands of Taimeo that both Ucareo and Maravatío on the other 
side appropriated).  
Pedro Prince of Necotlan (?). Sword- 28 September 1543. Also known 
as Undameo in Michoacán near Charo, Tiripitio and Michoacán 
City; between1536- 1545 it escheated and was made a 
cabecera in its own right. Corregimiento no longer tied to 
Matalcingo-Charo.  
Pero García Nobleman of Cinapécuaro (?). ‘To ride his father in law’s 
horse’- 10 February 1546. In Michoacán frontier with Mexica 
and Chichimeca. 1538 became a corregimiento. c. 8 leagues 
from NW of Taximaroa and about same NE of Valladolid and 8 
SW from Acambaro. 
Mixteca-Valley of Oaxaca-Tehuantepec 
 
Andrés Prince of Titicpac. Sword - 21 August 1543. 5 leagues south of 
Antequera in Oaxaca near Chichicapa in the jurisdiction of that 
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name and Cimatlan- Zapotecs; had been tributaries to the 
Mexica. Under crown jurisdiction overseen by a corregidor.  
Cristóbal Gobernador of Tlacachaguaya. Horse - 28th September 1543. 
Tlacochaguaya/Tlacuechahuayan was a Zapotec polity with a 
Mixtec minority that had governed after invading the area and 
until they themselves fell to the triple alliance. The region was 
part of the marquesado.   
Francisco Of  ‘G…melula’. Sword- 2nd August 1542. Guamelula ? near 
Guatulco (best harbour between Acapulco and Guatemala) 
and just north of Tehuantepec in Oaxaca, near the Pacific 
coast – Corregidores appointed from c. 1537. A complicated 
area with archaic Nahua speakers, Chontals and Zapotecs in 
the north- Francisco de Vargas may have been the local 
encomendero  at Suchitepec –Xadani in the area but the region 
escheated to the crown c. 1537. (Guamelula itself had 
escheated as early as 1531).  
Juan* Gobernador of the province of Tehuantepec. Horse and sword 
- 21 March 1545. Called Cosijipi II and took the name Juan 
Cortés, his mother was a Mexica princess. His alliance with the 
Spaniards since the conquest helped to strengthen and 
increase his regional supremacy. (See El cacicazgo en Nueva 
España y Filipinas, M. Menegus Borneman & S. Aguirre eds., 
(Mexico, 2005), p.168ff.) Mendoza described him as a ‘friend 
of Spaniards helping out any who travel around his land.’ (H) 
See cacicazgo book.). Tehuantepec was part of the 
marquesado.  
Juan Prince of Cuyotepeque. Sword - 7 January 1544. Near 
Antequera and Oaxacan Talistaca. 
Juan  Gobernador of ‘Macinitlan’. Sword - 10 february 1546. 
Mazatlan near Tehuantepec? Encomienda of Alvaro de Zamora 
interpreter of audiencia though it had been claimed by Cortés 
before 1540 as part of his Tehuantepec holding. Mainly 
populated by Chontals. They had been at war amongst 
themselves at contact, pacified by Juan Cortés prince of 
Tehuantepec and Pedro de Alvarado when it ‘rebelled’ in 
1520s. It would rebel again after the death of Juan Cortés in 
1560s. Near Guamelula (see above).  
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Pablo Gobernador of ‘Miquitla’ Sword - 30 January 1542. Mitla (?) in 
Oaxaca, near Antequera largest Zapoteca princedom with 
hereditary rulers. Crown land by the early 1530s. 
Pedro Of ‘Xoquinquitlapilco’. Horse ‘for war in Jalisco’ - 12 
September 1541.  Xochicuitlapilco was located in the Mixteca, 
northern Oaxaca, an area that had paid tribute to the triple 
alliance. It was considred a cabecera in 16th c. and the site of a 
corregimiento joined to that of Huaxuapan by 1555).  
Pedro Of Tuitlapilco Horse - 10 March 1542. Tuchitlapilco or 
Tuchcuitlapilco or Tuctla. Also in the Mixteca, near Huaxuapan 
– encomienda granted to Indian gobernador Juan Sánchez.  
Pachuca-Veracruz 
 
Domingo Prince of Tlatiquipa. Sword - 28th September 1543. Probably 
Tlaquilpa 5 leagues S. of Pachuca near Cempoala: Pame-
Speaking Chichimecs and Otomis mixed with Nahuatl speakers 
all paying tribute to Texcoco who appointed the Calpixque. – 
connected to Cuauhquilpan. May have been part of the 
encomienda of Francisco Ramírez before it escheated to the 
crown. The other half of the encomienda rights may have been 
held by Juan Pérez de la Gama (de la Riva) resident of Puebla 
and then Mexico City c. 1537. He renounced it to lic. Rodrigo 
de Sandoval who in c. 1550 transferred it to lic. Fernando 
Sanchez de Sandoval. Epazoyuca area to the north of the 
province was under Lope de Mendoza from the later 1530s 
and he left it to his widow Francisca del Rincón and on her 
death it went to the future viceroy Luis de Velasco jnr. It is 
near Talisteta where don Diego and don Hernando were also 
rewarded. 
Soconusco-Approaches to Guatemala 
 
Baltasar   Gobernador of Soconusco. Sword -  9 October 1538.  
Juan* Gobernador of Soconusco. Horse and sword - 28 April 1536. 
‘He was honoured and a great friend of the Spaniards. He 
helped Spaniards in need and even put them up in his 
house.(H)’ Had died by 1546.  
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Pedro Prince of Verapaz. Horse - 2nd May 1542. In Chiapas-
Guatemala an area where Bartolome de las Casas apparently 
achieved a peaceful conversion and alliance of the Indians who 
had previously resisted military conquest.  
Taxco 
 
Diego     Gobernador of Taxco. (Horse- 12 November).  
Pedro  Nobleman of Taxco: Gobernador of the ‘pueblo de los 
Aminegos(?) (mineros?)’. Horse- 24 July 1543.  
Tlaxcala-Puebla valley 
 
Alonso    Nobleman of Tlaxcala. Sword – 24 April 1542.  
Buenaventura   Of Tlaxcala. Carriage - 22 December 1545.   
Diego* Nobleman ‘licence was given to three noblemen of Tlaxcala 
who came from Spain with his lordship (Mendoza)’ Sword - 31 
December 1537 (I think they mean 1536 from position in 
list).Diego Tlilquiyahuatzin whi styled himself Diego 
Maxixcatzin: Confirmed as gobernador by king in 1535. Went 
to Spain to see the king with lic. Juan de Salmerón and 
returned with Mendoza to Mexico. He and his two 
companions were described as ‘good Christians and friends to 
the Spaniards’ (H). He had died by 1546. 
 
Francisco  Of Tlaxcala. Sword ‘for war in Jalisco’ - 12 September 
1541.Possibly Francisco Maxixcatzin though Gibson claimed his 
licence to carry a sword was given in 1538. His heir Juan 
Maxixcatzin received a similar licence in 1555.  
Gonzalo   Gobernador of Tlaxcala. Horse – November 12 1545.   
Hernando Prince of ‘Tlatlacotepeque’ Sword - 24 July 
1542.Tlatlauhquitepec? In northern Puebla, a centre of tribute 
collection conquered by Motecuhzoma. Nearby there had 
been a garrison hill-top town set up to ward off Tlaxcala at 
Iztaquimaxtitlan (this latter had remained loyal to Tenochtitlan 
longer than most until Sandoval took it by storm. Half shared 
between Pedro de Vargas and Bartolome Hernandez de Nava). 
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It became part of the encomienda of Hernando de Salazar and 
Pedro Cindos de Portillo but the latter became a Franciscan 
and the former lost it to crown in June 1535 when it became a 
corregimiento.   
Josepe Prince of ‘Çacotlan’. Horse – 12 November 1544.(Zacotla or 
Tzaoctlan? In Puebla state. Encomienda of Francisco de 
Oliveiros did not escheat till 1696. (Or is it nearby Zacatlan? : c. 
5 leagues west from Tetela in northern Puebla. Traditionally  
hostile to nearby Tlaxcalans. Revolted c. 1525 when Antonio 
de Carvajal encomendero.)  
Juan   Gobernador of ‘Atecalmachalco’. Horse - 5 April 1542.Probably 
Tecamachalco 10 leagues east of Puebla, province of Tepeaca, 
old frontier with Tlaxcala: there was a Mexica fort nearby. 
Encomienda of Fernando and Pedro Villanueva and then 
Gonzalo Rodríguez de la Magdalena. An important 
encomienda that had been fought over by Chirinos and 
Estrada. – Tecamachalco itself had been given by Cortés to his 
secretary Alonso Valiente which by 1550 he shared with Diego 
de Ocampo. Later became the encomienda of the Viveros. 
Juan Nobleman of Guaquechula. Horse - 6th December 1545. 
Atrisco part of the valley of Atlixco or Atrixco that was so 
praised by Spanish pastoralists. Border disputes of 
Huexotzinco (which was only 10 miles north) who achieved 
dominance over the area only at the end of the 16th century. 
Until then Guaquechula remained proudly independent. The 
governing dynasty of Guaquechula, had been closely tied to 
that of Izúcar and had been an autonomous ally of 
Huexotzingo before the conquest. It was given to Jorge de 
Alvarado who held it until his death in 1540. It remained an 
encomienda at least until 1696.  
Juan    Nobleman of Tlaxcala. Horse - 25 February 1542. 
Julián    Nobleman of Tlaxcala. Horse - 24 April 1542. 
Lucas Nobleman of Tlaxcala. Sword ‘for going to the war in Jalisco’ - 
25 February 1542. 
Martín* Prince of Guaquechula. Sword for ‘services in Guatemala as 
well as notable Christianity’: 31 Jan 1538. (see above) ’was 
very useful in the conquest of Guatemala, He is treated like a 
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Spaniard and is a great friend to them’ (H). Motolinia prased 
him and hispiety. (See Motolinia p.92-3). 
Martín* Nobleman of Tlaxcala. Sword - 31 Dec 1537. Maxixcatzin clan. 
Second of the three noblemen of Tlaxcala who accompanied 
Mendoza back from Spain. (I think they mean 1536 from 
position in list). 
Miguel Prince of Tlacomulco. Horse - 9 June 1546. Around Tepeaca 
area East of Puebla and a relatively small town.  
Pedro Elias   Nobleman of Tecamachalco. Horse - 5 April 1542. (see above). 
Sebastián* Nobleman of Tlaxcala. Sword - 31 December 1537 (though 
probably meant 1536) and another for a horse - 29 March 
1542.Maxixcatzin clan. Third of the three noblemen of Tlaxcala 
who accompanied Mendoza back from Spain. (I think they 
mean 1536 from position in list). 
  





Diego Of ‘Chala chila(?)’ (Chalchitlan or Chalchiguautl?) Horse – 21 
March 1545.N.E. of Querétaro. Otomi-Nahua area boardering 
Huaxteca Pame and other Chichimeca groups. Encomendero 
was Francisco de Torres (1530s and 40s) in an area with many 
encomiendas. Whole area had been a great support to 
Guzman in his administration and ambitions.   
Francisco   Nobleman of Toluca. Sword – 27 January 1544. 
Joachin  Nobleman of Amanalco Horse explicitly ‘to go to war in Jalisco’ 
- 12 September 1541. 10 leagues west of Toluca and 7 from 
the border with Michoacán. 
Juan Of Malinalco Sword - 20 March 1545. About eight leagues west 
of Cuernavaca. Had been an important pre-conquest religious 
and political centre. By 1531 half corregimiento and half in 
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hands of conquistador Cristóbal Rodríguez de Avalos whose 
widow married Cristóbal Hidalgo).  
Juan Of ‘Ysquinquyteapilco’ Carriage - 22 Dec 1545. 
Iscuincuitlapilco? In Central South Hidalgo state towards 
Xilotepec area and sometimes tied administratively to it. 
Conquered by Tlacopan- some Pame lived there but majority 
were Otomí. – crown corregimiento since c. 1531 but the 
other part of the province including Actopan were Rodrigo 
Gómez de Avila’s encomienda who in 1538 turned over his 
rights to Juan Martínez Guerrero who married his mestiza 
daughter and was the nephew of Mendoza’s mayordomo 
Agustín Guerrero. Agustín Guerrero de Luna, their son, 
succeeded to the encomienda which escheated after 1643 but 
part went to heirs of Motecuhzoma.  
Juan Gobernador and prince of ‘Gipacoya’. Horse - 28th November 
1544. Xipacoya? 72 leagues S. of Tula, in southern Hidalgo. 
Otomi speakers inhabited the area at contact. Had delivered 
their tribute to Tenochtitlan in Atotonilco, but Tepexi and 
Xipacoya were Nahuatl-speaking states with their own 
tlatoani. Tula in 1530s paid tribute to contador Rodrigo de 
Albornoz and after 1544 to Pedro Moctezuma the emperor’s 
son and it remained in his family.  
Juan Of Zapotlán Horse – 27 January 1544. Near Pachuca in Hidalgo: 
had been semi-autonomous border country- Pame, Otomi and 
Nahua spoken in the area. Crown possession by 1531.  





Antonio Prince of ‘Matelango’.  Sword- 21 November 1543. Probably 
Matalcingo: the Nahuatl version of Tarascan Charo and most 
common name used for the area in the 16th century. An area 
east of Michoacán city (later Valladolid, now Morelia), 
inhabited by Otomi settlers originally from Toluca who had 
arrived there in the 15th century and served the Cazonci as 
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mercenaries who gave them the land in exchange. 
Encomienda of Contador Rodrigo de Albornoz but by 1536 it 
was owned by Jorge Ceron Saavedra. Sometime before 1545 it 
had escheated to the crown becoming a corregimiento 
appointed by viceroy till 1565 when it was claimed and won by 
Martín Cortés for the marquessate who appointed the 
corregidores for a while.   
It could also refer to the valley of Matalcingo part of the 
Marquesado holdings in the Toluca region. Matalcingo had 
been rivals of the Mexica with an Otomi minority that 
cooperated with Spaniards against the Mexica garrison at the 
time of the conquest. This area became a crucial focus of the 
marquesado especially for cattle breeding.   
 
Cristobal Gobernador of Tenango. Sword- 12 November 1544. Could be 
one of several: Tenango del Valle or Teutenango a polity c.8 
leagues south of Toluca in an important region that had been a 
dependency of Tlacopan. After the conquest it was disputed 
first by Cortés and then by Isabel Moctezuma and by the 
crown. Francisco Vázquez de Coronado and the Cervantes 
family also had encomiendas here. And the towns of S. Pedro y 
S. Pablo Tultepec for instance were bought c. 1536 by Vasco 
de Quiroga and became a dependence of his hospital of Sta. 
Fe. There was another Tenango in Chalco , by 1533 a crown 
possession; another near Taxco (cabecera – crown possession 
by 1536 (252-4); Northern central Oaxaca(pp.301-4) and it 
could refer to a Chinanteca community near Veracruz held in 
encomienda by Francisco de Rosales and escheated c.1560 . 
Diego  Gobernador de ‘Tetela’. Sword- 10th February 1546.Most likely 
Tetela del Rio in the frontier between the old Mexica and 
Purépecha empires, near Cuzamala. 1538 change of 
encomendero from Juan de Mancilla to Francisco Rodriguez 
Guadalcanal. It could also be an eponymous town in Morelos 
near the Popocatepetl: part of large encomienda Cortés gave 
to Pedro Sanchez Farfán, 1536 he was succeeded by his widow 
Maria de Estrada. It could also be a polity of northern Puebla 
that was a traditional rival of Tlaxcala. If so it was part of the 
encomienda of Pedro de Escobar escheated to crown after his 




Diego Of ‘Talisteta’ Horse - 3 October 1543. (Talistaca? (Talistaca? in 
the Mixteca at the heart of the marquesado 3 leagues east of 
Antequera- ‘a most complicated jurisdiction, split into several 
non-contiguous segments’- it was assigned by Mendoza from 
c. 1537 to Juan López de Zarate, first bishop of Antequera till it 
escheated to the crown under the New Laws in 1544. Luis de 
Leon Romano was active in the area at the time which put him 
in conflict with the marquesado. Could also be Talistaca in 
South-Eastern Hidalgo – Pame Otomi and Nahua country 
covered in valuable maguey, c.10 leagues S.E. of Pachuca. If so 
this Talistaca was in the encomienda of Diego de Ocampo and 
later inherited by his illegitimate daughter María de Ocampo 
who married Juan Velázquez Rodríguez. Later held by Alonso 
Velázquez and then Motcuhzoma’s heirs- previously subjects 
of Texcoco.  
 
Francisco Of Tlacotepec. Horse - 2 January 1544. Cuernavaca area 
encomienda of Gaspar Guernica and shared with Alonso de la 
Serna. Or N. Mixteca near border with Tlaxcala; encomienda 
granted before 1550 to Gabriel Bosque from the previous 
large encomienda grant belonging to Francisco Maldonado (ie. 
Tlacotepec was an estancia of Tecomastlaguaca). Or Tepeaca 
about 16 leagues S.E. of Puebla a tributary of Tecamachalco. 
Or on border with Tarascan kingdom on way to Zacatula near 
the sea; encomienda there was held by first conqueror 
Francisco Rodriguez Magariño. Or near Veracruz; held by 
cannon-maker and first conqueror Francisco de Solís as part of 
a very large grant in the area granted by Cortés.  
Hernando Nobleman of Talistaca. Sword - 28th September 1543.(see 
above)  
Joaquín:   Horse ‘to ride in the war of Jalisco’ -  27 August 1541. 
Tapia: Sword and dagger - 24 December 1538. Without any further 
information it is unclear which Tapia this refers to. It could 
either be Hernando de Tapia the translator or Fernando de 
Tapia the Otomi captain and founder of Querétaro or another 
Tapia. It may be more likely to be the latter because the 
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former had already received a licence, but there was little 
bureaucratic accuracy with regards to the indigenous 
population. If it was the Otomi captain then he was married to 
the cacica of Acambaro the encomienda of Hernán Pérez de 
Bocanegra y Cordoba, and his one-time ally in the expansion 
towards Querétaro. I have not seen his birthplace mentioned 
with any certainty in any secondary literature however a 
document of 1704 in the collection of contains a generally 
accurate account of the foundation of Querétaro and is 
emphatic that Fernando de Tapia was originally from Tlaxcala 
(at one point called Francisco erroneously then Fernando, our 
man from circumstantial evidence including the name and 
description of his son Diego). (Fernández de Recas, Guillermo 
S. Cacicazgos y nobiliario Indigena de Nueva España (Mexico 
1961),pp.244 306 &309;  Powell P.W. La Guerra Chichimeca 
(1550-1600) pp.167-9 with notes along with Menegus 
Borneman and Aguirre Salvador... pp.37-8 with notes for 
further Reading). 
 
Gonzalo: Prince of Tonalá. Horse - 27th January 1544. In Mixteca (?): 
had belonged to treasurer Juan Alonso de Sosa till 1544 when 
it escheated according to the new laws. – Martin de Peralta 
was encomendero nearby. Or a smaller non-cabecera in 
Coatzacoalcos area, only additional support for this latter site 
is the name Gonzalo like conquistador Gonzalo de Sandoval 
who pacified the area.  
 
 
Indian witnesses from AGI Justicia 258 testimony.  
 
Diego Full name: don Diego de San Francisco Tehuetzquititzin, son of 
Tezcatlpopocatzin and grandson of huey tlatoani Tizoc; 
gobernador of Indian Mexico from 1542 (when Diego Huantzin 
(see above) died) until his own death in 1554. Claimed to be 
about 50 years old, ‘Christian and baptised’. Veteran of the 
Mixtón war, his testimony was ambivalent, stating merely that 
his polity provided water, fodder wood and coal to the viceroy 
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every day without pay and that he had not been involved in 
the expedition to Cíbola. His main complaint was against oidor 
Tejada’s appropriation of lands in Chalco, which don Diego had 
been trying to claim for himself since 1532. (La nobleza 
indígena…p.42)  
Juan Tlecanen Principal (of Mexico City). Participated in the ‘conquista’ of 
Cibola with Francisco Vázques de Coronado. He provided 
interesting evidence of the involvement of the lords of Mexico 
in the seemingly promising expedition to Cíbola. Juan Tlacanen 
claimed that he and 414 joined the expedition. Only 144 of 
these made it home again. Only 30 of the Indians that went 
were porters (and 30 other porters came from Tlatelolco) 
meaning that most went as conquistadores. Asked who 
ordered them to go he replied: ‘that lic. Tejada… spoke with 
don Diego (Huantzin) gobernador of Mexico and with the 
principales, that as [Cíbola] had been discovered and the 
viceroy was sending people to it, if some Indians, of their own 
free will, wanted to go there they should see about it because 
they were not going to be forced to go nor made to go against 
their will, as Nuño de Guzmán had done… and they said that 
they wanted to go and of their own free will they went.’  Lic. 
Tejada then gave them 60 pesos de Tepuzque to buy 
equipment and the same amount to the contingent from 
Tlatelolco. They then ‘went to Jalisco where they found the 
viceroy. The said viceroy asked them again if they were going 
of their own free will or if they were being forced.’ Later they 
were asked to carry further loads but were not paid to do so 
except in food (biscocho). He knows because he went and was 
in charge of the Indians that came from Mexico. 
Martin Caçol Principal from Mexico City who participated in the expedition 
to Cíbola. He claims 204 went and 4 deserted on the way. In 
the rest of his testoimony he broadly agreed with Juan 
Tlacanen’s testimony.  
Diego Tepecumecatl Principal from Mexico City. Witness to the disputes over land 
between Tejada, the Moctezuma family, the polities of Mexico 




Don Hernando Gobernador of Tlatelolco; 65 years old. ‘Said [the viceroy and 
the audiencia] had treated [him and his polity] well and helped 
and favoured them and that they have enjoyed justice and 
that they have not been aggrieved or treated badly as far as 
the witness knows’ However he did complain about the Tejada 
dispute (see above). He claimed that Juan García was in charge 
of distributing the fuel, water and food that they provided for 
the viceregal palace (without payment). He was not governor 
at the time of the Cíbola expedition so could not comment. 
Juan Coabis Principal of Tlatelolco ‘In charge of the macehuales of the 
district (barrio) of Santa Catalina’. He ‘knows of no grievance 
or ill-treatment’. Claims that 80 went from Tlatelolco to Cíbola. 
Tejada was the point of contact as the viceroy was in New 
Galicia. 20 were employed as tamemes (porters). A certain 
amount of money was given to don Martin (the gobernador 
back then, now dead) by Tejada and don Martin gave the 
company food and equipment for the campaign. Apart from 
the 20 tamemes others were employed in herding the cattle. 
As time went on provisions ran low and 60 made it back from 
Cíbola.  
Francisco Yautl Principal, 35 years old from the barrio de los Reyes in Santiago 
de Tlatelolco, where he is in charge of collecting the tribute.  
 
Don Ramiro Principal of Michoacán. Augustinian Fray Alonso de la Vera 
Cruz was the interpreter: From Pátzcuaro, had known the 
viceroy for 10 years. He is not sure about his age but from his 
looks guesses 50. They only provided tamemes for the Cíbola 
expedition until the next village. This they did by order of 
Gonzalo Gomez de Betanzos who was corregidor and Godoy 
alguacil mayor. They were eventually paid 200 pesos de oro de 
tepuzque for the tamemes by don Luis de Castilla. They have 
been paying some of their tribute from that money since the 
plague struck (cocoliste or cocohste).  
Don Alonso Principal from Pátzcuaro. Provided interesting information 
about how the viceroy used ‘intimate representatives to deal 
with indigenous communities: After the army for Cíbola left 
Pátzcuaro ’the said don Luis de Castilla went to Pátzcuaro and 
the principales to an assembly in the monastery of St. Francis 
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of the said town and he spoke to them, saying that he wanted 
top ay them for the food and porters they had provided for 
the [expedition] …  to this end he ordered a reduction in the 
tribute of cloth they owed hixs Majesty.’  
Indians named by Spanish witnesses in their testimony to Tello de Sandoval 
in AGI Justicia 258.  
 
Hernando de Tapia Jerónimo López claimed that Hernando de Tapia had helped 
‘rescue’ captive Indians during the Mixtón war from the 
indigenous lords who had captured them, but only in order for 
Agustín Guerrero to brand them for himself.  
Pedro de Villegas confirmed that he always saw Hernando de 
Tapia wearing a ‘sword of Castile’ but was not sure on what 
authority he did so. 
Tapizuela Bernaldino de Albornoz claimed that Tapizuela was a ‘very 
principal’ Indian and like the several unnamed Indians 
mentioned by other witnesses he claims that Tapizuela wore 
his sword only in the presence of the viceroy. Bernal Díaz del 
Castillo also mentions a Tapizuela who was an important 
nobleman that participated in Cortés’ disastrous expedition to 
the Hibueras (Conquista de la Nueva España, J. Ramírez 
Cabañas intro. & notes, (Mexico 1974)p. 458).  
Julian Francisco de Terrazas believed that Mendoza had given 
weapons to a principal from his town (Tulancingo?) called don 
Julian.  
Pablo Francisco de Terrazas similarly claimed that Mendoza had 
given a weapon to a principal of the town of Francisco de Avila 
(who shared the encomienda of Tulancingo with him).  
Luis Juan Tello de Medina claimed that don Luis an indigenous 
regidor of Tepeaca had received a sword from the viceroy.  
Lords of Soconusco Juan Tello de Medina also claimed that all the principales of 






The testimony given by Spanish witnesses regarding the possession of European 
weapons and horses by Indians like Tapizuela, who displayed them openly in front of the 
viceroy, speaks to the danger of seeing the lists provided by Turcios as definitive. From 
other evidence it is clear that many more Indian lords were either granted weapons by the 
viceregal regime or allowed to carry them; furthermore the lack of detail in Turcios’ lists also 
suggests that what mattered was formal or informal viceregal approval rather than 
bureaucratic accuracy.  
Apart from the geographical distribution of the favoured indigenous lords, it is 
interesting to note the correlation between the recipients of formal grants and 
encomenderos associated with the viceroy, crown lands overseen by viceregally appointed 
corregidores in strategic locations and attempts by the viceroy to establish links with lords 
within the marquesado presumably as an attempt to wean them off the influence of Cortés 
or his agents.   
II. Favoured Spaniards 
 
This is an attempt to establish the extent of Mendoza’s household and the number 
of individuals he attracted by his direct patronage (not excluding the distribution of offices 
like corregimiento which have been printed elsewhere from similar sources). The 
importance of these unofficial networks of patronage is discussed in the main text. It is 
worth highlighting for example the number of preponderant individuals whose prominence 
survived into Velasco’s reign: Tristán de Luna y Arellano, Fernando de Portugal , the Ibarra 
Luis de León Romano, Hernan Pérez de Bocanegra are some examples of individuals who 
began their ascendency as Mendoza’s dependents or allies. As Jerónimo de Valderrama 
noted in his own investigations into Velasco’s regime, it should be noted how many lesser 
relatives of more important officials in New Spain were patronised by the viceroy, 
presumably in an effort to foster links with them. It is also interesting how useful many of 
the members of the viceroy’s household were: the various prongs of the expedition to 
Cíbola were an almost totally household affair.  
 
Individuals registered at the Casa de Contratación in Seville as travelling to 
New Spain with the viceroy  
 
These individuals registered New Spain as their destination at the Casa de 
Contratación. Their day of departure was on or very near the time of Mendoza’s 
embarkation on 25 June 1535. The names included are those that were specifically noted as 
travelling with the viceroy around this date except for those with an asterisk (*) who are 
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likely to have travelled as part of the viceroy’s entourage from secondary evidence or 
inference. It is worth noting how many came from Mendoza areas of influence like Granada, 
Guadalajara, Santillán or Socuéllamos and their provinces.  
 
Alarcón Hernando de Son of Antonio de Torres & doña María de 
Acuña, from Granada.  
 
Aller de Benavides Juan Son of Alonso Aller & Isabel De Benavides, from 
Villanueva de Valdejamuz. Almaguer Antonio 
de, son of Francisco López de Almaguer & Juana 
López, from Corral de Almaguer.  
 
Arnalte Juan de  Son of Juan de Arnalte & Elvira de Calatayud, 
from Griman (Griñón?), near Madrid. 
 
Ayala Pedro de* Son of Rodrigo de Ayala & Mari Sánchez de 
Zamora, from Alcaraz. 
 
Carvajal Antonio de* Son of Antonio de Carvajal & Elvira Ramírez 
from Aguilera. 
 
Cortés Pedro* Son of Alonso Cortés and Mari López, from 
Tendilla. 
 
Duque Colinea (?)*  Son of De Juan El Duque Y De Juana De La Viña, 
from Flanders. 
 
Ecija Bartolome de Son of Alonso de Ecija and María Hernández, 
from Granada.  
 
Espino Pedro del Son of Juan del Espino and María de Muciente, 
from Medina de Rioseco. 
 





Garcia de Plasencia Juan Son of Juan García de Plasencia and Inés 
Gómez, from Murcia, along with Mencía De 
Molina, his wife, daughter of Lope De Molina. 
 
Guerra Toribio* Son of Pedro Guerra and Catalina Gutiérrez, 
from Santillana. 
 
Guerrero Agustín* Son of Bachiller Juan Martínez Guerrero and 
María Ximénez de Orillana, from Alcaraz. 
 
Guzman, don Cristobal* Son of don Alonso de Calatayza and doña 
Leonor de Guzmán, from Toledo, and with him 
came his criado Pedro Serrano, son of Pedro 
Serrano and Mari Sánchez, from Belmonte.  
 
Guzman Juan de* Son of Diego se Guzmán and doña Luisa, from 
Guadalajara. 
 
Hernandez Diego* Son of Gonzalo Hernández Gallego and Teresa 
Hernández, from Granada. 
 
Hernandez Gonzalo* Son of Bachiller Luis Alvarez and María 
Hernández, from Montilla. 
 
Hoznayo Miguel de Son of Juan Doznayo [Sic] and doña Leonor 
Beltrán, Vecinos De Guadalajara. 
 
La Torre Bernaldo de* Son of Doctor de La Torre, the crown’s fiscal 
general, and doña María De Caravajal, from 
Granada. 
 
Leal Pedro* Son of Pedro Leal and María González, from 
Alcaraz. 
 
Lezcano Julian de* Son of licenciado Lezcano and Teresa Alvarez 
Gil, from Socuéllamos. 
 
Medinilla Pedro de* Son of Francisco de Medinilla and Susana 




Mendoza Francisco de*  Son of comendador Diego de Mendoza and 
Isabel Segura of Sevilla, with Beatriz de 
Montoya his wife and Pedro de Mendoza, Isabel 
de Mendoza, Leonor de Montoya and Juana 
Ruiz his Children. 
 
Merida Bartolome de* Son of Francisco Rodríguez de Mérida and 
Gracia Sánchez, from La Pera (?). 
 
Mexia Gaspar Son of Rodrigo Mexía and Mestesia Rodríguez 
de Molina, from Alcaraz. 
 
Montero Pedro de Son of Juan Sánchez Montero and María 
Alvarez, from Cáceres. 
 
Monzon Baltasar de* Trumpeter, son of Luis de Monzón and 
Valentina Hernández, from Granada.  
 
Nuñez Diego* Son of Juan de Córdoba and Beatriz Hernández, 
from Granada. 
 
Ortiz Cristobal* Son of Pedro de Olea and Juana González de 
Llerma (?), from Guadalajara, A Nueva España. 
 
Palomeque Alonso Son of Alonso De La Peña, and María de 
Palomeque. 
 
Parada Juan de Son of Juan de Parada and Mencía de Villalón, 
from Huete. 
 
Prado Gaspar de Son of Alonso de Prado and doña Juana De 
Loaysa, from Madrid.  
 
Proaño don Rodrigo de* Son of don Antonio de Proaño and doña María 




Quesada don Luis de Son of Pedro Díaz de Quesada and doña 
Francisca de Mendoza, from Granada, and  
Bartolomé García de Jaén, son of Pedro García 
Colomo and Elvira Jiménez la Limona, from 
Jaén. 
 
Quiralte Francisco Son of licenciado Francisco Quiralte and Teresa 
Juárez, from Socuéllamos.  
 
Rivero Antonio de Criado of the viceroy, son of García de Espinosa 
and Francisca del Rincón, from Medina del 
Campo. 
 
Roa Alonso de Criado of Hernando de Alarcón, son of Pedro de 
Ubite and Elvira López Valero, from Villamayor. 
 
Saldaña Gaspar de Son of Juan se Saldaña and María de Salcedo, 
from Guadalajara. 
 
Sanchez Amoraga Juan* Son of Francisco de Santacruz and Isabel López, 
from Huete). 
 
Soto, Sebastian de Son of Sebastián de Soto and doña María 
Barbaz, from Guadalajara. 
 
Tejada Isabel de* Daughter of Juan de Mendoza and Maria de 
Tejada, from Granada, along with Gaspar 
Agueda and Melchor, her sons with Pedro de 
Toledo. 
 
Temiño Pedro de* Son of Bernardino de Temiño and Teresa 
González de Cortiguera, from Santillana. 
 
Tercero, el licenciado Francisco* Son of Pero Hernández Tercero and Ana Gasca, 
from corral de Almaguer. 
 
Torres Sebastian de Son of Sebastián de Torres and Catalina Ruiz, 




Venegas don García* Son of don Alonso Venegas and doña María de 
Quesada, from Granada, with criado Lorenzo de 
Padilla, son of Juan de Baena and Isabel de 
Medina, from Granada. 
 
Zarate Diego de Son of Hernando de Zárate and Elvira Porcel, 
from Guadalajara. 
 
Ciriaco Pérez de Bustamante in Los Orígenes Del Gobierno Virreinal En Las Indias Españolas 
– Don Antonio De Mendoza Primer Virrey De La Nueva España, (1535-1550) (Santiago, 1928) 
p.197 Reproduced in full a cedula signed by the queen on May 5th 1535, exempting the 
viceroy from having to pay the almojarifazgo or import duties for possessions that he and 
his household were taking to New Spain, ‘…para proveimiento de su [the viceroy’s] persona 
y casa [my italics]…’ (‘to provide for his person and household’). It provides a glimpse of the 
household’s original scale and the formal acceptance of this patrimonial aspect of viceregal 
government comes from It may not be an exhaustive list of what they took but it suggests 
the scale and intentions of the household. It includes items like 36 shirts for the viceroy and 
144 ‘for his criados’, 12 caps for him and 48 for his criados; 5 doublets for the viceroy and 
sixty for his criados; 12 pairs of socks for him and 120 for his criados and many further items 
of ceremonial and everyday clothing including slippers for the viceroy; all manner of 
splendid equestrian equipment, ornaments and refinements and knives for his vassals, 
along with six choice horses to complement their turnout. The list also includes other 
courtly refinements to decorate and entertain in the palace in a regal manner with 50 
marcos of worked silver ornaments, 300 anas of tapestries, two salas (perhaps furniture to 
decorate two halls?) 24 pieces of embossed leather furniture, draperies from Segovia; 
Cooking equipment and rare ingredients (in New Spain) including wine, olive-oil, vinegar, 
spices and flavourings amongst other products along with up to fifty ducats worth of 
medicinal elixirs; and as wonderful testimony to the viceroy’s inherited humanist 
inclinations, a library of 200 books, including almost certainly, Alberti’s Architettura  (as 
Guillermo Tovar de Teresa has pointed out this would count as one of only three large 
library collections known in New Spain at the time). 
 
List of ‘bodyguards’ taken from a copy of the memorial produced by Antonio 
de Turcios found in AGI Justicia 259.  
 
The lists reflect appointments to the viceregal bodyguard made on twenty three 
different dates between 4 September 1537 and 4 January 1546. These included thirty 
individuals:  10 horse and 20 foot. Agustín Guerrero was always named as captain of the 
guard. The viceroy had the right to ask for 2,000 ducats a year for their upkeep. As all 
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witnesses insisted, and even the viceroy admitted, the ‘guard’ was essentially composed of 
household dependents, both those that came with him and others he attached to the palace 
in New Spain and they hardly ever acted as a formal guard. The almost 200 different 
individuals named as having been members of the guard provide some of the best (if not 
extant) evidence for identifying who were Mendoza’s household dependents in these years. 
I have not included the rank (cavalry or infantry) or the date of appointment to the guard 
because my aim was to establish who enjoyed the viceroy’s patronage from the 2,000 ducat 
fund available to him from the treasury to establish links of patronage in this period. To this 
end I have only included the number of times they were named in brackets. I have added an 
asterisk (*) to the names of individuals named as the viceroy’s dependents elsewhere in the 
documentary evidence I have surveyed from the Archivo General de Indias. I have supplied 
the relevant information from these other sources with the following scheme of reference: 
Catálogo de Pasajeros a Indias (CPI); Justicia 258 (258); Justicia 259 (259); Quitas y 
vacaciones fund from ‘Relación sacada de los libros de la contaduria… 18 días del mes de 
Agosto 1546… relación del cargo de las quitas y lo librado en ellas’ from AGI Justicia 258 
(QV). 
 
Águila, Cristóbal del (2) 
*Alarcón Hernando de (9); From Granada, came with viceroy had his own 
criados like Alonso de la Roa (CPI); maestresala 
in Mendoza’s court and considered his criado 
(258: Alonso Ortíz de Zuñiga; Francisco de 
Lerma).  Most famous for his exploits in 
exploring Baja California and sailing up the 
Colorado river and his notoriously good 
relations with the indigenous groups he 
encountered. 150 pesos de tepuzque in 1539. 
*Almaguer Antonio de (7):  From Corral de Almaguer near Toledo, came 
with the viceroy (CPI); Mendoza’s secretary 
viceroy arranged for him to marry the ex-wife 
of Hernando de Turcios (258); viceroy claims he 
was useful in matters of governance (259); In 
late 1536 was awarded 250 pesos p/a for 
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reviewing the treasury accounts which he 
finished in 1544, receiving 1,900 pesos 2 
tomines. (QV) 
Almaguer Pedro de, (1) 
Amberes Nicolás de (4)  
Antón de (¿) 
Arias de Mansilla, Rodrigo (5)  
Audelo, Antonio de (1) 
*Ávila Gaspar de (3) Considered a criado by eg. Alonso Ortíz de 
Zuñiga, married daughter of encomendero 
Hernán Sanchez (258). 
Ávila Juan de (Dávila), (3) 
Avilés Pedro de (7) 
*Baeza Alonso de, (4) His father Rodrigo was one of Mendoza’s 
criados, Alonso married the daughter of 
Gonzalo Gómez de Betanzo (258). 
Bañuelos Baltasar de (6) 
Barbero Juan, (2) 
*Barrionuevo (7):  Could be Rodrigo or Velasco de Barrionuevo 
who received 120 and  80 pesos of tepuzque 
respectively in 1539 (QV).  
Bernaldino, (1) 
Betanzos Antonio de (3) (possibly related to Gómez de Betanzos, see below). 
386 
 
Betanzos Juan (6) (possibly related to Gómez de Betanzos, see below). 
Bolonia Alexandro de (1) 
Bracamonte Tomas de (1)  
Bracamonte, Andrés de (1) 
Calzada Matías de, (1) 
Camargo, (1) 
Carvajal Rodrigo (Diego?) (3) 
Carvajal, (1):  Could be Antonio de Carvajal or related who 
came with Mendoza from Spain (CPI) and 
considered one of Mendoza’s allies in the 
cabildo by Bernaldino Vázquez de Tapia. Could 
also be Juan de Carvajal who was married to 
Bernaldino Vázquez de Tapia’s niece but was 
considered a favoured relative and allegado of 
the viceroy who married the widow of Francisco 
Rodriguez de Magariño. 
Castilla Gaspar de (6) 
Castilleja, (1) 
Castillo Francisco del (7) 
Castillo Miguel del, (2) 
Caxco Tomas. (1) 
Cepeda Antón de, (1) 




Chaves Nicolás de (3) 
Coca Francisco de (3) 
Contreras Cristóbal de, (1)  
*Contreras Juan de (2): Possibly same as individual paid for his services 
as an interpreter in 1543 (QV). 
Córdoba Alonso de, (1) 
Corzo, Antonio (1) 
Dávalos Gonzalo (2) 
Dorantes Esteban de (4) 
Duarte Francisco (7) 
Durán Gonzalo, (1) 
Espino Alonso, (1) 
Estévez Jácome (2) 
Ferrara Cipio (7) 
Figuero Francisco de (5) 
Fioz Juan de (Pioz, Ríos) (9) 
Flamenco Nicolás, (possibly same as Nicolás de Amberes) (4) 
Flores Juan de (2) 
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*García Juan (el Sordo) (8): Also  Juan García de Plasencia came with wife 
Mencía de Molina at the same time as the 
viceroy (CPI); according to don Hernando, 
Indian governor of Tlatelolco, he was an 
important member of the viceregal household, 
he organised its supplies and provisions and 
dealt in this regard with Indian lords (258); may 
be Juan García de Beas or Juan García de la 
Madalena mentioned in QV. 
García Juan Camargo (5, though may be same as Juan García el sordo) 
Garcivaca (2) 
Gayan Gerónimo (4) 
Gayan Juan de, (1) 
Giales Gonzalo de (1) 
Gómez Alonso (1) 
Gómez Francisco (10) 
Gómez Gaspar, (4) 
Gómez Juan de Leyva (1)  
Gómez Ochoa, (1) 
Gubrino (Sobrino?) Pedro, (1) 
Gudiel Diego (1) 
Guernyca (Guernica) Maestre Antonio de, (20) 
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*Guerrero (Martínez) Juan (10): Agustín Guerrero’s nephew, married 
mestiza daughter of  encomendero 
Rodrigo Gómez (258; 259); 
*Guerrero, Agustín (23): From Alcaraz son of bachiller Juan 
Martínez Guerrero and María Ximénez 
Orillana (CPI) Captain of the guard and 
viceroy’s mayordomo until 1545 258; 
259; rewarded from treasury for 
organising the production of artillery 
(927 pesosand 10 gramos de tepuzque) 
to arranging material for paving roads 
(284 pesos de oro) and 1,000 ducats for 
auditing the previous administration 
with Ceynos in 1544 (QV). 
*Guevara (2)  If this was don Pedro de Guevara, then 
he received 200 pesos de tepuzque for 
his maintenance in 1544 (QV).  
*Gutiérrez, Diego (1) If this was Diego Gutiérrez de la 
Caballería 200 pesos for his 
maintenance in 1539 (QV).  
Hernández Manuel (8) 
Hernández Pero (1)  
Hurtado Juan (5) 
Juan (¿) 
Juarez Diego (Juárez/Suarez) (3) 
Jurado Antón, (Antonio de Jurado) (2) 
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Laines Diego de (3),  
las Casas Gonzalo de (1) 
Lerma Sebastián, (1)  
*Leyba (Leyva) Juan de (1):     200 pesos de tepuzque in 1546 (QV). 
Lezama Martin de, (2) 
*Lezcano Julián de (del escaño, (8)    from Socuéllamos (CPI) 
Lima Sebastián, (1) 
Loaysa Garci Jofre de (5) 
López Alonso (2) 
*López Francisco (2) QV 
López Gaspar, (1) 
Lozoya Martin de (7) 
*Lucena Francisco de (3)     Viceroy’s secretary (259) 
Luz Gerónimo de, (2) 
Luz Jerónimo de (2) 
Macías (1) 
Macías Andrés (3) 
Madrid Juan de, (1) 
Mallorquín Antón de (5) 
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Mallorquín Bartolomé (León) (3) 
Mallorquín Francisco, (2) 
Manorgas Pedro de (r), (3) 
Mansilla Luis de, (2)  
Manzanas Francisco (1) 
Manzanas Francisco de (5) 
Manzanas, (1) 
Martin, Alonso (2)  
*Martin, Alonso (2)     50 pesos de tepuzque for his maintenance (QV) 
*Medinilla Pedro de (11): From Medina de Pomar important part of the 
domain of the Constable of Castile (CPI), 
considere done of Mendoza’s criados who was 
favoured in a legal case over an encomienda 
when he married Guillén de la Loa’s widow. He 
came with Mendoza from Spain  (eg. Francisco 
de Lerma’s testimony, 258; 259).  
Méndez Gutierre (1) 
Mendoza Alonso de, (1) 
Mendoza Gaspar de (9) 
Mendoza Pedro de (21) 
Mendoza, (1) 
Mexia Francisco (3) 
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*Mexía Gaspar (13) From Alcaraz like the Guerreros probably came 
with the viceroy (CPI) 120 pesos de tepuzque in 
1539 (QV) 
Mexia, Alonso (1) 
Molina, (1)  
Molino Juan de, (1) 
Monteagudo Martin de, (4) 
Montemayor (1) 
Montemayor, Francisco de (3) 
Montoya Francisco (2) 
*Monzón Arias de (2) Likely Baltasar de Monzón, trumpeter from 
Granada (CPI). 
*Moreno, (3) Possibly Anton Moreno Trumpeter 100 pesos de tepuzque for his 
maintenance (QV) 
Moreno, Alonso (1) 
*Moscoso Juan de (4) Mendoza’s mace bearer, married, (259); also 
identified as Mendoza’s mace bearer by Bernal 
Vázquez de Tapia who accused him of violent 
behaviour (258). 
Muñoz Benito (2) 
Muñoz de Sotomayor Garci, (1) 
Murcia Juan de, (1) 
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Nncibay Pedro de (4) 
Oropesa Bartolomé de (3) 
Ortega Pedro de, (3) 
*Oznayo Antonio de (5)  Described as Mendoza’s maestresala and 
maestrecasa eg. Francisco de Lerma (258). 
Gaspar Mexía (el mozo) (1) 
Oznayo Juan de (or Hoznayo) (5) 
Palomyno Francisco de, (1) 
Pavia Hernando de, (1) 
Peralta Alonso de (5) 
Peralta Luis de (10) 
Pérez (1) 
*Pérez Hernán (Páez) (10)   1539 100 pesos de tepuzque and 120 in 1541 
(QV). 
Pérez Sebastián (5) 
Perez, Diego (2) 
Ponce Juan (2) 
Portugués Manuel (7) 
Portugués Pablo, (1) 
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*Pradano Gaspar de (Prado) (12) From Madrid (CPI) in 1541 100 pesos de 
tepuzque for his maintenance and 200 in 1544 
(QV). 
Rabanal, (1) 
Rabanales Juan de, (1) 
Ramírez Dávalos Gil (14) 
Raoli Pedro de (8) 
Regidor el Mozo Pedro (2) 
Regidor Pedro (4) 
Rendón Juan, (3) 
Ribera Álvaro de, (6) 
Ribero Andrés de (1) 
*Ribero Antonio de (8)  Viceroy’s criado from Medina del Campo (CPI);  
100 pesos de tepuzque in 1539 and another 150 
in 1545 (QV). 
Rindero Juan, (1) 
Rodríguez Juan (Carvajal?)(15) 
Rodríguez Pedro, (4) 
*Rodríguez, (1) (Antonio?)  Guarnicionero in charge of supplies to the 
palace’ (258);  or Hernando Rodríguez are 
mentioned who was awarded 130 pesos de 
tepuzque in 1545 (QV).  
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Roque Pedro (5) 
Ruiz de Medina Juan (6) 
Ruiz de Rozas Marcos (4) 
Ruyz, (1) 
Salas Juan de, (1) 
Salazar Cosme de (4) 
Salazar Luis de (3) 
Salazar Melchor de (1) 
Salazar Miguel de (1) 
Salazar, (1) 
*Salazar, Francisco de (3    Awarded 150 pesos de tepuzque 1545 (QV) 
*Salcedo (Sauzedo/Saucedo) Pedro de (8): Appointed veedor de plata and compensated 
with  100 pesos de tepuzque in 1543 and again 
1544 (QV) 
*Saldaña Gaspar de (8):  From Guadalajara, came with the viceroy (CPI); 
awarded 60 pesos de tepuzque in 1539 for his 
maintenance (QV). 
Salinas Pedro de (1) 
Sámano (1)  
Sámano Julián de, (3) 
Sánchez Moreno Pedro (2) 
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Santabaya Juan de, (1) 
*Santacruz Francisco de (2)  Possibly the same as the hostile witness in (258) 
and whom Mendoza accused of being one of 
those in ‘passion’ against him in 259. In which 
case he had ascended to the cabildo of Mexico 
City and at some point turned against the 
viceroy.  
*Santacruz Juan de (1):    Awarded 50 pesos de tepuzque in 1546 (QV).  
Sauzedo Miguel de (1) 
Segura Martin de (1) 
Socuéllamos Francisco de (21) 
Tejada Pedro de, (9) 
Temiño Carlos de, (6) 
*Temiño Pedro de (2)    From Santillana (CPI). 
Torre Antonio de la (2) 
Torres Pablo, (1) 
Vaca Juan, (1) 
*Valdivia Andrés de (6):  Viceroy allegedly wanted this allegado to marry 
a girl in the custody of Alonso Ortíz de Zuñiga, 
though this was disputed (258).  
Valdivia Luis de (1) 
Varela, Alonso (1) 
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*Vargas Pedro de (6)  Awarded 60 pesos de tepuzque in 1539 and 100 
more in 1545 (QV). 
Velasco Barrionuevo? (1) 
Vera, Alonso de (2) 
Villalobos, Antonio de (2) 
Vizcaíno Juan, (4) 
*Zambrana Álvaro de (1)    Awarded 130 pesos de tepuzque 1546 (QV). 
*Zarate (5):  If Diego de Zarate he came with the viceroy 
from Guadalajara (CPI)  then become a hostile 
witness by 1545 (258).  
*Zayas Luis de, (1):  Awarded 100 pesos de tepuzque for his 
maintenance in 1546 (QV).  
Zugasti(e) Santorun de (2) 
 
Individuals described explicitly as Mendoza’s household dependent in witness 
testimonies found in AGI Justicia 258  
 
Alarcón, Hernando de   
Almaguer, Antonio de: Viceroy’s secretary married the widow of 
encomendero Hernando de Torres.  
Avila, Gaspar de 
Carvajal, Juan de:  (Married widow of encomendero Francisco 
Rodriguez Magariño and according to rumour ‘a 
relative of his sons’, so possibly related to his 




García, Juan In charge of distributing the provisions brought 
daily to the viceregal palace by the polities of 
Mexico-Tenochtitlan and Tlatelolco to the 
various inhabitants of the palace.    
Gómez de Bentanzos, Gonzalo  
Guerrero, Agustín 
Guerrero, Juan (Martínez) Married the mestiza daughter of encomendero 
Rodrigo Gómez. 
Lerma Francisco de  
López de Nuncibay Iñigo Over 35 years old has been here 5 years and 
was from Vizcaya and then settled in Malaga 
before going to New Spain with the viceroy.  
Manuel, Luis  
Medinilla, Pedro de (Married Isabel de Alvarado the widow of 
encomendero Guillen de la Loa).  
Merida, Alonso de  
Moscoso, Juan de ‘El macero’ or viceroy’s mace-bearer, married 
Antonia Hernandez widow of Bartolome de 
Perales. 
Osorio, Pedro Married the daughter of encomendero 
Hernando de Torres).  
Oznayo(Hoznayo) Antonio de    Mendoza’s maestresala. 
Peralta, Martin de  
Rodriguez (?) de Baeza  Son of (married the daughter of  encomendero 
Gonzalo Gómez de Betanzos). 
Samaniego   
Sotomayor 
Torre Bernal de la 
Vanegas ‘el negro’.  





 Additionlly Mendoza mentioned in AGI Justicia 277 that Juan de Aguilar and Fernando Arias 
Mansilla were ‘absent’ from his household representing the viceroy in at court in Spain.   
 
 
Treasury disbursements from the Quitas y Vacaciones fund 
 
Acebedo, Baltasar 
Aguado Fray Alonso 
Aguayo, Pedro (2) 
Aguila, Domingo     Interpreter 
Aguila, Juan del  
Alarcón, Hernando 
Albor, Miguel Hernandez 
*Albornoz, Juan 
Alcaraz, Toribio (2) Architect of church in Michoacán and 
constructing a bridge and buiding in Malinalco.  
Aliero, Antonio de  
Almaguer, Antonio don  
Almyron, Alonso 
Alonso, Francisco     Alguacil de Tianguiz (market). 
Alonso, Hernando 
Alonso, Rodrigo 
Alvarado, Fernando de   Justicia mayor of Colima. 
Alvarado, Hernando (2) 




Arana, Gaspar     Interpreter in Soconusco 
Arias de Sayabedra Hernan In consideration for various services and 
because he could not be given a corregimiento 
at the time.  
Arias Sotelo, Juan    Alcalde mayor Veracruz. 
Balbuena, Diego 
Barrionuevo Rodrigo 
Barrionuevo Velasco de 




Bermudez, Francisco (2) 
Buenaventura, Pascual de Made the locks for the treasury and providing 
certain equipment. 
Cadena Hernando de la (2) 
Calderon, Francisco 
Calderon, Gaspar    Going to Veracruz by royal instruction. 
Camacho Bartholome (4) 
Canelas, Francisco 
Canseco, Alonso de 
Cardenas, Hernando (2) 
Cardenas, Lorenzo de  
Carvajal, Francisco 
Carvajal, Juan (2) 
*Castilla, Pedro 
Castillo Garcia del 
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Castillo, Hernando del 
Ceron, Jorge(3) For residencia of Juan Jaso; visitador of the 
pastel plant and maintenance of roads around 
Veracruz.  
*Cherinos, Lope (2) 
Cieza, Diego 
Contreras, Juan    Interpreter. 
Cortés, Pedro (2) 
Cuevas, Juan de 
Darias Sayavedra, Hernan 
Delgado, Alonso 




Duran Juanote (4) 
Ecija, Bartholome 
Entramas, Juan    Built the smelting house. 
Escobar, Francisco de    For going to Veracruz. 
Escobedo Luis (2) 
Escobedo, Alonso de    For the capture of Alonso Lugo. 
Espindola Cristobal de (2) 
Espindola, Tomas de 
Estrada, Salvador 
Figueroa, Sancho de for his services as visitador of the towns of his 
province of Tlacotepeque. 
Fraile, Juan     Interpreter of the audiencia. 
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Franco, Pedro (2) Vecino of Oaxaca comissioned as a visitador. 
Frias, Rodrigo (2) 
Fuentes, Luis 
Galeote, Anton (4) 
Galera, Juan 
Gallego, Juan (2)    Interpreter. 
Gallinas Cristobal (2) 
Gaona, Jerónimo (3) 
Garcia (¿) de Beas Juan (2) 
García Corona, Hernando 
García de la Madalena, Juan 
Garrido, Juan 
Gaytan Gabriel (2) 
Gomez de Almazan, Juan (2) 
Gonzalez Esquivel, Juan 
Gonzalez, Alonso 
Grijalva, Juan de 
Guardado, Lorenzo 
Guerrero, Agustín (3) Artillery making services and providing material 
for paving roads.  
Guevara, don Pedro de 
Gutierrez de la Caballeria, Diego 
Guzmán don Pedro de (3) 
Herbas, Gonzalo de 
Hernandez Aferrado, Diego (3) 





Holguin, Diego (2) 
Indian residents of the town of Tepeapulco  Brought copper to the viceroy.  
Jaramillo, Juan 
Jimenez, Luis (2) 
Juarez de Avila, Gaspar (4)   Alcalde mayor de Zacatula.  
Juarez, Andrés (2)    Alguacil 
Juarez, Gomez 
Juarez, Pedro (3) 
Leon Romano, Luis For conducting the residencia of officials of 
Zacatula. 
Leyva, Juan de 
Alvarado Lic.  
Arevalo Lic.,      Regidor of Michoacán. 
Benavente Lic.,     Services as prosecutor 
Caballero Lic. (¿) 
Ceynos Lic.  
Santillan Lic.  
Tellez Lic.  
Loaysa, Alonso 
López de Alcantara, Pedro 
*Lopez de Cardenas, Garci 
López de Nuncibay, Iñigo (2) Alcalde of the mines de Zultepec; alcalde mayor 
de Zumpango.  






Luna y Arellano, Tristan (3)   Justicia mayor Oaxaca.  
Maestre Juan  Surgeon; for his services incuring wounded and 
poor Indians. 
Maestre Miguel 
Malpaso, Gonzalo de 
Manrique, Alonso 
Manuel, Garci 
Marquez, Francisco     Alcalde of the mines of Zumpango. 
Martin Aguado, Pedro (2) 
Martín, Alonso 
Martin, Domingo 
Mayorga, Cristobal (2) 
Mederos, Clemente (3) 
Mendez, Benito (2) 
Mendoza, Diego (3) 
Merino, Alonso 
Messa, Antonio de  
Messina, Juan de  
Mexia Gaspar 
Mezquita Diego de (2) 
Molina, Alonso (4) 
Molina, Gil (2) 
Montanches, Juan 





Moreno, Anton (6)    Trumpeter.  
Moscoso, Luis de (2)    For services as corregidor of Tlaxcala 
Muñoz de Castañeda, Alonso (3) Alcalde of the mines of Zumpango and alcalde 
mayor of mines.  
Muñoz, Diego (3)    Mayordomo ‘of the house of his majesty’ and in 
      charge of royal cattle.  
Muñoz, Francisco (3)     Interpreter. 
Muñoz, Hernando 
Muñoz, Juan (3) 
Nieto, Alvaro 









Osorio, Antonio de 
Ovando Nicolas de 
Paez Hernando (2) 
Pantigosa, Juan 
Paz, Alonso de 
Paz, Diego (2) 
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Perez de Tamayo, Alonso 
Pinelo, Luis 
Pomar, Antonio (2)    Alcalde mayor of the Zumpango mines  
Ponce, Bartholome 
Ponce, Pedro 
*Portugal, Fernando de  
Prado, Gaspar (2) 
Puelles, Diego de 
Quesada, Luis de 
Quiroz, Diego de 
Ramírez de Vargas, Luis    Alcalde mayor of the  Chautla mines. 
Ramirez, Garci For his mission to the Chontales ‘to pacify and 
reform them’.   
Ribero, Antonio (2) 
Rincon, Alonso     Created the design for coined silver. 
Rincon, Antonio del 
Rivera, Miguel de 




Ruiz Lobillo, Juan 
Ruiz Marcos 
Salamanca Juan 





Salcedo, Pedro (2)     Veedor of silversmiths.  
Saldaña Gaspar (2) 
Salgado, Payo 
Sallaz, Juan 
Samaniego Lope de 
Samano, Juan 
San Juan, Alonso 
Sanabria, Diego 
Sanchez Naranjo, Diego 
Sanchez, Alonso (2) 
Sanchez, Anton 
Sanchez, Francisco Blacksmith as compensation for purchase of 3 
slaves and a furnace for the royal munitions 
house. 
Santacruz, Juan de 




Silbera Diego de la (2) 
Soltero, Alonso 
Soto Sebastian de 
Sotomayor, Jerónimo 
Suárez de Avila, Gaspar For his time as alcalde mayor of Cacatula, until 
the residencia Luis de León Romano conducted 
of his tenure.  
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Suárez de Avila, Juan  
Tapia, Diego (Camargo?) 
Tapia, Hernando de (4)    Translator for the audiencia.  
Temiño, Leonis de 
Terrazas, Francisco de For his work on the construction of the smelting 
house.  
Tinoco, Diego 
Torre, Bartholome de la 
Torre, Bernaldo de la 
Torres, Juan de 









Vargas Pedro (2) 
Vargas, Juan de 
Vargas, Luis 
Vargas, Pablo 






Velasco, Pedro de (executor) 
Velázquez, Juan  
Velázquez, Juan (heirs of) 
Vellerin, Cristobal 
Verdejo, Juan Francisco 
Villagomez Bernaldino 
Villamayor, Diego (3) 
Villanueva, Bartholome (2) 
Villanueva, Hernando de 
Villaseñor, Diego de 
Villegas, Juan 
Yeberis Pedro 
Zagarra, Francisco (heirs of) 
Zanbrana, Alvaro de 
Zayas, Luis 
 
Individuals described explicitly as Mendoza’s friends or favourites in AGI 
Justicia 258  
 
 
Cadena, Antonio de la   Beneficiary of corregimientos. 
Castilla, Luis de Beneficiary of all sorts of offices, commands 
and commissions. He would become one of the 
wealthiest miners of New Spain.     
Chavez, Francisco de Encouraged to marry Marina Montesdoca who 
held the strategically important encomiendas of 
Tinhuandín and Tacascaro.     
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Gomez, Gonzalo Owner of at least two cloth-making enterprises 
and Mendoza’s business partner in this with 
Agustín Guerrero as an intermediary.  
Juárez (Suárez or Xuaréz), Juan Encomendero and appointed alcalde mayor de 
minas in Ayoteco in Chautla  
Maldonado, Francisco Encomendero and an important ‘strong-man’ in 
Oaxaca for Mendoza. He was an important 
lieutenant and trusted as an intermediary with 
allied and enemy Indians during the Mixtón 
War. 
Medina, Geronimo de Trusted encomendero but a rival of Alonso Ortíz 
de Zuñiga (a hostile witness against Mendoza), 
over tribute of the same town.  
Merida, Alonso de  Treasurer of the Mint. In Spain he and his 
brothers had been clients of Mendoza’s 
brother.  
Peralta, Martin de Recepient of an encomienda and offices from 
the viceroy. 
Pérez de Bocanegra y Córdoba, Hernán Alcalde ordinario of Mexico City, encomendero 
of Acámbaro Mendoza’s ‘strong man’ of the 
northern Chichimeca frontier who mediated 
with the indigenous lords of the frontier, most 
notably Fernando de Tapia of Querétaro.  
Rosales, Francisco de    Recepient of corregimientos.  
Salazar, Gonzalo de  Factor of the treasury, along with his sons and 
heirs to the office Hernando and Juan 
Velázquez. 
Sámano, Juan de Alguacil mayor of Mexico City married to oidor 
Ceynos’ wife’s sister. Oidor Tejada’s wife was 
considered Sámano’s deuda. 
Sámano, Lope de  
Sosa, Juan Alonso de    Royal Treasurer.  
Tejada, Lorenzo de    Oidor of the audiencia of Mexico City.  
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Vitoria, Fray Francisco de   Along with his unnamed nephew.  
Turcios, Antonio de    Escribano Mayor.   
Varela Pedro     Mendoza’s agent in Veracruz.  
Vázquez de Coronado, Francisco Elevated to the governorship of New Galicia, 
granted encomiendas and allowed a favourable 
marriage. His career never recovered from the 





















Appendix B: monetary terms and 
measurements of capacity 
 
All figures in the main text of the thesis will be expressed as ducats (d) for ease of 
comparison in accordance with the following methodology. 
Ducat  
Traditionally a gold coin containing 3.6 grams (g) of gold: 
 In 1497 it was valued at 375 maravedís or 11 reales.  
 After 1537 it was valued at about 350 maravedís. 
Maravedí 
The maravedí did not actually exist in coin form by our period but rather as a method of 
establishing value.  
Marco of Silver 
One fifth of a ducat. 
Real Español 
 Was c.3.35g of silver or about 34 maravedís.  
 It was coined in pieces of 2, 4 and 8. The piece of 8, made famous by English speaking pirates 
and their parrots, was extremely common and it was worth 1 silver peso.  
Tomin  
One eighth of a gold peso or 575 milligrams of gold. It seems that at the start of Mendoza’s 
viceroyalty one tomin could buy 11 loaves of bread. ( see A.S. Aiton, Antonio de Mendoza: 
First Viceroy of New Spain (Duke 1927) p. 114) 
Escudo de oro  
Contained 3.4g of gold was worth 350 maravedís or 16 reales  
Peso de Oro 
 Coined or considered de ley perfecta or de minas it was valued at 450 maravedís.   
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 When un-coined 
o  de tepuzque it was valued at 271 maravedís 
o Común it was valued at 300 maravedís 
o Común con tres quilates it was valued at 360 maravedís 
Castellano de Oro 
Valued at 485 maravedís. 
Cacao  
Had different values: Guatemalan was the best, Colima less so: 
 80-100 cacao beans  were valued at 1 real 
 They were sold in cargas and each carga was worth 28-30 silver pesos (of 8 reales each)  
 A Guatemalan load of Cacao could fetch up to 3-4 silver pesos more per load.  
Alonso de Villaseca became a millionaire with the exchange rate showing its continued use 
into the viceregal period. (See Suárez de Peralta J. Tratado del descubrimiento de las Indias, 
ed. S. Tena, (Mexico, 1990), p.157). 
Fanega  
One fanega was a measure of capacity equivalent to c.55.5 litres,  c. 215 gallons or 27 
bushels.  
It could also denote the amount of land needed to produce a fanega of grain.  
A fanega was equivalent to 2 almudes, the more usual measurement for maize.  
  
 
 
